

# GAP.8

KONSTANZ 2012

**Was dürfen wir glauben?  
Was sollen wir tun?**

**What may we believe?  
What ought we to do?**

**Konstanz 17.–20. 9. 2012**

veranstaltet von der  
Gesellschaft für Analytische  
Philosophie e. V.  
und dem Fachbereich Philosophie der  
Universität Konstanz

Organisationsteam der Universität Konstanz  
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## Greeting



Prof. Dr. Schavan



Prof. Dr. Töchterle



Dr. Dell'Ambrogio

Dear Participants,

The notion of a tri-national endorsement of the Eighth International Congress of the Society of Analytic Philosophy (GAP) is an excellent idea that we are happy to facilitate, especially given the fact that, first, although the home of GAP is Germany, it also has Swiss and Austrian contingents, and, second, that this congress is being organized in Konstanz at the similarly tri-national Lake Constance.

Philosophy has shaped Western culture in important ways, and it will (and should continue to) do so in the future. We are well aware that this has become more and more demanding. The cultural and scientific foundations of our societies have become more complex, and under these conditions it has also become more difficult for philosophy to make its voice heard. In the hectic pace of daily life, philosophy's long-term impact is in increasing danger of going unnoticed.

At the same time, we see that there is a real need for philosophical counsel and guidance. We are aware that this can

only come about through the support of academic culture at large. After all, complex external effects require an even more complex internal machinery. Indeed, society as well as other scientific fields are particularly curious to learn about this philosophical culture that lurks in the background. Please share it with us and inspire yourself to continue searching for new ways to connect up with society and with the other academic disciplines! The voice of reason, of doubt, and of balance will be needed forever and everywhere.

Does philosophy lend itself to »alpine« imagery? In any case, the main questions of the congress »What may we believe? What ought we to do?« are themselves mountains to be conquered. We wish you great success in your endeavors here! And be sure to make known what you see from the peaks!

Prof. Dr. Annette Schavan

Bundesministerin für Bildung und  
Forschung, Deutschland

Prof. Dr. Karlheinz Töchterle

Bundesminister für Wissenschaft und  
Forschung, Österreich

Dr. Mauro Dell'Ambrogio

Staatssekretär für Bildung und Forschung,  
Schweiz

## Geleitwort



Prof. Dr. Schavan



Prof. Dr. Töchterle



Dr. Dell'Ambrogio

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

dem 8. Internationalen Kongress, den die in Deutschland beheimatete Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie mit ihrer schweizerischen und österreichischen Sektion am trinationalen Bodensee in Konstanz veranstaltet, eine trinationale Schirmherrschaft zu geben, ist eine ausgezeichnete Idee, die wir gerne ermöglichen.

Die Philosophie hat die abendländische Kultur maßgeblich mitgeprägt. Sie soll und wird das auch in Zukunft tun. Dass dies anspruchsvoller geworden ist, dessen sind wir uns durchaus bewusst. Die kulturellen und wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen unserer Gesellschaften sind vielschichtiger geworden. Unter diesen Voraussetzungen ist es auch für die Philosophie komplexer geworden, ihrer Stimme Gehör zu verschaffen. Wirkungen, die auf Dauer angelegt sind, laufen mehr und mehr Gefahr, in der Hektik des Alltags wenig wahrgenommen zu werden.

Gleichwohl sehen wir, dass das Bedürfnis nach kritischer Begleitung und Beratung durch die Philosophie gewachsen ist.

Uns ist bewusst, dass solche Gedanken und Hinweise Ergebnis einer viel größeren, dahinter stehenden akademischen Kultur sind. Schließlich bedarf eine komplexe Außenwirkung immer eines noch komplexeren inneren Räderwerks. Gerade auf diese dahinter stehende Kultur sind die Gesellschaft und die anderen Wissenschaften neugierig. Lassen Sie uns daran teilhaben und lassen Sie sich dafür begeistern, immer wieder neue Wege in die Gesellschaft und in die anderen Wissenschaften zu suchen! Die Stimme der Vernunft, der Abwägung und des Zweifels wird immer und überall gebraucht.

Neigt die Philosophie zu alpiner Metaphorik? Die Titelfragen des Kongresses »Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun?« sind jedenfalls auf einen Gipfelsturm hin angelegt. Dabei wünschen wir Ihrem Kongress einen großen Erfolg! Und machen Sie öffentlich, was Sie dort oben gesehen haben!

Prof. Dr. Annette Schavan

Bundesministerin für Bildung und  
Forschung, Deutschland

Prof. Dr. Karlheinz Töchterle

Bundesminister für Wissenschaft und  
Forschung, Österreich

Dr. Mauro Dell'Ambrogio

Staatssekretär für Bildung und Forschung,  
Schweiz

## Greeting



Mayor Boldt

Dear Participants,

We live in an age of information overload. Every day, via numerous channels, we are showered with information. Contradictory statements are not uncommon. Dearly held convictions become debated issues in no time. While talk show experts argue about the big issues of our time, we can often remain puzzled, wondering: »What may we believe?«

Our knowledge is the basis of each small and big decision we make. Should we buy margarine or butter? Should we choose to study economics or philosophy? Our world is rich in possibilities, but »what ought we to do?«

Clearly, the eponymous questions of the Eighth Congress of the Society for Analytic Philosophy are intimately intertwined. In the following days, they will receive particular scientific attention. Both questions, however, are also central motifs of our daily lives. They are paradigms of the engagement of knowledge and guidelines to action not only in science, but in society as well.

In the university city of Constance, there is a lively dialogue between science and society. The Citizens' University program with its many events for interested members of society is an exceptional example of the fruitful exchange between science and the community. It is safe to say that the exceptional atmosphere on the shores of Lake Constance will contribute to the success of GAP.8.

I wish you all a pleasant and eventful time in the city of Constance and many profound thoughts.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Claus Boldt' in a cursive style.

Claus Boldt  
Mayor

## Geleitwort



Bürgermeister Boldt

Sehr geehrte Konferenzteilnehmerinnen und Konferenzteilnehmer,

wir leben in einer Zeit des Informationsüberflusses. Täglich prasseln Informationen über viele verschiedene Kanäle auf uns ein. Nicht selten kommt es zu Widersprüchen. Was gestern noch als sicheres Wissen galt, wird heute plötzlich infrage gestellt. Und während in den Talkshows die Experten über große Themen streiten, sind wir oft ratlos: »Was dürfen wir glauben?«

Unser Wissen ist die Grundlage für unsere kleinen und großen Entscheidungen. Kaufen wir Margarine oder Butter? Wollen wir lieber Betriebswirtschaftslehre oder Philosophie studieren? Unsere Welt ist voller Möglichkeiten, aber »was sollen wir tun?«

Man sieht: Die zwei titelgebenden Fragen des achten Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie sind eng miteinander verbunden. An den Kongresstagen erfahren sie besondere wissenschaftliche Aufmerksamkeit. Aber die beiden Fragen sind auch zentrale Themen unseres alltäglichen Lebens. Sie stehen für eine konkrete Auseinandersetzung mit der Rolle von Wissen und Handlungsgrundsätzen nicht nur in der Wissenschaft, sondern auch in der Gesellschaft.

In der Universitätsstadt Konstanz wird der Dialog zwischen Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft in hohem Maße gelebt. Die Bürgeruniversität und viele Veranstaltungen für unsere Bürgerinnen und Bürger sind Beispiele für den fruchtbaren Austausch zwischen Wissenschaft und Lebenswelt. Ich bin mir sicher, dass die besondere Atmosphäre hier in der Vierländerregion, am Ufer des Bodensees, zum Gelingen der Tagung beitragen wird.

Ich wünsche Ihnen einen angenehmen und erlebnisreichen Aufenthalt in Konstanz und gute Gedanken.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Claus Boldt". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly stylized script.

Claus Boldt  
Bürgermeister

## Greeting



Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Rüdiger

Dear Participants,

As Rector of the University of Konstanz – which with its 11 000 students represents the smallest and perhaps the finest of the six universities to have been successful in both rounds of the so-called »German Universities Excellence Initiative« – I would like to heartily welcome all of you as participants of the 8th International Congress of the Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie (GAP). I am delighted that our university has the privilege of hosting the largest philosophical event in Germany in 2012.

The University of Konstanz is doubly suited for this congress. First, given our particular geographic location, the university suitably embodies the fact that the German-language philosophical community also has a very important Swiss and Austrian contingent. Second, our philosophy department (as part of the so-called »Erlangen-Konstanz School«) was one of the pioneers of analytic philosophy in Germany, and it has remained, I am told, a prime example of analytic philosophy departments in Germany.

Both as rector of the university and as a physicist by training, I am particularly interested in the position of philosophy within the spectrum of the scientific disciplines. The Konstanz model has always been centered around the idea that each of the three chairs in philosophy both methodologically and substantially maps onto the three faculties of the university, namely the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities. This model seems fitting and indeed recommendable for other universities, though its realization is becoming ever more difficult. This difficulty stems from both sides of the relationship: the individual disciplines are becoming more and

more specialized and thus tend to marginalize their contact to philosophy, and philosophy itself seems to be becoming more and more self-contained.

These tendencies can only be counter-acted to a certain extent. When literature scholars and chemists fail to understand each other, this seems due to the nature of the disciplines in question. However, if philosophy is no longer able to understand other academic fields and vice versa, then an important connection – perhaps the only remaining one – which may serve (at least indirectly) to bring the disciplines together, threatens to be lost.

I realize that you will be discussing many different topics at a congress of this size. However, if I may, I would request that you do everything you can, even here, to aim at strengthening the connection between philosophy and other disciplines.

Apart from this, I hope that you will enjoy your time at the University of Konstanz (which shouldn't be too difficult) and that the congress will be full of exciting ideas and discussions. We would love to welcome you to Konstanz again in the future.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Ulrich Rüdiger". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Ulrich Rüdiger  
Rector, University of Konstanz

## Geleitwort



Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Rüdiger

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

als Hausherr der Universität Konstanz, der mit 11 000 Studierenden kleinsten, möglicherweise aber auch feinsten unter den sechs deutschen Universitäten, die in beiden Phasen der so genannten Exzellenzinitiative erfolgreich waren, begrüße ich Sie alle sehr herzlich als Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer des Achten Internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie. Ich freue mich außerordentlich, dass unsere Universität damit das größte philosophische Ereignis in Deutschland in diesem Jahr beherbergen darf.

Die Universität Konstanz erscheint mir doppelt geeignet für Ihren Kongress. Zum einen verkörpert sie besser als jede andere Universität den Umstand, dass Sie eine deutsche Gesellschaft mit einer schweizerischen und einer österreichischen Sektion bilden – allein schon durch unsere geographische Lage. Und zum anderen gehört unser Fachbereich Philosophie zu den wenigen frühen Vorreitern der Analytischen Philosophie in Deutschland, unter den spezifischen Vorzeichen der so genannten Erlanger-Konstanzer Schule, und er ist, so habe ich mir sagen lassen, bis heute ein Aushängeschild der Analytischen Philosophie geblieben.

Mich als Rektor der Universität, aber auch als Physiker interessiert insbesondere die Stellung der Philosophie im Spektrum der Wissenschaften. Das Konstanzer Modell war und ist, dass jeder der drei Philosophie-Lehrstühle methodologisch wie inhaltlich in eine unserer drei Sektionen ausstrahlen sollten – in die Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Sektion, in die Geisteswissenschaftliche Sektion und in die Sektion Politik – Recht – Wirtschaft. Das scheint mir ein stimmiges und auch für andere Universitäten empfehlenswertes Modell zu sein, gleichzeitig jedoch immer schwerer umzusetzen. Dies liegt wohl an beiden Seiten: während sich die Einzelwissenschaften

immer weiter spezialisiert und die Kontakte mit der Philosophie häufig auf ihre Randgebiete verlegt haben, scheint sich die Philosophie auf der anderen Seite ebenfalls wieder stärker auf ihre Eigenheit zu besinnen.

Solchen Tendenzen kann man nur in Grenzen entgegenwirken: wenn die Anglistik die Chemie nicht versteht und umgekehrt, so liegt dies gewissermaßen in der Natur der Sache. Aber wenn die Philosophie die Einzelwissenschaften nicht mehr versteht und umgekehrt, dann droht ein – vielleicht der einzige – Konnex verloren zu gehen, der alle Wissenschaften indirekt noch miteinander verbindet.

Ich weiß, Sie haben viele Themen auf Ihrem großen Kongress zu behandeln. Aber wenn ich einen Wunsch an Sie richten darf, dann den, dass Sie von Ihrer Seite aus alles tun – auch auf Ihrem Kongress –, diesen Konnex wieder zu stärken.

Ansonsten wünsche ich Ihnen, dass Sie sich an der Universität Konstanz wohl fühlen – das dürfte eigentlich nicht allzu schwer fallen –, und dass Sie einen reichen Kongress voller interessanter Ideen und Diskussionen erleben werden.

Und ich würde mich sehr freuen, Sie in der einen oder anderen Form wieder hier in Konstanz willkommen heißen zu dürfen!

Ihr


A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Ulrich Rüdiger". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Ulrich Rüdiger  
Rektor der Universität Konstanz

## Greeting



Prof. Dr. Spitzley



Prof. Dr. Spohn

Dear Participants,

What may we believe? What ought we to do? These two questions, which are basically a subtle contemporary version of the questions that concerned Kant, remain central systematic questions of theoretical and practical philosophy. They thus set the parameters of the diverse activities of the Eighth International Congress of the Society of Analytic Philosophy (GAP), to which we cordially welcome all participants at the hospitable University of Konstanz on beautiful Lake Constance!

In particular, we are happy to welcome Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Bittner, the winner of this year's Frege Prize, Ms. Margret Stegmüller, donor of the Wolfgang-Stegmüller-Prize, and Dr. Rafael Hüntelmann, donor of the Ontos-Prize, as well as the winners of those prizes. The large and densely-packed program called for a threefold patronage. We are thus most grateful to the heads of research and education policy of Germany, Switzerland, and Austria for lending us their support. Furthermore, we are deeply indebted to all those who worked so hard to prepare this congress: the program committee, the referees, the congress organizer, our various assistants, the administration of the University of Konstanz, and many, many more.

Analytic Philosophy within the German-speaking world is flourishing, as witnessed by the huge number of proposals for colloquia and the record-breaking number of submissions for talks and posters that we received this year. We regret that the program committee and the referees had to turn down so many qualified proposals, yet there is still a large number of parallel sessions. Even the number of associated self-organized workshops is greater than ever. This year, we are trying something new by offering poster sessions, which are still rather unusual in philosophy. If this experiment works, it will certainly remain part of future GAP congresses.

In any case, this clear boom in analytic philosophy in Germany is no reason for complacency. We must always be aware that our prosperity is merely borrowed from state and society. Nevertheless, we need not always express our gratitude by proving our relevance to state and society; the mind is at its most creative when it, freely, is not eyeing such things. Still, the least that may be expected from us is that we do not merely administrate our questions, but also productively and qualitatively advance them at the highest levels. And in this respect we can definitely improve.

But, of course, we may as well show our gratitude by demonstrating our work's relevance. Yet this is difficult; it is no longer conceded readily to us. All the more reason to continue striving for it! Let us thus pursue the guiding questions of this conference with fervor!

We wish you all the best for an inspiring and fruitful GAP.8 Congress,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Dr. Spitzley".

Prof. Dr. Thomas Spitzley  
President of the GAP

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Wolfgang Spohn".

Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Spohn  
Vice-President and Local Organizer



## Geleitwort



Prof. Dr. Spitzley



Prof. Dr. Spohn

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Diese zwei Kant subtil aktualisierenden Fragen bleiben zentrale systematische Grundfragen der theoretischen und der praktischen Philosophie und bilden so die Leitlinien für die vielfältigen Aktivitäten des 8. Internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie, zu dem wir alle Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer in der gastfreundlichen Universität Konstanz am Bodensee herzlich begrüßen!

Besonders begrüßen wir unseren diesjährigen Frege-Preisträger, Herrn Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Bittner. Sehr herzlich begrüßen wir auch die Träger des Wolfgang-Stegmüller-Preises und des Ontos-Preises und ihre Stifter, Frau Margret Stegmüller und Herrn Dr. Rafael Hüntelmann. Das große und dichte Programm bedurfte einer dreifachen Schirmherrschaft. Dass sich die Spitzen der Wissenschaftspolitik aus Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz dazu zusammengefunden haben, dafür sind wir sehr dankbar. Überhaupt sind wir allen, die zur Vorbereitung dieses Kongresses beigetragen haben – dem Programmkomitee, den Gutachter(inne)n, der Kongressorganisatorin, den Hilfskräften, der Verwaltung der Universität Konstanz und vielen, vielen mehr –, zu tiefem Dank verpflichtet.

Die Analytische Philosophie im deutschen Sprachraum blüht und gedeiht! Davon legt das Übermaß an Kolloquiumsvorschlägen und die Rekordzahl an Einreichungen für Vorträge und Poster beredtes Zeugnis ab. Gutachter(innen) und Programmkomitee haben eine scharfe Auswahl treffen müssen, dennoch gibt es nach wie vor eine große Zahl von Parallelsitzungen. Auch von den eigenverantwortlich organisierten angelagerten Workshops gibt es mehr denn je. Eine Neuerung haben wir mit der Einführung der in der Philosophie noch wenig üblichen Poster-Sessions gewagt. Wenn dieses

Experiment positiv aufgenommen wird, werden sie sicherlich Bestandteil künftiger GAP-Kongresse bleiben.

Das offensichtliche Gedeihen ist freilich gar kein Grund zur Selbstzufriedenheit. Es muss uns immer bewusst sein, dass diese Blüte von Staat und Gesellschaft geliehen ist. Dafür müssen wir uns nicht immer mit Relevanz bedanken; der Geist ist dann am kreativsten, wenn er, frei, danach nicht schießt. Aber dass wir unsere Fragen nicht verwalten, sondern produktiv und mit hoher Qualität voranbringen, darf man von uns erwarten. Und da können wir immer noch besser werden.

Und natürlich dürfen wir uns auch mit Relevanz bedanken. Das ist schwierig; sie wird uns nicht mehr ohne weiteres eingeräumt. Daher dürfen wir in unserem Bemühen auch darum nicht nachlassen. Gehen wir also den Leitfragen unseres Kongresses mit aller Leidenschaft nach!

Mit den besten Wünschen für einen anregenden und fruchtbaren GAP.8-Kongress,


A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Dr. Spitzley".

Prof. Dr. Thomas Spitzley  
Präsident der GAP

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "W. Spohn".

Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Spohn  
Vize-Präsident und Kongressausrichter


# Veranstaltungsort / Congress Venue for GAP.8



**Universität Konstanz**  
**Universitätsstr. 10**  
**D-78464 Konstanz**  
**www.gap8.de**

- 1 Eingang links / Entrance left
- 2 Eingang rechts / Entrance right
- 3 Garderobe / cloakroom upstairs
- 4 Information / i-point caretaker

- A6 GAP.8 Congress Counter (17.9.-20.9.)
- A6 Audimax
- A7 Vortragsräume / lecture rooms
- C Vortragsräume / lecture rooms
- D Vortragsräume / lecture rooms
- K Mensa / Cafeteria
- K4 Arche / Chinese Restaurant



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# Gesamtüberblick / Comprehensive Overview

	Mon, Sep 17, 2012	Tue, Sep 18, 2012	Wed, Sep 19, 2012	Thu, Sep 20, 2012
9 a.m.			Section Talks 5 9:00–9:45 a.m.	
10 a.m.		Colloquia ## 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 in parallel 9–12 a.m. Audimax, A 701–704	Section Talks 6 9:45–10:30 a.m.	Colloquia ## 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 in parallel 9–12 a.m. Audimax, A 701–704
11 a.m.	Section Talks 7 10:30–11:15 a.m.			
	Section Talks 8 11:15–12:00 a.m.			
12 a.m.		15 min break	15 min break	15 min break
		Poster Session/Lunch total 45 min	Poster Session/Lunch total 45 min	(poss.: Poster Session) Lunch 45 min
1 p.m.	<b>Congress Counter, A 6</b> phone 0049 7531 88 2766 Open 1:00 p.m. – 7:00 p.m. Tue + Wed. 8:30 a.m.–7:00 p.m. Thursday 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.	15 min break	15 min break	15 min break
2 p.m.		Section Talks 1 1:15–2:00 p.m.	Section Talks 9 1:15–2:00 p.m.	Section Talks 13 1:15–2:00 p.m.
		Section Talks 2 2:00–2:45 p.m.	Section Talks 10 2:00–2:45 p.m.	Section Talks 14 2:00–2:45 p.m.
3 p.m.	<b>Book Exhibition</b> during the GAP Congress on A 5 area	15 min break	15 min break	15 min break
4 p.m.		Section Talks 3 3:00–3:45 p.m.	Section Talks 11 3:00–3:45 p.m.	3 <sup>rd</sup> Keynote Lecture Sorensen 3:00–4:30 p.m. Audimax Best Poster Award
		Section Talks 4 3:45–4:30 p.m.	Section Talks 12 3:45–4:30 p.m.	
		Break 4:30–5:00 p.m.	Break 4:30–5:00 p.m.	Conference Close 4:30 p.m.
5 p.m.	Opening Spitzley, Rüdiger, Boldt	2 <sup>nd</sup> Keynote Lecture Erkenntnis Lecture Blau 5:00–6:30 p.m. Audimax	Frege Award Ceremony and Authors Colloquium Bittner, Buss, Hill 5:00–8:00 p.m. Audimax	Workshop 2 and 6 starting at 5 p.m. Workshops 1, 3, 4, 5 start on Friday.  Workshop office is in Room C 426 For more information have a look at chapter workshops.
5:30	1 <sup>st</sup> Keynote Lecture Hacker 5:30–7:00 p.m. Audimax			
6 p.m.		Reception/Dinner 6:30–7:30 p.m.		
7 p.m.	Stegmüller /ontos Award Best Paper Award / 7:00–7:30			
7:30	Reception 7:30–9:00 p.m.	Members' Assembly 7:30–10:00 p.m.	GAP bus-shuttle to city Konstanz at 8:30 p.m.	
8 p.m.				
9 p.m.	GAP bus-shuttle to city Konstanz at 9.30 p.m.	GAP bus-shuttle to city Konstanz at 10.30 p.m.		



**Dienstag 13:15–14:00**

**Dienstag 14:00–14:45**

<b>1 Sprachphilosophie / Philosophy of Language</b>		
Raum D 436 Chair N. Kompa	Nadja El Kassar <i>Primitive Normativität als Antwort auf Kripkes Regelfolgen-Skeptiker?</i>	Jaan Kangilaski, Daniel Cohnitz <i>Understanding a sentence? Knowing its truth-conditions: Why the epistemological determination argument fails</i>
<b>2 Metaphysik und Ontologie / Metaphysics and Ontology</b>		
Raum C 427 Chair T. Sattig	Alexander Steinberg <i>Defining Global Supervenience</i>	Peter Schulte <i>How Truth Can Be Grounded in Being: A Grounding Theory of Truthmaking</i>
Raum C 426 Chair J. Diekemper	Laura Cecilia Porro <i>Karen Bennett on »difference-minimizing« disputes</i>	Siegfried Hermann Jaag <i>Humes Dictum und die Dispositionale-Kategoriale- Unterscheidung bezüglich natürlicher Eigenschaften</i>
<b>3 Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie / Logic and Philosophy of Science</b>		
Raum C 425 Chair A. Büter	Alexander Gebharter <i>A Formal Framework for Representing Mechanisms?</i>	Jens Harbecke <i>Two regularity theories of mechanistic constitution</i>
Raum C 424 Chair M. Eronen	Georg Schiemer <i>Carnap's structuralism reconsidered</i>	Markus Seidel <i>Zwischen Relativismus und Absolutismus? Warum ein Kuhnscher, moderater Relativismus scheitert</i>
Raum C 423 Chair A. Eder	Michael Poznic <i>Wissenschaftliche Repräsentation und Ähnlichkeit</i>	Torsten Wilholt <i>Is There Such a Thing as the Reliability of a Method?</i>
<b>4 Philosophie des Geistes / Philosophy of Mind</b>		
Raum C 422 Chair A. Newen	Philipp Huebl <i>Consciousness for Attention</i>	Jonas Klein <i>Horizontal Perceptual Experience in Cognitive Science</i>
Raum C 421 Chair A. Stephan	Malte Dahlgrün <i>Emotions and Natural Kindhood</i>	Jan Slaby <i>Clarifying Enaction</i>
Raum D 435 Chair G. Vosgerau	Florian Leonhard Wüstholtz <i>Thinking about Thoughts without Language</i>	Patrice Soom <i>A Functionalist Approach to the Concept of »Delusion« and its Sub-Types</i>
<b>5 Erkenntnistheorie / Epistemology</b>		
Raum C 336 Chair H. Rott	Jochen Briesen <i>Reliabilism and Epistemic Circularity</i>	Markus Werning <i>Reliabilism and the Extra Value of Knowledge</i>
<b>6 Religionsphilosophie und Ästhetik / Philosophy of Religion and Aesthetics</b>		
Raum D 431 Chair J.M. Fischer	Stamatios Gerogiorgakis <i>Combining the Bayesian Argument for the Existence of God with Pascal's Wager!</i>	Georg Gasser <i>Personal Embodiment and Bodily Resurrection</i>
<b>7 Angewandte Ethik, Politische, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Applied Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy</b>		
Raum D 430 Chair S. Gosepath	Christoph Schmidt-Petri <i>Erbschaftssteuern, Obduktionen und die posthume Konfiszierung von Organen</i>	Julia Apollonia Engels <i>Das Transplantations-Trilemma und eine Ethik des Tötungsverbots</i>
<b>8 Normative Ethik, Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie / Normative Ethics, Metaethics, Theory of Action and Theory of Decision</b>		
Raum D 434 Chair F. Dietrich	Vuko Andric <i>A New Argument for Subjective Consequentialism</i>	Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder <i>Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach</i>
Raum D 433 Chair C. Fehige	Niels van Miltenburg <i>Tracing the commitments of Libertarianism: Indeterminism without objective probability</i>	Dawa Ometto <i>Libertarian alternative possibilities: why Frankfurt cases continue to miss the mark.</i>
Raum D 432 Chair U. Wessels	Christian Pilller <i>What Is Goodness Good For?</i>	Johann Gudmundsson <i>Das Gute als Objekt des Strebens – Zur konativen Theorie der Güte</i>

## Sektionen Dienstag / Sections Tuesday

Dienstag 15:00–15:45		Dienstag 15:45–16:30	
<b>1 Sprachphilosophie / Philosophy of Language</b>			
Raum D 436 Chair N. Kompa	Theresa Marx <i>Relevanz statt Wahrheit?</i>	Emanuel Viebahn <i>Speaker intentions and semantic content</i>	
Raum D 435 Chair G. Mras		Kristina Liefke <i>A Single-Type Ontology for Natural Language</i>	
<b>2 Metaphysik und Ontologie / Metaphysics and Ontology</b>			
Raum C 427 Chair N. Wildman	Christian Wüthrich <i>When the actual world is not even possible</i>	Robert Michels <i>Can Conceptual Possibilities be Metaphysically Impossible?</i>	
Raum C 426 Chair B. Schnieder	Joshua Mugg <i>Why Dispositions Are Not Second Order Properties</i>	Hölger Sturm <i>Eine allgemeine Theorie der Eigenschaften</i>	
<b>3 Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie / Logic and Philosophy of Science</b>			
Raum C 425 Chair A. Büter	Lena Kästner <i>The Curious Symmetry of Mechanistic Constitution</i>	Beate Krickel <i>Making Sense of Mechanistic Interlevel Causation</i>	
Raum C 424 Chair M. Eronen	Jörn Wüstenberg <i>Das perspektivische Argument für den wissenschaftstheoretischen Antirealismus</i>	Paul Hoyningen-Huene <i>Der Sackgasseneinwand gegen verschiedene Formen des Realismus: Beispiele</i>	
Raum C 423 Chair A. Eder	Johannes Lenhard <i>The Changing Relationship Between Simulation and Experiment: The Case of Quantum Chemistry</i>	Richard David, Stephan Hartmann, Jan Sprenger <i>The No Alternatives Argument</i>	
<b>4 Philosophie des Geistes / Philosophy of Mind</b>			
Raum C 422 Chair A. Newen	Christoph Michel <i>Evaluative object-cognition, attitudes and metarepresentation</i>	Hölger Lyre <i>Sozialer Externalismus und geteilte Intentionalität</i>	
Raum C 421 Chair A. Stephan	Wendy Wilutzky <i>Integrating Evaluation into the Intentionality of Emotion</i>		
<b>5 Erkenntnistheorie / Epistemology</b>			
Raum C 336 Chair H. Rott	Thomas Grundmann <i>What role can experience play in apriori justification? – A reliabilist account</i>	Magdalena Balcerak Jackson <i>Imagination and the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction</i>	
<b>6 Religionsphilosophie und Ästhetik / Philosophy of Religion and Aesthetics</b>			
Raum D 431 Chair G. Gasser	Ruben Schneider <i>Leibnizianischer Molinismus: Individuelle Essenzen und metaphysische Freiheit</i>	John Martin Fischer, Patrick Todd <i>The Truth about Foreknowledge: A Reply to Trenton Merricks</i>	
<b>7 Angewandte Ethik, Politische, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Applied Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy</b>			
Raum D 430 Chair S. Gosepath	Andreas F. X. Wolkenstein <i>Welchen Wert hat Würde? Zur Rolle des Würdekonzeptes in der (Angewandten) Ethik</i>	Sebastian Muders <i>Naturrechtliche und kantianische Konzeptionen von Würde in der Sterbehilfedebatte</i>	
<b>8 Normative Ethik, Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie / Normative Ethics, Metaethics, Theory of Action and Theory of Decision</b>			
Raum D 434 Chair F. Dietrich	Marcel Warmt <i>Konsequentialistische Theorien und der besondere-Pflichten-Einwand</i>	Magdalena Hoffmann <i>Warum dürfen wir unsere Freunde bevorzugen, aber nicht unsere Feinde benachteiligen?</i>	
Raum D 433 Chair C. Fehige	Erasmus Mayr <i>Free Will, Capacities and their Exercise</i>	Christoph Lumer <i>Willensschwäche – Eine Systematisierung und eine Erklärung</i>	
Raum D 432 Chair U. Wessels	Nora Kreft <i>Love and Value Judgments</i>	Sebastian Köhler <i>Do Expressivists have an Attitude Problem?</i>	



## Sektionen Mittwoch / Sections Wednesday

Mittwoch 9:00–9:45

Mittwoch 9:45–10:30

<b>1 Sprachphilosophie / Philosophy of Language</b>		
Raum D 436 Chair M. Siebel	Roland Bluhm <i>Don't Ask, Look! Linguistic Corpora as a Tool for Conceptual Analysis</i>	Maik Sühr <i>Analyses as Explanations</i>
Raum D 435 Chair R. Busse	Christian Folde <i>Operator Fictionalism and Logical Neutrality</i>	David Dolby <i>Understanding Non-Nominal Quantification</i>
<b>2 Metaphysik und Ontologie / Metaphysics and Ontology</b>		
Raum C 427 Chair P. Schulte	Joseph Diekemper <i>The Ontology of Thisness</i>	Johannes Korbmacher <i>Essence and Identity. A Note on Essential Properties and Criteria of Identity</i>
<b>3 Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie / Logic and Philosophy of Science</b>		
Raum C 425 Chair J. Lenhard	Markus Ilkka Eronen <i>Levels of mechanisms in neuroscience: A deflationary account</i>	Marie I. Kaiser <i>Reductive Explanation in Biology</i>
Raum C 424 Chair J. Harbecke	Johannes Röhl <i>Causation, Dispositions and Mathematical Physics</i>	Cord Friebe <i>Meta-Ontologie der Raumzeit</i>
Raum C 423 Chair T. Wilholt	Jendrik Stelling <i>When is it rational to believe a mathematical statement?</i>	Carsten Thomas Weigelt <i>The Frequentist Interpretation of Probability in Quantum Mechanics</i>
<b>4 Philosophie des Geistes / Philosophy of Mind</b>		
Raum C 422 Chair M. Baumgartner	Sebastian Joachim Müller <i>Ein Dilemma für modale Argumente gegen den Materialismus</i>	Daan Evers <i>The causal efficacy of the mental: against the counterfactual argument</i>
Raum C 421 Chair F. Esken	Alexandra Zinck <i>First-Third- and Second-Person-Perspective</i>	Theresa Stiller, Saskia Nagel <i>Über Veränderung und Einheit der Person – Eine Synthese analytischer und phänomenologischer Überlegungen</i>
<b>5 Erkenntnistheorie / Epistemology</b>		
Raum C 426 Chair G. Ernst	Michael Schmitz <i>Practical Knowledge</i>	David Löwenstein <i>Why Know-how and Propositional Knowledge Are Mutually Irreducible</i>
Raum C 336 Chair T. Grundmann	Eugen Fischer <i>Philosophical Intuitions, Heuristics, and Metaphors: Towards a Cognitive Epistemology</i>	Romy Jaster <i>Contextualism and Gradability</i>
<b>7 Angewandte Ethik, Politische, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Applied Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy</b>		
Raum D 431 Chair W. Lübbe	Christine Bratu <i>Liberalismus, Handlungsfreiheit und Autonomie</i>	Rebecca Gutwald <i>Im Namen der Autonomie? Eine kritische Untersuchung des liberalen Paternalismus am Beispiel von Maßnahmen des kognitiven Enhancements</i>
Raum D 430 Chair W. Pfannkuche	Christian Neuhäuser <i>Unternehmen als moralische Akteure</i>	Valentin Beck <i>Unternehmensverantwortung und partielle Normenkonformität</i>
<b>8 Normative Ethik, Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie / Normative Ethics, Metaethics, Theory of Action and Theory of Decision</b>		
Raum D 434 Chair G. Löhner	Julian Fink <i>The requirements of rationality: wide or narrow content?</i>	Tim Henning <i>Will I be glad I did it? – Rational Decision, Preference Change, and Personality</i>
Raum D 433 Chair F. Dietrich	Julius Schälike <i>Moralischer Zufall</i>	Michael Kühler <i>Sollen, Können und Versuchen</i>
Raum D 432 Chair K. Meyer	André Grahle <i>Two Dimensions of Meaningfulness</i>	Susanne Mantel <i>On why (not) to identify normative reasons with motivating reasons</i>

## Sektionen Mittwoch / Sections Wednesday

Mittwoch 10:30–11:15		Mittwoch 11:15–12:00
<b>1 Sprachphilosophie / Philosophy of Language</b>		
Raum D 436 Chair M. Siebel	Raphael van Riel <i>Three Conceptions of Explication – Two In, One Out</i>	David Samuel Lanius <i>Has Vagueness Really No Function In Law?</i>
Raum D 435 Chair R. Busse	Elia Zardini <i>Consequence and Context. The Intercontextual Logic of Sentences</i>	Marta Sznajder <i>Intensional verbs – a dynamic approach</i>
<b>2 Metaphysik und Ontologie / Metaphysics and Ontology</b>		
Raum C 427 Chair A. Steinberg	Nathan Wildman <i>Some Fine Lessons</i>	Thomas Sattig <i>Pluralism and Determinism</i>
<b>3 Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie / Logic and Philosophy of Science</b>		
Raum C 425 Chair J. Lenhard	Till Grüne-Yanoff <i>Modelling and How-Possible Explanations</i>	Chrysostomos Mantzavinos <i>Explanatory Games</i>
Raum C 424 Chair J. Harbecke	Thomas Müller <i>Branching space-times and general relativity</i>	Roberto Ciuni <i>The Abundance of the future</i>
Raum C 423 Chair T. Wilholt		Corina Strößner <i>Statistical and Non-Statistical Normality</i>
<b>4 Philosophie des Geistes / Philosophy of Mind</b>		
Raum C 422 Chair M. Baumgartner	Carlos Zednik <i>From extended mechanisms to extended minds</i>	Bettina Gutsche <i>Mechanistische Erklärung: Reduktiv oder nicht?</i>
Raum C 421 Chair F. Esken	Martin Hoffmann <i>Menschliche Individualität und personale Identität</i>	Gerhard Christopher Bukow <i>Minimality notions in the Theory of Mind-debate</i>
<b>5 Erkenntnistheorie / Epistemology</b>		
Raum C 426 Chair G. Ernst	Pedro Schmechtig <i>Interrogatives Formen des Wissens und reduktiver Intellektualismus</i>	Franz Knappik <i>Selbstwissen als »Maker's Knowledge«?</i>
Raum C 336 Chair T. Grundmann	Alexander Dinges <i>An invariantist explanation of contextualist intuitions</i>	Erik Stei <i>A presuppositional strict invariantist account of knowledge attributions</i>
<b>7 Angewandte Ethik, Politische, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Applied Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy</b>		
Raum D 431 Chair W. Lübbe	Matthias Katzer <i>The Idea of Global Public Reason</i>	David P. Schweikard <i>The Justification of Contributory Political Obligations</i>
Raum D 430 Chair W. Pfannkuche	Carsten Köllmann <i>Lohngerechtigkeit: Tausch oder Verteilung?</i>	
<b>8 Normative Ethik, Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie / Normative Ethics, Metaethics, Theory of Action and Theory of Decision</b>		
Raum D 434 Chair G. Löhner	Nathaniel Sharadin <i>The Wrong Kind of Reason</i>	Benjamin Paul Kiesewetter <i>The Principle of Decisive Reasons</i>
Raum D 433 Chair F. Dietrich	Benedikt Kahmen <i>How Do We Know What We Intend?</i>	Johannes Himmelreich <i>Action vs. Agency</i>
Raum D 432 Chair K. Meyer	Christian Kietzmann <i>Der Realismus praktischer Gründe und das Problem der Motivation</i>	Julius Schönherr <i>What makes moral values queer?</i>

**Mittwoch 13:15–14:00**

**Mittwoch 14:00–14:45**

<b>1</b>	<b>Sprachphilosophie / Philosophy of Language</b>
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Raum D 436 Chair K. Saporiti	Laura Delgado <i>Is Frege's Context Principle in Conflict with His Principle of Compositionality?</i>	Robert Sascha Schwartzkopff <i>Frege vs. Moltmann: Why 'The number of planets is eight' is an identity statement after all</i>
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<b>2</b>	<b>Metaphysik und Ontologie / Metaphysics and Ontology</b>
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Raum C 427 Chair H. Sturm	Brandon Charles Look <i>The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics and the Question of Fundamentality in Metaphysics</i>	Michael De <i>A Solution to the Humphrey Objection</i>
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<b>3</b>	<b>Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie / Logic and Philosophy of Science</b>
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Raum C 425 Chair M. Thomann	Anna Leuschner <i>Good dissent, bad dissent. When dissent is hostile to science</i>	Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn <i>Epistemic and non-epistemic values in applied science</i>
Raum C 424 Chair C. Mantzavinos	Florian Steinberger <i>Logic, normativity and paraconsistency</i>	Johannes Stern <i>Modality and Axiomatic Theories of Truth</i>
Raum C 423 Chair M. Unterhuber	Allard Tamminga, Sander Verhaegh <i>Katz's Revisability Paradox Dissolved</i>	Carl George Wagner <i>The Corroboration Paradox</i>

<b>4</b>	<b>Philosophie des Geistes / Philosophy of Mind</b>
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Raum C 422 Chair H. Lyre	Lisa Grunenberg <i>Can Rule-following be blind?</i>	Martin Weichold <i>Wissen Wie: Intelligenz ohne Intellektualismus</i>
Raum C 421 Chair M. Pauen	Max Mergenthaler Canseco <i>The Phenomenal Concept Strategy: still battling the bewitchment of our Intelligence.</i>	Albert Newen <i>Analyzing Phenomenal Concepts with Mental Files</i>

<b>5</b>	<b>Erkenntnistheorie / Epistemology</b>
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Raum C 426 Chair M. Werning	Michael Schippers <i>Probabilistic Measures of Coherence: A Two-Level Approach</i>	Julia Langkau <i>Reflective Equilibrium and Counterexamples</i>
Raum C 336 Chair G. Keil	Christoph Kelp <i>Towards a Knowledge-Based Account of Understanding</i>	Christoph Baumberger <i>Defining Explanatory Understanding</i>

<b>6</b>	<b>Religionsphilosophie und Ästhetik / Philosophy of Religion and Aesthetics</b>
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Raum D 435 Chair S. Gäb	Patrick Todd <i>Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: Remotivating Incompatibilism</i>	Sebastian Gäb <i>Semantischer Realismus und religiöse Sprache</i>
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<b>7</b>	<b>Angewandte Ethik, Politische, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Applied Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy</b>
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Raum D 431 Chair W. Lübbe	Christian Seidel <i>Defending distributive equality against the social-relational critique</i>	Gabriel Wollner <i>Obligations of fairness and natural duties of justice under conditions of moderate injustice</i>
Raum D 430 Chair P. Schaber	Alexander Bagattini <i>Kindeswohl als moralpsychologischer Grundbegriff</i>	Christoph Schickhardt <i>Zum Begriff des Kindeswohls. Ein liberaler Ansatz</i>

<b>8</b>	<b>Normative Ethik, Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie / Normative Ethics, Metaethics, Theory of Action and Theory of Decision</b>
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Raum D 434 Chair G. Löhrer	Jonas Pfister <i>Are there Exclusionary Reasons?</i>	Jan-Christoph Heilinger <i>Non-effective moral reasons</i>
Raum D 433 Chair J. Schälike	Jan Gertken <i>Kann Notwehr nicht nur moralisch erlaubt, sondern gänzlich unproblematisch sein?</i>	Jörg Löschke <i>Drei Arten von Hilfspflichten</i>
Raum D 432 Chair C. Lumer	Olivier Roy, Albert J. J. Anglberger, Norbert Gratzl <i>You ought to do something! The logic of obligation as weakest permission</i>	Daniel Dohrn <i>Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of »Ought«</i>

## Sektionen Mittwoch / Sections Wednesday

	Mittwoch 15:00–15:45	Mittwoch 15:45–16:30
<b>1</b>	<b>Sprachphilosophie / Philosophy of Language</b>	
Raum D 436 Chair K. Saporiti	Andrei Moldovan <i>Rigid definite descriptions</i>	Tobias Rosefeldt <i>Talking about things that don't exist</i>
<b>2</b>	<b>Metaphysik und Ontologie / Metaphysics and Ontology</b>	
Raum C 427 Chair R. Michels	Jacek Jerzy Brzozowski <i>Defending Weak Supplementation</i>	David Hommen <i>The ontology of omissions and the problem of omissive causation</i>
<b>3</b>	<b>Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie / Logic and Philosophy of Science</b>	
Raum C 425 Chair M. Thomann	Anke Büter <i>Wertfreiheit, Pluralismus und epistemische Vertrauenswürdigkeit: Das Beispiel Frauengesundheitsforschung</i>	Martin Carrier <i>Values and Objectivity in Science</i>
Raum C 424 Chair C. Mantzavinos	Ole Thomassen Hjortland <i>Truth, Paracompleteness, and Substructural Logic: Half as lovely, twice as true</i>	
Raum C 423 Chair M. Unterhuber	Peter Brössel <i>Ein Argument für den Bestätigungspluralismus</i>	Soroush Rafiee Rad, Stephan Hartmann <i>Updating on Conditionals = Kullback-Leibler + Causal Structure</i>
<b>4</b>	<b>Philosophie des Geistes / Philosophy of Mind</b>	
Raum C 422 Chair H. Lyre	Arne Martin Weber, Gottfried Vosgerau <i>The arché of Cognition – Grounding Representations in Action</i>	Tobias Schlicht <i>Social Cognition as know-how</i>
Raum C 421 Chair M. Pauen	Anne-Sophie Brüggem <i>The content of imaginings</i>	Jennifer Michelle Windt <i>Are dreams deceptive experiences? Assessing Cartesian dream skepticism from the perspective of philosophy of mind</i>
<b>5</b>	<b>Erkenntnistheorie / Epistemology</b>	
Raum C 426 Chair M. Werning	Lars Weisbrod <i>Why agreement cannot justify peerhood: Completing Elga's non-sceptical Conciliationism by refining his Equal Weight View</i>	Stefan Reining <i>Are Conciliatory Views about Peer Disagreement Self-Undermining?</i>
Raum C 336 Chair G. Keil	Joachim Horvath <i>Understanding and Rational Revisability</i>	Frank Hofmann <i>How Gettier helps to understand justification</i>
<b>6</b>	<b>Religionsphilosophie und Ästhetik / Philosophy of Religion and Aesthetics</b>	
Raum D 435 Chair S. Gäb	Christoph Kurt Mocker <i>Zur Rechtfertigung religiöser Überzeugungen durch pragmatische Argumente</i>	Marie-Luise Raters <i>Don't worry – be happy? Ein Konsistenzproblem in der pragmatistischen Religionsphilosophie von William James</i>
<b>7</b>	<b>Angewandte Ethik, Politische, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Applied Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy</b>	
Raum D 430 Chair W. Lübke	Joachim Wündisch <i>Climate Change &amp; Virtue Theory: A Cautionary Perspective</i>	Sabine Hohl <i>Individuelle Verantwortung für kollektiv verursachte Schädigungen</i>
Raum D 431 Chair P. Schaber	Barbara Bleisch <i>Rabentöchter? Rabensöhne? Zur Begründung filialer Pflichten</i>	Simone Aicher <i>Problems of advance directives in psychiatric care</i>
<b>8</b>	<b>Normative Ethik, Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie / Normative Ethics, Metaethics, Theory of Action and Theory of Decision</b>	
Raum D 434 Chair G. Löhrer	Francesco Orsi <i>Higher-order Internalism about Moral Judgment</i>	David Horst <i>Practical Knowledge</i>
Raum D 433 Chair J. Schälike	Vasco Correia <i>Illusions and well-being: The costs and benefits of misbelief</i>	
Raum D 432 Chair C. Lumer	Martin Rechenauer, Olivier Roy <i>Deontic Logic for Procedural Ethics</i>	Gerog Brun <i>Institutions and reflective equilibrium—an uneasy combination?</i>

**Donnerstag 13:15–14:00**

**Donnerstag 14:00–14:45**

<b>1</b>	<b>Sprachphilosophie / Philosophy of Language</b>
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Raum D 436 Chair J. Schulte	Julia Zakkou <i>(Not So Many) Varieties of Disagreement</i>	Wolfgang Freitag <i>Moore's Paradox and the Manifestation of Belief</i>
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<b>2</b>	<b>Metaphysik und Ontologie / Metaphysics and Ontology</b>
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Raum C 427 Chair J. Korbacher	Anne Sophie Spann <i>Can there be strict biological Identity through Time without Aristotelian Substances? A short Examination of Eric T. Olson's Animalism</i>	Gerhard Christopher Bukow, Markus Pierre Knappitsch <i>Organisms and semiotic reactivity – information in the ontology of biology</i>
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<b>3</b>	<b>Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie / Logic and Philosophy of Science</b>
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Raum C 426 Chair J. Schmitt	Rico Hauswald <i>Was sind vage natürliche Arten?</i>	Philipp Haueis <i>Fuzziness in the Brain. Semantic Vagueness and Functional Neuroanatomy</i>
Raum C 425 Chair A. Leuschner	Marius Thomann <i>Eine Logik des Könnens mit Handlungstypen</i>	Stefania Centrone <i>Notes On Mally's First Deontic Logic and von Wright's First Plausible Logic</i>
Raum C 424 Chair A. Gebharter	Nick Haverkamp <i>Intuitionism and Incompleteness</i>	Daniel Alscher <i>Negative Resultate über Interpretierbarkeit in RCF</i>
Raum C 423 Chair P. Brösse	Matthias Unterhuber <i>Modeling the Ramsey Test by Chellas-Segeber Semantics</i>	Peter Fritz <i>Conditionals and ACTUALITY</i>

<b>4</b>	<b>Philosophie des Geistes / Philosophy of Mind</b>
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Raum C 422 Chair C. Zednik	Michael Baumgartner <i>Is it possible to experimentally reveal non-reductive mental causation?</i>	Tim Seuchter, Gottfried Vosgerau <i>Causal Indexicals in a Mental File Framework</i>
Raum C 421 Chair J. Brandl	Eva Schmidt <i>How We Know Our Senses</i>	

<b>5</b>	<b>Erkenntnistheorie / Epistemology</b>
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Raum C 336 Chair H. Rott	Sergi Rosell <i>Voluntary Belief on a Strictly Epistemic Basis?</i>	Andrea Kruse <i>Was sind epistemische Pflichten?</i>
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<b>6</b>	<b>Religionsphilosophie und Ästhetik / Philosophy of Religion and Aesthetics</b>
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Raum D 435 Chair C. Misselhorn	Lisa Katharin Schmalzried <i>Die Relevanz des moralischen Werts eines Kunstwerkes</i>
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<b>7</b>	<b>Angewandte Ethik, Politische, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Applied Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy</b>
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Raum D 430 Chair P. Schaber	Fabian Wendt <i>Zur Moralität moralischer Kompromisse</i>	Philipp Schink <i>Grundelemente einer Theorie sozialer Freiheit</i>
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<b>8</b>	<b>Normative Ethik, Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie / Normative Ethics, Metaethics, Theory of Action and Theory of Decision</b>
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Raum D 434 Chair J. Schälike	Andreas Müller <i>Is Metaethical Constructivism Circular?</i>	Matthew Braham <i>The Formula of Universal Law: A Reconstruction</i>
Raum D 433 Chair C. Lumer	Ezio Di Nucci <i>Double Effect and Terror Bombing</i>	Martin Hoffmann <i>Thomas Buddenbrook und der Vorrang der Moral</i>
Raum D 432 Chair U. Wessels	Anne Burkard <i>Defending Moral Intuitionism Against Debunking Arguments</i>	

## **Aussteller / Exhibitors**

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## Hauptvorträge / Main Lectures

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Hauptvortrag	<b>M</b>	Main Lecture
Montag, 17.09. Audimax 17:30–19:00	<b>Peter Hacker</b> Two Conceptions of Language	Monday, 17.09. Audimax 5:30–7:00 p.m.
Dienstag, 18.09. Audimax 17:00–18:30	<b>Ulrich Blau</b> Ewige Rätsel, künftige Mathematik und utopischer Monismus	Tuesday, 18.09. Audimax 5:00–6:30 p.m.
Donnerstag, 20.09. Audimax 15:00–16:30	<b>Roy Sorensen</b> Zande Sorites: Illogical Insouciance and Inconsistent Verstehen	Thursday, 20.09. Audimax 3:00–4:30 p.m.

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**M** Blau

**Ewige Rätsel, künftige Mathematik und utopischer Monismus**


Ulrich Blau  
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Die kategoriale Trichotomie **TR**

Physisch-Konkretes raumzeitlich intersubjektiv	Psychisch-Mentales zeitlich subjektiv	Rein Formales raumzeitlos übersubjektiv
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erzeugt alle ewigen Rätsel. Sie werden bis heute

- (a) praktisch hingenommen,
- (b) theoretisch verdrängt oder
- (c) philosophisch vernebelt. Irgendwann vielleicht
- (d) ernst genommen, reflektiert und grenzenlos verschärft.



Drei Beispiele:

1. Der **Lügner** erzwingt den grenzenlos wohlgeordnet oszillierenden Reflexionsprozess, den ich in der Reflexionslogik **LR** analysiert habe. **LR** erweitert und verfeinert konservativ, zuletzt transdefinit, die klassische Logik, Mengen- und Klassentheorie.

2. Zenons **Läufer** erzwingt den grenzenlos wohlgeordneten infinitesimalen Teilungsprozess, der dem strukturlosen Kontinuum nie näherkommt. Lügner und Läufer zwangen mich zur allgemeinen linearen Zahlentheorie **IL\***. Sie erweitert und verfeinert konservativ, zuletzt transdefinit, die reelle, ordinale und kardinale Standardarithmetik. Das war seit Cantor überfällig. Bis heute können die Mathematiker mit so simplen Zahlen wie

$$\omega - 1, 1 - \omega, \omega, \frac{1}{2}, \omega^\pi$$

nicht rechnen. (Conway opfert die ordinale Standardarithmetik, Robinson opfert schon  $\omega - 1$ .)

3. Das **Subjekt/Objekt**-Rätsel. In allen archaischen Verhaltensbereichen – Atmung, Bewegung, Ernährung, Behausung, Fortpflanzung, soziale Bindung – finden wir die Subjekt/Objekt-Korrelation



Diese physikalisch unerklärliche Korrelation wird seit Darwin von allen Bewusstseinsfachleuten praktisch hingenommen und theoretisch verdrängt oder philosophisch vernebelt. Denn die evolutionäre Erklärung für **K** erfordert Myriaden (vor)menschlicher Urheber, die ihre objektiven Hirnströme nach ihrem subjektiven Glück/Schmerz/Wert-Kompass steuern. Wie das? Gibt es neben den objektiv-physikalischen  $\varphi$ -Kräften Myriaden subjektiver  $\psi$ -Kräfte? Irgendwann wird

man **K** und die Physik ernst nehmen und zur uralten mystischen Identitätsvermutung  $\varphi = \psi$  kommen:

**I** Alles ist *ein* zeitlos-absolutes Bewusstsein, das sich durch den zeitlichen Trick **TR** in einen kosmischen Prozess verwandelt, der sich myriadenfach subjektiv von innen erlebt und objektiv von außen erkennt.

Die strukturelle Synchronisation von Myriaden subjektiv-zeitlichen Innenwelten mit *einer* objektiv-raumzeitlichen Außenwelt erzwingt die dritte Kategorie:

Es gibt nur eine zeitlos-absolute Logik & Mathematik, die selbstexplikativ mehr und mehr reine Bewusstseinsmechanik, d. h. Objektivierungsmechanik, subjektiv-zeitlich bewusst macht und auf jenes unbegreifliche Selbst verweist, das sich im *Ich-Jetzt* fortwährend zeigt und entzieht.



M Hacker

## Two Conceptions of Language

Peter Hacker  
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Two conceptions of language have dominated philosophical reflection over the last century on the nature of language and linguistic understanding, and on the relationship between thought and language. The first is the calculus conception, advanced in various forms by Frege, Russell, the early Wittgenstein, Carnap, Dummett and Davidson. The second is the anthropological conception of language, advanced in various forms by the later Wittgenstein, Strawson, Grice, and Rundle. The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the two conceptions. The calculus conception assigns priority to the notions of truth and truth-condition, and to the assertoric mode. The anthropological conception assigns priority to use, meaning and explanations of meaning, and is indifferent to mode. The calculus conception presents understanding as a computational process, the anthropological conception presents it as akin to an ability.

The disagreements between the two conceptions are explored, and the further consequences of each conception are described.

Sorensen M

## Zande Sorites: Illogical Insouciance and Inconsistent Verstehen

Roy Sorensen  
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While living among the Azande in the 1930s, E. E. Evans-Pritchard challenged his hosts' beliefs about witchcraft inheritance:

Base step: At least one man in your line of descent is a witch.

Induction Step: If any man in your line of descent is a witch, then so his father and all of his sons.

Conclusion: All of the men in your line of descent are witches.

The Azande accepted the premises. They found the inference compelling. Yet they rejected the conclusion.

When Bertrand Russell alerted Gottlob Frege to an inconsistency in his *Grundgesetze*, Frege appreciated the catastrophe and energetically attempted to revise his beliefs. But the Azande made only cursory efforts to resolve their inconsistency. Evans-Pritchard characterized their logical insouciance as irrational.

My historical thesis is that the ensuing anthropological debate mirrors the debate about the sorites paradox. I favor a simple explanation of this parallelism: Evans-Pritchard's witchcraft inheritance argument is a sorites argument – albeit in a form masked by the different ontologies of the Azande and Evans-Pritchard. Evans-Pritchard failed to recognize his witchcraft inheritance argument as a sorites paradox because he was witchcraft nihilist in a community of witchcraft realists.

Evans-Pritchard's metaphysics immunized him from the irrational response sorites paradoxes provoke from realists. However Evans-Pritchard's comparative lucidity was not due to a distinctive difference in his *topic-neutral* rationality. Evans-Pritchard was prone to the same logical insouciance with respect to vague predicates about which he was realist (such as ›heap‹, ›bald‹, and ›chicken‹).

My general conjecture is that many of the irrationalities that seem distinctive of alien cultures are actually paradoxes that are universal to humanity (thanks to the uniformity of human brains). The irrationality of the aliens is real and profound; it just not distinctive of those aliens or their cultures.

The universality of the irrationality helps to explain Evans-Pritchard's surprising success at understanding the Azande. Since he shares their core irrationality, Evans-Pritchard could simulate Azande thinking.



## Preisverleihungen / Award Ceremonies

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Montag, 17.09.  
Audimax  
19:00–19:30

### **STEGMÜLLER-AWARD**

Laudationes

Awardees:

**Miguel Hoeltje**

Wahrheit, Bedeutung und Form. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Davidson'schen Programm

**Stephan Krämer**

Second-Order Quantification and Ontological Commitment

**Moritz Schulz**

Counterfactuals and Probability

### **ONTOS-AWARD**

Awardee:

**Alexander Steinberg**

A Chance for Possibility. An Investigation into the Grounds of Modality

### **BEST-PAPER-AWARD**

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Mittwoch, 19.09.  
Audimax  
17:00–17:15

### **FREGE-AWARD**

**Ralf Stoecker**  
Laudatio

Awardee:

**Rüdiger Bittner**

Wednesday, 19.09.  
Audimax  
5:00–5:15 p.m.

Donnerstag, 20.09.  
Audimax  
15:00

### **BEST-POSTER-AWARD**

Thursday, 20.09.  
Audimax  
3:00 p.m.

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# Autorenkolloquium / Author's Colloquium

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Autorenkolloquium



Author's Colloquium

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Mittwoch, 19.09.  
Audimax  
17:00–20:00

**Rüdiger Bittner**  
Without autonomy

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Wednesday, 19.09  
Audimax  
5:00–8:00 p.m.

**Thomas E. Hill**  
Rüdiger Bittner on Autonomy

**Sarah Buss**  
Authenticity and Autonomy: A Meditation  
on Themes in the Work of Rüdiger Bittner

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### A Bittner

#### Without autonomy

Rüdiger Bittner  
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Leaving aside the ancient, political notion of autonomy, there are now basically two conceptions of autonomy in existence, Kant's on the one hand and the understanding of autonomy as self-governance or self-determination on the other, the latter often explicated with the help of Harry Frankfurt's higher level attitudes. Discussions in the last few decades showed, however, that for different reasons neither conception will stand up. Yet to understand humans as endowed, in one or the other sense, with autonomy has become a vital part of the political thought prevailing in western countries. Thus the question becomes urgent where the demise of autonomy leaves us in political terms. How are we going to live together, without autonomy?

### A Buss

#### Authenticity and Autonomy: A Meditation on Themes in the Work of Rüdiger Bittner

Sarah Buss  
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sbuss@umich.edu

In reflecting on the nature and value of human freedom and autonomy, Rüdiger Bittner offers many provocative observations. Here are some of the claims that provoked me to reexamine my own assumptions:

- We cannot impose laws on ourselves; and if we could, the actions we perform in deference to these laws would not be autonomous.
- Regardless of what any of us may say, it is more important for us to limit the »resistances« against which we must »struggle« in pursuing our ends than to limit our vulnerability to the power of other end-setters.
- »Freedom is not a human predicament or privilege.«
- »There is no other than the ›gross literak sense in which some piece of behavior is or is not somebody's.«
- »There is nothing in us or about us to guide us.«

These observations link Bittner's views about freedom and autonomy to his views about both the source of moral requirements (no requirements can be grounded in laws we impose on ourselves) and the conditions of moral responsibility (whether we are accountable for our deeds does not depend on whether they are »self-determined« in some special sense). I will explore some of these connections by exploring the conception of the self that underlies them. More particularly, I will consider Bittner's claims that (i) we cannot be more or less »true to« ourselves, (ii) there is no meaningful sense in which some aspects of our psyche are »deeper« than others, and (iii) we cannot be divided from ourselves in ways that make it possible for us to exercise authority over ourselves. I will challenge these claims, even while conceding that (i) something has gone wrong when we regard »authenticity« as a regulative ideal; (ii) the distinction between »deep« and »superficial« elements of our »motivational set« is irrelevant

to whether we are accountable for what we do; (iii) (a) there are limits to our capacity for self-alienation and (b) if we have reasons to act in certain ways, these reasons are not grounded in our authority to give ourselves orders.

### Hill A

#### Rüdiger Bittner on Autonomy

Thomas E. Hill  
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thill@email.unc.edu

In several beautifully written essays, as well as books, Rüdiger Bittner surveys classic and contemporary conceptions of autonomy, arguing that these are untenable and unnecessary. With a skeptical eye he examines Kantian autonomy, Harry Frankfurt's idea of free willing, and current conceptions of political autonomy and individual autonomy in economic transactions. High-minded general affirmations of human freedom, he argues, are unfounded and not likely to retain their grip on our thinking. Nevertheless, he allows that we can be more or less free in a modest (quasi-Hobbesian) sense and that many people may want more of this freedom from impediments that make it difficult or impossible to do various things. Those who do, Bittner argues, have reason to fight human subjugation, including dependent labour as well as slavery, even though traditional philosophical grounds for opposing these are dubious.

While acknowledging the force of some of Bittner's challenges, I want to revisit the idea and role of autonomy in Kant's ethics and broadly Kantian theories. Questions remain about the best way to understand – or reconstruct – Kant's claims and argument, and, even more, from a contemporary philosophical point of view we may want to inquire further about what important concerns lay behind its appeal and what survives if Kant's grand metaphors are taken less literally and his moral psychology is appropriately de-mystified. Similarly, questions arise about Bittner's dismissal of various ideas of freedom that are apparently imbedded in ordinary language. The special value of his challenge is that it requires us to work out – charitably but without untenable assumptions – what is meant and why it seems important. As Bittner says, Kantian autonomy is not the same as the working conceptions of autonomy in medicine, politics, and everyday life as philosophers' interpret this. Nevertheless, those who care about either have some reason to think about how these are connected.

## Kolloquien / Colloquia

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Aggregationism	<b>A</b>	Dienstag / Tuesday, 18.09. 9:00–12:00, Audimax
Vagueness and Ontology	<b>B</b>	Dienstag / Tuesday, 18.09. 9:00–12:00, A 704
Game Theory Meets Philosophy	<b>C</b>	Dienstag / Tuesday, 18.09. 9:00–12:00, A 701
Should open-minded people be dogmatists about justification?	<b>D</b>	Dienstag / Tuesday, 18.09. 9:00–12:00, A 703
Consequence and Consequences – What’s truth got to do with it?	<b>E</b>	Dienstag / Tuesday, 18.09. 9:00–12:00, A 702
Moral Understanding	<b>F</b>	Donnerstag / Thursday, 20.09. 9:00–12:00, Audimax
Truth, Meaning, and the Semantics – Pragmatics Distinction	<b>G</b>	Donnerstag / Thursday, 20.09. 9:00–12:00, A 702
Mindreading versus Teleological Reasoning: Two Ways of Understanding Rational Action	<b>H</b>	Donnerstag / Thursday, 20.09. 9:00–12:00, A 703
The Contribution of the History of Philosophy to the Theory of Perception	<b>I</b>	Donnerstag / Thursday, 20.09. 9:00–12:00, A 701
Perspectivism in the Philosophy of Science and Epistemology	<b>J</b>	Donnerstag / Thursday, 20.09. 9:00–12:00, A 704

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## A Aggregationism

Imagine that you are faced with a choice between saving one person and saving five different people. Should you save the greater number? Deontologists attempt to answer this question without an appeal to interpersonal aggregation of gains and losses. But what is wrong with interpersonal aggregation? One answer to this question is the claim that it is not worse period when five people die than when one person dies. It is just worse to die for each of the persons involved. John Taurek has famously put forward his ›no worse claim‹ in his meanwhile classical paper »Should the numbers count?« (1977) in order to argue from it to his view that it is not one's moral duty to save the five (Taurek rather proposes to throw a dice). With his ›no worse claim‹, Taurek opposes the view that certain consequences of acts are better period than others and that such valuing can be arrived at by aggregating well-being across persons. This critique radically challenges con-

sequentialism, since it rejects the idea that we can evaluate states of affairs with regard to their impersonal goodness. A large part of the discussion which was prompted by Taurek's paper was devoted to the question whether and how deontologists are able to account for the intuition that saving the greater number is morally called for. Hereby, the question for the extent to which aggregationism can be defended against Taurek's challenge has not yet been dealt with in satisfactory depth. By bringing together one of the few defenders of the ›no worse claim‹ (Weyma Lübbe), a vigorous opponent of it (Iwao Hirose) and a sophisticated value theorist (Wlodek Rabinowicz), this colloquium is meant to start changing this. – The talks and the discussion will be in English.

Organisation: **Kirsten Meyer, Thomas Schmidt**

**Dienstag / Tuesday, 18.09. Aggregationism**  
**9:00–12:00** (Language: English)  
**Audimax**

09:00–09:10 Introduction (Kirsten Meyer / Thomas Schmidt)  
09:10–10:00 **Weyma Lübbe**: The Aggregation Argument: What can we learn from its failure?  
10:00–10:50 **Iwao Hirose**: From ›Better‹ to ›Right‹  
10:50–11:10 *Coffee Break*  
11:10–12:00 **Wlodek Rabinowicz**: Goodness and Numbers



## A Hirose

## From »Better« to »Right«

Iwao Hirose  
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Imagine that you are faced with a choice between saving one person and saving five different people. Call this example the *rescue case*. What is the right thing to do? Some philosophers attempt to establish the case for saving the greater number without an appeal to interpersonal aggregation of gains and losses. One such case is the argument that appeals to impartiality and the Pareto principle. I call this the *argument for best outcomes* (ABO). According to ABO, (1) the outcome of saving the five is strictly better than the outcome of saving the one, and therefore (2) it is right to save the five. Some people would agree with (1) but not (2). This is because they do not want to accept consequentialism. In this paper, I shall argue that (2) follows from (1) in the rescue case even if we do not commit to consequentialism.

Consequentialism holds that the rightness or wrongness of an act is determined by the goodness of its consequence. Non-consequentialist principles reject this. They usually hold that the rightness or wrongness of an act can be determined independently of the goodness of its consequence. The non-consequentialist principles do not necessarily rule out the consideration for the goodness of consequence insofar as the non-consequentialist constraints are satisfied. In the rescue case, there are little non-consequentialist constraints. Thus, if we accept (1), then (2) follows. There is one possible interpretation, according to which saving the five is unfair to the one person and this is a violation of non-consequentialist constraint. I shall argue that if this interpretation is correct, the only right act is to let all six people die. This means, I shall argue, that if letting all six people die is wrong, saving the five is the right act.

## A Lübbe

**The Aggregation Argument:  
 What can we learn from its failure?**

Weyma Lübbe  
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The Aggregation Argument is an argument to the effect that »the numbers count«. This refers to the idea that when it is possible to save only one of two non-overlapping groups of equally deserving people, it is better to save the greater number. The Aggregation Argument uses a Pareto Premise, which says that saving a more numerous group is better when the smaller group is contained in it, and an Indifference Premise, which says that saving one person out of an endangered group is of equal value to saving one other person out of it. There exist informal and axiomatized versions of the argument.

The talk starts by presenting the Aggregation Argument and a counter-argument (already published) which denies the acceptability of the Indifference Premise. The aim is to discuss the relevance of the counter-argument for the general acceptability of maximizing consequentialism. Maximizing conse-

quentialism says that the rightness of an act is determined by the goodness of its consequences, the act with the best consequences being the right act. The consequences of an act are usually taken to consist in the state of affairs that holds place as a result of the act. *Aggregative* consequentialism holds that the goodness of states is some function of the values of parts of the states.

The Aggregation Argument presupposes a consequentialist framework. It does not, however, explicitly make assumptions about the values of parts of states – e.g., about the value of one saved life – or about the nature of the aggregating function. It rests on an ordinal comparison of whole states only. The argument against the Indifference Premise, however, shows that the prima facie plausibility of that premise rests on the fact that such assumptions are implicitly made. The argument also shows that the assumptions are far from being trivial, and it suggests the necessity of a more careful analysis of the concept of the consequence of an act. This analysis, it is argued, gives rise to serious doubts about the consequentialist framework in general.

## Rabinowicz A

## Goodness and Numbers

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In his famous provocative paper (*PPA* 1977), John Taurek argued against the common-sense view that the numbers should count in life-saving situations. Frances Kamm responded to this challenge by proposing what she called the Aggregation Argument in favour of the view that numbers count (*Morality, Mortality*, vol. 1, OUP 1993; cf. also *Utilitas* 2005). Kamm's argument was defended by Iwao Hirose in a number of papers (*Analysis* 2001, *Utilitas* 2004), while Weyma Lübbe developed a defence of Taurek's view (*PPA* 2008, cf. also her paper in the *Festschrift* for Georg Meggle, mentis 2009).

In my talk, I will target Taurek's claim that there is something deeply problematic and illegitimate in judgments of goodness and betterness period, as opposed to judgments of goodness or betterness *for* someone. That the former are meaningful and can be legitimate is a basic presupposition of the Aggregation Argument Hirose is defending and Lübbe is criticizing – at least if we suppose that the premises of the argument (Impartiality and Pareto) and its conclusion are interpreted as axiological claims, as it is usually done. Lübbe in her paper on Taurek quite rightly points out the importance of this issue for his view. So, I think there might be a point to discuss this matter at some length. I would like to discuss this problem from a particular perspective on goodness: more precisely, from the point of view of the fitting-attitude analysis of this notion.

## B Vagueness and Ontology

Vague terms, it is said, are tolerant to marginal changes, admit of borderline cases, give rise to the heap paradox and thus challenge bivalence. Is there, in addition to semantic vagueness, such a thing as vagueness *in rebus*? Can objects be vague? Russell has argued that the idea is absurd, since »vagueness and precision alike are characteristics which can only belong to a representation. They have to do with the relation between a representation and that which it represents«. Dummett has sung the same tune: »The notion that things might actually be vague, as well as being vaguely described, is not properly intelligible«. Evans has advanced a famous one-page argument against »vague objects«.

In recent years, however, a growing minority of philosophers have argued that ontological vagueness can be made sense of. Various ways have been suggested to spell out the idea. Undoubtedly, ordinary physical objects can have fuzzy boundaries, both spatially and temporally, while it may still

sound odd to call them »vague«. But, what exactly is the relation between vagueness and other indeterminacy phenomena? What role does Unger's »problem of the many« play? Does the distinction between vagueness of classification and vagueness of individuation mirror or does it cut across the distinction between semantic and ontological vagueness? Can properties, kinds, or propositions be vague? Does every kind of vagueness involve Sorites-susceptibility? These are some of the questions that the colloquium will hopefully shed light upon.

*Das Kolloquium wurde kofinanziert durch das von der Volkswagen-Stiftung geförderte Forschungsprojekt »Vernünftiger Umgang mit unscharfen Grenzen« [www.unscharfe-grenzen.de](http://www.unscharfe-grenzen.de).*

Organisation: **Geert Keil**

### Dienstag / Tuesday, 18.09. Vagueness and Ontology

9:00–12:00 (Language: English)

A 704

09:00–09:10	Introduction
09:10–09:45	<b>Matti Eklund</b> : Metaphysical Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy
09:45–10:00	Discussion
10:50–11:10	<b>Jonathan Lowe</b> : Ontological Vagueness, Existence Monism, and Metaphysical Realism
10:35–10:50	Discussion
10:50–11:00	<i>Break</i>
11:00–11:35	<b>Peter Simons</b> : Vague Kinds and Biological Nominalism
11:35–12:00	Final Discussion

**B** Eklund**Metaphysical Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy**

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There are good reasons to distinguish between vagueness narrowly conceived, the phenomenon that paradigmatically shows up in sorites paradoxes, and the broader phenomenon of indeterminacy, which can be taken also to show up in, for example, the case of the open future, or partially defined expressions, or quantum physics. Relatedly, there is reason to distinguish between the question of whether metaphysical vagueness is possible and the question of whether metaphysical indeterminacy is possible. Once these distinctions are drawn, it is natural to suspect that metaphysical indeterminacy is possible but metaphysical vagueness is not. However, as I will discuss, some of the most prominent arguments against metaphysical vagueness are equally arguments against metaphysical indeterminacy. My own view is that metaphysical vagueness is impossible and I discuss what sorts of arguments may be leveled specifically against the idea of metaphysical vagueness. But I also discuss how one might in principle argue for the idea of metaphysical vagueness.

Simons **B****Vague Kinds and Biological Nominalism**

Peter Simons  
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Among biological kinds the most important are species. But species, however defined, have vague boundaries, both synchronically owing to hybridization and ongoing speciation, and diachronically owing to genetic drift and genealogical continuity. It is argued that the solution to the problems of species individuation is to adopt a thoroughgoing nominalism in regard to all biological kinds, from molecules to genes to genomes to species to higher taxa. This accommodates all the important biological facts while avoiding the legacy problems of ancient typological taxonomy.

**B** Lowe**Ontological Vagueness, Existence Monism, and Metaphysical Realism**

E. Jonathan Lowe  
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Recently, Terry Horgan and Matjaz Potrc have defended the thesis of ›existence monism‹, according to which the whole cosmos is the only concrete object. Their arguments appeal largely to considerations concerning vagueness. Crucially, they claim that ontological vagueness is impossible, and one key assumption in their defence of this claim is that vagueness always involves ›sorites-susceptibility‹. I aim to challenge both the claim and this assumption. As a consequence, I seek to undermine their defence of existence monism and support a common-sense pluralist ontology of ›ordinary objects‹ as being fully consistent with a thoroughgoing metaphysical realism.

## C Game Theory Meets Philosophy

Game theory has developed into one of the most important foundational theories of the social sciences. Mathematics has been reduced to set theory according to the Bourbaki program; and similarly, the reduction of economics to game theory has far advanced. At the same time applications have extended to social and political sciences. Even behavioral scientists have developed great interest. Accordingly, game theory is not really fixed; mathematical theorizing as well as the spectrum of interpretations have deepened and widened in various significant ways in the last decades.

These developments have taken place also in close exchange with philosophy. A contractualist justification of morals must rely on game theory; this is common knowledge since the work of Rawls. The prisoners' dilemma, dis-

covered by game theorists, is the core problem of cooperative or collective rationality. And so forth. Reversely, the theory of coordination games, initiated by David Lewis, has become an independent topic in game theory. So-called epistemic game theory is originally an economic-philosophical co-production. And so forth again.

Thus, mutual connections are very rich. The philosophical relevance of game theory is large and of deep interest to a wider philosophical audience. The talks will discuss this relevance from a philosophical, a game theoretic, and a psychological side in positive as well as critical ways.

Organisation: **Wolfgang Spohn**

### Dienstag/Tuesday, 18.09. Game Theory Meets Philosophy

9:00–12:00 (Language: English)

A 701

09:00–09:30 **Brian Skyrms**: The Spontaneous Emergence of Meaning

09:30–09:45 Diskussion

09:45–10:15 **Ken Binmore**: Origins of Fairness Norms

10:15–10:30 Diskussion

10:30–10:45 *Pause*

10:45–11:15 **Gerd Gigerenzer**: Heuristics Meet Philosophy

11:15–11:30 Diskussion

11:30–12:00 Podiumsdiskussion

## C Binmore

## Origins of Fairness Norms

Ken Binmore  
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John Mackie's *Inventing Right and Wrong* suggests founding a naturalistic theory of ethics on anthropological data, using game theory as a conceptual framework. This lecture discusses some of the game theory results that are relevant in such an enterprise.

## C Gigerenzer

## Heuristics Meet Philosophy

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Like Reinhard Selten, I draw a firm line between game theory – which is for proving theorems, not playing games – and the study of how people actually make decisions. Herbert Simon asked: How do humans reason when the conditions for rationality postulated by neoclassical economics are not met? Simon referred to the world of uncertainty, as opposed to that of known risks. My answer is: Humans and other animals rely on simple heuristics, that is, on rules that *ignore* part of the information in order to make *better* decisions. In my research, I have also asked a normative question: How should humans reason under uncertainty? This program includes (i) the descriptive study of the heuristics in the adaptive toolbox of individuals or cultures, and (ii) the normative study of the ecological rationality of specific heuristics. In an uncertain world (as opposed to known risks), heuristics can be more accurate than so-called »optimization methods«; the reasons for this can be analyzed in terms of the bias-variance dilemma. I would like to invite philosophers to think about rationality in an uncertain world.

## Skyrms C

## The Spontaneous Emergence of Meaning

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The spontaneous emergence of meaning is studied in the context of models of signaling. In favorable conditions, the dynamics of evolution and the dynamics of simple learning lead to the spontaneous emergence of meaningful signals. We can characterize some situations in which optimal signaling will arise and situations in which this is possible but not guaranteed.

## D Should open-minded people be dogmatists about justification?

Dogmatism is one of the most promising internalist theories of justification, but it has only been systematically defended in recent years, largely inspired by Jim Pryor's seminal paper »The Sceptic and the Dogmatist« (Noûs 34, 2000). The basic idea of dogmatism is that a belief that *p* is (prima facie) epistemically justified if it seems to the relevant subject as if *p*. One can distinguish between local dogmatism that only defends this principle for seemings of a particular kind, most notably perceptual seemings, and global dogmatism that claims that seemings in general have justificatory power (or, even more radically, that only seemings have that power). Dogmatism allows, for example, that one can be justified in believing that grass is green simply because it seems to one that grass is green – no further evidence is needed, and no skeptical hypotheses must be ruled out. Therefore, dogmatism promises to combine the intuitive plausibility of internalism with a key virtue of externalism, namely the dispensability of meta-justification for one's beliefs, e.g. of reasons for believing that one is a reliable perceiver. Like all theories of justification, dogmatism faces a number of formidable objections. Externalists will complain that there is no constitutive connection between

dogmatist justification and truth-conduciveness. Internalists will object that dogmatism shares some of the most pressing problems of externalism, e.g. the possibility of gaining absurdly easy meta-justification through bootstrapping. Moreover, seemings may be much too cheap cognitive states. For example, if it seems to a paranoid that someone persecutes her, then this would already suffice to justify her respective belief. A related problem is that seemings can sometimes be shaped by one's desires, and so dogmatism seems committed to the possibility of justified belief on the basis of wishful thinking.

The three speakers of our colloquium will further explore some of the problems and prospects of dogmatism. First, Chris Tucker (Auckland) will defend dogmatism against worries from wishful thinking, broadly construed. Then, Roger White (MIT) will explore dogmatism's options with respect to the problem of bootstrapping. Finally, Jim Pryor (NYU) will defend a generalized form of dogmatism against Bayesian worries.

Organisation: **Joachim Horvath, Thomas Grundmann**

### Dienstag / Tuesday, 18.09. Should open-minded people be dogmatists about justification?

9:00–12:00 (Language: English)

A 703

- 09:00–09:10 Welcoming & Introduction (Joachim Horvath)
- 09:10–09:50 **Chris Tucker:** If Dogmatism has a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too
- 09:50–10:30 **Roger White:** How bad is bootstrapping?
- 10:30–10:45 Coffee break
- 10:50–11:30 **Jim Pryor:** Problems for Credulism
- 11:30–12:00 Roundtable discussion (chair: Thomas Grundmann)

D Pryor

**Problems for Credulism**

Jim Pryor  
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I've defended the view that perceptual beliefs about the external world are sometimes immediately justified. This is a species of a genus of views I call »Dogmatism.« According to some authors, Bayesianism the formal theory together with some natural interpretive assumptions conflicts with that epistemology of perception. I argue that the conflict here is much more pervasive than is usually acknowledged: that combination of formalism plus interpretive assumptions fits poorly with informal commitments that are much more widespread than Dogmatism about perception. I call this wider family of views »Credulism.« The conflict is not remedied by moving to a Jeffrey-conditionalizing form of Bayesianism. I argue that the conflict here does not speak against Credulism, but just reflects its having been ignored in the way the Bayesian formalism is motivated and interpreted. Instead we should look to more critical interpretations of Bayesianism, or to more general formalisms. I express some sympathy for both responses, and consider briefly how they may go.

White D

**How bad is bootstrapping?**

Roger White  
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Dogmatist theories of perceptual justification appear to face the following objection: If Dogmatism is correct then one can legitimately gain evidence for the reliability of one's perceptual faculties via the use of those very faculties in a way that seems patently absurd, e.g. by examining a series of colored objects and reasoning, »this one is red, and it appears red, this one is green and it appears green. . . , my vision keeps getting things right so surely it is highly reliable.« (This is known as bootstrapping). There are two strategies for responding to the objection. (i) Argue that Dogmatism can avoid commitment to the legitimacy of bootstrapping in a way that is consistent and well motivated. (ii) Argue that bootstrapping is not so bad, or at least it is something we will have to live with anyway in other domains. I argue that the first strategy must fail. The second is trickier. I explore ways in which we might accept some forms of bootstrapping while still maintaining that the reasoning above is unacceptable.

D Tucker

**If Dogmatism has a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too**

Chris Tucker  
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Dogmatism holds that, in the absence of defeaters, if it seems to S that P, then S has prima facie justification for P. But suppose Wishful Willy is prospecting for gold. He sees a yellow object and his desire for gold makes it seem to him that it is a gold nugget. Can his wishfully-caused seeming provide his belief with prima facie justification? More generally, can seemings provide prima facie justification when they are cognitively penetrated (roughly: caused) by desires and unjustified beliefs? Intuitively, the answer to these questions is no, which is a problem for dogmatism. Yet before you mock the speck in the dogmatist's eye, be sure that you don't have a plank in your own. I argue that, if dogmatism has a problem with cognitive penetration, then lots of other views have similar problems that are *at least* as bad. These views include: doxastic conservatism, Wright-styled entitlement views, many coherentisms, reliabilism, proper functionalism, and some versions of restricted dogmatism that are explicitly designed to avoid the cognitive penetration objection. What's particularly ironic is that those who have adamantly objected to dogmatism on the basis of cognitive penetration tend to have even worse wishful thinking troubles than the dogmatist.

## E Consequence and Consequences – What’s truth got to do with it?

The colloquium »Consequence and Consequences – What’s truth got to do with it?« is devoted to the most central notion in the philosophy of logic, namely the concept of logical consequence.

Usually, logical consequence is characterized as necessary truth preservation. E.g. an inference is said to be logically valid just in case for every model it holds that if the premises are true in the model, then so is the conclusion.

Our colloquium is concerned with the role the notion of truth plays in the analysis of logical consequence. Should the standard characterization indeed be part of the analysis of logical consequence? Is the notion of consequence perhaps at least as fundamental as the notion of truth (Peter Schroeder-Heister)? Moreover, is the classical characterization in fact self-evident and independent from other assumptions?

A reason for calling into doubt the classical characterization of logical consequence comes with the semantical paradoxes. According to dialethism, a doctrine defended by two of our speakers (JcBeall and Graham Priest), paradoxical statements

such as the Liar are both true and false. As paraconsistent logicians they try to avoid the disastrous consequences dialethism results in from the classical point of view by assuming a non-classical logic that does not license the derivation of arbitrary conclusions from contradictory premises.

If one combines paraconsistency with the idea that logical consequences are truth-preserving, then some very familiar inferential patterns are invalid. (This problem is addressed in Jc Beall’s lecture). In particular, modus ponens is no longer a valid rule in the so-called logic of paradox. (Suppose  $p$  is both true and false, whereas  $q$  is just false. Since  $p \supset q$  (»if  $p$  then  $q$ «) is at least true if  $p$  is false,  $p \supset q$  is at least true if  $p$  is both true and false. Thus, in the assumed case the two premises  $p \supset q$  and  $p$  are at least true, whereas  $q$  is false.) Another example of the problem is given with the inference (discussed by Graham Priest) from »if  $A$ , then  $\neg A$  is true« and » $A$ « to the conclusion » $\neg A$  is true«.

Organisation: **Heinrich Wansing, Manfred Kupffer**

**Dienstag / Tuesday, 18.09. Consequence and Consequences – What’s truth got to do with it?**  
**9:00–12:00** (Language: English)  
**A 702**

09:00–09:10 Introduction (Heinrich Wansing)  
09:10–10:00 **Jc Beall**: Logic and Choices  
10:10–11:00 **Graham Priest**: Is the Biconditional of the T-Scheme Material?  
11:10–12:00 **Peter Schroeder-Heister**: What is the proper logic of consequence?



**E** Beall

**Consequence and Consequences: Logic and Choices**

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With others, I believe that a consequence of familiar paradoxes is that some things are not consequences of paradox. Less cryptically: one lesson of the paradoxes is that our logic is paraconsistent (or paracomplete, or perhaps both). But such »para-logics« are notoriously weak. My aim in this talk is to discuss a new response to such weakness (or, at least, a new way of thinking about an old response to such weakness!). In short, there is a difference between logic and inference (Harman 1986); and Logic sometimes leaves us with »choices«; and we exhibit a »return« to classical inference patterns based on extra-logical resources. My talk aims to make these ideas clear.

Schroeder-Heister **E**

**What is the proper logic of consequence?**

Peter Schroeder-Heister  
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According to the standard view, consequence means transmission of truth: A consequence statement is valid if its conclusion is true given its premisses are true. In this sense truth is the fundamental concept on which consequence is based. From the point of view of proof-theoretic semantics I argue for reversing this order: Consequence should be taken as a »primordial« hypothetical concept which does not rely on a categorical concept such as truth. The proper logic of consequence then becomes the logic of consequences, i.e., the logic of consequence statements. I will discuss the implications of this view for standard laws of consequence as well as for notions of inference and (semantic) completeness.

**E** Priest

**Is the Biconditional of the T-Scheme Material?**

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It seems to be a truism about truth that  $\langle A \rangle$  is true if and only if A. But can we infer A from  $\langle A \rangle$  is true, and vice versa? It is usually assumed that the answer is »yes«. In a paraconsistent context, this rules out taking the biconditional to be a material one. This paper explores the opposite possibility.

## F Moral Understanding

The colloquium »Moral Understanding« explores whether and how recent debates about knowledge vs. understanding and about epistemic values can shed new light on issues in moral epistemology. In theoretical philosophy, several authors have suggested that understanding rather than propositional knowledge should be regarded as the central concept of epistemology since it captures better what we consider a cognitive achievement. On the one hand, some knowledge (e.g. trivial and irrelevant truths) neither constitutes a cognitive achievement nor contributes to understanding a phenomenon. On the other hand, certain cognitive achievements contribute to understanding without constituting knowledge. Idealizations and thought experiments play a crucial role for scientific and philosophical understanding although they involve false beliefs. Cognitive progress may also be made by developing fruitful categories, but categories are not beliefs. All this implies that we acknowledge a plurality of cognitive goals, whose relative significance also depends on pragmatic considerations. Consequently, striving for understanding is considerably more ambitious than acquiring knowledge. It also calls for grasping interconnections between items of knowledge and for the ability to use information (e.g. arguing

within the framework of a theory, applying results to new situations and devising suitable (thought) experiments).

The colloquium is based on the assumption that moral theories too primarily aim at understanding rather than knowledge. Even though the cognitive significance of understanding for moral theories has been acknowledged occasionally, there have been hardly any detailed investigations into the consequences of focusing on moral understanding. First of all, there is the question of what understanding amounts to in the context of moral theories. More specific questions include: What is the object of moral understanding? Is moral understanding factive? What are the epistemic values moral theories should try to realize? Should pragmatic considerations (e.g. chances for reaching a consensus) shape epistemic goals of moral theories? Does moral understanding relate in a cognitively relevant way to abilities, such as raising relevant questions, developing illuminating thought experiments and appealing to appropriate examples?

Organisation: **Peter Schaber, Christoph Baumberger, Georg Brun, Gertrude Hirsch**

**Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09. Moral Understanding**

**9:00–12:00** (Language: English)

**Audimax**

09:00–09:55 **Alison Hills:** What is a Moral Expert?

09:55–10:00 Kurze Pause/Short break

10:00–10:55 **Geoffrey Sayre-McCord:** Moral Know-How and Moral Understanding

10:55–11:05 Pause/Break

11:05–12:00 **Gerhard Ernst:** The Importance of Moral Understanding

F Ernst

**The importance of moral understanding**

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Moral knowledge is knowledge about what to do. It typically takes the form »It is right for me (in circumstances C) to  $\Phi$ «. We can have moral knowledge without having moral understanding. When someone whom I know to be trustworthy tells me what to do, I might come to a justified ungettierized true belief that it is right for me to  $\Phi$  (in circumstances C). Nevertheless, there is something fundamentally defective about this piece of knowledge: Even if I know *that* it is right for me to  $\Phi$  in C, I might not have a clue as to *why* it is right for me to  $\Phi$  in C. That it is right for me to  $\Phi$  in C implies that the best reasons speak in favor of  $\Phi$ ing in C. But you might know that the best reasons speak in favor of  $\Phi$ ing in C without knowing *what these reasons are*. And when this is the case, you act on what, in this connection, has been called a fetish: the *mere* reason that it is right for you to  $\Phi$  in C.

In order to be able to do the right thing for the right reasons, i.e. to be virtuous, you not only have to know that it is right for you, e.g., to  $\Phi$  in C. You also need to know the reasons why it is right for you to  $\Phi$  in C, so that the reasons which speak in favor of  $\Phi$ ing in C can be *your* reasons for  $\Phi$ ing in C. But in order to know reasons you not only have to be aware of certain (natural) facts. You also have to know that these facts are reasons, i.e. you have to be able to recognize (natural) facts as reasons. In this paper I shall argue that, at this point, moral understanding becomes crucial. For knowing that some (natural) fact is a reason requires being able to locate the fact in a *system* of reasons. And being able to do so, in my opinion, is the best candidate we have for what might be called »having moral understanding«.

Sayre-McCord F

**Moral Know-How and Moral Understanding**

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There is a common, and intuitively attractive, distinction between knowing *that* something is the case, and knowing *how* to do something. This distinction has seemed especially important when it comes to moral (and other »practical«) knowledge, where know-how seemingly takes pride of place. Yet any plausible account of moral *know-how* needs to make sense of how and why the abilities in question count as knowledge. And it is not clear there is any way to do this without, in effect, reducing knowing how to a kind of knowing that. I explore the extent to which meeting the challenge is compatible capturing what is attractive and important about the original distinction.

F Hills

**What is a moral expert?**

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I distinguish a number of different ways in which one could be considered a moral expert, both theoretical and practical, with a focus on expertise in moral judgement. I argue that moral understanding is crucial to certain particularly important kinds of moral expertise. Distinguishing between implicit and explicit understanding, I argue that whilst implicit moral understanding is sufficient for what I call minimal virtue, explicit moral understanding is required for full moral virtue.

## G Truth, Meaning, and the Semantics – Pragmatics Distinction

Orthodoxy in philosophy of language has it that semantics is concerned with truth-conditional meaning of (declarative) sentences, while pragmatics deals with use-conditional aspects of utterances. According to this view, there is a clear cut distinction between the propositional content of sentences on the one hand, and what is conveyed by sentences or their utterance in certain conversational settings, on the other hand. This orthodoxy has come under criticism as it appears to be unable to give a clear cut analysis of the mechanisms responsible for the ways in which features of the context of utterance seem to influence different aspects of meaning in natural language. The purpose of the colloquium »Truth, Mean-

ing, and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction« is to discuss proposals of three dominant camps, namely minimalism, indexicalism, and pragmaticism and their analyses of how the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is to be understood. Some more general guiding questions are: What is the relation between meaning and truth-conditions? Is propositional content compositional? What are the necessary features of a context of utterance? And in what ways can they influence the speaker-meaning of sentences?

Organisation: **Elke Brendel, Erik Stei**

**Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09. Truth, Meaning, and the Semantics – Pragmatics Distinction**

**9:00–12:00** (Language: English)

**A 702**

09:00–09:10 Opening

09:10–10:00 **Emma Borg**: Exploring the mechanisms of linguistic context-sensitivity

10:00–10:10 Coffee Break

10:10–10:50 **Zóltan Gendler Szabó**: Dyadic Truth

11:00–11:10 Coffee Break

11:10–12:00 **Robyn Carston**: Linguistic Underdeterminacy, Context and Pragmaticism

## G Borg

**Exploring the mechanisms of linguistic context-sensitivity**

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This paper explores a range of mechanisms which have been posited in philosophy of language in order to explain how linguistic content becomes sensitive to features drawn from a context of utterance (namely indexicality, unarticulated constituents, modulation, and relativisation of content). I consider in what respects these mechanisms differ from one another and what evidence can be provided that any one of them is required within an adequate semantic theory. It is suggested that positing both unarticulated constituents and a process like modulation, as some theorists do, is unmotivated, with modulation apparently providing a better solution to various problems. It is also argued that relativisation is unattractive for various reasons. Thus I suggest that the focus of debate should be on indexicality together with the possibility of semantically relevant modulation of meaning. I then ask about the nature of modulation and explore the implications of these findings for semantic theorising in general.

## G Carston

**Linguistic Underdeterminacy, Context and Pragmaticism**

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I take it that the view that linguistically provided content underdetermines the utterance content (speaker meaning) recovered by addressees in successful communicative exchange is agreed by virtually everyone working in the field of semantics-pragmatics. What remains very much in dispute is the extent and nature of this short-fall, in particular, whether it includes components of content that are wholly pragmatically motivated (setting aside here cases of conversational implicature) or is confined to content whose pragmatic recovery is linguistically indicated (by, for example, indexical elements). The position argued for in this talk is that there is no avoiding the existence of at least some processes of ›free‹ pragmatic enrichment contributing to what addressees take as the speaker-meant propositional content of an utterance and that the remaining questions concern the status of particular cases, whether they are linguistically controlled or free (Carston & Hall, forthcoming).

Among those who accept that pragmatic processes can play this role in the recovery of utterance content, there are divergent views on how these processes work and what they result in. These divergences hinge to a large extent on different conceptions of ›semantics‹ and of the role of ›context‹ in utterance comprehension. *Contextualists* (e.g. Recanati 2004) maintain that the pragmatically-enriched propositional content of an utterance constitutes its (truth-conditional) semantics and that this content is determined by context (both lin-

guistic and extra-linguistic). *Pragmaticists* (e.g. Carston 2008), taking a communicative perspective, maintain that the content that hearers derive (the ›explicature‹) is the outcome of regular pragmatic inferences geared to the recovery of what the speaker meant (her communicative intention). On this view, the role of context is evidential rather than determinative and the resulting content (a hybrid of linguistic meaning and pragmatically inferred meaning) is not the semantics of anything. Rather, it is simply speaker-meant (or communicatively intended) content. Semantics is a different matter and comes in two varieties: a minimalist (often sub-propositional) semantics of linguistic expressions and a truth-conditional semantics of (propositional) thoughts, including both explicatures and implicatures.

## Szabó G

**Dyadic Truth**

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Semantic theories usually employ a triadic notion of truth: they specify the conditions under which a sentence is true in a context  $c$  at an index  $i$ . Yet philosophical orthodoxy holds that truth is absolute. The compromise is forged by two claims. First, that truth belongs primarily to propositions and the reason sentences can have different truth-values in different contexts is that they express different propositions in them. So, propositional truth does not depend on context. Second, talk of truth at an index should be paraphrased away: a proposition is true at a time iff it is, was or will be true when that time is present and it is true at a possible world iff it would be true if that world were actual. So, propositional truth does not depend on index either.

Following Austin, I suggest that the fundamental notion of truth is neither triadic nor monadic. Truth is dyadic: to be true is to be *true of* a situation. As a first rough approximation, the semantics works as follows. The semantic value of a declarative sentence is a property of situations, which I call a proposition. For example, the proposition expressed by ›Sam has the queen of spades‹ in context  $c$  is a property  $p$  such that for all possible situations  $s$ ,  $s$  instantiates  $p$  just in case Sam has the queen of spades in  $s$ . We also have another function  $[\cdot]^c$  which assigns to linguistic expressions targets relative to contexts. Intuitively, the target of an expression in a context is what the expression is used to talk about in that context. For example, the target of ›Sam has the queen of spades‹ in context  $c$  is a situation – the particular game of poker the speaker of  $c$  is referring to. A declarative sentence  $S$  is true relative to context  $c$  iff  $[S]^c$  instantiates  $[[S]]^c$ . This semantics makes propositional truth context-relative and eschews indices altogether. I argue that it has significant advantages over the standard theories, both empirically and conceptually.

## H Mindreading versus Teleological Reasoning: Two Ways of Understanding Rational Action

Folk psychology is a powerful tool for understanding human behavior. It does so by attributing mental states to human agents that define standards of rationality and correctness. Actions are thereby evaluated as rational in the light of what an agent desires and what he believes to be the best way to satisfy his desires. And actions are evaluated as correct in the light of norms which an agent understands and to which he subscribes. Since folk-psychological reasoning is so entrenched in our thinking, it is often assumed to be the only way how standards of rationality and normative evaluations can be grounded.

The contributions to this colloquium will reconsider the controversy between theory-theory and simulation theory in the light of a new approach: teleological reasoning. This approach tries to explain rationality and normativity in objective terms, without appealing to the mental states of an agent. An action is then taken to be rational if it realizes a goal-state that counts as a goal independently of the subjective desires of an agent.

And an action is evaluated as correct if it conforms to a pattern that counts as a norm independently of whether an agent understands the content of this norm.

Empirical motivation for this teleological approach comes from recent work in developmental psychology. There is a wealth of empirical evidence indicating that children understand actions in teleological terms before they begin to attribute beliefs and desires to an agent. While folk-psychological reasoning emerges in children only during their fourth year, teleological reasoning can be observed already in infants from one year on. Josef Perner will start the colloquium by giving an update on relevant empirical data. Pierre Jacob will offer a critical examination of this debate from a philosophical point of view, followed by comments by Johannes Roessler and Hans-Johann Glock.

Organisation: **Johannes Brandl, Frank Esken**

**Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09. Mindreading versus Teleological Reasoning: Two Ways of Understanding Rational Action**  
**9:00–12:00** (Language: English)  
**A 703**

09:00–09:05 Introduction (Johannes Brandl & Frank Esken)  
09:05–09:35 **Josef Perner**: Belief-Desire Psychology and Counterfactual Teleology  
09:35–09:50 Discussion  
09:50–10:20 **Pierre Jacob**: A puzzle about belief-ascription  
10:20–10:35 Discussion  
10:35–10:50 Coffee break  
10:50–11:05 **Hanjo Glock** (commentator)  
11:05–11:20 **Johannes Roessler** (commentator)  
11:20–11:35 Replies from Perner and Jacob  
11:35–12:00 General Diskussion

**H** Jacob**A puzzle about belief-ascription**

Pierre Jacob  
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Much developmental evidence based on the so-called »standard false belief task« shows that when asked to predict where an agent with a false belief about an object's location will look for it, children who know the location of the object fail until they are well into their fourth year. However, several more recent experiments based on different paradigms, including the violation-of-expectation and anticipatory looking paradigms also show that preverbal human infants are able to reliably represent an agent's false beliefs. The puzzle is: how to reconcile these more recent findings with the results based on the standard false belief task? Until very recently there were two main strategies for solving the puzzle. One strategy is to take the data on preverbal human infants at face value and show why it is so hard for 3-year-olds to pass the standard false belief task. The other strategy is to offer low-level explanations for the data on preverbal human infants and deny that they are able to represent another's false beliefs. Recently, a third strategy has emerged based on a so-called »two-systems« approach to belief-ascription. On behalf of the first strategy, I will argue that there is decisive evidence against the second strategy and that the third strategy cannot really get off the ground.

within the agent's perspective (»teleology in perspective;« Perner & Roessler 2010). This allows the use of one's own reasoning about the world, like in simulation, without the need for pretend mental states or introspection.

I present developmental data showing that, when perspectives differ, prediction and explanation of action develops at the age of about 4 years regardless of whether the perspective difference is due to belief or desire. Four years is also the age at which children master other perspective tasks, which also tend to recruit the same cerebral resources in left inferior parietal regions.

**H** Perner**Belief-Desire Psychology  
and Counterfactual Teleology**

Josef Perner  
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An action is objectively rational if it is the appropriate action for reaching a goal. To know whether an action is objectively rational one has to figure out from a given goal and current circumstances what the appropriate instrumental action would be. A teleologist uses this scheme for interpreting agents' movements as intentional actions. It is limited, though, to cases where the agent shares the perspective of the teleologist about what the current circumstances and goals are. When the views diverge the agent's actions often become irrational for the teleologist. Such an agent's actions can be rationalized (subjective rationality) by considering her subjective beliefs and desires, i.e., with a belief-desire psychology.

When construed as a theory with principles of when mental states are created, how they interact, and issue in behaviour (»theory theory«) belief-desire psychology meets an impasse when it comes to determining the appropriate instrumental action to reach a goal. This has to be figured out using one's own knowledge about the world and can hardly be contained in a theory about the mind – an insight due to simulation theory (Heal 1986). Standard simulation theory (Goldman 2006) has, however, undesirable features; it relies on pretence (pretend beliefs) and on introspection. As an alternative, teleology can be applied in counterfactual suppositional reasoning

## I The Contribution of the History of Philosophy to the Theory of Perception

The topic of perception is widely discussed in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of mind, but it has also been the subject of much debate in the history of philosophy: What is sensory perception, and in what sense is it epistemically relevant?

In order to answer this question, one must engage oneself with other related questions: Is there a reliable way to distinguish perception from illusion, and if so, how? How is the relationship between sensory and conceptual elements in perception to be determined, and what significance does this determination have for the possibility of (perceptual) know-

ledge? In what respect(s) is the characterization of perception as a »passive« process relevant to the determination of its epistemological function?

In this colloquium, we intend to discuss three possible answers to these questions that come from different traditions and epochs in the history of philosophy: the early modern period, Kant, and phenomenology. The aim is to look at the adequacy of these various approaches to a contemporary theory of perception.

Organisation: **Dina Emundts, Ursula Renz**

### **Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09. The Contribution of the History of Philosophy to the Theory of Perception**

**9:00–12:00** (Language: English and German)

**A 701**

09:00–09:05 Begrüßung und Eröffnung/Welcome and Opening

09:05–09:40 **Lisa Shapiro**: Hume and Condillac on Consciousness and the Content of Thought

09:40–09:50 Diskussion/Discussion

09:50–10:25 **Barry Stroud**: Perceptual Knowledge and the Primacy of Judgement

10:25–10:35 Diskussion/Discussion

10:35–10:50 Pause / break

10:50–11:25 **Gianfranco Soldati**: Elements of a Phenomenological Theory of Perception

11:25–11:35 Diskussion/Discussion

11:35–12:00 Abschlussdiskussion/Discussion



**I** Shapiro**Hume and Condillac on Consciousness  
and the Content of Thought**

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Hume and Condillac both see themselves as following the Empiricist programme set out by Locke, and yet their accounts of sensory experience – the foundation of empiricism – diverge in interesting ways. For Condillac all sensations are species of pleasure and pain; for Hume, though pleasure and pain are sensations, not all sensations are pleasant or painful. The crux of the difference between Condillac and Hume on this point lies in their conception of awareness. For Condillac, a sensory experience is essentially owned by a thinking subject, whereas Hume rejects the view that there is a self – or owner – accompanying every thought. Nonetheless, Condillac ought not to be taken to suppose a subject's existing prior to experience, as for him our awareness begins as something quite primitive and develops with our experiences over time. These different conceptions of awareness would seem to imply different conceptions of the representational content of our sensory experiences. To properly understand wherein this difference lies requires a consideration of the role of force and vivacity in Hume's account of sensory experience.

**I** Soldati**Elements of a Phenomenological Theory  
of Perception**

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In this paper I shall develop a number of ideas that have their origin in Husserl's theory of perception. I want to argue that there is room for a phenomenological conception of perception and perceptual experience that distinguishes it from most alternatives that have been formulated so far. Among the questions I shall address there is first the issue about Husserl's intentionalism and its supposed opposition to direct realism. I shall argue that Husserl's epistemic version of direct realism (perceptual experience provide direct justification) does not commit one to support metaphysical direct realism (perceptual experiences do not have genuine correctness conditions and depend on their relation to their objects). The elucidation of Husserl's epistemology of perception will insist on his notion of perceptual fulfillment, which has to be distinguished from different forms of propositional justification. Perceptual fulfillment, I shall argue, applies originally in the domain of demonstrative thought, and only derivatively in other domains. It is important to determine what the experience makes manifest in consciousness and thus available as an epistemic basis for judging. Husserl's inquiries into the role of attention provide useful insights in this respect. I shall compare and contrast them with some more recent work in that domain.

Stroud **I****Perceptual Knowledge and the Primacy of Judgement**

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Broadly ›Kantian‹ views of perception regard judgement or propositional thought as essential to the possibility of perceptual knowledge. Other modern views of perception regard only things or qualities, not states of affairs, as the proper objects of perception. I think this is what enables broadly ›Kantian‹ views to offer the best (perhaps the only) explanation of how we know by perception that certain things are so in the world around us.

## J Perspectivism in the Philosophy of Science and Epistemology

In current philosophy of science, the notion of perspective and the related idea of perspectivism have become important topics. However, the concept of perspective is often unclear in its philosophical application, where it is not merely to be used in a metaphorical sense. A first goal of the colloquium will therefore consist in clearly outlining the notion in a philosophical context.

The idea of perspectivity has become crucial in the debate about scientific representation. Bas van Fraassen's 2008 book *Scientific Representation: The Paradox of Perspective* is one of the best known examples for this development. On the other hand, scientific perspectivism had originally been established based on the ideas of perspectival knowledge and scientific observation. These origins have given room to a number of debates: Is perspectivism merely a form of constructivism or must perhaps collapse into constructivism? Does it imply a form of relativism, or must a proponent of perspectivism, on the contrary, adopt a version of realism? This leads to the question whether scientific perspectivism may establish an alternative third position between realism and various forms of antirealism or constructivism in philosophy.

To discuss these questions, the colloquium will bring three important philosophers together: James Conant, Ronald Giere and Paul Teller. James Conant will provide a basis for the colloquium's debate by analyzing the concept of perspective and locating it in the various contexts of discourse in which it is being used, presenting varieties of perspectival arguments in philosophy.

His talk will be followed by Ronald Giere, who associated perspectivism with a sort of realism that differs from regular realism while still representing a version of perspectival realism. His paradigm for scientific perspectivism is color vision, which he argues to be analogue to scientific observation. Nonetheless, this relation is still controversial and subject of debate.

Another important question related to perspectivism is that of ontology. Paul Teller will address this question in his presentation. He argues for a perspectivism of scientific knowledge that claims that our knowledge is based on »complementary ontologies«, all needed for a robust understanding of reality.

Organisation: **Jörn Wüstenberg**

### Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09. **Perspektivismus in der Wissenschaftstheorie und der Erkenntnistheorie/Perspectivism in Philosophy of Science and Epistemology**

**9:00–12:00** (Language: English and German)  
**A 704**

- 09:00–09:15 Einleitung/Introduction (Jörn Wüstenberg)
- 09:15–10:00 **James Conant**: Varieties of Perspectivism
- 10:00–10:10 Diskussion/Discussion
- 10:00–10:55 **Ronald Giere**: Scientific Perspectivism: Elaborations and Explorations
- 10:55–11:05 Diskussion/Discussion
- 11:05–11:50 **Paul Teller**: What Is It to Give an Ontology?
- 11:50–12:00 Diskussion/Discussion
- 12:00 Mittagspause/Lunch Break

J Conant

**Varieties of Perspectivism**

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The aim of the paper is to distinguish four rather different philosophical positions, all of which can be and have been associated with the term ›perspectivism‹ and to clarify the dialectical relation between these four philosophical positions. The positions in question run the gamut from robust realism to strident anti-realism. That the same term and some of the same philosophical considerations can be and have been associated with opposite poles in the realism/anti-realism debate suggests that there is considerable unclarity in what is at stake in a philosophical position being a version of perspectivism. The primary goal of the paper is to diagnose some of the sources of these unclaritys.

J Giere

**Scientific Perspectivism: Elaborations and Explorations**

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Since the publication of my *Scientific Perspectivism*, there have been several lines of criticism coming from apparently different directions. One line suggests that perspectivism slips into constructivism. An opposing line suggests that perspectivism presupposes scientific realism. Cutting across these lines is the question whether there are weaker and stronger forms of perspectivism. The weaker form takes perspectivism to be a response to our epistemological situation. There are truths out in the world, but our methods are not strong enough reliably to discover them. We must settle for developing various perspectives on what the truths might be. A stronger form of perspectivism denies the independent existence of truths in the world, leaving perspectives as our only option. I will argue for the stronger form.

I would also like to explore perspectivist views in the work of some recent prominent philosophers of science, particularly Feyerabend, Kuhn, and Putnam. Regarding Kuhn in particular, it is easy to understand his original paradigms as providing a perspective within which scientists formulate hypotheses and design experiments. But his later writings are even more explicit, suggesting a form of perspectival realism. My tentative conclusion is that, although the rhetoric of perspectivism has been absent, perspectivism as a form of conceptual constructivism has been a widespread view within the philosophy of science for half a century. Here conceptual constructivism is distinguished from a prominent form of social constructivism, which is an account of the mechanisms of consensus formation in science. Perspectivism, on the other hand, is compatible with standard accounts of hypothesis formation and testing while allowing room for social and other influences in theory choice.

Teller J

**What Is It to Give an Ontology?**

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We think of the ontologist's job as that of figuring out, what is the true ontology of the world. A tough job because, today and for at least a long time to come, even our best theories are highly idealized, not true. Consider the example of water: To understand the fluid properties of water we idealize it as a continuous medium, and to understand dispersive, electrolytic and other properties we idealize it as a collection of thermally moving particles. We think that the particulate ontology is »more nearly right«. I argue against this attitude, urging that instead we should think of the two water models both as legitimate ways of understanding aspects of the world, both of which, given human limitations, we must have for the our best available way of getting at the world. And I argue that this »water / water« moral applies very generally to all our theoretical knowledge. Given that the world is too complicated for us to devise theories that are both completely precise and completely accurate, our theoretical knowledge of the world is ineliminably pluralistic. The same sort of conclusions apply also to our prescientific, in particular to perceptual knowledge. We have a kind of »reifying instinct« that makes us think intuitively as direct realists. But perception essentially involves representation, and where representation in science always fails of perfect precision and / or accuracy, the more so does this hold for perception. This conclusion is well illustrated and supported by what we know of color perception that is not of some independent, intrinsic properties of external objects, but is a complex, approximate, and dynamic relation among us, perceptual targets and the intervening environment. So the conclusion holds with complete generality: Our epistemic limitations dictate that, rather than choosing some one correct ontology from among competing rivals, human knowledge works with complementary ontologies all of which we need for a robust but never exact understanding of what there is.



## Sektionen / Sections

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Sprachphilosophie	<b>1</b>	Philosophy of Language
Metaphysik und Ontologie	<b>2</b>	Metaphysics and Ontology
Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie	<b>3</b>	Logic and Philosophy of Science
Philosophie des Geistes	<b>4</b>	Philosophy of Mind
Erkenntnistheorie	<b>5</b>	Epistemology
Religionsphilosophie und Ästhetik	<b>6</b>	Philosophy of Religion and Aesthetics
Angewandte Ethik, Politische, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie	<b>7</b>	Applied Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
Normative Ethik, Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie	<b>8</b>	Normative Ethics, Metaethics, Theory of Action and Theory of Decision

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**7** Aicher

**Problems of advance directives in psychiatric care**

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Advance directives are a powerful tool for prospective patients to manage end-of-life treatment prior to a state of incompetence. Since documents of this kind are becoming more and more popular amongst people who suffer from severe mental illness, it is worth examining psychiatric advance directives (PADs) in more detail. Professionals like psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers sometimes raise critical voices about PADs, pointing to implementation problems on the one hand and questioning its moral authority on the other hand. Although patients' and professionals' attitudes are appropriately studied with the help of empirical research methods, ethical theory poses equally important questions about (surrogate) decision-making as well as (precedent) autonomy, paternalism, coercion, trust and personal identity which are relevant to the bioethical debate surrounding PADs. It is therefore of utmost importance in the present debate to consider both ethical theory and empirical research. In this very paper I want to address some philosophically relevant questions concerning PADs: First of all, I am interested in how psychiatric advance directives differ from other medical advance directives (e.g. in palliative care) and why it is important to acknowledge this difference. Second, I will turn to the bioethical principle of autonomy and the concept of voluntary informed consent insofar as it relates to the debate surrounding PADs. Finally, I will focus on the problem of (surrogate) decision-making in case of mentally ill patients and the moral authority of PADs.

**3** Alscher

**Negative Resultate über Interpretierbarkeit in RCF**

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Eine wichtige Frage der Philosophie der Mathematik beschäftigt sich mit den Grundlagen der Mathematik. Dabei spielt häufig die Idee eine Rolle, Mathematik oder umfassendere Teilbereiche auf ein bestimmtes Gebiet zurückzuführen. Mit Hilfe der Logik können solche Reduktionen als Relationen zwischen Theorien formal bestimmt und untersucht werden. Auch unabhängig von der Frage nach den Grundlagen der Mathematik werden dabei Einsichten in die Zusammenhänge mathematischer Theorien gewonnen.

Im Lichte der Unterscheidung zwischen diskreter und stetiger Mathematik und ausgehend von der Menge der reellen Zahlen als Paradigma der Kontinua, stellt sich die Frage, inwieweit eine Theorie der reellen Zahlen als Grundlage anderer mathematischer Theorien dienen könnte. Während es auf der Hand liegt, bestimmte stetige Objektbereiche (wie geometrische Räume oder komplexe Zahlen) auf reelle Zahlen zurückzuführen, erwartet man von diskreter Mathematik eher, dass ihre Reduzierung auf eine Theorie der reellen Zahlen nicht zu bewerkstelligen ist. Diese Erwartung soll hier bestätigt wer-

den. Dabei werden als Repräsentationen mathematischer Teilbereiche prädikatenlogische Theorien erster Stufe mit Identität dienen, als Theorie der reellen Zahlen wird die vollständige Theorie RCF der reell abgeschlossenen Körper gewählt und der Reduzierbarkeitszusammenhang wird durch die intertheoretische Relation der relativen Interpretierbarkeit formalisiert. Dementsprechend werden negative Resultate über die Interpretierbarkeit in RCF gezeigt. Die zu behandelnden Beispiele diskreter Mathematik sind Arithmetik, diskrete Ordnungen, Paarfunktionen und Boole'sche Algebren.

Außerdem können diese Ergebnisse einen Beitrag zu einer präziseren Distinktion zwischen diskreter und stetiger Mathematik leisten. Zunächst ist die klassische Unterscheidung mittels der Mächtigkeit der zu Grunde liegenden Objektbereiche (diskret – abzählbar, stetig – überabzählbar) wegen des Löwenheim-Skolem-Theorems auf prädikatenlogische Theorien erster Stufe nicht anwendbar. Ein alternativer Vorschlag ist es nun, gewisse Theorien aufgrund ihrer Interpretierbarkeit in RCF als Theorien stetiger Mathematik aufzufassen. Ein Argument für dieses Kriterium besteht dann im Nachweis, dass bestimmte Theorien, welche klassischerweise der diskreten Mathematik zugeschrieben werden, nicht in RCF interpretierbar sind.

**Andric** **8**

**A New Argument for Subjective Consequentialism**

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Consequentialists argue about how their theory should best be understood. Subjective consequentialism is the doctrine that an act is right if and only if it maximizes expected value, otherwise the act is wrong. Subjective Consequentialism's most important rival is objective consequentialism. According to objective consequentialism, an act is right if and only if it maximizes actual value, otherwise the act is wrong.

This paper aims to defend a new argument for subjective consequentialism which I call the argument from limited tasks. The basic idea is that consequentialism gives you a limited task because the states of affairs you ought to bring about according to consequentialism are not ideal (in a sense which will be specified in the talk). In the case of limited tasks, agents ought to maximize expected rather than actual value. Therefore, consequentialists should accept subjective consequentialism.

**Bagattini** **7**

**Kindeswohl als moralpsychologischer Grundbegriff**

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Der Begriff des Kindeswohls, bzw. des kindlichen Wohlergehens, wird häufig in öffentlichen Debatten in politischen, medizinischen und pädagogischen Kontexten verwendet. Hierbei gibt es einen breiten Konsens darüber, dass das Kindeswohl ein relevantes und schützenswertes Gut ist. Gleichwohl gibt es sowohl auf praktischer als auch auf theoretischer Ebene keine

## Defining Explanatory Understanding

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In spite of the increasing interest in the concept of understanding, epistemologists have offered little in the way of its analysis. I propose a definition of explanatory understanding. First, I argue with reference to testimonial cases that in contrast to knowledge why  $p$ , understanding why  $p$  involves a grasp of the causes or reasons why  $p$  that manifests itself in an ability to explain  $p$  as well as an ability to justify one's explanation. Since one can have these abilities to a greater or lesser degree, understanding-why is gradual. Second, I argue that one's explanation has to answer the facts but in contrast to knowledge-why, understanding-why is not always factive. Third, I argue that a definition of understanding-why does not need an epistemically external anti-luck condition.

As a result, I suggest that  $S$  understands why  $p$  (to some extent) iff (1)  $S$  has the justified true belief that  $p$  and her justification is independent from her explanation of  $p$ , (2)  $S$  commits herself to an explanation  $E$  which explains  $p$  with  $q$ , (3)  $S$  is (to some extent) able (a) to explain  $p$  with  $q$  by means of  $E$  and (b) to justify  $E$ , and (4)  $E$  answers (to some extent) to the facts. Condition (3, a) requires being (to some extent) able (i) to draw the conclusion that  $p$  from the information that  $q$  and, given the information that  $p$ , give the explanation that  $q$ , (ii) to explain how  $q$  can cause  $p$  or be a reason why  $p$ , and (iii) for some  $p^*$  and  $q^*$ , similar but not identical to  $p$  and  $q$ , draw the conclusion that  $p^*$  from the assumption that  $q^*$ , and, assuming that  $p^*$ , give the explanation that  $q^*$ . Condition (3, b) requires being (to some extent) able to show that  $E$  (i) is coherent and coheres with background beliefs, (ii) is empirically adequate, and (iii) optimizes explanatory desiderata.

Finally, I argue against reducing explanatory understanding to propositional understanding and indicate how my definition can be adapted to objectual understanding.

## Is it possible to experimentally reveal non-reductive mental causation?

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Arguments of causal exclusion, as most famously advanced by Kim (1989; 2003; 2005), aim to expose a tension within the position of non-reductive physicalists, who (among other things) endorse the following claims: (i) the domain of the physical is causally closed, (ii) mental properties non-reductively supervene on physical properties, and (iii) mental properties may be causes of physical effects of their own supervenience bases. The tension revealed by exclusion arguments exists between the first two claims and the third: it is unclear how something that is not reducible to the physical domain, i.e. something ultimately nonphysical, could causally affect

einheitliche Meinung darüber, worin das Kindeswohl genau besteht. Eine philosophische Analyse kann an dieser Stelle weiterhelfen, indem normative und deskriptive Bedingungen des Kindeswohls geklärt werden. In diesem Vortrag soll auf die Unklarheiten des Kindeswohlbegriffs eingegangen werden, die mit dem Begriff des Wohlergehens – des well-being – einer Person zusammenhängen.

Ausgehend von der These, dass der Kindeswohlbegriff schwach paternalistisch (auf das beste Interesse des Kindes bezogen) zu verstehen ist, soll untersucht werden, ob und inwiefern sich die allgemeine philosophische Debatte um den Begriff des Wohlergehens einer Person auf eine Analyse des Kindeswohlbegriffs übertragen lässt. In einem ersten Schritt wird sowohl eine präferenz utilitaristische als auch eine eudämonistische Analyse des Kindeswohlbegriffs zurückgewiesen. Während die utilitaristischen Ansätze gewissermaßen zu wenig normative Grundlage für eine Bestimmung des Kindeswohlbegriffs liefern, oszillieren eudämonistische Ansätze zwischen einer zu starken oder zu vagen normativen Grundlage.

In einem zweiten Schritt wird dann eine mittlere Position für eine Bestimmung des Kindeswohlbegriffs vorgeschlagen, die sich an Maslows Modell der Grundbedürfnisse orientiert, das fünf menschliche Grundbedürfnisse unterscheidet: physiologische Bedürfnisse, Sicherheit, soziale Bedürfnisse, Individualbedürfnisse und Selbstverwirklichung. Der Vorteil dieser Position gegenüber den utilitaristischen Ansätzen liegt darin, dass Bedürfnisse im Gegensatz zu Präferenzen einen intrinsisch normativen Charakter haben. Insbesondere die psychologische Forschung und die Bildungsforschung liefern starke empirische Belege dafür, dass Bedürfnisse auf allen fünf Ebenen für das Kindeswohl relevant sind. Der Vorteil des Bedürfnis-Ansatzes gegenüber eudämonistischen Konzeptionen des Kindeswohls liegt darin, dass deren Stärke (eine robuste normative Grundlage) bewahrt wird, ohne aber mit deren notorischen Problemen (Elitarismus oder Relativismus) behaftet zu sein. Ich werde argumentieren, dass diese beiden Vorteile gute Gründe dafür liefern, einen auf dem Bedürfnisbegriff basierenden Kindeswohlbegriff anzunehmen.

## 5 Balcerak Jackson

## Imagination and the A Priori / A Posteriori Distinction

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In this paper I argue that imagination provides us with a priori justification and I draw consequences for the traditional a priori / a posteriori distinction.

From an epistemic point of view, imagination is a puzzling cognitive capacity: When we imagine a red apple we are in a lot of ways in a mental state that is similar to the perceptual state of seeing a red apple. However, while we rely on the input of the external environment to exercise our capacity of perceiving, we can exercise our capacity of imagination even absent any external input in the philosophical armchair. So, does imagination provide us with any sort of evidence? And if so, is it a posteriori like the evidence we get from sensory experience, or is it a priori like the evidence we get from reasoning and/or understanding?

the domain of the physical, even though the latter is causally closed.

In recent years, the argumentative strategies adopted by non-reductive physicalists to immunize their position against the threat posed by exclusion arguments have been supplemented by an experimentalist strategy. Authors as Shapiro and Sober (2007), Woodward (2008), or List and Menzies (2009) argue that the currently very popular interventionist approach to causation – as most exhaustively presented in Woodward (2003) – provides techniques of causal discovery and modeling that allow for experimentally confirming the possibility of non-reductive mental-to-physical causation, i.e. that supply empirical evidence for claim (iii).

This paper argues that experimentally revealing non-reductive mental-to-physical causation is by far not as straightforward as non-reductive physicalists would like to have it. In the first part, I show that standard interventionist techniques of causal discovery as developed in Woodward (2003) are in fact not applicable to cases of mental-to-physical causation. The second part is then concerned with conceivable adaptations of interventionist techniques that are custom-built for structures featuring downward mental causation. However, it will turn out that these custom-built techniques, in principle, cannot produce empirical evidence that would favor (iii) over its negation. Overall, the paper concludes that the experimentalist defense of non-reductive physicalism fails.

turelle Unternehmensverantwortung in ein adäquates Verhältnis zueinander zu setzen und systematisch abzuwägen, wofür Unternehmen unter ungerechten Hintergrundbedingungen jeweils interaktional und strukturell verantwortlich sind. Diesbezüglich verteidige ich die These, dass struktureller Verantwortung von Unternehmen unter diesen Umständen ein vergleichsweise großer Stellenwert zukommt. Unternehmen und insbesondere multinationale Konzerne sind auch strukturell relativ wirkmächtige Akteure, die ihren Einfluss häufig direkt auf politischer Ebene geltend machen. Nach der Vergegenwärtigung eines Spektrums von unterschiedlich weit gehender interaktionaler und struktureller Unternehmensverantwortung argumentiere ich dafür, dass Unternehmen in interaktionaler Hinsicht mindestens dafür verantwortlich sind, geltendes positives Recht nicht zu verletzen, und in struktureller Hinsicht, solche Strukturereformen nicht aktiv zu verhindern, die Hintergrundgerechtigkeit reduzieren würden. Die Verantwortung von Unternehmen reicht jedoch weiter: Je nach ihren spezifischen Einflussmöglichkeiten können sie ihrer moralischen Verantwortung entweder interaktional durch die Einlösung eines fairen Anteils nachkommen, der sich durch ein kontrafaktisches Szenario vollständiger Normenkonformität bestimmen lässt, oder aber durch einen positiven Beitrag zu strukturellen Reformen, die zu mehr Hintergrundgerechtigkeit und zu einer Verrechtlichung von interaktionaler Verantwortung führen.

### 7 Beck

#### Unternehmensverantwortung und partielle Normenkonformität

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Ob Unternehmen überhaupt als Subjekte moralischer Verantwortung gelten können, ist eine immer noch kontrovers debattierte Grundfrage der Unternehmensethik. Ich werde in meinem Vortrag eine affirmative Antwort auf diese Frage voraussetzen und mich auf die Anschlussfrage konzentrieren, wie der Umfang von Unternehmensverantwortung genauer zu bestimmen ist. Dazu werde ich in einem ersten Schritt interaktionale und strukturelle Verantwortung als zwei für die Zuschreibung von Unternehmensverantwortung wichtige Verantwortungsformen unterscheiden, die eine unterschiedliche Adressatenrichtung aufweisen. Die Zuschreibung von interaktionaler Verantwortung erfolgt mit Blick auf die Normenkonformität des jeweiligen Verantwortungssubjekts in der direkten Interaktion mit seinen Verantwortungsadressaten. Im Unterschied dazu erfolgt die Zuschreibung von struktureller Verantwortung mit Blick auf den Einfluss von Verantwortungssubjekten auf soziale Strukturen, die diese mit ihren Verantwortungsadressaten verbinden. Es zeigt sich, dass struktureller Unternehmensverantwortung ein wichtiger Stellenwert zukommt, auch wenn sie viel seltener als interaktionale Unternehmensverantwortung zugeschrieben wird und auch in theoretischer Hinsicht eher noch unterbelichtet ist.

In einem zweiten Schritt gehe ich ausführlicher auf Möglichkeiten ein, den Umfang von interaktionaler und struktureller Unternehmensverantwortung unter Berücksichtigung der partiellen Normenkonformität von relevanten Akteuren substantiell zu bestimmen. Es gilt, interaktionale und struk-

### Bleisch 7

#### Rabentöchter? Rabensöhne? Zur Begründung filialer Pflichten

Barbara Bleisch

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Sind erwachsene Kinder ihren Eltern in spezieller Hinsicht verpflichtet? Gibt es – analog zur »Rabenmutter«, die ihren Nachwuchs vernachlässigt – auch die »Rabentochter« und den »Rabensohn«, die einen moralischen Fehler begehen, weil sie sich nicht (hinreichend) um ihre Eltern kümmern? Dieser Beitrag untersucht, ob Kindschaft ein Umstand ist, der spezielle Pflichten generiert. In den ersten drei Abschnitten werden drei gängige Begründungsmodelle solcher filialer Pflichten kritisch diskutiert: das Dankbarkeitsmodell, das Reziprozitätsmodell und das Freundschaftsmodell. Da keines der gängigen Modelle abschliessend zu überzeugen vermag, soll im vierten Abschnitt mittels einer Analyse der »Nicht-Aufkündbarkeit« der Eltern-Kind-Beziehung ein alternatives Modell entwickelt werden: das Identitätsmodell filialer Pflichten. Es leitet entsprechende Verpflichtungen direkt aus der Eltern-Kind-Beziehung ab, welche die Identität von Eltern wie deren Söhne und Töchter massiv prägt. Dieses identitätsstiftende Moment der Eltern-Kind-Beziehung ist dabei unabhängig davon, ob diese Beziehungen gelingen oder nicht. Fokussieren wir auf die Schattenseiten solcher Relationen, wird umso deutlicher, wie gerade deren identitätsstiftender Charakter mit einer extremen Verletzbarkeit der Beteiligten einhergeht. Die filiale Pflicht verlangt deshalb, im Bewusstsein dieser besonderen wechselseitigen Verletzbarkeit respektvoll mit den eigenen Eltern umzugehen. Eine solche Herangehensweise an filiale Pflichten impliziert zweierlei: Erstens lässt sich über deren Inhalt nichts Allgemeines, sondern nur Partikulares sagen, denn jede Bezie-



hung birgt andere Grade und Formen gemeinsamer Identität und wechselseitiger Verletzbarkeit. Zweitens erweisen sich filiale Pflichten, so begründet, als nicht-exklusiv für die Eltern-Kind-Beziehung. Vielmehr sind sie reduzierbar auf die generelle Pflicht, andere Menschen nicht zu verletzen. Diese Pflicht erfährt jedoch in der Eltern-Kind-Beziehung eine ganz besondere Wichtigkeit und Ausprägung.

## 1 Bluhm

### Don't Ask, Look! Linguistic Corpora as a Tool for Conceptual Analysis

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Ordinary Language Philosophy has largely fallen out of favour and with it the belief in the primary importance of analyses of ordinary language for philosophical purposes. Still, in their various endeavours philosophers not only from analytic but also from other backgrounds make reference to the use and / or meaning of terms of interest in ordinary parlance. In doing so, they most commonly appeal to their own linguistic intuitions (in the sense of their active knowledge of the object language). Not uncommonly, the appeal to individual intuitions is supplemented by reference to dictionaries. In recent times, internet search engine queries on expressions of interest have become quite popular. Apparently, the attempt is to surpass the limits of one's own linguistic intuitions by appeal to experts or to factual uses of language. I will argue that this attempt is recommendable but that its execution is wanting. Instead of appealing to dictionaries and / or internet queries, philosophers should employ computer-based linguistic corpora in order to confirm or falsify hypotheses about the factual use of language. This also has some advantages over methods employed by experimental philosophy. If the importance of ordinary language is stressed, the use of linguistic corpora is hardly avoidable.

### The Formula of Universal Law: A Reconstruction

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This paper provides a methodologically original and precise rendition of the version of Kant's Categorical Imperative known as the »Formula of Universal Law« (FUL). A formal structure consisting of possible worlds and games – a »game frame« – is used to interpret a Kantian maxim and to define the two tests of FUL: the so-called »contradiction in conception« and »contradiction in the will« tests. The analysis of the resulting formal structure demonstrates how FUL fails to generate the conclusions that Kant thought could be derived from it. In particular, we reinforce existing doubts that Kant's famous defence of the duty of beneficence cannot be sustained. Furthermore, we show that certain agent-neutral forms of consequentialism satisfy FUL. We conclude by suggesting that the problems can be circumvented if we focus on what we call »comprehensive« Kantianism, which is the application of FUL to systems of maxims rather than to isolated maxims.

### Liberalismus, Handlungsfreiheit und Autonomie

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Häufig wird behauptet, dem Liberalismus als einer Theorie des wechselseitigen Miteinanders ginge es um den Schutz der individuellen Handlungsfreiheit. Sein normativer Kerngedanke sei daher ein individuelles Recht auf Freiheit, aus dem nicht nur den Individuen untereinander, sondern vor allem auch dem Staat gegenüber seinen Bürgern bestimmte Pflichten erwachsen. In meinem Vortrag möchte ich zeigen, dass diese Annahme für den Kontext der politischen Philosophie falsch ist: Denn der Liberalismus setzt sich nur insofern für die Handlungsfreiheit der Bürger gegenüber dem Staat ein, als diese notwendig ist für deren Autonomie. D. h. das Legitimitätskriterium, das der Liberalismus an staatliches Handeln anlegt, sichert den Bürgern genau diejenigen Handlungsalternativen, die sie brauchen, um autonom handeln zu können; doch sofern eine Handlungsoption keine ist, in der sich die Autonomie der Bürger manifestieren könnte, muss sie staatlichen Eingriffen nicht entzogen werden.

Um für diese These zu argumentieren, werde ich in einem ersten Teil darlegen, was man grundsätzlich unter deskriptiver Handlungsfreiheit verstehen sollte. Dafür stelle ich zuerst bestimmte Kriterien auf, denen eine adäquate Explikation des Begriffs der Handlungsfreiheit gerecht werden muss. Hier wird sich zwar zum einen zeigen, dass keine der gängigen Auffassungen von Freiheit all diesen Kriterien genügen kann; zudem wird aber deutlich, dass man insgesamt an einer bestimmten Version einer negativen Auffassung von Freiheit festhalten sollte. In einem zweiten Teil möchte ich dann darstellen, dass es, gegeben die zuerst entwickelte Auffassung von

Handlungsfreiheit, eben nicht diese ist, um deren Schutz es dem Liberalismus geht. Denn das Freiheitsrecht, das klassische liberale ebenso wie libertäre Autoren den Individuen gegenüber dem Staat einräumen, schützt vielmehr nur diejenigen Handlungsalternativen vor staatlichem Zugriff, die für ein autonomes Leben notwendig sind. Diese Erkenntnis ist nicht nur deswegen interessant, weil sie ein weitverbreitetes Missverständnis – dem auch viele Anhänger des Liberalismus anheimfallen – aufklärt: Ausgehend von ihr lässt sich zudem zum einen klären, worin genau der Unterschied zwischen Liberalismus und Libertarismus besteht; vor allem aber eröffnet sie neue Perspektiven hinsichtlich der Frage, wie man für den normativen Kerngedanken des Liberalismus argumentieren sollte.

**Ein Argument für den Bestätigungspluralismus**

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Dieses Paper präsentiert ein einfaches Argument für den Bestätigungspluralismus, d. i. die Position, dass eine adäquate Bestätigungstheorie mehr als ein Bestätigungsmaß benötigt. Hierfür wird zunächst nachgewiesen, dass es keine Bestätigungsmaß geben kann, welches alle Aufgaben einer Bestätigungstheorie gerecht wird. Konkret wird aufgezeigt, dass in der Geschichte der Wissenschaftstheorie zwei Aufgaben als die Kernaufgaben einer Bestätigungstheorie angesehen werden. Zum einen soll eine Bestätigungstheorie angeben, welche Theorien Wissenschaftler im Lichte der Beobachtungsdaten akzeptieren sollen; zum anderen soll eine Bestätigungstheorie angeben, welche Experimente Wissenschaftler ausführen sollten, um wissenschaftliche Theorien zu testen. Die Annahme, dass es eine Bestätigungsmaß gibt, welches beiden Aufgaben gerecht wird, setzt voraus, dass dieses Bestätigungsmaß zum einen angibt, wie akzeptable eine Theorie im Lichte der Beobachtungsdaten ist, und zum anderen angibt, wie sehr die Beobachtungsdaten eine Theorie stützen bzw. schwächen. Abschließend wird gezeigt, dass es keine solches Bestätigungsmaß geben kann. Als Konsequenz ergibt sich, dass eine Bestätigungstheorie, welche beiden Aufgaben gerecht werden möchte, mehr als ein Bestätigungsmaß beinhalten muss: eines, welches angibt, wie akzeptable eine Theorie im Lichte der Beobachtungsdaten ist, und eines, welches angibt, wie sehr die Beobachtungsdaten eine Theorie stützen bzw. schwächen.

**The content of imaginings**

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Sensory imaginings and perceptual experiences are often considered to be similar mental states. Nevertheless we are typically able to reliably distinguish perceptual from imaginative states. So what exactly is the difference between perceptual experiences and sensory imaginings? The main goal of this paper is to answer this question by elucidating the distinctive nature of imaginative content. To do so I will concentrate on one feature often claimed to distinguish imaginings from perceptions, which is the different relation of the subject's will to the content of the respective kind of state. While the content of (veridical) perceptual experiences is dependent on external factors and will-independent, imaginings are held to be will-dependent. What is imagined is determined by the subject's intention.

I will analyze this particular feature of imaginings by reconsidering a claim about the content of visual imaginings and the role of imaginative intentions: the so-called Multiple Use Thesis of imagination (MULT), which has been endorsed (implicitly or explicitly) by many authors. MULT claims that the same mental image can serve different imaginative projects.

**5 Briesen**

**Reliabilism and Epistemic Circularity**

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Pretheoretically we hold that we cannot gain justification or knowledge through an epistemically circular reasoning process. Epistemically circular reasoning occurs when a subject forms the belief that p on the basis of an argument A, where at least one of the premises of A already presupposes the truth of p. It has often been argued that process reliabilism does not rule out that this kind of circular reasoning leads to justification or knowledge (cf. the so-called bootstrapping-problem or the easy-knowledge-problem). For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject reliabilism. Those who try to defend reliabilism have two basic options: (1) accept that reliabilism does not rule out circular reasoning, but argue that circular reasoning is not as epistemically »bad« as it seems, or (2) hold on to the view that circular reasoning is epistemically »bad«, but deny that reliabilism really allows this kind of epistemically circular reasoning. After all, reliabilists claim that a belief is justified (or an instance of knowledge) only if it is the result of a reliable belief-forming process. And it is at the very least questionable whether circular reasoning could constitute such a reliable process.

Option (1) has been spelled out in several ways, all of which have found to be problematic for various reasons. Option (2), however, has not been discussed very widely, and where it is considered, it is usually quickly dismissed. In this paper I will thus spell out option (2) in more detail and discuss its prospects and problems. I will argue that the reasons why option (2) has been dismissed are not convincing and that option (2) might in fact be a more promising starting point to defend reliabilism than option (1).

The same mental image can be used to imagine an apple and to imagine a perfect wax replica of an apple. The idea is that mental images are enriched or accompanied by some other, will-dependent and supposition-like mental states which thereby fix the overall imaginative content. According to MULT, the will-dependency of imaginings becomes manifest mainly in the supposition-like states which conceptually grasp mental images.

But MULT raised several questions, e.g.: If the same mental image can be used in different imaginative projects, what is the intrinsic content of the »neutral« mental image? After reviewing MULT on the basis of this criticism, I will offer an alternative account to construe imaginative content and the role of will-dependent imaginative intentions. In the case of imaginings the subject's will-dependent intention determines what the imagining is an imagining of. The role of the will-dependent imaginative intentions is stronger than assumed by MULT: imaginative intentions do not only accompany mental images but rather directly act on their content. So there is no room for »neutral« mental images.

## 8 Brun

### Intuitions and reflective equilibrium – an uneasy combination?

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The method of reflective equilibrium (RE) is often characterized in terms of intuitions or conceived of as a method for justifying intuitions. I argue that the method of RE cannot be characterized in terms of intuitions, but can be applied to intuitions if intuitions are not taken to have an epistemic privilege which makes them immune from revision.

The core of the method of RE is that justification is a matter of agreement between judgements and principles, reached by mutual adjustments. The distinction between judgements and principles involves two contrasts: At every stage in a process of developing a RE, (»current«) judgements differ from principles insofar as judgements include a commitment, whereas principles are elements of a proposed systematic account. A second contrast can be found between the resulting account and the (»antecedent«) commitments the RE-process started out with. If intuitions are to enter this picture, they must play the role of commitments.

Once RE has been reached, all current commitments can be derived from principles. Those entertained solely for this reason are not intuitions since intuitions cannot be produced by conscious inference. Characterizing RE in terms of intuitions is therefore inadequate. Nevertheless, intuitions can be involved in a RE as antecedent commitments and in this way contribute to justification by RE; but justification by RE does not exclusively rest on intuitions. Moreover, the method of RE can also be applied to intuitions: an intuition counts as justified by RE iff a commitment with the same content is included in the commitments that are in RE with the principles. This approach is compatible with the claim that some intuitions may prove impossible to give up.

However, some accounts of intuitions are incompatible with the method of RE. If intuitions are granted not only »initial

credibility« but an epistemic privilege to be immune from revision (e.g. reliability or self-justification), then intuitions must be justified in some way independent of RE. If moral intuitionism holds that intuitions are justified independently of any inferential backing, intuitions again cannot be justified by RE.

## Brzozowski 2

### Defending Weak Supplementation

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The Weak Supplementation Principle is one of the core axioms of Minimal Mereology. It says that when an object has a proper part, it has another proper part that does not overlap with the former proper part. This is supposed to capture the idea that if there is a bit of something (a part distinct from that object), then there must be a bit more of that object (another distinct part). The principle is highly intuitive, and has even been thought to be analytic to parthood. But given the possibility of certain kinds of multi-location motivated either by principles of modal recombination or by the possibility of time travel, the weak supplementation principle has recently come into question. That is, it has been argued that it is possible for there to be objects composed of only a single proper part. I will argue that once we look closer at the nature of composite objects, we can and should resist these arguments against weak supplementation.

**Minimality notions  
in the Theory of Mind-debate**

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Minimality is a topic in philosophy of science: is it both a worthy epistemological and ontological aim to have minimal explanations, simplicity, minimal numbers of entities, relations, levels, etc.? So, how to handle minimality and Theory of Mind?

Common examples are: (1) minimal theory of mind, (2) minimal rationality in various, (3) alief (instead of belief), (4) affordances, (5) minimal ontology, (6) fused belief operator, and (7) undemanding mental particulars.

I argue that a justified notion of minimality capturing the essence of Theory of Mind as thought-following can be tied to the mental model based approach of belief revision (Johnson-Laird and Knaff) and conditional belief. Micro worlds offer a theoretically and experimentally controllable environment that can be used for scaling agents with respect to minimality by combining belief attribution- and revision scenarios.

Minimality in »Theory of Mind« shall be defined as the ability to follow a few of B's revisions. This means that one (1) does only realize a few mental models the other can potentially see if one is minimal-minded, (2) possibly cannot realize the other's preferences or preferred models or revision style, (3) cannot attribute a globalist point of view to him. Being minimal in such circumstances may be a severe limit with respect to making sense of others' action / thoughts – notwithstanding other not assessable contents like »minimal first person content«.

From a philosophical point of view, this scenario shall be given a deeper analysis by linking it to debates about the inventar of mental states. It captures aspects of conditional belief that can be distinguished from »belief simpliciter«, because here the essence of following is to know someone's »habits of beliefs«. Attributing conditional belief or preferences implicates understanding justification and defeasible reasoning in theory of mind.

From a cognitive point of view, it comprises relational reasoning about space. It shall be argued for a special role of space in human thinking and belief attribution in terms of relations and indexicals. We also investigate this scenario experimentally.

**Organisms and semiotic reactivity –  
information in the ontology of biology**

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There are many proposals for organism concepts in terms of lists of properties, mereologies, vitals, or functions. This diversity of concepts may be unsatisfying for the biologist, and the susceptibility of organisms to problems of material constitution as well as »functions« may be problematical for the philosopher. We discuss information as another suggestive foundation for the organism concept and how the choice of an information concept with respect to biological adequacy influences the biological nature and its problems. Our proposal is that (1) organism has a central place in the ontology of biology, and (2) a local and dynamic information concept is needed.

Mainly, we propose that inner relations between functional parts of the organism are informational relations constituted by the semiotic reactivity of these parts – and it is qua these relations that organization and structure are instantiated. Information only makes sense in the context of the organism, i.e. the structure or organization that is held locally by »interpretation«. This property of »semiotic reactivity« is proposed to be a genuine property of biological things of a certain class, i.e. organisms.

From the viewpoint of biology, information and communication play a key role in our understanding of organisms, but the application of Shannon's theory of information in the life sciences faces some significant shortcomings. We summarize some of the core problems and show how they effect our understanding of organism-concepts. Then, we agitate for an alternative, local and dynamic concept of information, called dynamic information that has been introduced with suitable mathematical formalism and examples from biology. This new concept enables us to identify semiotic reactivity as a key property of organisms. In conclusion, some ontological aspects of dynamic information will be discussed.

A new understanding of information allows formulating some dynamic information theoretic »necessary properties« structured things should possess to be an organism. Many answers will have to be asked, e.g.: What is the ontological status of dynamic information? Should we adopt indefiniteness concerning organisms or is organismic information »fixed« such that the individuation of organisms is a definite issue?

## 8 Burkard

**Defending Moral Intuitionism  
Against Debunking Arguments**

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One way of challenging someone's moral beliefs is to show that their sole basis are religious or traditional doctrines which the person no longer accepts. Such a challenge can be formulated as a debunking argument. These are arguments which undermine beliefs – in the sense of showing them to be unjustified (or of removing their justification) – by offering an exhaustive explanation for why they are believed, where the explanation is independent of the beliefs' correctness or truth and leaves no room for a justificatory account. Although the uses to which debunking arguments are put in ethics and the targets they address differ considerably, a dominant theme in recent discussions has been the support these arguments seem to lend to forms of anti-realism about ethics and normative discourse in general: Debunking arguments have been put forward as a challenge to robust versions of moral or normative realism, that is, roughly, to positions according to which there are mind-independent moral or normative facts that serve as truth-makers for the relevant convictions. The targets of these debunking arguments are not particular moral or normative beliefs or contents; rather, the debunking is taken to challenge these beliefs and to judge them unjustified only when understood in a specific, namely a realist way.

Instead of pursuing the metaphysical implications certain debunking arguments purportedly have, this paper focuses directly on the relevance of such arguments for the epistemic justification of moral beliefs. More specifically, I propose ways to respond to debunking arguments within an intuitionist framework. I argue that a plausible form of moral intuitionism can integrate convincing debunking arguments into its account of (defeasibly) justified moral beliefs. To do so, I sketch a minimal form of moral intuitionism that can be spelled out both in realist and anti-realist versions and is mainly motivated by the logical and semantic autonomy of morality. Before this background, I specify the nature of local and global debunking arguments, illustrate their use with reference to a number of instructive examples and show how intuitionists can respond to debunking arguments of both sorts.

## 3 Büter

**Wertfreiheit, Pluralismus und epistemische  
Vertrauenswürdigkeit: Das Beispiel  
Frauengesundheitsforschung**

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Der Vortrag behandelt die Haltbarkeit des Wertfreiheitsideals als einer Bedingung für die Objektivität und epistemische Vertrauenswürdigkeit wissenschaftlicher Ergebnisse. Die zeitgenössische Form dieses Ideals beruht auf einer Reihe spezifischer Annahmen – insbesondere der Trennbarkeit kognitiver und nicht-kognitiver Werte sowie der epistemologischen

Unabhängigkeit des Rechtfertigungszusammenhangs von Entdeckungs- und Anwendungszusammenhang – die jeweils problematisch sind. Ich werde gegen letztere Annahme argumentieren, dass Werte im Entdeckungszusammenhang indirekt Einfluss auf die Rechtfertigung von Theorien nehmen. Dies ist darin begründet, dass wertgeladene Selektionen in der Entdeckung sich darauf auswirken, welchen Daten eine Theorie gerecht werden und gegen welche Alternativen sie sich durchsetzen muss – und damit letztlich auf Einschätzungen ihrer Geltungsansprüche.

Diese These wird anhand von Beispielen aus der Frauengesundheitsforschung erläutert. Dieses Forschungsfeld entstand aus der feministischen Frauengesundheitsbewegung der 1960er / 70er Jahre, welche sich über die Kritik einer Diskriminierung von Frauen durch das Gesundheitssystem und die medizinische Wissenschaft definierte. Mit Bezug auf die Debatten um eine Inklusion von Frauen in klinische Studien und um präventive Wirkungen von Hormonersatztherapie in der Menopause wird exemplarisch dargestellt, wie erst der Einbezug einer feministischen Perspektive in die Medizin Untersuchungen und Ergebnisse ermöglichte, die auch zuvor gut bestätigte Theorien in Zweifel zogen.

Letztlich ist damit das Wertfreiheitsideal in seiner heutigen Form zumindest ungenügend als normatives Leitbild der Wissenschaft, da es der Gefahr systematischer blinder Flecken aufgrund einer wertbeladenen Vernachlässigung bestimmter Perspektiven in der Entdeckung – und daraus resultierenden Einseitigkeiten in der Rechtfertigung – nicht begegnen kann. Vielmehr erfordert dieses Problem einen Einbezug der sozialen Ebene von Wissenschaft in ihre normative Betrachtung. Die beste Strategie ist hier die eines Pluralismus in Bezug auf die in der wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft vertretenen Werthaltungen: Nur die Diversität der Beteiligten kann die Gefahr einseitiger blinder Flecken verringern. Die epistemische Vertrauenswürdigkeit wissenschaftlicher Ergebnisse findet in einer Freiheit der Theoriewahl von nicht-kognitiven Werten keine ausreichende Grundlage, sondern muss um eine Betrachtung des Entdeckungszusammenhangs ergänzt und durch die Bedingung einer pluralistischen Wertvielfalt gesichert werden.

## Carrier 3

**Values and Objectivity in Science**

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My intention is to clarify the nature of scientific objectivity and of the characteristics of epistemic research, also known as fundamental research or academic research. I claim that epistemic research or the epistemic attitude in science can be reconstructed by appeal to values. I wish to explore the role of values in the test and confirmation procedures of science (also known as the context of justification) and to discuss the role and influence of epistemic and non-epistemic values. The trouble with values is that they are mostly partisan and non-universal and are thus feared to undermine the objectivity of science. I contrast a Baconian notion of objectivity, expressing a detached stance of scientists and a correspondence of their views to the facts, with a pluralist notion, involving a critical debate between conflicting approaches. These conflicts include substantive hypotheses or theories but extend

to values as well. I argue that pluralism serves to accomplish a non-Baconian form of objectivity that is apt to preserve most of the intuitions tied to the objectivity of science. However, scientific research needs to be characterized by additional factors, e.g., by the willingness to subject one's claims to empirical scrutiny and to respect rational argument. To account for such features of scientific practice, appeal to shared epistemic goals is necessary. This is where pluralism is bound to come to an end. This shared epistemic attitude expresses a commitment to the gain of objective knowledge and is embodied in rules adopted by the scientific community concerning the procedures of examining assumptions. These rules do not address the evaluation of scientific hypotheses directly but rather the social processes that govern the test and confirmation practices in the scientific community. Controversy and strife is as characteristic of research as is unforced consensus formation. My claim is that the two features can be brought into harmony by placing them at different levels of consideration: at the level of scientific reasoning and at the level of social conventions regarding how to deal with claims put forward within the scientific community.

### 3 Centrone

#### Notes On Mally's First Deontic Logic and von Wright's First Plausible Logic

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It is by now rather well known that the Austrian philosopher Ernst Mally, a pupil of Alexius Meinong, was the first scholar to pose systematic questions about the possibility of a formal treatment of deontic modalities as well as to attempt an axiomatization of ethics. In his *Grundgesetze des Sollens* (1926) he tried to find a formal counterpart for statements as for instance ›A ought to be the case‹, ›It is permitted to do A‹, ›It is forbidden (obligatory / non-obligatory / optional / ...) to do A‹.

Unfortunately, Mally's axiomatic system for deontic logic derives *A ought to be the case iff A is the case* (in symbols: a ›a, where ›a‹ means ›a is obligatory‹.) This represents a collapse of obligation, so Mally's system is not considered – as it stands – to be viable.

Is a formalization of norms (rules) of action possible? In his paper *Deontic Logic* (Mind 1951) G. H. von Wright proposed a first sound formalization of deontic logic. Later on, in his *An Essay in deontic logic and the general theory of action* (1968), he rightly stressed the necessity to have symbolic means for differentiating between the ›active‹ and the ›passive‹ mode of behavior. ›What is required – he says – is a Logic of Action founded upon a Logic of Change.‹

In this paper we will present and discuss Mally's system of deontic logic, trying to sort out as well as understand his arguments, and to sift claims and counterclaims. Next, after briefly recalling von Wright's axiomatization, we will discuss the issue about differentiating between the ›active‹ and the ›passive‹ mode of behavior in connection with Mally's approach.

#### The Abundance of the future

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Supervaluationism holds that the future is undetermined, and as a consequence of this, statements about the future may be neither true nor false. In the present paper, we explore the novel and quite different view that the future is abundant: statements about the future do not lack truth-value, but may instead be glutty, that is both true and false. We will show that (1) the logic resulting from this ›abundance of the future‹ is a non-adjunctive paraconsistent formalism based on subvaluations, which has the virtue that all classical laws are valid in it, while no formula like  $A \ \& \ \neg A$  is satisfiable (though both  $A$  and  $\neg A$  may be true in a model); (2) we present some theorems which connect our logic to the logic of probability proposed by Ernest Adams; these theorems suggest that failure of classical inference rules has the same source in both logics; (3) abundance is closer to classical logic than supervaluationism, when it comes to express those important retrogradations of truth which are underlined by the argument *de praesenti ad praeteritum*. The point highlighted in (3) keeps some balance between the supervaluationist and subvaluationist approach. Such a result was accomplished by Dominique Hyde for subvaluationist systems in general, by showing that supervaluationism and subvaluationism can be taken to be exactly on a par on the loss of classical inferences. However, here we do something more: we show that there is an important specific phenomenon (discourse ›*de praesenti ad praeteritum*‹) w.r.t. which a subvaluationist approach preserves more classical reasoning than the usual supervaluationist one. The point highlighted in (2) suggests a probabilistic reading of the notion of ›subtruth‹ (subvaluationist truth) employed in our logic. Thus, ›subtrue‹ would be read as ›having a positive probability‹. Our logic can then be conjectured to be the qualitative ground for a quantitative probabilistic reasoning about the future. We also briefly discuss this perspective.

### Correia 8

#### Illusions and well-being: The costs and benefits of misbelief

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This article critically examines the claim that illusional beliefs may be beneficial for people's well-being. Although some studies indicate that positive illusions can promote happiness and adaptive behavior in certain contexts, I argue that such benefits tend to be short-lived and that misbeliefs are generally maladaptive from a long-term perspective. While unrealistic assessments of the available evidence may initially provide a rewarding vision of the self and the world, and even improve the subject's mood and motivation, I show that they tend to undermine the process of deliberation itself and are ultimately detrimental to the maximization of people's preferences. To that extent, it seems reasonable to suggest that

truthful beliefs are generally preferable all things considered, not only from an ethical perspective but also from a utilitarian one.

## 4 Dahlgrün

### Emotions and Natural Kindhood

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Philosophers of emotion widely view Paul Griffiths' *What Emotions Really Are* (1997) as the classical scientifically informed statement of the idea that emotion, and many emotions, fail to form a natural kind. I offer a critical re-assessment. Moreover, I criticize the positive taxonomy defended by Griffiths.

Griffiths' generic claim – that our vernacular category of emotion fails to form a natural kind – preaches to the converted, rather than pioneering a future psychological science of emotion. It is not even approximately true that past affective scientists have treated »the emotions« as a unitary category to which novel findings can be reliably extrapolated from samples.

Griffiths' specific claim, on the other hand – that many vernacular categories of specific emotions fail to form natural kinds – misrepresents his core empirical assumptions. By virtue of advocating basic-emotions theory in the Darwin-Ekman tradition, Griffiths endorses the paradigm of a view on which many emotions are indeed natural kinds. The real challenge to viewing emotions as natural kinds comes from dimensional theories. These pursue a longstanding psychological research program ignored entirely by Griffiths.

Griffiths' basic subdivision of the emotional realm is problematic too. He suggests a fundamental division into basic emotions (BEs) and higher cognitive emotions (HCEs), with »socially sustained pretense emotions« added as a third category in dubious standing. I argue that there are no pretense emotions, or at least that Griffiths has not provided the requisite arguments for positing them. I also adduce considerations suggesting that Griffiths overstates the discontinuity between BEs and HCEs.

What should scientists believe about the number of alternatives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions that we will address in this paper. We also ask under which conditions failure to find an alternative to H confirms the theory in question. This kind of reasoning (which we call *the no alternatives argument*) is rather popular in science and therefore deserves a careful philosophical analysis.

De 2

### A Solution to the Humphrey Objection

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One serious objection to Lewisian modal realism, in particular counterpart theory without overlap, is that it violates important adequacy conditions on an analysis of modality. One such constraint, call it the »Aboutness« constraint, is that de re possibilities for an individual *s* be genuinely about *s*. What the »genuinely« qualification is intended to rule out are analyses according to which de re possibilities for *s* may be given without (in the analysans) attributing a property intrinsic to *s* herself. Kripke's well-known »Humphrey objection« is precisely the objection that Lewis' counterpart theory violates Aboutness. Lewis responds by claiming that what is important for an analysis of de re possibilities concerning an individual such as Humphrey need not be genuinely about Humphrey as long as the analysis involves an individual that suitably represents Humphrey. Thus, claims Lewis, Aboutness mistakenly assumes that representation ought to be identity; i.e., that in order for *s'* to represent *s*, *s'* must be identical to *s*. I will argue, however, that there are two responses faithful to counterpart theory that embrace Aboutness. What is important about these responses, moreover, is that they do not require overlap which Lewis has strong reasons for rejecting. One of the responses undermines an assumption Lewis held concerning the temporal structure of possible worlds, viz. that they are linear, while the other concerns the ontological status of transworld individuals.

## 3 David/Hartmann/Sprenger

### The No Alternatives Argument

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Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists have found a theory H, they often believe that there cannot be many distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified?

## Delgado 1

### Is Frege's Context Principle in Conflict with his Principle of Compositionality?

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The context principle says that words have meaning only in the context of the sentences in which they occur. The principle of compositionality says that the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meaning of its constituents. These principles can be seen as conflicting because it seems that they explain meaning in opposite ways, for the former seems to say that the sentence confer meaning to its constituent while the latter says that the meaning of the constituents confer meaning to the sentence. It is fairly uncontroversial that this is what the principle of compositionality says; it is

less clear, however, what does the context principle express. This is because the context principle is introduced in the *Foundations* as part of different arguments and thus it can be seen as expressing distinct – yet related – principles in each argumentative context. I will discuss the different ideas the context principle expresses and offer a plausible interpretation of it.

The second task of assessing the principles' compatibility is complex because at the time the context principle was introduced, Frege had not yet made his famous distinction between sense and reference. But the principle of compositionality has clear applications for both sense and reference; therefore, we will need to consider versions of the context principle for both these notions in order to evaluate whether they are compatible. I will explore these versions and discuss their compatibility.

A plausible interpretation of the context principle would make sense of the different ideas that it expresses in the different argumentative contexts in which it occurs and also would explain its fundamental role in Frege's strategy for explaining the reference of abstract words (in particular, number words). I believe that on the interpretation I offer, the context principle is compatible with the principle of compositionality. Moreover, I believe that the job the context principle is required to do in Frege's strategy presupposes compositionality.

**The Ontology of Thisness**

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This paper seeks to give an account of what it is for an individual to instantiate thisness (i.e. primitive individual essence). Thisnesses are peculiar entities, and even those who endorse their existence and instantiation by objects / entities, have said very little about how an individual and its thisness are related. My approach is to seek out a model for the instantiation of thisness by canvassing realist accounts of the substance / attribute relation, and then by making appropriate modifications to the most likely candidates in order to accommodate an individual's instantiation of thisness (the accounts cannot be strictly identical for reasons that I will explain). In Sections 1 and 2 I consider two, broadly Aristotelian, ontologies (the first due to Loux and the second to Lowe) as models; and in Section 3 I consider a hybrid Aristotelian ontology which combines aspects of both Loux's and Lowe's models. What emerges is that the model with the most utility makes thisness redundant in the case of material substances. Here I lay my cards on the table and acknowledge that although I think some entities have thisness (such as events and possibly persons), material substances in all likelihood do not. So although the preferred ontology makes thisness redundant in the case of material substances, this is consistent with my own views on thisness, and I suggest that the ontology does provide a suitable structure for the instantiation of thisness in other kinds of entities.

**8 Di Nucci**

**Double Effect and Terror Bombing**

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I argue against the Doctrine of Double Effect's explanation of the moral difference between terror bombing and strategic bombing. I show that the standard thought-experiment of Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber which dominates this debate is underdetermined in three crucial respects: (1) the non-psychological worlds of Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber; (2) the psychologies of Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber; and (3) the structure of the thought-experiment, especially in relation to its similarity with the Trolley Problem. Briefly, (1) If the two worlds are not identical, then it may be these differences between the two worlds and not the Doctrine of Double Effect to explain the moral difference; (2a) if Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber have the same causal beliefs, then why does Terror Bomber set out to kill the children? It may then be this unwarranted and immoral choice and not the Doctrine of Double Effect that explains the moral difference; (2b) if the two have different causal beliefs, then we can't rule out the counterfactual that, had Strategic Bomber had the same beliefs as Terror Bomber, she would have also acted as Terror Bomber did. Finally, (3) the thought-experiment could also be constructed so as to be structurally equivalent to the Fat Man scenario in the Trolley Problem: but then the Doctrine of Double Effect would give different answers to two symmetrical cases.

**Dinges 5**

**An invariantist explanation of contextualist intuitions**

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Invariantism in epistemology is the thesis that »knows« invariably expresses the same relation in every context of use. As opposed to that, contextualists maintain that »knows« expresses different relations in relevantly different contexts. One major argument for contextualism is based on the idea that only this view can satisfactorily explain the intuitions we have with respect to scenarios such as the bank cases by Keith DeRose about when it is correct to ascribe or deny knowledge. In my paper, I want to show that this idea is mistaken by providing a satisfactory invariantist explanation of our intuitions.



## 8 Dohrn

## Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of »Ought«

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I take issue with Caspar Hare's strategy of using counterfactuals to deal with puzzles like *the Parent's Paradox*: I am told by my doctor that begetting a child at an earlier time is likely to result in the child suffering severe life-long health problems as contrasted to a child begot at a later time. I do not abide by the doctor's recommendation. My child John has severe health problems throughout his life. However, I value John more than anything in the world. Given my affection for John, it seems questionable that I *ought* to have acted differently. But at the same time I acknowledge a sense in which I *ought* to have followed the doctor's advice. How can that be? To deal with such cases, Hare distinguishes a subjective and an objective sense of *ought*:

*The Ought of Omniscient Desire*: What you ought<sup>OD</sup> to do is what an omniscient, rational creature with appropriate interests would want you to do.

*The Ought of Most Reason*: What you ought<sup>MR</sup> to do is what there is most reason to do. (Hare 2011, 190)

Whereas I ought<sup>OD</sup> to have begot a child earlier, I ought<sup>MR</sup> not to have done so. In order to mark the difference between ought<sup>OD</sup> and ought<sup>MR</sup>, Hare resorts to a pattern of embedded counterfactuals: to figure out what I ought<sup>MR</sup> to have done, I ask:

Given I have acted as I did, if I had not, then if I had, what would have been the case?

I pinpoint technical mistakes in Hare's counterfactual criterion. Then I vary the scenario from *The Parent's Paradox* such as to show that the counterfactual criterion misses the real – epistemic- distinction.

## El Kassar 1

Primitive Normativität  
als Antwort auf Kripkes  
Regelfolgen-Skeptiker?

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Der Beitrag diskutiert und verwirft Hannah Ginsborgs Theorie der primitiven Normativität als alternative Antwort auf Saul Kripkes Regelfolgen-Skeptiker. Ursprünglich auf ihre Theorie der Wahrnehmung beschränkt, bildet primitive Normativität in Ginsborgs jüngstem Aufsatz das Fundament für ihre teilreduktionistische, naturalistische Antwort auf den Regelfolgen-Skeptiker. Das Ziel des Papers ist es, zu zeigen, dass Ginsborgs Konzeption keine erfolgreiche Antwort auf den Skeptiker bietet. Die Argumentation erfolgt in drei Schritten. Im ersten Schritt werden die Herausforderung durch den Kripke'schen Skeptiker sowie zwei Standardreaktionen, Dispositionalismus und Anti-Reduktionismus, dargestellt. Der zweite Schritt stellt Hannah Ginsborgs Antwort, insbesondere ihr Konzept der primitiven Normativität, vor. Im abschließenden dritten Schritt werden drei Argumente präsentiert, die nahelegen, dass Ginsborgs Antwort abzulehnen ist: weder gelingt es ihr eine systematisch kohärente Position zu entwickeln, noch vermag sie die von Saul Kripke diskutierten Bedingungen für eine akzeptable Replik auf den Regelfolgen-Skeptiker zu erfüllen. Eine Gegenüberstellung von primitiver Normativität und ausgewachsener (full-blown) Normativität wird zudem zeigen, dass Hannah Ginsborgs Begriff der primitiven Normativität überflüssig ist. Das Modell der primitiven Normativität scheidet sowohl als eigenständige Theorie, als auch als Antwort auf Kripkes Regelfolgen-Skeptiker.

## 1 Dolby

Understanding Non-Nominal  
Quantification

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Quantification into non-nominal positions, such as sentence position, remains controversial. Many philosophers follow Quine in arguing that such there is no genuine quantification into any position other than nominal position. And those philosophers who accept non-nominal quantification disagree about how it should be understood. One account is the objectual interpretation according to which quantification into general term or sentence position is quantification over a domain of objects, typically properties or propositions. In this paper I argue that any truth definition for a language involving objectual non-nominal quantification will appeal implicitly to non-nominal quantification in the metalanguage, and therefore cannot be regarded as illuminating our understanding of non-nominal quantification.

## Engels 7

Das Transplantations-Trilemma  
und eine Ethik des Tötungsverbots

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Ausgangspunkt meines Vortrags ist die Wiederaufnahme der Hirntod-Debatte, die seit dem Bericht »Controversies in the Determination of Death« des President's Council on Bioethics<sup>1</sup> auch in Deutschland erneut angestoßen wurde<sup>2</sup>. In der Tat stellt uns die Situation hirntoter Menschen vor ein philosophisches Problem, das ich das »Transplantations-Trilemma« nenne und ins Zentrum stelle. Es setzt sich aus drei für sich genommen sehr starken Sätzen zusammen, die jedoch miteinander unvereinbar scheinen:

- (1) Hirntote Menschen sind noch nicht tot.
- (2) Einem nicht toten Menschen lebenswichtige Organe zu entnehmen, bedeutet ihn zu töten und ist moralisch verboten.
- (3) Die Praxis der modernen Transplantationsmedizin ist moralisch nicht verboten.

Mit der Annahme (1) stelle ich meine Überlegungen unter das Konditional, was es bedeutet, wenn die Zweifel am Hirntodkriterium berechtigt sind und was daraus für die Transplantationsmedizin folgt. Auch Satz (3) möchte ich als prima

facie gültig annehmen. Das philosophisch interessante Problem steckt in Satz (2), vor allem im zweiten Teil (2b) »die Tötung von Menschen ist (mit wenigen Ausnahmen) moralisch verboten«. Daher untersuche ich verschiedene Begründungsansätze für ein grundsätzliches Tötungsverbot. Diese kritische Analyse zeigt, dass diverse Begründungskonzepte des Tötungsverbots den Handlungsakt »Töten« auf so unterschiedliche Weise verwenden, dass deutlich wird, dass sie im Grunde ganz unterschiedliche Handlungen meinen und beurteilen. Gemeinsam ist all diesen Handlungen zwar, dass sie zum Tod eines Menschen führen; der moralische Gehalt jedoch ist nicht immer gleich, auch wenn durch die Verwendung des gleichen sprachlichen Begriffs dies suggeriert wird. Eine differenzierte Analyse des Begriffs »Töten« erfordert demnach die Einbeziehung des jeweiligen Handlungskontexts. Es zeigt sich, dass die moralische Beurteilung eines Tötungsakts abhängig ist von dem Zustand, in dem sich eine Person befindet. Zentrale Kriterien für die Bewertung eines Zustands einer Person sind nicht ihr am Leben sein, sondern vielmehr die Frage, welcher Umgang ihr Schaden zufügt und wie ihre Würde geachtet wird. Übertragen auf die Situation hirntoter Menschen lautet dann meine These, dass diese sich in einem Zustand befinden, in dem eine Organentnahme unter bestimmten Bedingungen zwar deskriptiv bedeutet, ihr Leben zu beenden, moralisch aber deswegen nicht verboten ist, da sie ihnen weder schadet, noch ihre Würde verletzt oder missachtet.

<sup>1</sup> The President's Council on Bioethics, *Controversies in the Determination of Death. A White Paper*, 2008.

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. dazu Stoecker, *Ein Plädoyer für die Reanimation der Hirntod-Debatte in Deutschland*, Stoecker, »Sind hirntote Menschen wirklich tot?«; Stoecker, *Hirntod. Ein medizinethisches Problem und seine moralphilosophische Transformation*; Müller, »Revival der Hirntod-Debatte: Funktionelle Bildgebung für die Hirntod-Diagnostik«. Sogar die deutsche Printmedienpresse bezieht sich in den letzten Monaten mehrfach auf dieses Thema. Vgl. z. B. Sahm, Stephan, »Ist die Organspende noch zu retten?«, *FAZ.NET*, 14. 9. 2010; Görlitzer, Klaus-Peter, »Neue Zweifel am Hirntod«, *taz.de*, 5. 11. 2010; Galaktionow, Barbara, »Den Hirntod sieht man nicht«, *sueddeutsche.de*, 4. 10. 2010.

### 3 Eronen

#### Levels of mechanisms in neuroscience: A deflationary account

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In recent years, there has been heated discussion on the nature of mechanistic explanation and the definition of a mechanism, but little attention has been paid to the idea of mechanistic levels. This is unfortunate, since the claim that mechanistic explanations are multilevel is central to the mechanistic explanation paradigm. In this paper, I point out three fundamental problems in the mechanistic account of levels: it is too localized, too focused on the part-whole relation while other relations are just as important, and ontologically undefined. As an alternative, I propose a deflationary account of levels. I argue that the multilevel explanations are better understood in terms of the more familiar

and well-defined notions of scale and composition. Mechanistic explanations are multilevel only in the sense that they refer to robust properties and generalizations at different scales and at different stages in the compositional hierarchy.

### Evers 4

#### The causal efficacy of the mental: against the counterfactual argument

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Kim (1998) argued that the supervenience of the mental on the physical, combined with certain other plausible assumptions, leaves no room for mental causation. But there is an increasingly popular response (found in Lowe (2008), Andersen (2009), Raatikainen (2010) and Papineau (forthcoming)). It purports to establish the causal efficacy of mental events on the basis of differences in counterfactuals true of those events and their supervenience bases. I argue that this strategy is problematic: it leaves many bodily movements without any cause at all.

### Fink 8

#### The requirements of rationality: wide or narrow content?

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Commonly, we more or less agree about the conditions under which a subject *violates* a requirement of rationality. For example, if you intend to present a conference paper, yet you do not intend to attend a conference – even though you believe that attending a conference is necessary for presenting a conference paper – you violate a requirement of rationality. Likewise, you violate a requirement of rationality if you believe that you ought to drink less coffee, yet you do not intend to drink less coffee. So much is usually agreed upon.

Disagreement arises, however, if we come to consider how you can *satisfy* a requirement of rationality. Consider again my latter example of violating a requirement. No doubt, you can satisfy this requirement by forming an intention to drink less coffee. But can you also satisfy it by ceasing to believe that you ought to drink less coffee?

If your answer to the latter question is »no«, then the content of this requirement would be that *you intend to drink less coffee*. The violated requirement governs a proposition expressing an individual attitude. Its content would thus be *narrow*, as I shall put it.

If your answer is »yes«, then the content of this requirement will be *wide*. The violated requirement would then not govern a proposition expressing an individual attitude. Instead, it would govern a proposition expressing a relation among attitudes: *if you believe that you ought to drink less coffee, then you intend to drink less coffee*.

After discussing various unsuccessful attempts to settle the wide- and narrow-content question, this paper develops a

position that I shall call ›wide-content radicalism‹. Utilising an constitutive account of ›rationality requires‹, I will argue that there are *no* rational requirements that govern propositions expressing an individual attitude. Instead, rationality always governs propositions expressing relations among a subject's attitudes.

## 5 Fischer

### Philosophical Intuitions, Heuristics, and Metaphors: Towards a Cognitive Epistemology

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Psychological explanations of philosophical intuitions can help us assess their evidentiary value, and our warrant for accepting them. To explain and assess conceptual or classificatory intuitions about specific situations, some philosophers have suggested explanations which invoke heuristic rules proposed by cognitive psychologists (e.g. Hawthorne 2004, Williamson 2005). This approach offers a promising alternative to the standard approach of experimental philosophy. The present paper develops this alternative in fresh directions: It motivates the proposal of a fresh heuristic, and shows that this heuristic can explain a class of intuitions that have been neglected in current debates in the epistemology of philosophy – even though their negative assessment can help resolve prominent problems about the mind and perception. By integrating results from two hitherto disconnected strands of psychological research, on intuitive judgement and on analogy and metaphor, respectively, the paper motivates the proposal of a ›metaphor heuristic‹. Second, it shows that this heuristic can explain general factual intuitions influential in the philosophies of mind and perception. The paper shows that the proposed heuristic satisfies all principal requirements imposed by cognitive psychologists in the influential heuristics and biases research tradition, and that explanations employing this new heuristic can reveal whether particular philosophical intuitions are due to the proper exercise of cognitive competencies or constitutive of cognitive illusions.

## 6 Fischer/Todd

### The Truth about Foreknowledge: A Reply to Trenton Merricks

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In this paper we critically evaluate Trenton Merricks' recent attempt to provide a ›new‹ way of defending compatibilism about divine foreknowledge and human freedom. We take issue with Merricks' claim that his approach is fundamentally different from Ockhamism. We also seek to highlight

the implausibility of Merricks' rejection of the assumption of the fixity of the past, and we also develop a critique of the Merricks' crucial notion of ›dependence‹.

Folde **1**

### Operator Fictionalism and Logical Neutrality

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Operator fictionalism about a domain of discourse (e.g. talk about numbers, possible worlds, or moral properties) is the view that claims made within that domain are best regarded as being correct if and only if they are true according to a suitable fiction. Operator fictionalism is logically neutral only if it does not per se commit one to any substantial views about the logic of the respective domain of discourse. Here, I argue that a careful examination of inconsistent fictions shows that, within the scope of a genuine fiction operator, many valid inferences of classical logic do not hold. Accordingly, these inferences would also be blocked in the respective domain of discourse. Thus, to be an operator fictionalist about that discourse would – contra neutrality – involve special views about the logic applicable to it. Having established that operator fictionalism is not logically neutral, I go on to argue that some varieties of operator fictionalism are misguided and in need of revision.

Freitag **1**

### Moore's Paradox and the Manifestation of Belief

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G. E. Moore once observed that the following sentence is ›absurd‹: (1) It is raining, but I believe that it is not raining.

The absurdity assumes a paradoxical air, since the two conjuncts ›It is raining‹ and ›I believe that it is not raining‹ do not appear contradictory; they can, it seems, be jointly true. As Moore says: ›It is a paradox that it should be perfectly absurd to utter assertively words of which the meaning is something which may quite well be true.‹ (Moore 1993, 209) The challenge of Moore's Paradox is to either dispel the air of absurdity surrounding the affirmative utterance of (1) or to provide an explanation of its absurdity.

The purpose of the paper is to provide a well-founded linguistic account of the absurdity on the basis of a theory of the manifestation of doxastic states. My argument proceeds in three steps. In section 1, I will make a detour and present examples of a Moore-style paradox for assertion and discuss the speech-act-theoretical mechanisms which do away with this paradox. This excursion serves as a model for my own approach to Moore's original case. In section 2, I sketch a theory of the linguistic expression of mental states, the theory of manifestatives, and apply the main results to the Moorean sentence (1). The third, and final, section draws attention to

the fact that the picture complicates because sentences of the form »I believe that p« are speech-act-theoretically ambiguous.

such appearance is the consequence of an equivocation between different conceptions of logical validity.

### 3 Friebe

#### Meta-Ontologie der Raumzeit

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Meta-Ontologie untersucht ontologische Debatten: Ist ein solcher Streit gehaltvoll oder bloß einer um Worte? Anwendungsbeispiel ist hier die Raumzeit-Philosophie und die Debatte um Präsentismus vs. Block View. Die metaphysik-kritische Position, dieser Streit sei irrelevant für die Ontologie der Raumzeit, wird meta-ontologisch hinterfragt. Der Vortrag zielt dann darauf ab, aus der Analyse dieses Beispiels Allgemeines zum Verhältnis von Metaphysik und Physik zu gewinnen.

### 3 Fritz

#### Conditionals and ACTUALITY

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Timothy Williamson has recently shown that in any logic of indicative conditionals which satisfies certain plausible conditions and contains an operator A which satisfies a condition he calls ACTUALITY, indicative conditionals are equivalent to material conditionals. I argue that this formal result does not indicate that indicative conditionals are in fact equivalent to material conditionals. Williamson motivates the condition ACTUALITY with the semantics of the actuality operator in modal logic, which formalizes the English »actually«. However, I argue that in the context of logics of indicative conditionals, assuming that an operator formalizing the English »actually« satisfies ACTUALITY amounts to assuming that indicative conditionals are equivalent to material conditionals. Thus one cannot apply the formal result directly to a formalization of English to argue that indicative conditionals are equivalent to material conditionals.

Another way of reaching this conclusion would be to argue that while »actually« might not have the right semantics, an operator of the required kind could be introduced by stipulation. This could either be done on the level of logic or on the level of natural language. I argue that neither strategy succeeds. A natural way of implementing the first strategy would be to assume that the logic of indicative conditionals has a conservative extension satisfying ACTUALITY as well as all of the other conditions required for Williamson's result. I argue by analogy with epistemic logic that this assumption is unjustified. In the case of the second strategy, I argue that if we introduce the relevant expression to English and represent it in the logic in a way that it satisfies ACTUALITY, then on a natural understanding of logical truth, one of the other conditions required for Williamson's result fails. While this might appear to lead to implausible consequences, I argue that any

### Gäb 6

#### Semantischer Realismus und religiöse Sprache

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Realismus ist die These, daß die Gegenstände oder Eigenschaften eines bestimmten Bereichs unabhängig von uns existieren, Antirealismus ist die Negation dieser These. Der religiöse Realismus ist der Meinung, daß religiöse Gegenstände wie Gott oder die Seele unabhängig von uns existieren und daß Aussagen über sie echte Aussagen und fähig zu objektiver Wahrheit sind, was der Antirealismus bestreitet. Mit Michael Dummett läßt sich behaupten, daß Realismus und Antirealismus semantische Thesen sind, die Behauptungen über die Begriffe von Wahrheit und Bedeutung in religiöser Sprache aufstellen. Ausgehend von diesem Verständnis lassen sich die verschiedenen Antirealismen in der Religionsphilosophie anhand ihres Umgangs mit dem Wahrheitsbegriff einteilen in starke und schwache, je nachdem, ob sie den realistischen Wahrheitsbegriff gänzlich aufgeben oder nur modifizieren. Doch beide Formen des religiösen Antirealismus stehen vor dem Problem, den wichtigen Begriff der Rechtfertigung aufgeben zu müssen: Der starke Antirealismus, der den Begriff der Wahrheit für religiöse Sprache völlig verwerfen möchte, kann nicht erklären, wie sich Aussagen rechtfertigen lassen können, ohne wahr zu sein, der schwache Antirealismus, der den realistischen Wahrheitsbegriff durch einen pluralen ersetzt, kann nicht erklären, was Konsistenz als notwendige Voraussetzung von Rechtfertigung sein soll und wie Rechtfertigung sich als Konsequenz eines Arguments einstellen kann. Dies gilt unabhängig davon, welches Konzept von Rechtfertigung man vertritt, denn die Verbindung zur Wahrheit ist für jeden Rechtfertigungsbegriff essentiell. Die Folgen für den religiösen Antirealismus sind fatal: Akzeptiert man das Argument, so läuft ein Antirealismus notwendigerweise auf einen Fideismus hinaus, denn religiöse Aussagen sind rein semantisch bereits jeder Rechtfertigung entzogen. Gleichzeitig kann er auch nicht mehr den Anspruch erheben, empirisch adäquat zu sein, denn die in der Religionsphilosophie seit Jahrhunderten geführten Debatten über die Rechtfertigung religiöser Überzeugungen lassen sich nicht mehr erfassen. Schließlich ergibt sich zumindest für den starken Antirealismus die Konsequenz, daß aufgrund der engen Verbindung von Wahrheit und Bedeutung religiöse Sprache keinen Sinn mehr haben kann, sie verliert ihre grundsätzliche kommunikative Funktion und kann daher nicht mehr als Sprache bezeichnet werden. Somit scheidet der Antirealismus als akzeptable Theorie religiöser Sprache aus.

## 6 Gasser

**Personal Embodiment and Bodily Resurrection**

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I take two constraints to be crucial for any account of bodily resurrection being faithful to the Christian tradition and philosophical reflection.

A metaphysical constraint: Personal identity between pre- and post-mortem existence ought to be secured.

A theological constraint: Christian soteriological reflections on life after death define the core of human existence by our relationships to God and our fellow human beings.

Against this background I analyse three materialist accounts of bodily resurrection. I reject the first two accounts and propose substantial amendments for the third one. The accounts are:

- (i) Accounts in the spirit of van Inwagen's metaphysics.
- (ii) Accounts relying upon reassembly.
- (iii) Accounts in the vein of the Constitution View.

I argue that accounts of the first kind like van Inwagen's Body-Snatching-model and Zimmerman's Falling-Elevator-model run particularly afoul of the theological constraint. Their costs are prohibitive because resurrection seems to mutate either into reanimation or into a kind of divine duplication process.

From my point of view accounts of the second kind like Hershenov's model of intermitted existence and Davis' model of reassembly are questionable from a metaphysical perspective. They rely upon mereological assumptions which might be adequate for artefacts but it is doubtful whether they apply to persistence conditions of human persons too.

Finally I introduce the Constitution View as presented by Baker. I will supplement it with a suggestion stemming from Lowe's account of Non-Cartesian Dualism, according to which personal embodiment is a unique kind of relationship in its own right. This move shall forestall in particular two objections Baker's approach is prone: First, that constitution is not so much a metaphysical rather than an explanatory concept. Second, that Baker's treatment of the resurrection body is too liberal because the only persistence condition is the same first-person perspective. If our relationships, however, are essential for a Christian understanding of resurrection, then it seems that the body cannot be of secondary importance only because our relationships display to a large extent a bodily character.

For correcting these pitfalls I propose to amend the »thin« concept of personal embodiment with insights from phenomenology by referring substantially to the notion of *Leib*. Finally I shall shortly respond to two objections which might possibly be raised against this move.

## Gebharter 3

**A Formal Framework for Representing Mechanisms?**

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In this paper I tackle the question of how mechanisms can be represented within a causal graph framework. I start with a few words on mechanisms and on some of their characteristic properties, as well as some of the problems these properties may pose for a formal representation. I then concentrate on one of these problems: How can the hierarchic order of mechanisms (mechanisms oftentimes consist of submechanisms) be represented within a causal graph framework? I illustrate an answer to this question proposed by Lorenzo Casini, Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo, and Jon Williamson (2011) and demonstrate on a concrete example that their formalism, though nicely capturing the hierarchic order of mechanisms, does not support another important typical property of nested mechanisms: The more of the structure of a mechanism's submechanisms is uncovered, the more accurate the predictions of the phenomena this mechanism brings about will be. As a last step I sketch an alternative approach that can represent the hierarchical order of a mechanism while still supporting said strong intuition that better knowledge about a mechanism's substructure leads to more precise predictions. I demonstrate these two features of this new approach on the above-mentioned exemplary mechanism.

## Gerogiorgakis 6

**Combining the Bayesian Argument for the Existence of God with Pascal's Wager**

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I consider Gwiazda's arguments concerning the exact numerical values of the Bayesian argument for the existence of God to be valid and Swinburne's counter-argument to be *ad hoc*. In order to rescue Bayesian theism, I propose a reformulation of the Bayesian argument in the spirit of Pascal's wager. My modification makes the probabilities, which Bayesian theism discusses, subjective expectations. The reputation of Bayesian theism is shown not to be worsened by my modification.

## Gertken 8

**Kann Notwehr nicht nur moralisch erlaubt, sondern gänzlich unproblematisch sein?**

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Wenn es moralisch erlaubte Notwehr gibt – sind dann alle Fälle erlaubter Notwehr derart, dass moralische Gründe gegen die einschlägige Handlung sprechen, oder kann es dann auch moralisch unproblematische Formen von Notwehr geben,

gegen die keinerlei moralische Gründe sprechen? Die zentrale These des Vortrags lautet, dass der zweite Fall eintreten kann: Manchmal spricht, moralisch betrachtet, nichts dagegen, einen Angreifer durch Maßnahmen der Selbstverteidigung zu schädigen.

Hierfür wird folgendermaßen argumentiert: Nicht immer, wenn Notwehr erlaubt ist, gibt es auch moralische Gründe, die *dafür* sprechen, sich zu verteidigen. Zum einen fällt es schwer, Kandidaten für solche Gründe zu benennen; zum anderen haben Situationen, in denen Notwehr erlaubt ist, nicht zwingend Konfliktcharakter. Wenn moralisch problematische Handlungen erlaubt sind, dann müssen jedoch auch moralische Gründe dafür sprechen, diese Handlungen auszuführen. Prudentielle Gründe können es nicht moralisch erlaubt machen, etwas zu tun, und weder die Annahme eines Rechts auf Selbstverteidigung noch der Versuch, sog. *exclusionary reasons* im Sinne von Raz ins Spiel zu bringen, stützt die Idee, dass es moralisch erlaubte Handlungen gibt, gegen die Gründe vorlegen, ohne dass diese durch weitere moralische Gründe aufgewogen werden.

Im Anschluss an die Entwicklung des Arguments für die genannte These wird diskutiert, welchen Raum diese lässt, den folgenden Phänomenen Rechnung zu tragen: (i) Auch bei moralisch erlaubter Notwehr ist ein charakteristisches Unbehagen angesichts der gewählten Entscheidung angemessen; (ii) eine Person, gegen die man sich in Notwehr verteidigen muss, wird nicht zu »moralischem Freiwild«, über das der Akteur frei verfügen kann; (iii) wenn es eine mildere und zumutbare Weise gibt, sich des Angriffs zu entziehen, so ist diese Option geboten. Es wird abschließend gezeigt, dass und wie man diesen Annahmen einen hinreichenden Sinn abgewinnen kann, ohne von der zentralen These des Vortrags abzuweichen.

## 8 Grahle

## Two Dimensions of Meaningfulness

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Susan Wolf (2010) argues that meaning in life consists in and arises from »active and loving engagement in projects of worth«. Whether or not one's life has meaning has to do with one's ability to respond adequately to what Wolf calls reasons of love; reasons that have their normative source in a fitting relation of one's love or attraction for an objectively valuable project. The aim of this presentation is a constructive one: Accepting the main idea of Wolf's theory, a position is established according to which there is an additional dimension of meaningfulness that does not require the availability of reasons of love.

Second-dimensional meaning (as against the first-dimensional meaning captured by Wolf's view) is made available to one *by others*. It is argued that through expressions of admiration, others can *address* one with a reason to maintain or develop further one's admirable properties. In virtue of one's being subjected to such reasons, one's life has second-dimensional meaning. In particular, it is argued that when going through episodes of depression and emotional indifference where reasons of love are no longer available to one, admiration-based reasons can come to the rescue. Temporarily at least one's life can be orientated around these reasons.

## What role can experience play in apriori justification? – A reliabilist account

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Whether a belief is justified apriori or aposteriori is, according to the received view, a matter of its source. Whereas apriori justified beliefs are supposed to be based on non-experiential sources, aposteriori justified beliefs are supposed to depend on experiential sources. It is currently a highly controversial matter whether this is a sufficient criterion of demarcation. But it seems uncontroversial to claim that non-experiential sources are at least a necessary condition for being apriori justified. Now, in what sense does a source of a belief have to be non-experiential to provide us with apriori justification? Obviously, many paradigmatic cases of apriori justified beliefs are such that empirical factors play an important role in the their production. Think of conceptual judgments which are based on a competent use of empirically acquired concepts, or think of mathematical judgments that are based on visual thinking. In all of these cases experience plays a significant role in bringing about an intuitively apriori justified belief. In order to make sense of these phenomena, Burge (1993) famously distinguishes between (epistemically irrelevant) enabling conditions and (epistemically relevant) entitling conditions. Nevertheless, the foundation of this distinction remained unclear. In my talk, I will suggest a reliabilist criterion for this distinction. According to this criterion (R), the justification of a belief is non-experiential if and only if the reliability of the relevant belief-forming process does not depend on the reliability of the experience that is involved in the production of the belief. I will then show that with this criterion (R) one can make proper sense of many intuitive cases of apriori and aposteriori justification. Moreover, I will respond to a serious objection from cases which intuitively seem to be of the apriori kind although the reliability of perception is required for them. After having dismissed this objection, I will conclude by providing some evidence for the claim that internalists lack a similarly successful criterion to draw the proper distinction between apriori and aposteriori justification.

## Grüne-Yanoff 3

## Modelling and How-Possible Explanations

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The paper shows how models that lack a well-supported relation to real-world entities and properties can be justified, beyond the weak role that they might play as heuristic tools. Using conceptual distinctions from the discussion of »how-possibly« explanations, eight types of models are distinguished by their modal qualities of their initial conditions, model processes and model results. For each of these eight model types, contexts and purposes are identified in which the use

of such a model offers genuine epistemic gain. These respective prospects offer novel justifications for abstract modelling practices.

beziehen. Somit bleibt durch Bezugnahme auf den zweiten Begriff des Strebens der Weg einer aristotelischen konativen Theorie der Güte offen.

## 4 Grunenberg

### Can Rule-following be blind?

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Dispositional accounts of rule-following are promising candidates, if we want to explain how rule-following can be blind. However, Paul Boghossian has recently argued that besides difficulties in spelling out such accounts in detail there is a general problem, which casts doubt on the very idea that underlies all dispositional accounts of rule-following. I argue that his reasoning is fallacious.

In order to show that the difficulties Boghossian envisages do not threaten dispositional accounts in general, I will explain how dispositional accounts can be spelled out by relying on what Herbert Hart has called a ›reflective critical attitude«. Reflection on the concept of explanation and the notion of having a reason will be necessary to see how dispositional accounts can be defended against Boghossian's more fundamental criticism.

## 8 Gudmundsson

### Das Gute als Objekt des Strebens – Zur konativen Theorie der Güte

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Unter einer konativen Theorie der Güte wird der Versuch verstanden, Güte unter Bezugnahme auf den Begriff des Strebens oder Begehrens zu erläutern. Versteht man das Urteil ›X ist gut‹ im Sinne von ›X ist gut für S‹, so deutet die konative Theorie der Güte die Relation *gut für* im Sinne von *wird erstrebt von*. Dass ein X gut ist, bedeutet dieser Theorie zufolge, dass es ein S gibt, welches X erstrebt. So wie in dem Urteil ›X ist rot‹ das X, welches rot ist, von der Röte unterschieden wird, die dem roten X zukommt, so wird in einem Urteil der Form ›X ist gut‹ das X, welches gut ist – das Gute – von der Güte unterschieden, die dem guten X zukommt. Konative Theorien der Güte haben sowohl eine Antwort darauf, was das Gute ist, als auch darauf, worin dessen Güte besteht. Das, was gut ist, ist das, was erstrebt wird. Und die Güte dessen was gut ist besteht darin, dass es erstrebt wird.

In meinem Vortrag differenziere ich zwei Begriffe des Strebens. Dem ersten Begriff des Strebens zufolge ist das, was erstrebt wird, dem Streben *extern*. Man kann vollständig verstehen was Streben ist, ohne auf sich auf das zu Beziehen, was erstrebt wird. Dem zweiten Begriff des Strebens zufolge gibt es einen *inneren* Zusammenhang zwischen dem Streben und dem Erstrebt. So ist Streben nur verständlich als ein Streben hin zur Vollkommenheit des Strebenden. Im Vortrag wird gezeigt, dass neoaristotelische Kritiken an konativen Theorien der Güte sich lediglich auf den ersten Begriff des Strebens

## Gutsche 4

### Mechanistische Erklärung: Reduktiv oder nicht?

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Ist der Ansatz der mechanistischen Erklärung (ME) – bei dem kausale Mechanismen für bestimmte Phänomene v. a. in den Neurowissenschaften gefunden werden – ein ausschließlich reduktiver Ansatz? Hat er reduktive Komponenten oder muss er gar als völliger Gegenentwurf zum Reduktionismus verstanden werden? Die Antworten auf diese Fragen hängen davon ab, wie Reduktion und Reduktionismus verstanden werden, jedoch auch davon, wie die Vertreter von (ME) ihren Ansatz beschreiben. Während in einigen Publikationen William Bechtel und seiner Kollegen (Bechtel 2001; Bechtel 2007; Bechtel & Hamilton 2007) der mechanistische Erklärungsansatz durchaus als ein reduktionistischer Ansatz verstanden wird, so ist dies bei den Arbeiten von Carl Craver und seinen Kollegen (v. a. Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000; Craver 2005; Craver 2007) und auch bei neueren Publikationen von William Bechtel und Kollegen (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2008; Bechtel 2009; Bechtel 2010) nicht der Fall.

Im Folgenden wird anhand der angeführten Texte gezeigt, inwiefern (ME) als reduktiver Ansatz aufgefasst werden kann, danach wird beschrieben, inwieweit (ME) dem Reduktionismus entgegengesetzt ist. Schließlich werden mit Ernest Nagel – dem Begründer der *klassischen Reduktion* – die verbleibenden reduktiven Komponenten von (ME) beleuchtet. Genauer heißt das: die ›reduktive Sicht der Vereinheitlichung«, die Craver (2007) angreift und der er für die Neurowissenschaften eine alternative Form von Vereinheitlichung (›intralevel / interlevel integration«) entgegengesetzt, kann im Sinne von Nagel (1961) rehabilitiert werden. Im Fazit wird die Nagel-Reduktion in Teilen als mit dem mechanistischen Ansatz kompatibel erachtet.

## Gutwald 7

### Im Namen der Autonomie? Eine kritische Untersuchung des liberalen Paternalismus am Beispiel von Maßnahmen des kognitiven Enhancements

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Im vorliegenden Beitrag möchte ich einen kritischen Blick auf den sog. liberalen Paternalismus werfen. Der Rechtfertigungsstrategie über die liberale Forderung nach Respekt für Autonomie sollten meiner Ansicht nach Grenzen gesetzt werden, auch wenn Respekt für Autonomie vermeintlich gewährt wird. Kritisch zu betrachten sind vor allem die Arbeiten von Cass Sunstein und Richard Thaler sowie einigen Medizinethikern,

die einen Autonomie-fördernden bzw. verbessernden Paternalismus unterstützen.

Dieser erscheint, so meine Argumentation, vor allem fragwürdig, wenn wir neue, technische Möglichkeiten betrachten, um Autonomie und Entscheidungen (vermeintlich) zu verbessern, insbesondere Maßnahmen des sog. »Cognitive Enhancements«. Der Einsatz bzw. Förderung dieser Maßnahmen scheint eine logische Konsequenz aus der Befürwortung eines weichen Paternalismus im Stile von Sunstein/Thaler.

Meine These ist jedoch, dass dies nicht der liberalen Grundidee des Freiheitsschutzes entspricht: nicht alles, was Autonomie befördert, muss auch getan werden, selbst wenn die Risiken gering sind. Vielmehr muss dem Menschen auch die Möglichkeit eingeräumt werden, eigene Fehler zu machen und Irrtümer zu begehen. Mein Anliegen ist hier vor allem, eine kritische Frage gegenüber Theoretikern wie Sunstein/Thaler aufzuwerfen, nämlich, was aus ihrem verbessernden, weichen Paternalismus folgt und inwiefern dieser noch als »liberal« aufgefasst werden kann.

### 3 Harbecke

#### Two regularity theories of mechanistic constitution

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A central concept of the mechanistic approach to neurobiological explanation is that of »mechanistic constitution«, resp. »constitutive relevance«. It is at the heart of the mechanists' model of explanation in the sense that an explanation of a phenomenon in neurobiology is taken to be informative only if an adequate description of a mechanism constituting that phenomenon is achieved. Furthermore, the ontology promoted by the mechanists is essentially based on the constitution relation.

Despite its centrality and widespread use, it is still quite unclear what exactly the mechanists take the nature of constitution, resp. constitutive relevance to be. A screening of the pertinent literature reveals that the terms are used in various different, sometimes even incompatible ways. Craver himself, for instance, uses the term »constitutive relevance« at times to depict a relation between individuals and phenomena, and on other occasions to describe a relation between events and phenomena. Other authors seem to use the notion of supervenience as the mechanists use the notion of constitution. Again others appear to identify it with the parthood relation.

The clearest and hitherto most explicit analysis of constitution has been provided by AUTHOR and Mark Couch, who independently have defended a regularity theory of constitution. The key idea driving these theories has been to take some of the formal definitions known from regularity theories of causation and adapt them to the case of constitution. This paper tries to understand in detail the similarities and differences of these two regularity approaches.

In a first step, the similarities of the two theories are made precise. It is then pointed out that AUTHOR's definition postulates a condition that rules out spurious constitutive regularities whilst Couch's does not. Moreover, Couch's theory, in contrast to AUTHOR's account, fails to make precise how

parthood relates to constitution. Finally, the two theories differ in defining constitution either as (a)symmetrical and (ir)reflexive. Several consequences of these differences are discussed. On the bases of these arguments, AUTHOR's definition is characterized as better suited for the reconstruction of actual neurobiological explanations relative both to Couch's theory and to the above-mentioned alternatives.

### Haueis 3

#### Fuzziness in the Brain. Semantic Vagueness and Functional Neuroanatomy

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Contributing to an »applied« philosophy of science, this paper sets out how philosophical theories of vagueness are relevant for current research in neuroscience. Predicates with vague extension are found in everyday language (e.g.: »heap«; »bald«; »red«) and in the vocabulary of disciplines such as law and geography (Endicott 2001; Varzi 2001). In neuroscience, concepts with fuzzy boundaries (e.g. »brain area«) are found in the field of (human) brain mapping and its accompanying sub-disciplines (anatomy, physiology, functional neuroimaging). Although neuroscientists acknowledge the existence of fuzzy boundaries at different levels of research (Logothetis 2008; Wu *et al.* 2011), there is little systematic understanding of the theoretical implications and demarcation from other linguistic phenomena such as epistemic uncertainty or ambiguity. Here, philosophical analysis can help to disentangle conceptual puzzles which result in overlapping issues in empirical research (Hyman 1989). In this paper, I attempt to give such an analysis by outlining the phenomenon of vagueness in neuroanatomy for three levels of neuroscientific research, namely for the (i) identity conditions for brain regions at the neuron level; (ii) voxel activation at the level of intra-region neuronal interaction measured by the BOLD-signal of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and (iii) community membership of nodes at the level of functional connectivity between brain regions.

My analysis tries to show that the empirical solutions to tackle epistemic uncertainty or ambiguity are inappropriate to deal with vagueness, which is a conceptual issue independent from the lack of information (Grice 1989) or technological shortcomings (Saxe, Brett and Kanwisher 2010). To give an example: to reduce intersubject-variability, individual data are normalized and put into a stereotactic atlas. But that anatomical distortion prevents the researcher to find out whether »region A« has an exact or vague denotation. A further implication of my analysis is that if functional subdivisions and anatomical structure do not map one-to-one, (i) and (iii) have different grades of precision. Hence, the assumption that functional connectivity gives a more »precise« description of region boundaries than cytoarchitectonic studies would be false, because to different issues of vagueness are addressed in each case.

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### 3 Hauswald

#### Was sind vage natürliche Arten?

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Gängige Theorien natürlicher Arten (insbesondere Essentialismus und *homeostatic property cluster*-(HPC)-Theorie) divergieren grundlegend hinsichtlich der Frage, ob es so etwas wie Vagheit, Unbestimmtheit oder unscharfe Kategoriengrenzen bei natürlichen Arten geben kann. Während Essentialisten auf diskreten natürlichen Arten bestehen, räumen Vertreter der HPC-Theorie bereitwillig die Möglichkeit »vager« natürlicher Arten ein.

Die genaue theoretische Klärung, was »Vagheit« in diesem Zusammenhang eigentlich heißt, stellt allerdings bislang ein Desiderat dar. Ich will mich in meinem Beitrag dieses Desiderats annehmen und eine Bestimmung und systematische Modellierung der Vagheit von HPC-Arten vornehmen, wobei Einsichten und Unterscheidungen aus der vagheitstheoretischen Diskussion fruchtbar gemacht werden sollen. Sowohl die HPC- als auch die Vagheitstheorie können, wie ich meine, von diesem bisher kaum geführten Dialog profitieren.

Ich argumentiere (1.) dass die HPC-Theorie als kausal-realistischer, d. h. nicht-semantischer Clusteransatz mit dem semantischen Externalismus kompatibel ist und dass die die HPC-Arten bezeichnenden Terme direkt, namensartig auf diese referieren. Daraus folgt (2.) dass es sich bei der von diesen Termen aufgewiesenen Vagheit nicht um intensionale, sondern um extensionale Vagheit handeln muss. (3.) argumentiere ich, dass HPC-Arten erfolgreich mithilfe des vagheitstheoretischen Begriffs der »Realisierungslücke« modelliert werden können. Auf dieser Grundlage kann dann (4.) die Parallele zum sogenannten »problem of the many« verständlich gemacht werden. Ein wichtiges Ergebnis besteht in der genauen Differenzierung und Rekonstruktion unterschiedlicher Vagheitstypen, die für den HPC-Ansatz einschlägig sind, insbesondere: (a) synchrone und (b) diachrone Unbestimmtheit von HPC-Arten, (c) »imperfect homeostasis« und (d) die Gradualität des natürliche-Arten-Konzepts selbst.

#### Intuitionism and Incompleteness

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If someone wants to promote a system of inferential rules for a class of logical expressions, then she is often seen to incur the commitment to the existence of a model-theoretic semantics which coheres with the promoted calculus: there has to be a model-theoretic semantics for which the system of rules is provably sound and complete. Furthermore, the need to find a suitable model-theoretic semantics which corresponds to a given calculus is felt especially strong if the calculus deviates from the canons of reasoning that are codified in classical logic. With respect to a non-classical system of inferential rules, there is no guarantee, or so it seems, that they really govern meaningful expressions. Hence the efforts of non-classical logicians to come up with suitable semantics which correspond to their preferred calculi.

In this talk, I will discuss intuitionistic logic and intuitionistic model-theoretic semantics. More precisely, I will deal with the following two questions:

1. Is there a suitable model-theoretic semantics which corresponds to the intuitionistic calculus of first-order predicate logic?

2. What are the consequences if there is no such semantics?

Relying only on a weak consistency assumption about the models of a possible model-theoretic semantics, I will prove in the first part of my talk that question (i) has to be answered negatively: there is no suitable model-theoretic semantics which corresponds to intuitionistic logic. Moreover, this result can be proved by intuitionistically acceptable means.

In the second part of my talk, I will defend the following answer to question (ii): the fact that there is no suitable semantics which corresponds to intuitionistic derivability does *not* speak against intuitionistic logic. In particular, I will argue, *pace* Dummett, that intuitionists can be as happy with Tarskian model-theoretic semantics as classicists are. The fact that intuitionistic logic is not complete with respect to this semantics does not mean that this semantics fits classical logic better than intuitionistic logic. The idea that the correctness of intuitionistic logic depends on a sound and complete model-theoretic semantics is seriously flawed. Completeness results may have aesthetic mathematical value and useful mathematical applications but they do not have philosophical or semantical importance.

### Heilinger 8

#### Non-effective moral reasons

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Moral reasoning aims at identifying the action an agent is morally demanded to perform in a given situation. Moral reasons speak for or against a certain action. If we say an action is morally demanded, we mean to have moral reasons to do it; if we say it is morally prohibited, we mean to have moral

reasons not to do it; if we say it is morally permitted, we mean that no moral reasons speak in favour or against it.

Given the complexity of dilemmatic scenarios, most often multiple moral reasons pertain. They may compete and speak for or against several, sometimes mutually exclusive actions. Because ultimately a decision has to be made and only one moral reason (or a cluster of moral reasons speaking in favour of one specific action) can become effective and initiate action of a moral agent, it has to be asked what happens to the *non-effective reasons* speaking in favour of an action that ultimately is *not* performed.

I argue that two different strategies can be distinguished how to deal with non-effective moral reasons (NEMR). They can either be *cancelled* or their *persistence* has to be admitted. Further differentiation suggests the following five possibilities:

1. Cancelling non-effective reasons («silencing claim»)
  - 1.1. The NEMR is overridden by other reasons and is no longer a moral reason.
  - 1.2. The NEMR dissolves in the overall judgement.
  - 1.3. The NEMR loses its *prescriptive* force, even if it contributes to the *evaluation* of a non-realised action as partly morally good («partial silencing», insofar as only the prescriptive function, not the evaluative function is cancelled).
2. Accepting non-effective reasons («persistence claim»)
  - 2.1. The NEMR persists and demands an additional but the ultimately chosen action. It provides a cause for a residual feeling of remorse and regret in the moral agent.
  - 2.2. The NEMR persists and demands an additional but the ultimately chosen action. It provides a cause for some degree of (potentially inevitable) moral guilt.

I will attempt to reject the silencing claim and inquire about the plausibility of the persistence claim.

## Himmelreich 8

### Action vs. Agency

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Some people argue that talk of collective agency is misguided. They might claim that all action is individual action. Therefore, they might argue collective agency is merely individual agency, strictly speaking. I disagree and argue that agency is not about *doing* something. More precisely, collective action is neither necessary nor sufficient for collective agency. This is my first and main claim.

In defending this claim I make a correlated second claim. It concerns what could be called the «redundancy principle». In short it says that if all collective actions are reducible to individual actions, then any mentions of collective agency are redundant and should, therefore, be abandoned. My second claim is that this principle is wrong.

The main argument considers two examples. Both involve collections of individuals. The first is the «Tragedy of the Commons» case: *All* individuals in the collection act such that they bring about an event. I argue that this is a case of collective action but not of collective agency. Collective action therefore is not sufficient for collective agency. The second case is the «Spokesperson» case: *one* individual acts to bring about an event, in line with a decision taken by the collection. I argue that this is not a case of collective action but possibly of collective agency. Therefore collective action is not necessary for collective agency.

I present a third example to suggest that action simpliciter is not necessary for collective agency. This is the «Bailiff» case: *one* individual acts to bring about an event, in line with a decision taken by the collection. However, the acting individual is not a member of the collection. If the collection in the «Bailiff» case is a collective agent just as the collection in the «Spokesperson» case is, then no action simpliciter by any member of the group is necessary for collective agency.

This talk advances the argument that discussions of collective agency should not focus on actions. Instead, I suggest that cases such as «Bailiff» provide interesting examples where action and collective agency can easily become disjoint rather than overlapping concepts.

## 8 Henning

### Will I be glad I did it? – Rational Decision, Preference Change, and Personality

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This talk is about a neglected kind of decision problem. Some choices lead to predictable changes in fundamental utilities. In some such cases, we have clear intuitions as to which choice is rational. But it turns out to be hard to account for these intuitions in standard decision-theoretic frameworks. These problems have some interesting implications. I argue that the most promising solution to the problem of predictable preference change is, surprisingly, Kantian in spirit. I begin by discussing an example, and I contrast the case with other cases for which diachronic principles of ratifiability or reflection have been proposed. The changes I discuss are special because they are not induced by conditionalization on new evidence. They do not constitute changes in information but changes in basic values – or in *personality*. Recent Kantian authors have claimed that we have reason to care about a person's preferences because we have reason to respect her. When we respect preferences (even our own ones), we do so because this respect is *owed* to particular persons. This Kantian view has the potential to solve the problem of predictable changes

### 3 Hirsch Hadorn

#### Epistemic and non-epistemic values in applied science

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The picture of scientific research as ongoing revisions of theories to improve their merits regarding accuracy, scope, simplicity and further criteria that make up what is conceived as a good theory dates back to the 1970ies. These criteria function as epistemic values or standards, since they provide the normative basis to decide on acceptance of theories as part of the body of scientific knowledge. It has been proposed that the proper role of non-epistemic values, e.g. moral and prudential values, is in evaluating the usefulness of theories to solve real-world problems, which comes after the epistemic evaluation of theories regarding acceptance as part of the body of scientific knowledge has taken place. This position assumes that epistemic values are the same in both fields, basic and applied research. I will criticize this assumption and the related additive account of epistemic and non-epistemic evaluation for applied research while defending the thesis that non-epistemic values have a role in determining epistemic values in applied research.

Epistemic values come as an open list of vague criteria, lacking a general ordering. Epistemic values for deciding on acceptance of theories to be used for solving real-world problems may differ from those for acceptance as part of the body of scientific knowledge regarding (1) how vague standards are specified, (2) what counts as a standard, and (3) how standards are weighted. Real-world problems are matters or situations regarded as unwelcome, harmful, or wrong and needing to be overcome. Focussing on accuracy and simplicity as examples, the role of moral and prudential aspects of real-world problems in considering how to determine epistemic standards in case of deciding on acceptance of theories to be used for solving real-world problems is discussed. Accepting such an integrative account of epistemic and non-epistemic values for applied research means rejecting the position of epistemic standards to be the same for all of science.

### 3 Hjortland

#### Truth, Paracompleteness, and Substructural Logic: Half as lovely, twice as true

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Contemporary work on formal theories of truth are dominated by two opposing camps – classical theorists and revisionary theorists. Both positions are reactions to the Tarskian legacy: there can be no consistent theory of truth which is (i) classical, (ii) strong enough to express its own syntax (e.g. has names for its sentences), and (iii) includes the unrestricted T-schema. The moral drawn by the classical theorists is that the T-schema in its unrestricted form has to go. In its place they offer a *restricted* truth predicate. The revisionists, on the other hand,

suggests weakening the logic to consistently accommodate the full T-schema.

In what follows it is the revisionist theories that will be discussed. Rather than giving arguments against classical theories here, I will focus on comparing different revisionary theories. In particular, I will compare two revisionary strategies for an unrestricted theory of truth: *paracomplete* theories and *contraction-free* theories, i.e. logics without the structural rule of contraction. Ultimately I will argue that a certain type of contraction-free theory have important advantages over the more familiar paracomplete theories. These theories, I argue, come with two considerable benefits: First, unlike paracomplete theories they offer a single revisionary solution to both the Liar paradox and the Curry paradox. Second, contraction-free logic allows for a truth predicate which can be applied in suppositional reasoning, or reasoning under assumption.

### Hoffmann 8

#### Warum dürfen wir unsere Freunde bevorzugen, aber nicht unsere Feinde benachteiligen?

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Betrachtet man die moralphilosophische Debatte um Parteilichkeit und Unparteilichkeit aus einer Metaperspektive, fällt auf, dass die Parteilichkeitsbefürworter ausschließlich auf positive Beziehungen (v. a. Freundschaft) fokussiert sind, während die negative Beziehung der Feindschaft keine Beachtung findet. Diese Eindimensionalität zeigt sich auch am Parteilichkeitsbegriff, der als *Bevorzugung* expliziert wird, ohne dass die Dimension der Benachteiligung berücksichtigt wird.

Dabei legt der Parteilichkeitsbegriff die einseitige Auseinandersetzung mit positiven Beziehungen keinesfalls nahe: In unserer Alltagssprache und verschiedenen Kontexten (z. B. bei der Rolle des Richters) greifen wir vielmehr auf einen Parteilichkeitsbegriff zurück, der symmetrisch ist: Er gilt für positive wie negative Beziehungen gleichermaßen.

Die Diskrepanz zwischen der einseitigen Betonung von Freundschaft auf Seiten der Parteilichkeitsbefürworter einerseits und dem symmetrischen Parteilichkeitsbegriff unserer Alltagssprache andererseits irritiert und birgt ein ernstes Problem für die Überzeugungskraft der Parteilichkeitsbefürworter. Denn ihre Argumentation lässt sich vielfach umkehren, so dass sich die Frage aufdrängt: Wenn ich meinen Freund bevorzugen darf, warum darf ich dann nicht aus demselben Grund meinen Feind benachteiligen? Solange die Parteilichkeitsbefürworter diese Frage nicht beantworten, fehlt ihrem Ansatz die Überzeugungskraft. Sie stehen also vor der Herausforderung, die Asymmetrie in ihrer Argumentation zu rechtfertigen.

In meinem Vortrag werde ich mich dieses Desiderats annehmen, indem ich drei denkbare Rechtfertigungsstrategien der Parteilichkeitsbefürworter diskutiere, nämlich:

- 1) Die Zurückweisung des Maßstabs der Unparteilichkeit, welcher dem Symmetrieverständnis zugrundeliegt,
- 2) Die Neuformulierung des zugrundeliegenden Parteilichkeitsbegriffs mittels einer Explikation, die nicht in ihr Gegenteil verkehrt werden kann (und entsprechend nicht auf die Antipoden Freundschaft vs. Feindschaft angewendet werden kann),

3) Die Verneinung der bei einer Symmetrie vorliegenden Ähnlichkeit (unter umgekehrten Vorzeichen) von Freundschaft und Feindschaft.

Von diesen Optionen können 1) und 2) m. E. nicht abschließend überzeugen. Im Zuge einer Analyse der Beziehungsform »Feindschaft« werde ich stattdessen zum Ergebnis kommen, dass sich Freundschaft in *einer* Hinsicht von Feindschaft maßgeblich unterscheidet, welche die Asymmetrie rechtfertigt: Anders als Feindschaft ist Freundschaft nicht nur psychologisch, sondern auch moralisch relevant, weil Freundschaft einen intrinsischen Wert darstellt, der zu einem gelingenden Leben nicht nur prudentiell, sondern auch moralisch beiträgt.

## 4 Hoffmann

### Menschliche Individualität und personale Identität

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In der gegenwärtigen Debatte um die Begriffe Person und personale Identität lassen sich zwei grundlegende Positionen unterscheiden: Auf der einen Seite stehen die Vertreter eines mentalen bzw. psychischen Kriteriums personaler Identität (Shoemaker, Parfit), auf der anderen Seite die Vertreter eines physischen bzw. Körperkriteriums der personalen Identität (Williams, Thomson, Olson). Die beiden Lager stimmen insofern überein, als beide den Anspruch vertreten, eine Theorie vorzulegen, die Kriterien für die *transtemporale Persistenz von Personen* spezifiziert. Sie widersprechen einander, weil die einen dieses Kriterium ausschließlich mit Bezugnahme auf psychische, die anderen ausschließlich mit Bezugnahme auf physische Eigenschaften formulieren wollen. Beide Kriterien lassen sich durch Intuitionen stützen, die in unserer Normalsprache fest verankert sind. Ein Grund dafür, dass keines der beiden Lager die Kontroverse zu seinen Gunsten entscheiden kann, liegt offensichtlich darin, dass relevante Intuitionen miteinander unverträglich sind, was anhand zahlreicher Gedankenexperimente aufgezeigt werden kann.

Mein Ziel besteht darin, diese scheinbar unauflösbare Kontroverse einer Lösung näher zu bringen. Das entscheidende Problem in dieser Kontroverse liegt meines Erachtens in der einseitigen Konzentration auf den Personbegriff. Meine *Kernidee* lässt sich formulieren wie folgt: Relevant ist hier die Unterscheidung zwischen Personen und Menschen. Mit Hilfe dieser Unterscheidung, so werde ich zeigen, lassen sich eine ganze Reihe von Streitpunkten zwischen den Vertretern physischer und psychischer Kriterien personaler Identität beilegen. Allerdings löst dieser Nachweis allein noch kein theoretisches Problem. Denn da Menschen und Personen unterschiedliche Individuationskriterien haben (ein toter Mensch ist immer noch Mensch, aber nicht mehr Person), liegt die Vermutung nahe, dass die durch die Einführung der Distinktion Mensch/Person gelösten Widersprüche nur verschoben sind und sich nun stattdessen als Konflikte zwischen divergierenden Individuationskriterien darstellen.

Dieses Problem lässt sich nur ausräumen, wenn man die Theorie personaler Identität entsprechend erweitert. Diese notwendige Erweiterung fasse ich unter dem Term »menschliche Individualität«. Im Vortrag werden zwei Explikationsvor-

schläge für wichtige Bedeutungskomponenten eines so verstandenen Individualitätsbegriffs formuliert.

## Hoffmann 8

### Thomas Buddenbrook und der Vorrang der Moral

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Die Auffassung, dass Handelnde in ihrem Handeln moralischen Gründen gegenüber anderen praktischen Gründen den Vorrang geben sollen – im Folgenden: die Vorrangthese –, ist in der Ethik weithin akzeptiert. In der philosophischen Tradition ist Kant einer ihrer herausragenden Vertreter; in der modernen Metaethik hat sie Richard Hare unter dem Schlagwort »overridingness« prominent vertreten. In jüngerer Vergangenheit ist die allgemeine Geltung der Vorrangthese aber aus verschiedenen Gründen bezweifelt worden. Zu nennen sind in diesem Zusammenhang vor allem John L. Mackie sowie – im deutschen Sprachraum – Dieter Birnbacher und Héctor Wittwer.

Im Vortrag wird diese Kritik entkräftet und eine plausible Version der Vorrangthese verteidigt. Dabei gehe ich in drei Schritten vor: Zunächst wird der Status der Vorrangthese diskutiert. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass die Vorrangthese eine Behauptung ist, die in unserem alltäglichen Sprechen und Urteilen über moralische Gründe und über deren Verhältnis zu anderen Handlungsgründen tief verankert ist. Es handelt sich somit um ein Element der »deskriptiven Metaphysik« unseres alltäglichen Verständnisses von Moral. Relevant ist dieser Hinweis, weil explizit zugestanden wird, dass der Vorrang moralischer Gründe in einem verbesserten – dann aber »revisiöner« Bild von Moral – möglicherweise nicht mehr besteht. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird dann – zweitens – die Frage gestellt, ob das in der Vorrangthese zum Ausdruck kommende Gebot ein allgemeines *Vernunftgebot* oder ein *moralisches Gebot* ist. Ich werde zunächst Gründe dafür anführen, dass die Vorrangthese nicht als allgemeines Vernunftgebot aufgefasst werden kann. Dann werde ich anhand der Darstellung eines in Thomas Manns *Buddenbrooks* gestalteten Handlungsszenarios exemplarisch zeigen, dass sich die Vorrangthese sinnvoll als moralische Forderung interpretieren lässt. Drittens schließlich werden einige Fallbeispiele diskutiert, die die Kritiker der Vorrangthese vorbringen, um ihre Unplausibilität zu belegen. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass diese Fallbeispiele entgegen dem ersten Anschein keine schlagkräftigen Belege gegen die allgemeine Geltung des Vorrangs der Moral darstellen.

## Hofmann 5

### How Gettier helps to understand justification

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There are Gettier cases for justification. I will describe two such cases, cases involving veridical hallucination. An analysis of the cases is given, along the lines of (reliabilist) virtue epistemology (cf. Sosa, Greco).

First, the two cases show that rational, evidenced belief need not be justified. Thereby, they show that (what can be called) ›evidentialist accounts of justification‹ are false. According to such evidentialist accounts of justification, a subject's belief that *p* is (prima facie) justified if and only if she possesses some evidence *e* for *p* and she bases her belief that *p* on her possession of evidence *e* for *p* (cf., similarly, Conee and Feldman who speak of ›well-foundedness‹). A belief that *p* has the status of being evidenced, by definition, if and only if there is some evidence for *p*. It is supported by evidence, in some sense; it is in accordance with reasons.

Second, the two cases show that justification has the same kind of abstract structure that knowledge has. In Gettier cases, a certain status is achieved and a corresponding competence is exercised, but the status is not reached because of the exercise of the competence. We get lucky success. In the good, non-Gettier cases, the status is achieved by competence. For knowledge, the status is *being true*, and the competence is a kind of truth tracking ability (cf. Sosa, Greco). For justification, I submit, the status is *being evidenced*, and the corresponding competence is a reason tracking ability. Exercising a reason tracking ability makes the resulting belief rational, since reason tracking abilities are rational capacities. Thus, a virtue-theoretic account of both knowledge and justification can be provided.

The two Gettier cases for justification that I describe involve veridical hallucination. Things appear perceptually a certain way to the subject, and they really are that way, but only by mere coincidence. In such a case, the subject can possess evidence (luckily) and form a belief in a rational way, but the belief need not be justified, intuitively. So being rational and evidenced is not sufficient for being justified.

## 7 Hohl

### Individuelle Verantwortung für kollektiv verursachte Schädigungen

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Ich befasse mich in diesem Paper mit folgendem Problem: Inwiefern sind einzelne Individuen für kollektiv verursachte Schädigungen moralisch verantwortlich? Dabei interessiert mich ein bestimmter Typ von kollektiv verursachten Schädigungen. Es handelt sich dabei um Szenarien, in denen eine Vielzahl von Akteuren, die ihr Verhalten nicht untereinander koordinieren, einen ähnlichen Typ von Handlung ausführen, wobei jede einzelne Handlung für sich betrachtet unproblematisch erscheint, alle Handlungen zusammen (oder eine Teilmenge davon) aber eine Schädigung von Drittpersonen verursachen. Beispiele für solche Szenarien sind durch Passivrauchen verursachte Krankheiten oder Klimawandel. Gemeinsam ist den entsprechenden Szenarien, dass die Schädigung von Drittpersonen durch den aggregierten Effekt der Handlungen einer Vielzahl von Individuen hervorgebracht wird und eine kollektive Regulierung der betreffenden Handlungen fehlt. Ein gutes Beispiel ist der Klimawandel, der insofern einen Extremfall darstellt, als die Beiträge einzelner Personen verschwindend klein sind, aber insgesamt massive Schädigungen drohen. Es gibt in diesem Fall keine – oder zumindest keine angemessene – kollektive Abmachung, welche die Schädigung verhin-

dert. Die Schädigung von Drittpersonen könnte jedoch – das ist die Annahme – in den hier diskutierten Situationen verhindert werden, wenn zumindest eine Teilmenge der beteiligten Individuen ihr Verhalten verändern würde. Diese lose ›Gruppe‹ von Individuen ist allerdings kein echtes Kollektiv und kann nicht als solches angesprochen werden. Aussichtsreicher scheint es, auf die individuellen Pflichten der einzelnen beteiligten Personen abzielen. Hier stellt sich das Problem, inwiefern man eine einzelne Person für den aggregierten Effekt der Handlungen aller Beteiligten verantwortlich machen kann. Eine Grundfrage ist, inwiefern es für die moralische Beurteilung des Verhaltens eines einzelnen Individuums eine Rolle spielt, wie die anderen beteiligten Individuen handeln. Die anderen Beteiligten haben zum einen Einfluss auf den *Effekt* der Handlungen eines Individuums: Wenn nur eine einzelne Person einen Offroadler fährt oder in den Urlaub auf einen anderen Kontinent fliegt, so ist dies unproblematisch, tun dies aber viele Personen, kommt es aber an einem bestimmten Punkt zu gefährlichem Klimawandel. Kann man also den Handlungen einer Einzelperson überhaupt einen bestimmten Effekt zuschreiben? Zudem stellt sich die Frage der Fairness: Wenn viele andere Beteiligte nicht bereit sind, ihr Verhalten zu ändern, kann man dann von einer einzelnen Person verlangen, dass sie erhebliche Opfer erbringt, um ihr eigenes Verhalten anzupassen?

## Hommen 2

### The ontology of omissions and the problem of omissive causation

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In this talk, I deal with the issue of the ontology and causality of omissions which is currently heavily debated both in legal theory and moral philosophy. The dilemma in morality and criminal law is that many theorists want to preserve a causal relevance of omissions but endorse an eliminativist view on omissions which is incompatible with omissive causation on almost any conception of causation. In the first section of my talk, I evaluate eliminativists' strategies to deal with the problem of omissive causation. Especially, I discuss Michael Moore's approach to posit a non-causal dependency-relation to base liability attributions in cases of omission, and reject it. In the second section of my talk, I consider reductive and non-reductive versions of realism about omissions. Reductive realism, which identifies omissions with an agent's concurrent actions, has the problem that the causal consequences of those actions generally seem not to match the causal consequences relevant for the moral attributions in question. Reductionist approaches to that problem, however, such as Jonathan Schaffer's account of contrastive causation, threaten the objectivity of causation by introducing perspectival and perhaps even normative criteria into the causal analysis. Hence, the task of the last section is to establish a version of non-reductive realism about omissions, which reifies omissions as negative properties of agents, that is both metaphysically acceptable and able to provide a solution to the problem of omissive causation.

8 Horst

**Practical Knowledge**

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In her book *Intention* G. E. M. Anscombe famously claims that acting intentionally essentially involves knowledge of one's action. Doing something intentionally is doing it knowingly. In my talk I shall offer an interpretation and defense of her claim. In doing so, I will, first, clarify the claim that there is an essential connection between knowledge and intentional action. Second, I will argue for the negative claim that, if there is such an essential connection between knowledge and intentional action, the relevant kind of knowledge cannot be observational or inferential knowledge. Third, I attempt to show that the knowledge involved in intentional action must be practical knowledge, and to specify what a positive conception of such knowledge must look like.

5 Horvath

**Understanding  
 and Rational Revisability**

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Concerning the epistemology of judgments like BACHELORS ARE UNMARRIED or ALL KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE, it seems an attractive view that our justification for such judgments is typically provided by understanding alone. In this talk, I will first put forward a novel version of this traditional view, and then defend it against an important objection from the rational revisability of human judgments.

The view itself can be put as follows:

(USJ) Understanding is a sufficient source of justification for judgments like BACHELORS ARE UNMARRIED or ALL KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE.

Understanding is understood broadly here, as the cognitive ability to form and entertain mental states with conceptual content. A source of justification (SOJ) is sufficient iff it alone suffices to justify a judgment. But even sufficient SOJs can typically be substituted or defeated by other sources.

Claims like (USJ) that express a constitutive link between understanding and justification are by no means uncontroversial. One of the main objections takes the *rational revisability* of almost all human judgments as its starting point. Particularly troublesome in this respect are cases where even experts concerning a judgment to which (USJ) supposedly applies can rationally deny that judgment (cf. Williamson, *The Philosophy of Philosophy*, ch. 4). Thus, proponents of (USJ) need to argue that their view is compatible with the following, seemingly incompatible claim:

(URD) Even someone who fully understands e.g. the judgment ALL KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE can rationally deny that judgment and even lack any inclination to accept it.

However, I will argue that (URD) is merely an instance of the following general truth about SOJs:

(GTS) A subject S who possesses a sufficient source of justifi-

fication Q for the judgment J can rationally deny J and even lack any inclination to accept J.

The argument for (GTS) is that it is true of all standard SOJs, even quite diverse ones like perception and introspection, which strongly indicates that it expresses a general truth about SOJs. The rational revisability of human judgments is therefore compatible with possessing a sufficient SOJ for these judgments, and thus poses no special problem for (USJ).

Hoyningen-Huene 3

**Der Sackgasseneinwand  
 gegen verschiedene Formen  
 des Realismus: Beispiele**

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Der Sackgasseneinwand richtet sich gegen den konvergenten Entitäten-Realismus und zugleich gegen bestimmte Formen des Strukturen-Realismus; er wurde »the ultimate argument against convergent realism and structural realism« genannt. Betroffen sind alle Formen des Realismus, die irgendeine Kontinuität in einer Theorienfolge als Argumentation für eine Form des Realismus benutzen. Beispielsweise wird im konvergenten Entitäten-Realismus die Kontinuität postulierter Entitäten über verschiedene Theoriewechsel hinweg als Argument für die wirkliche Existenz dieser Entitäten genommen, oder in manchen Formen des Strukturen-Realismus die Kontinuität von Strukturen über verschiedene Theoriewechsel hinweg als Argument für die Realität dieser Strukturen genommen. Diese Art der Stützung des Realismus wird vom Sackgasseneinwand angegriffen. Der Sackgasseneinwand besagt, dass die beobachtete Kontinuität in der Theorienfolge (deren Existenz um des Argumentes willen nicht bezweifelt wird) auch von der Konvergenz der Theorienfolge zu einer Grenzwerts-Theorie herrühren könnte, die zwar empirisch außerordentlich genau ist, hinsichtlich ihrer Entitäten bzw. Strukturen aber keineswegs die Realität trifft. In diesem Falle würde die beobachtete Kontinuität in der Theorienfolge keine Legitimation für ihre realistische Interpretation liefern, sei es im Sinne des Entitäten-Realismus oder des Strukturen-Realismus. Tatsächlich sind keine Ressourcen erkennbar, die diesen für die betroffenen Realisten unliebsamen Fall ausschließen könnten.

Nach einer kurzen Darstellung des Sackgasseneinwands werde ich drei Fallstudien vorstellen, die zeigen, dass die vom Sackgasseneinwand ins Auge gefasste Möglichkeit keineswegs nur eine logische Spielerei darstellt, sondern in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte wiederholt aufgetreten ist.

Erstens: Die Entwicklung der klassischen Mechanik von ca. 1740 bis ca. 1900. In diesem Zeitraum war die klassische Mechanik praktisch einhellig anerkannt und wurde aufgrund ihrer immer neuen und z. T. unerwarteten Erfolge als endgültige Theorie gesehen. Das 20. Jahrhundert zeigte dann, dass diese Hoffnung verfrüht war.

Zweitens: Die Berechnung der Perihelbewegung des Planeten Merkur. Die zunächst überraschende Perihelbewegung des Merkur konnte mittels der Newtonschen Gravitationstheorie im Laufe des 19. Jhdts. in verschiedenen Approximationsschritten sukzessive bis auf 0.7 % berechnet werden. Das Verfahren konvergierte, allerdings auf einen grundsätzlich falschen Wert.

Drittens: Die Empirie und Theorie der Infektionskrankheiten

war seit den Arbeiten von Pasteur und Koch im Kern stabil. Die Entdeckung der Prionen zeigte, dass diese Stabilität trügerisch gewesen war.

## 4 Huebl

### Consciousness for Attention

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What is the relation between consciousness and attention? In a recent debate, Jesse Prinz argues that attention is a necessary condition for consciousness, while Chris Koch and Naotsugu Tsuchiya hold that attention and consciousness are independent from another. I challenge both views, since they are either vulnerable to counterexamples, or cross-fade *perceptual focus* and *attentional focus*, as well as *access to information* with *access to mental states*. As a counterstrategy, I defend the view that consciousness is necessary for attention. As used in psychology and the neurosciences, the term »attention« is best understood as denoting a mental mode that only occurs within a field of consciousness. Like breathing, it can be *passive* in occurring involuntarily, or *active*, in being performed voluntarily as an action. Empirical research from problem solving, masking experiments and the like shows that information can be processed and stored below consciousness. In other words, there is *information access* within the *cognitive system*. However, mental states need to be in the focus of the field of consciousness in order to be *state accessible* for the *person*, that is, in order to be used for mental actions like deliberating or imagining, which in turn are necessary conditions to store complex contents in long-term memory.

## 2 Jaag

### Humes Dictum und die Dispositional-Kategorial-Unterscheidung bezüglich natürlicher Eigenschaften

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Die Annahme natürlicher Eigenschaften hat sich für die Erklärung der objektiven Ähnlichkeit von Gegenständen, für die Definition von Duplikaten und intrinsischen Eigenschaften, für die Konzeption von Naturgesetzen und Kausalität und die Theorie der Modalität als eminent fruchtbar erwiesen. Überdies findet sie auch außerhalb der Metaphysik erfolgreich Anwendung, beispielsweise indem sie vielversprechende Lösungen zentraler Probleme der Sprachphilosophie (Putnams und Kripkensteins metasemantische Paradoxien) und der Erkenntnis- bzw. Wissenschaftstheorie (Hempels Rabenparadox, Goodmans neues Rätsel der Induktion) ermöglicht.

Weitgehend unabhängig von der Frage, ob es sich bei natürlichen Eigenschaften um Universalien, Tropes oder natürliche Klassen handelt, haben sich in der einschlägigen Literatur besonders zwei unterschiedliche (Familien von) Konzeptionen natürlicher Eigenschaften durchgesetzt: Während nach dem Dispositionalen Essenzialismus (z. B. A. Bird & S. Shoemaker) zumindest einige natürliche Eigenschaften dispositionale

Essenzen haben, hat eine natürliche Eigenschaft nach dem neo-humeschen Kategorialismus (z. B. D. Armstrong & D. Lewis) eine primitive Essenz (Quidditas), die das dispositionale Profil der Eigenschaft nicht mit einschließt. Zur Unterscheidung dieser beiden Konzeptionen wird üblicherweise zusätzlich Humes Dictum herangezogen. Während die Annahme von kategorialen Eigenschaften *per se* keinerlei metaphysisch notwendige Verbindungen zwischen distinkten Entitäten (Humes Dictum) impliziert, hat die Annahme von Dispositionen die Existenz essenzieller und somit metaphysisch notwendiger Verbindungen zwischen distinkten Entitäten zur Folge.

Das Hauptziel dieses Vortrags besteht darin, gegen beide Konjunkte des letztgenannten Unterscheidungskriteriums zu argumentieren: Gegen das erste Konjunkt wird anhand dreier (Familien von) Fälle(n) dargelegt, dass zwischen bestimmten kategorialen Eigenschaften metaphysisch notwendige Verbindungen bestehen. Gegen das zweite Konjunkt wird ausgehend von der Kernthese des Dispositionalen Essenzialismus für die Kompatibilität der Annahme dispositionaler Eigenschaften mit Humes Dictum argumentiert. Abschließend wird diskutiert, welche Konsequenzen sich aus diesen Befunden für die Debatte zwischen Anhängern einer neo-humeschen und den Vertretern einer anti-humeschen dispositionalistischen Metaphysik ergeben: Reden die beiden Parteien aneinander vorbei? Wenn nicht, worin besteht die Kontroverse wirklich? Welche Auswirkungen hat dies auf die Konzeptionen und den modalen Status von Naturgesetzen und Kausalität?

## Jaster 5

### Contextualism and Gradability

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Epistemic Contextualism is the claim that the knowledge predicate is context-sensitive. Jason Stanley objects against this view that if it were correct, »know« should be gradable in the same way as for instance »tall« and »flat«. I show that the contextualist is not committed to the gradability of the knowledge predicate in the first place. I will distinguish between what I will call *pure threshold predicates*, which in each context either apply simpliciter or not at all, and *impure threshold predicates*, for which context determines whether they apply simpliciter, but which can also be satisfied to certain degrees. Pure threshold predicates are not gradable, but since many of them are context-sensitive, a lack of gradability does not in itself jeopardize context-sensitivity. Pace Stanley, three claims are going to be established: that the lack of gradability of the knowledge predicate (i) does not jeopardize its context-sensitivity, (ii) does not dismantle the relevant analogies between »know« and gradable adjectives, and (iii) is perfectly consistent with the idea of varyingly high epistemic standards.

## 8 Kahmen

### How Do We Know What We Intend?

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How do you know what you intend? One influential suggestion is that intentions, like many other propositional attitudes, are transparent: One can come to know that one has a certain intention by making up one's mind about what to do. However, Jonathan Way (2007) and Sarah K. Paul (2011) have independently recently raised two objections to the transparency thesis: that it cannot explain knowledge of spontaneous or irrational intentions, and that it cannot explain knowledge of rationally underdetermined intentions. The aim of this paper is to defend a version of the transparency thesis against these objections. I argue that they mistakenly presuppose an exclusively evidential role of what the agent takes to be reasons for action. By appreciating the practical dimension of the transparency thesis and the associated privilege, I conclude, both objections can be answered.

## 3 Kaiser

### Reductive Explanation in Biology

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The question whether all biological phenomena can ultimately be explained in a reductive way is frequently disputed by philosophers as well as by biologists themselves. What matters most to them is whether explanatory reductionism is correct or not. Only few philosophers are interested in spelling out in detail what it means to explain a biological phenomenon reductively. It seems to me that this is a major shortcoming of the debate since any convincing defense of explanatory (anti)reductionism must be based on a clear and precise understanding of what a reductive explanation is. In order to fill this gap I present three main characteristics that distinguish reductive explanations in biology from non-reductive ones. The first and third of the following features are necessary conditions, whereas the second is a characteristic that is only typical of most reductive explanations.

First, reductive explanations refer solely to factors that are based on a *lower level* than the phenomenon to be explained. There exists an important subtype of this characteristic. Molecular explanations appeal exclusively to factors that are not only located on a lower level, but on the one *fundamental* (biological) level of molecules. It is important to note that reductive explanations in biology are not confined to this type of fundamental-level explanations.

Second, in reductive explanations the behavior of a system is typically explained solely in terms of factors that are *internal* to the system (i.e. to the system's parts). External factors that belong to the environment of the system are either completely ignored or simplified to being mere background or input conditions.

Third, to explain the behavior of a system in a reductive way means to appeal to the parts of a system *in isolation*.

That is, reductive explanations only include information that is discovered by taking the parts out of the system and by exploring their properties in other contexts than *in situ*.

These three features clarify the notion of a reductive explanation and thereby serve as a useful starting point to assess the strengths and limitations of explaining biological phenomena reductively.

## Kangilaski/Cohnitz 1

### Understanding a sentence $\neq$ Knowing its truth-conditions: Why the epistemological determination argument fails

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The determination argument tries to establish that a sentence's meaning is at least a truth-condition. This argument is supposed to rest on innocent premises that even a deflationist about truth can accept. The determination argument comes in a metaphysical and in an epistemological version. In this paper we will focus on the epistemological version. We will argue that the apparently innocent first premise of the epistemological version of this argument is true only if understood in a way that is actually question-begging. If it is understood in a weaker sense (which we take to be the intended sense), it loses its innocence and should be rejected by a truth-deflationist.

## Kästner 3

### The Curious Symmetry of Mechanistic Constitution

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How do we best explain cognitive phenomena? Throughout the past decades, neuroscientists have made significant progress in associating divisions of our brains with specific cognitive capacities. Theories of mechanistic explanation promise to take such scientific practice at face value: they claim explanation – at least in the neurosciences – works by identifying the mechanisms underlying the explanandum phenomenon. According to the most prominent conception, a mechanism is a whole composed of entities and their activities organized in such a way that they produce or constitute the phenomenon in question.

The current paper focuses on the relation between a mechanism as a whole and its component parts. It investigates the proposed constitutive relation between them and how this is cashed out in terms of mutual manipulability. According to the mechanistic view, being able to manipulate the behavior of a mechanism as a whole through manipulation of a part and a part's behavior through manipulation of the whole



mechanism is sufficient to establish constitutive relevance – a supposedly symmetrical relation holding between the mechanism and its component parts.

I will argue that this appeal to symmetry, though well reasoned against the background of scientific practice, raises a dilemma. If the mechanist holds onto it, she will be forced into a metaphysical puzzle; for part-whole relations clearly are not symmetrical. If she rejects symmetry, however, she will not only risk losing her empirical adequacy but also appears to confront worries about cross-level causation.

## 7 Katzer

**The Idea of Global Public Reason**

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This paper explores the idea of a conception of global public reason that is distinct from public reason appropriate to domestic political deliberations in a democratic society. The idea of public reason in a general sense can be understood to mean that a political regime should be based on principles that »all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse«. Inspired by Rawls, Joshua Cohen has suggested the idea of global public reason that applies only to international political conduct and institutions and whose standards for what counts as reasonable are different from the standards at the domestic level. The paper explores this idea and examines the arguments presented by Cohen.

In the first part, the paper examines the subject to which global public reason is supposed to apply – the international political order. In comparison to public reason at the domestic level, three differences are highlighted: the international political order is still *in the making*; its proponents cannot reasonably aim at a universal consensus of all existing political and moral views to certain principles, but only at a wide consensus; and many elements of the international order are not enforced against other societies by coercive means.

In the second part, this description serves to confront Cohen's arguments for the view that global public reason contains standards which are substantially less demanding than those of domestic public reason. The first argument is based on collective self-determination, the view that citizens have a right to determine their political order, the second on the view that the criteria for political obligation are different from those of justice. The third argument points to the value of toleration and the possibility of reasonable disagreement. The fourth argument is based on the requirement that a conception of global public reason must be widely shareable among the proponents of different political doctrines.

After an assessment of these arguments, the paper concludes that they do not support the view that the standards of global public reason are fundamentally different from the standards of public reason at the domestic level.

**Towards a Knowledge-Based Account of Understanding**

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The aim of this paper is to provide a novel knowledge based account of understanding. More specifically, an account of degrees of understanding is combined with a contextualist account of outright attributions of understanding. It is argued that this account has an edge over its main non-knowledge based rivals and that it avoids a number of forceful objections that have been levelled against knowledge-based accounts in the literature.

## Kiesewetter 8

**The Principle of Decisive Reasons**

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In this paper, I present an argument for the claim that an agent has decisive reason to do something only if she has sufficient reason to believe that she has decisive reason to do it. I argue that this claim follows from the plausible assumption that it is always conceptually possible for an agent to respond correctly to her decisive reasons. In conclusion, I discuss some implications of this argument (given that some other standard assumptions about reasons hold). One such implication is that we are always in a position to be justified in believing all truths about what we have decisive reason (or ought) to do.

## Kietzmann 8

**Der Realismus praktischer Gründe und das Problem der Motivation**

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Als »Realismus praktischer Gründe« bezeichne ich eine Position, die behauptet, normative Handlungsgründe seien Tatsachen. Praktische Vernunft wird von diesen Autoren als ein Vermögen zur Erkenntnis solcher Tatsachen vorgestellt. Bei dem, was so erkannt wird, soll es sich aber dennoch um *praktische* Gründe handeln. Sie sollen einen Bezug zum Handeln haben. Dieser Bezug kann nicht nur darin bestehen, dass sie für Handlungen *sprechen*. Sie müssen auch, wenn alles gut geht, zum Handeln *motivieren* können. Ich kann in der Literatur zwei Strategien ausmachen, die das verständlich machen sollen. Die erste Strategie (z. B. Thomas Scanlon) glaubt, Überzeugungen allein könnten vernünftige Handlungen motivieren, indem sie diese verursachen. Die zweite Strategie (z. B. R. Jay Wallace) postuliert dagegen ein eigenständiges Vermögen des Willens, mit dessen Hilfe sich sein Besitzer unab-

hängig von seinen Wünschen auf das Verfolgen bestimmter Ziele festlegen kann. Ein *vernünftiger* Wille wird sich dabei an Überzeugungen über praktische Gründe orientieren. Beide Vorschläge sind m. E. unbefriedigend. Der *kausalistische Lösungsvorschlag* scheidet an einer Variante des Problems abweichender Kausalketten, das in anderer Form alle klassischen Wunsch-Überzeugungs-Modelle der Handlungsverursachung plagt. Der *voluntaristische Vorschlag* kann dagegen nicht erklären, wie der Wille auf die Erkenntnis von Gründen orientiert ist. Ein drittes Problem betrifft beide Vorschläge im gleichen Maße; sie lassen nämlich beide im Dunkeln, inwiefern normative Gründe von sich aus schon als praktisch gelten können. Im Rest des Vortrages versuche ich mich an einer Diagnose der tieferen Ursache dieser Probleme und skizziere eine Alternative. Die Probleme entstehen m. E. deshalb, weil der Realismus normativer Gründe die Erkenntnis eines Grundes von der vernünftigen Handlung, für die der Grund spricht, von vornherein abtrennt. Zu dieser Konzeption praktischer Erkenntnis ist man aber gezwungen, wenn man praktische Gründe als Tatsachen oder Situationsaspekte begreift, die unabhängig vom Handelnden einfach vorliegen. Ich will deshalb zweierlei vorschlagen. Erstens sollte es alles eines begriffen werden, ein Ziel zu verfolgen und einen praktischen Grund zu kennen, und nicht als *zwei verschiedene* Dinge. Zweitens sollte man von der Handlungsmotivation her erläutern, was ein praktischer Grund ist, statt umgekehrt von einer vorgängigen Konzeption praktischer Gründe auszugehen und dann zu fragen, wie sie motivieren können.

### 4 Klein

#### Horizontal Perceptual Experience in Cognitive Science

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It has been drawn on the phenomenological tradition to question the paradigm of what might be called Standard Cognitive Science (SCS). It is claimed that SCS fails to acknowledge and account for the richness of our conscious mental life. I will test this critical tendency by sketching a way to develop an SCS-account of perceptual experience that is based on Edmund Husserl's phenomenological concept of *horizon*. Husserl introduced this concept to describe the dynamics of perceptual intentionality. He writes, that the contents of perceptual experience comprise actually present as well as merely possible properties, entities, and aspects. These phenomenological descriptions can be further explicated by drawing on the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who brought in the lived body as a structural correlative of the horizon. I shall present seven theses that capture the idea of the horizon. It will become clear, that the mentioned dynamics can be characterised as variations of perceptual content along three dimensions: *determination*, *accessibility*, and *acquaintance*. These dimensions can be described in terms of contents and in terms of corresponding bodily structures.

To implement the seven theses, I will rely on the general idea of the Global Workspace Hypothesis (GWT) as put forward by Baars (1997). Contents of (perceptual) consciousness are borne by competing representations of visual and proprioceptive as well as memory related subsystems. Modulatory

processes manage the limited resources of consciousness and assign which contents become conscious. The structuring role of the body is accounted for by giving proprioceptive systems such a modulatory role.

### Knappik 5

#### Selbstwissen als »Maker's Knowledge«?

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In neueren Debatten über Selbstwissen bezüglich mentaler Zustände, Episoden usw. (»mentales Selbstwissen«) erfreut sich als Alternative zu den oft als unbefriedigend angesehenen Positionen des *Wahrnehmungsmodells* von Selbstwissen (z. B. »innerer Sinn«) einerseits und der *behaviouristischen* Leugnung von Selbstwissen andererseits eine sogenannte »rational agency«-Theorie von Selbstwissen großer Beliebtheit. Diese Theorie deutet mentales Selbstwissen als Ausdruck unserer Fähigkeit zu rationaler Aktivität. Demnach haben wir – zumindest in zentralen Fällen – deshalb ein autoritatives und nicht-inferentielles Wissen von unseren Überzeugungen, Absichten usw., weil *wir* es sind, die diese Zustände im Rahmen rationaler Aktivität hervorbringen.

Während die Vertreter von »rational agency«-Theorien die *Annahme* von besonders verlässlichem mentalem Selbstwissen – gegen den Behaviourismus – als Bedingung für rationale Überzeugungs- und Absichtsbildung plausibel begründen können, haben sie typischerweise Schwierigkeiten, die Möglichkeit solchen Selbstwissens ohne Annahme eines inneren Sinns zu *erklären*. Um verständlich zu machen, warum aus unserer *Urheberschaft* bestimmter rationaler Zustände ein besonderes *Wissen* von diesen Zuständen folgt, wird immer wieder auf die traditionelle Vorstellung des »Maker's Knowledge« verwiesen: wer einen Gegenstand hergestellt hat, hat demzufolge ein privilegiertes Wissen von diesem Gegenstand (z. B. weiß der Uhrmacher, der eine Uhr gebaut hat, am besten, wie diese Uhr aufgebaut ist und funktioniert).

Für die Idee, mentales Selbstwissen als einen Fall von »Maker's Knowledge« zu interpretieren, spricht auch eine mögliche Parallele im Fall von sogenanntem *Handlungswissen*. Es wird häufig angenommen, dass wir beobachtungsunabhängiges Wissen von eigenen intentionalen Handlungen haben. Derartige Selbstwissen wäre ein weiterer Fall einer direkten Verbindung zwischen Selbstwissen und rationaler Aktivität, und auch hier scheint die Vorstellung von »Maker's Knowledge« eine Erklärung zu bieten.

Doch obwohl Vertreter von »rational agency«-Theorien gerne auf »Maker's Knowledge« verweisen, wird gewöhnlich weder expliziert, was genau unter »Maker's Knowledge« zu verstehen ist, noch, wie »Maker's Knowledge« eine Erklärung von Selbstwissen liefern kann. In meinem Beitrag prüfe ich die Idee, Selbstwissen der beiden genannten Arten könne im Rahmen einer »rational agency«-Theorie als Fall von »Maker's Knowledge« erklärt werden, indem ich verschiedene mögliche Formulierungen für »Maker's Knowledge« unterscheidet und in der Anwendung auf Selbstwissen diskutiere. Mein Ergebnis lautet: »Maker's Knowledge« kann in gewissem Maße zur Erklärung von Handlungswissen beitragen, nicht aber von mentalem Selbstwissen.

## 8 Köhler

**Do Expressivists have an Attitude Problem?**

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One objection that has been raised for meta-ethical expressivism is that expressivists must give an account of the nature of the attitude which constitutes moral thinking, but that any expressivist account that attempts to do seems to fail. Call this objection (following Alexander Miller (Miller 2003:47)) the *Moral Attitude Problem*. In this paper I suggest a strategy for expressivists to escape this problem: I argue that the Moral Attitude Problem is a problem that not only arises for expressivists, but also for meta-ethical cognitivists, and that expressivists can use the same resources used by cognitivists to escape this problem.

## 7 Köllmann

**Lohngerechtigkeit: Tausch oder Verteilung?**

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Es gibt bislang keine Theorie der Lohngerechtigkeit, die sich mit den zeitgenössischen Theorien der sozialen Gerechtigkeit messen könnte. Ein Grund ist sicher die schon bei Rawls zu findende Annahme, dass Lohngerechtigkeit unter soziale Gerechtigkeit subsumiert werden könne. Angesichts dieses unbefriedigenden Zustands scheint es sinnvoll, sich vor der Ausarbeitung einer solchen Theorie auf die begrifflichen Grundlagen zu konzentrieren. In diesem Sinne will ich eine auf den ersten Blick möglicherweise zweitrangig erscheinende Detailfrage untersuchen, die Klaus Peter Rippe kürzlich aufgeworfen hat. Er meinte, dass die Frage nach dem gerechten Lohn häufig als Frage der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit gestellt werde, dass sie aber tatsächlich als Frage der Tauschgerechtigkeit zu behandeln sei. Ich bin anderer Meinung, finde aber die Frage wichtig. Die Unterscheidung selbst geht bekanntlich auf Aristoteles zurück. Der zentrale Unterschied besteht darin, dass wir im Falle der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit relevante Eigenschaften derjenigen berücksichtigen, unter denen das jeweilige Gut zu verteilen ist, während solche Eigenschaften im Falle der Tauschgerechtigkeit keine Rolle spielen. Das leuchtet besonders ein, wenn man Tauschgerechtigkeit auf unpersönliche Markttransaktionen anwendet und den der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit auf verbindlichere Kooperationsbeziehungen. Nun hat Höffe kürzlich den Begriff der Tauschgerechtigkeit zum Grundbegriff der Gerechtigkeitstheorie erklärt, weil der Tausch zwischen Gleichen der Verteilung durch eine übergeordnete Instanz normativ überlegen sei. In einem ersten Schritt werde ich deshalb prüfen, ob der Begriff der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit damit ganz entfällt. Das ist nicht der Fall. Ich werde ihn vielmehr als generalisierte Tauschgerechtigkeit rekonstruieren. Der Unterschied bleibt trotz der begrifflichen Reduktion normativ relevant. Im zweiten Schritt werde ich dann die von Rippe aufgeworfene Frage dahingehend beantworten, dass die »Ware Arbeitskraft« zwar auf dem Arbeitsmarkt angeboten und nachgefragt wird und insofern der Tauschgerechtigkeit zu unterliegen scheint,

dass aber ihre »Verwertung« im Rahmen kooperativer Arbeitsbeziehungen bei der Lohnverhandlung antizipiert wird. Damit ist letztlich das Kriterium der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit maßgebend. Im dritten Schritt werde ich die oben zitierte Vermutung, Lohngerechtigkeit könne unter soziale Gerechtigkeit subsumiert werden, diskutieren. Sie ist falsch, weil sie Gerechtigkeit von oben herab (top down) verordnen will, während ich mit Höffe einen bottom up-Ansatz für überlegen halte. Damit erhält die Lohngerechtigkeit gegenüber der sozialen Gerechtigkeit normativen Vorrang.

## Korbmacher 2

**Essence and Identity.  
A Note on Essential Properties  
and Criteria of Identity**

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The aim of this paper is to provide a formally precise and philosophically satisfying definition of essential properties. We will mainly be motivated by the more or less Aristotelian notion of essential properties as properties that a thing cannot lose without changing its identity. Our proposal is to analyze this intuitive notion using a model-theoretic notion of supervenience on acceptable criteria of identity. The account that we are going to propose yields several nice formal properties, and captures the above-mentioned intuitive notion in a very natural way.

Here, we will only consider one-level criteria of identity for a kind  $K$ , i.e. statements of the form (for all  $x, y$ )(if  $Kx$  and  $Ky$ , then  $x = y$  iff  $R(x, y)$ ). We assume that we have a way of deciding whether a given criterion is *acceptable* or not. Now, consider an object  $a$  of kind  $K$  in a first-order structure  $M$  and let  $L$  be the corresponding first-order language. First, add a constant  $c$  to the language that denotes  $a$ . This gives us the new language  $L(a)$  and we can canonically construe  $M$  as an  $L(a)$ -structure. We say that a non-logical  $L$ -formula  $p[x]$  expresses an essential property of  $a$  in  $M$  if and only if for some acceptable identity criterion  $R[x, y]$  and all  $L(a)$ -structures  $M'$  with  $\text{dom}(M) = \text{dom}(M')$  where  $c$  denotes  $a$ ,

$$R[x, c] \wedge M = R[x, c] \wedge M' \text{ implies } p[c] \wedge M = p[c] \wedge M'.$$

Note that this is essentially a localized form of supervenience. Intuitively the definition says that if you want for  $a$  to lose its essential properties you will have to change its identity as judged by the acceptable criteria of identity.

Given this definition we will prove a few bridging and adequacy results relating this concept to other analyses of essence. Furthermore, we will give illustrative examples to show that the so-defined notion coincides with the above-mentioned intuitive notion.

**8** Kreft

**Love and Value Judgments**

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Theories according to which love is a response to the beloved's valuable qualities have problems explaining why lovers consider their beloveds to be irreplaceable. For if love is grounded in value judgments, it looks as if lovers should be willing to replace their beloveds for relevantly similar or even more valuable persons; but this is counter-intuitive, because lovers would neither want to, nor think they were allowed to replace their beloveds on the basis of comparative value judgments such as these. Harry Frankfurt therefore rejects the idea that love is a response to value: according to him, value judgments are neither necessary nor sufficient for love, because love is primarily a volitional rather than a cognitive or emotional attitude. More precisely, to love a person means to care for them unconditionally, and thus, to treat them as an irreplaceable end in itself.

In this paper, I am going to argue that Frankfurt's theory of love faces an internal dilemma. Apart from intuitive problems with his account, it turns out that – depending on how we analyze the concept of ›unconditional care‹ – he either fails to explain the beloved's irreplaceability himself, or he has to give up his subjectivism and concede that love implies value judgments after all. So I suggest that we keep the idea that love is a response to value, and I end by laying out ways in which value-theories of love can respond to the irreplaceability-problem.

**3** Krickel

**Making Sense of Mechanistic Interlevel Causation**

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In my paper, I will show that the notion of a level of mechanism is compatible with the idea of interlevel causation. Craver and Bechtel (2007) deny the possibility of interlevel causation in the context of the mechanistic approach. According to the mechanistic approach, an object X  $\phi$ -ing is at a lower mechanistic level than another object S  $\psi$ -ing if and only if X's  $\phi$ -ing is a *component* in the mechanism for S's  $\psi$ -ing (cf. Craver 2007, 189). From this definition it follows that X's  $\phi$ -ing and S's  $\psi$ -ing are related as part and whole. Since a whole and its parts cannot causally interact for conceptual reasons, mechanistic interlevel causation is supposed to be impossible.

Craver and Bechtel raise several objections against the possibility of mechanistic interlevel causation that all stem from the idea that causal interactions between a whole and its parts would violate central assumptions about the notion of causation (cf. Craver & Bechtel 2007). These objections and the underlying line of argument can be summarized in what I will call ›The Argument Against Mechanistic Interlevel Causation‹. I will further show that this argument is not valid. The reason is that Craver's and Bechtel's mistake is to assume

that mechanistic interlevel causation is possible only if S's  $\psi$ -ing and X's  $\phi$ -ing in their *entirety* can causally interact. I will argue that if the mechanistic level-relation is understood to be a relation between *processes*, then mechanistic interlevel causation is possible if there are causal relations between temporal sequences (events) of S's  $\psi$ -ing and X's  $\phi$ -ing. Since these sequences are not necessarily related as part and whole, there are no conceptual reasons to deny the possibility of mechanistic interlevel causation. Furthermore, it will become clear that mechanisms are best described as relating processes since this does justice to the claim that mechanisms are acting entities.

**Kruse** **5**

**Was sind epistemische Pflichten?**

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Die Frage »Was dürfen wir glauben?« ist eine zentrale Frage der »ethics of belief«. Zu ihrer Beantwortung müssen Normen oder Pflichten aufgestellt werden, die angeben, welches Verhalten unter bestimmten Umständen geeignet bzw. erforderlich ist, um bestimmte kognitive Ziele zu erreichen.

Ich möchte diese Frage aus einer epistemischen Perspektive betrachten und der Frage nachgehen, was epistemische Pflichten sind. Dafür wird zunächst der Begriff der epistemischen Pflicht eingeführt, der an die Verfolgung bestimmter epistemischer Ziele gebunden ist.

Es wird weiterhin gezeigt, dass epistemische Pflichten nach ihren Erfüllungsbedingungen (subjektive vs. objektiv), ihrer Quelle (institutionell vs. natürlich) oder ihrem Gegenstand (inhaltsbezogen vs. bezogen auf die doxastische Praxis) unterschieden werden können. Ausgehend von diesen Merkmalen wird eine Taxonomie von epistemischen Pflichten aufgestellt, welche auch die in der Literatur diskutierten epistemischen Pflichten umfasst.

Damit epistemische Pflichten der Verfolgung und der Bewahrung bestimmter kognitiver Ziele, wie dem Wahrheitsziel, dienen können, müssen epistemische Pflichten die doxastische Praxis oder die epistemisch relevanten Eigenschaften der doxastischen Einstellungen epistemischer Akteure wirksam beeinflussen können. Dafür ist es notwendig, dass epistemische Pflichten normative Kraft aufweisen. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass sich die normative Kraft epistemischer Pflichten zum einen aus der angenommenen Gültigkeit einer epistemischen Lesart des »Sollen impliziert Können« Prinzips speist und zum anderen aus der Möglichkeit konstituiert, einem epistemischen Akteur im Falle eines unentschuldigsten Verstoßes gegen eine epistemische Pflicht epistemischen Tadel zu zuschreiben. Es wird ein Begriff des epistemischen Tadels eingeführt, der auf dem Begriff der doxastischen Kontrolle beruht.

Obwohl epistemische Akteure nicht in der Lage sind, ihre doxastischen Einstellungen willentlich hervorzubringen, werden im Vortrag andere Formen doxastischer Kontrolle vorgestellt, die epistemische Akteure ausüben können.

Angelehnt an der normativen Kraft epistemischer Pflichten und den ausführbaren Formen doxastischer Kontrolle werden Adäquatheitskriterien aufgestellt, aufgrund derer die epistemischen Pflichten ermittelt werden können, die der

Beantwortung der Frage »Was dürfen wir glauben?« dienlich sind.

Ausgehend von den Adäquatheitskriterien untersuche ich, ob es sich bei der Evidentialismnorm, welche von epistemischen Akteuren fordert, diejenige doxastische Einstellung zu einer Proposition  $p$  zum Zeitpunkt  $t$  auszubilden, die zu der zu  $t$  zur Verfügung stehenden Evidenz passt, um eine adäquate epistemische Pflicht handelt.

Langkau 5

### Reflective Equilibrium and Counterexamples

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At first glance, reflective equilibrium seems to reduce to an uncontroversial claim about philosophical methodology: we aim to take into account all information available to build a coherent theory. I argue that a plausible interpretation of reflective equilibrium entails two non-trivial methodological claims. 1. We assign equal weight to intuitions and principles. 2. In a case of a conflict between intuitions and principles, we either drop the first or adjust the second. I discuss how the method applies to our practice of debating thought experiments as counterexamples to philosophical theories in non-normative philosophy. I conclude that reflective equilibrium does not correspond with our practice and hence is not trivial.

## 8 Kühler

### Sollen, Können und Versuchen

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Soll ich ein ertrinkendes Kind *retten* oder soll ich nur *versuchen*, es zu retten? Soll der Stürmer einer Fußballmannschaft Tore *schießen* oder soll er dies nur *versuchen*? Bei derlei Fragen stehen zwei Überlegungen im Hintergrund: Erstens gehen wir üblicherweise davon aus, dass wir den Erfolg unserer Handlungen, sei es mit Blick auf die Durchführung der Handlung selbst oder hinsichtlich der Herbeiführung eines bestimmten Sachverhalts, nicht vollständig unter unserer Kontrolle haben. Der Handlungserfolg hängt vielmehr auch von äußeren Umständen der Welt ab, die wir bestenfalls partiell kontrollieren oder beeinflussen können. Als Handelnde *können* wir demnach nicht mehr tun, als entsprechende *Handlungsversuche* zu unternehmen. Zweitens gehen wir gemäß dem Prinzip »Sollen impliziert Können« davon aus, dass wir das, was wir tun sollen, auch tun können. Wenn unser Können jedoch lediglich Handlungsversuche umfasst, dann wäre der Inhalt von Sollensansprüchen konsequenterweise entsprechend einzuschränken. Wir wären somit generell nurmehr zu (erfolgsunabhängigen) Handlungsversuchen aufgefordert.

Dieser Argumentation steht allerdings unsere Alltagspraxis entgegen, in der beispielsweise der Stürmer den an ihn adressierten Sollensanspruch keineswegs bereits durch erfolglos bleibende Versuche, ein Tor zu schießen, erfüllt. Der Stürmer *soll* sehr wohl (erfolgreich) Tore *schießen* und dies nicht nur versuchen. Auch im Falle des ertrinkenden Kindes besteht das *Gesollte* in dessen (erfolgreicher) *Rettung* und nicht nur in meinem gegebenenfalls ebenso erfolglosen entsprechenden Versuch – selbst wenn ich im Nachhinein nicht dafür getadelt werde, wenn ich das ertrinkende Kind nicht zu retten vermochte.

Im Vortrag soll die obige, auf den ersten Blick ja keineswegs völlig abwegige Argumentation deshalb kritisch auf den Prüfstand gestellt werden. In Auseinandersetzung mit den drei wesentlichen handlungstheoretischen Positionen, das Konzept des Versuchens zu explizieren (volitionaler Ansatz, instrumentalistischer Ansatz und Fähigkeitsansatz), werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass eine grundsätzliche Einschränkung des Inhalts von Sollensansprüchen auf Handlungsversuche nicht zu überzeugen vermag. Die konzeptionellen Schwierigkeiten eines für eine solche Einschränkung nötigen eigenständigen Handlungskonzepts des Versuchens werden zeigen, dass sowohl Handlungsversuche als auch im Anschluss der Inhalt von Sollensansprüchen als begrifflich davon abhängig zu verstehen sind, *was* versucht bzw. *gesollt* wird. Weder die Explikation von Handlungsversuchen, noch diejenige von Sollensansprüchen kommt damit ohne Erfolgsbezug aus.

Lanius 1

### Has Vagueness Really No Function In Law?

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When the American Supreme Court in the case *Brown v. Board of Education* used the expression »with all deliberate speed,« it did so presumably because of its vagueness. Many jurists, economists, linguists and philosophers have accordingly assumed that vagueness can be strategically used to one's advantage. Roy Sorensen has cast doubt on this assumption by strictly differentiating between vagueness and generality. Indeed, most arguments for the value of vagueness go through only when vagueness is confused with generality. Sorensen claims that vagueness – correctly understood – has no function in law and, consequently, judges lie systematically when confronted with borderline cases. I argue that both claims are wrong. First, even if vagueness had no function in law, judges would not need to resort to lying. Judges can always bring in linguistic and extra-linguistic arguments to back up their decisions, as legal concepts are highly multi-dimensional and it is not fixed which dimension prevails in a particular context. So, even when facing borderline cases, judges can honestly believe in their verdicts. Secondly, vagueness has several important functions in law; it can be used by the legislator to reduce decision costs because it allows some questions to remain open, while giving general guidance. In a borderline case judges and authorities have discretion to decide either way, which is needed to do justice to its particularities. Hence, the legislator can delegate power to judges and authorities which might be confronted with situations that the legislator had no time to consider or simply did not foresee. In summary, by taking into account the role of the legislator instead of solely the judge, we find important functions of vague expressions in law which are not due to their generality but to their having borderline cases. Thus, also vagueness, properly understood, does have a function in law.

## 3 Lenhard

**The Changing Relationship  
Between Simulation and Experiment:  
The Case of Quantum Chemistry**

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Simulation modeling seems to involve a particular kind of experiment – numerical or simulation experiment. The status of these experiments is a controversial topic in philosophy of science. This talk will not focus on the nature of these experiments, but on the relationship between simulation experiments, simulation modeling, and laboratory experiments. The relation between them is not fixed, however: Computing technology and simulation modeling have been developing in close connection. Over the course of their evolution, the conception of computational modeling has changed and the relationship between simulation and experiment has taken on different characteristics.

Computational quantum chemistry presents a telling case because it took a path that reflects the changing relationship between simulation and experiment. Three phases of its development will be discerned. It started out, prior to digital computers, from the Schrödinger equation, and turned, based on the use of mainframe computers, into an established sub-discipline of chemistry. The most recent third phase is marked by a steep rise in the distribution and application of computational chemistry. All three phases differ in the conceptions of computational modeling, in the computing technologies they use, and in the relationship between simulation and experiment. It will be argued that the recent success in applications is indeed based on the way experiments are incorporated into computational modeling.

## 3 Leuschner

**Good dissent, bad dissent.  
When dissent is hostile to science**

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Kuhn once argued that normal science is very productive as scientists work under a paradigm, i.e. established theoretical and methodological conditions. Yet in policy-relevant sciences, stakeholders are often involved that make efforts to doubt scientific results by disqualifying scientists, and by creating artificial counter-approaches. Accordingly, scientists in policy-relevant fields constantly have to explain and vindicate their methodological and theoretical assumptions. Dissent that is actually epistemically fruitful becomes problematic as its purpose is to defer scientific progress in order to postpone political regulation measures. Therefore, it is important for political as well as epistemic reasons that there is broad (social, methodological, and theoretical) pluralism in such research fields, and that scientists behave with particular responsibility.

## Liefke 1

**A Single-Type Ontology for Natural Language**

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In (Montague, 1970a), Richard Montague defines a formal theory of linguistic meaning that interprets natural languages through the use of two basic types of objects: individuals and propositions. In this paper, I present a comparable semantic theory that only uses a *single* basic type of object (hence, *single-type semantics*). The possibility of the latter has been conjectured by Partee (2006) to account for the ambiguity between a noun phrase's referential and assertoric interpretation (observed in (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990; Snedeker et al., 2007)).

My paper provides ontological support for Partee's hypothesis. To this aim, I first identify a number of semantic requirements (i.e. Booleanness, representability, intensionality, and partiality) on any single basic type and apply them to the set of the simplest Montagovian types. This process enables the elimination of all but one candidate: partial sets of propositions. The remainder of the paper surveys the objects in this domain. The paper closes with an assessment of the merits of single-type semantics and pointers to future work.

## Look 2

**The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics and the  
Question of Fundamentality in Metaphysics**

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*Why is there something rather than nothing?* This question, Leibniz tells us, is the very first question that we ought to ask ourselves. Indeed, Heidegger has called it »the fundamental question of metaphysics [*die Grundfrage der Metaphysik*]«. Wittgenstein, too, seems to be moved to awe: »Nicht *wie* die Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondern *dass* sie ist«. As fundamental as this question may be, it is not the question to be addressed in this paper. Rather, this paper will concern a related question, one that is arguably even more fundamental: Is nothingness possible? For it is only if nothingness is possible that the fundamental question of metaphysics really develops any force.

There are two ways to justify the possibility of nothingness. One can hold, like Leibniz himself, that »nothing is simpler and easier than something« – that is, that nothingness is the natural or default state of the universe and only an act of will, an act of free creation, can overcome this. Yet, this is less an argument for the possibility of nothingness than it is an article of faith. (And it assumes the Principle of Sufficient Reason as well.) Or one can argue, as Thomas Baldwin and others have done, that it is possible to »subtract« concrete objects from worlds until one has arrived at a world without concrete objects – an »empty world«. This »subtraction argument« for »metaphysical nihilism« has occasioned a fair bit of discussion in the philosophical literature in the last decade, and it is worth considering seriously.

It will be argued in this paper, however, that serious consideration of the subtraction argument shows that its premises rest on tendentious and question-begging assumptions about *ontological dependence* and the *grounding relation*. In other words, questions of fundamentality in metaphysics reveal the fundamental question of metaphysics to be ill-formed and arguments purporting to show the possibility of nothingness invalid. Against the view of metaphysical nihilism, this paper argues for *metaphysical aliquidism* – the view that there must be *something*.

## 8 Löscke

## Drei Arten von Hilfspflichten

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Der Vortrag untersucht Hilfspflichten und den jeweiligen Grad an normativer Verbindlichkeit, der in ihnen zum Ausdruck kommt. Entgegen der These der generellen Unterbestimmtheit von Hilfspflichten wird eine dreifache Differenzierung verschiedener Formen von Hilfspflichten vorgeschlagen, die jeweils durch einen unterschiedlichen Grad an Unterbestimmtheit und konsequenterweise einen unterschiedlichen Grad an normativer Verbindlichkeit gekennzeichnet sind:

- 1) Situative Hilfspflichten: Diese Hilfspflichten entstehen situativ und sind situativ einlösbar (Beispiel: Rettung eines ertrinkenden Kindes). Hier ist der Grad an Unterbestimmtheit gering und der Grad an normativer Verbindlichkeit hoch.
- 2) Projektbezogene Hilfspflichten: Sie richten sich auf moralische Projekte. Diese können nicht situativ eingelöst werden, aber es ist grundsätzlich denkbar, dass das entsprechende Projekt abgearbeitet wird (Beispiel: Bekämpfung der Weltarmut). Diese Hilfspflichten erfordern konzertierte Handlungen individueller Akteure im Rahmen einer moralischen Arbeitsteilung; sind die einzelnen Aufgaben zugeschrieben, ist der Grad an Unterbestimmtheit höher als bei situativen Hilfspflichten, der Grad an Verbindlichkeit ist geringer, kann aber immer noch im Sinne einer Pflicht expliziert werden.
- 3) Konstante Hilfspflichten: Dies sind Hilfspflichten, die nicht realistischweise einmal abgearbeitet sind, sondern die sich konstant an alle moralischen Akteure richten (Beispiel: Förderung fremden Wohlergehens). Diese Form von Hilfspflichten ist grundsätzlich durch ein hohes Mass an Unterbestimmtheit gekennzeichnet; gleichzeitig ist der Grad an normativer Verbindlichkeit geringer einzuschätzen, als dies bei den ersten beiden Formen von Hilfspflichten der Fall ist, und diese Form von Hilfspflichten reicht in den Bereich des Supererogatorischen hinein.

Der Vortrag schliesst mit weitergehenden Überlegungen, die die Relevanz dieser vorgeschlagenen Differenzierung betreffen (insbesondere bezogen auf die Felder der internationalen Gerechtigkeit sowie der Frage nach der angemessenen Bestimmung von allgemeinen Hilfspflichten und speziellen Hilfspflichten, die als Parteilichkeitspflichten zu interpretieren sind) und gibt einen allgemein Ausblick auf eine gütertheoretische einheitliche Begründung dieser Hilfspflichten.

## Why Know-how and Propositional Knowledge Are Mutually Irreducible

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The distinction between know-how and propositional knowledge is a piece of common sense. Knowing how to do something seems to be something entirely different from knowing that something is the case. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that one of these concepts can be reduced to the other. Intellectualists like Jason Stanley (*Know How*, 2011) try to reduce know-how to propositional knowledge, while practicalists like Stephen Hetherington (*How to Know*, 2011) try to reduce propositional knowledge to know-how. In this talk, I argue that both reductionist programs fail because they make the manifestations of the knowledge to be reduced unintelligible.

If intellectualism is true, it is mysterious how know-how (then a kind of propositional knowledge) can be manifested in ways such as riding a bicycle, playing chess, and so on. If such manifestations of know-how are nothing but manifestations of propositional knowledge, they turn out to rely on further know-how, namely the knowledge how to apply those propositions to cases. This eventually leads to a vicious regress. The core of this idea stems from Gilbert Ryle (*Knowing How and Knowing That*, 1945 and 1949), but I propose a version of this argument which survives the objections that have been voiced against Ryle.

Conversely, if practicalism is true, it is mysterious how propositional knowledge (then a kind of know-how) can be manifested in ways such as asserting that *p*, acting in the light of sufficient certainty that *p*, and so on. If such manifestations of propositional knowledge are nothing but manifestations of know-how, they turn out to rely on further propositional knowledge, namely knowledge of at least some defeating and enabling conditions for successfully performing those activities. This also leads to a vicious regress.

Contrary to both intellectualism and practicalism, we should take the intuitive distinction between know-how and propositional knowledge at face value. I suggest that know-how and propositional knowledge are conceptually interdependent, and that the proposed criticisms of intellectualism and practicalism can be seen to reveal this fact. Finally, I discuss the implications of this view for the debate about the nature of know-how and propositional knowledge.

Willensschwäche –  
Eine Systematisierung und eine Erklärung

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Das klassische Problem der Willensschwäche in der abendländischen Philosophie ist eigentlich ein Problem i.w.S. rationalistischer Handlungstheorien, deren aktuellste Version die Theorie ist, daß Absichten Optimalitätsurteile sind. Denn wenn Wil-

lensschwäche, in Anlehnung an Platon, darin besteht, daß 1. man etwas (*a*) intentional tut, 2. aber glaubt, *b* zu tun sei besser / optimal, 3. wobei dieser Glaube besser begründet ist als der der Absicht zu *a* zugrundeliegende Glaube und 4. man *b* tun kann – dann ist Willensschwäche, zumindest prima facie nicht möglich: Der Optimalitätsglaube 2 hätte zur Ausführung von *b* führen müssen. Rationalistische Handlungstheorien leugnen deshalb entweder die Möglichkeit der Willensschwäche, oder sie entwickeln relativ subtile Differenzierungen der Bedingungen für Willensschwäche oder Modifikationen der Handlungstheorie selbst – wobei diese Differenzierungen dann meist doch auf eine implizite Leugnung der Möglichkeit der Willensschwäche hinausläuft.

Die philosophische Diskussion der Willensschwäche war in den letzten Jahrzehnten zum einen durch Differenzierungen der zuletzt genannten Art geprägt. Auch als Folge dieser Entwicklung wurden immer mehr benachbarte Phänomene in die Diskussion einbezogen, die oft nur schwer von der Willensschwäche abzugrenzen sind: Wankelmut, Indolenz, Rücksichtslosigkeit ... Andere Gründe für diese Entwicklung sind, daß mit dem Zurückdrängen i.w.S. rationalistischer Handlungstheorien das Interesse an (und teilweise auch die Kenntnis) der philosophischen Ausgangsproblematik zurückgegangen ist. Schließlich haben eher praktisch psychologische Fragen, vor allem die Diskussion von Selbstkontrollstrategien gegen Willensschwäche immer mehr Gewicht bekommen. Diese Entwicklungen zusammen haben zu einer Unübersichtlichkeit der Theorien und Phänomene sowie einer begrifflichen Unklarheit bis Verwirrung geführt.

Der Beitrag verfolgt folgende Ziele: Zum einen soll Willensschwäche von den benachbarten Phänomenen abgegrenzt werden. Zum anderen wird versucht, eine Systematik der in der Diskussion vorgeschlagenen Erklärungsmöglichkeiten der Willensschwäche zu entwickeln. Diese Systematik enthält auch Erklärungen, die durch begriffliche Differenzierungen einzelner Elemente der Definition der ›Willensschwäche‹ oder Ergänzungen der Optimalitätsurteilstheorie echte Willensschwäche im klassischen Paradigma erklären wollen. Schließlich soll durch eine Ausarbeitung der zuletzt genannten Ansätze ausgelotet werden, ob sich die Optimalitätsurteilstheorie so weit verbessern läßt, daß sie empirisch gesicherte Formen der Willensschwäche erklären kann. Ansätze hierzu sind insbesondere: durch unbewußte Absichten verursachte Handlungen oder affektbedingte Absichten, die sich gegen eher intellektuelle Absichten durchsetzen.

### 4 Lyre

#### Sozialer Externalismus und geteilte Intentionalität

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Das Paper besteht aus drei Teilen. Der erste Teil rekapituliert den sozialen Externalismus, also die Doktrin, dass der semantische Gehalt mentaler Zustände nicht allein von den internen Faktoren eines kognitiven Systems, sondern durch externe, die soziale Umgebung des Systems betreffende Bedingungen determiniert ist. Traditionell ist der soziale Externalismus ein sprachbezogener Externalismus, da er sich auf die Frage bezieht, inwieweit die Bedeutungen sprachlicher Aus-

drücke von den Gebrauchsweisen der Sprecher einer Sprachgemeinschaft abhängen. Da ferner ein einzelner Sprecher keine Einflussmöglichkeiten auf das Sprachgebrauchsverhalten einer ganzen Sprachgemeinschaft hat, lässt sich der sprachbezogene Externalismus als passiver Externalismus charakterisieren.

Im zweiten Teil geht es darum zu zeigen, dass geteilte Intentionalität als grundlegender Mechanismus kooperativen Handelns und sozialer Kognition ebenso auf einen Externalismus führt, den man kooperationsbezogenen Externalismus nennen könnte. Er wurde in der Literatur bislang nicht explizit betrachtet. Meine These ist, dass es sich beim kooperationsbezogenen Externalismus um einen aktiven Externalismus handelt, bei dem für das kognitive System aktive kausale Einflussmöglichkeiten auf die externen Faktoren bestehen. Der wesentliche Grund hierfür ist, dass bei kooperativen Handlungen der Handlungsplan aus Subplänen bestehen kann, die für die Kooperationspartner unterschiedlich sind und geeignet ineinandergreifen. Geteilte Intentionalität hängt von den Kooperationspartnern wechselseitig ab, sie bedingen und beeinflussen einander in aktiver Weise.

Im dritten und letzten Teil soll ausblickhaft gezeigt werden, wie die Ergebnisse der beiden ersten Teile zusammenhängen, denn falls Sprache und Sprachbedeutungen ihren Ursprung in geteilter Intentionalität haben, wie in der empirischen Forschung mittlerweile weit vertreten, sollte die Nahtstelle zwischen aktivem und passivem Externalismus genau hier verlaufen. In der Tat wird im Grenzfall kleiner Sprachgemeinschaften der mögliche Einfluss jedes einzelnen Sprechers auf die in der Gemeinschaft bestehende Sprachpraxis deutlich. Hier findet daher de facto ein Übergang vom passiven zum aktiven sprachbezogenen Externalismus statt. So gesehen erweist sich der sprachbezogene Externalismus als ein verkappter aktiver Externalismus, der gleichwohl effektiv und für alle praktischen Fälle ein passiver Externalismus ist. Das Paper soll somit deutlich machen, wie Analysen zu geteilter Intentionalität und Sprachentwicklung mit bedeutungstheoretischen Analysen in Einklang gebracht werden können, und dabei zu einem vertieften Verständnis des semantischen Externalismus führen.

### Mantel 8

#### On why (not) to identify normative reasons with motivating reasons

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Many philosophers believe that motivating reasons and normative reasons must be identical when an agent acts for a normative reason (e.g., Parfit 2011, 37; Broome 2009, 88; Lord 2008, and others). They all affirm the Identity Thesis (IT):

(IT): When an agent acts for a normative reason *N*, she acts for a motivating reason *M* such that *N* is identical with *M*.

One could gain the impression that (IT) expresses one widely held and unified view about acting for a normative reason and that (IT) was rather obviously true. Contrary to this impression I argue that two arguments fail in their attempt to show that (IT) is obviously true. I consider two other arguments that might succeed in establishing (IT) as true. But, first, these arguments offer two different interpretations of (IT) (which rest on an ambiguity in the term »motivating reason«), such that it becomes clear that there are really two



different views that can be expressed by (IT). This means that (IT) does not express one widely held and unified view about acting for a normative reason – it expresses two different views. Furthermore, if one or both of these arguments work, (IT) is not as obviously true as many would have thought, as both arguments rest on substantial premises that are more controversial than (IT) is commonly thought to be. I thus challenge the beliefs that (IT) expresses one widely held view and that (IT) is obviously true.

### 3 Mantzavinos

#### Explanatory Games

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A philosophical theory of explanation should provide solutions to a series of problems, both descriptive and normative. The aim of this essay is to establish the claim that this can be best done if one theorizes in terms of explanatory games rather than focusing on the explication of the concept of explanation. The development of the precise meaning of the concept of scientific explanation occupies centre-stage in all contemporary approaches. The paper deals with three examples from the social sciences – neoclassical economic theory, the theory of civil wars and econometrics – which show that the unitary models of explanation have at best limited application. The lesson that is drawn is that *each* of the three main models currently on offer, the unificationist, the mechanistic, and the manipulationist, can accommodate only *some* of the existing scientific practices in different social scientific domains.

The alternative position that seems obvious and which is adopted is that of an explanatory pluralism. At every moment of time there is a stock of explanations available in a society proposed by ordinary people »in the wild« or by specialists organized formally or semi-formally within specific organizational structures such as churches, universities, etc. This explanatory reservoir is distributed among diverse individuals and groups in the society under conditions of a cognitive division of labour. The terms of provision, control, and dissemination of explanations in this collective explanatory enterprise are regulated by the different rules that the participants have come to adopt over time. These rules incorporate the normative standards that guide the processes of discovery and justification of explanations as well as the modes of their communication, dissemination, and adoption. They constitute *the rules of the explanatory game* that the participants are playing. The philosophical project consists in describing and normatively appraising the rules that constitute these games. This project is fundamentally liberal, in the sense that participants and non-participants to the game alike engage in the critical discussion and revision of the rules or to put it in other terms, the project is fundamentally naturalistic – philosophers and scientists equally take part in it.

#### Relevanz statt Wahrheit?

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In diesem Paper werde ich entgegen der Auffassung der Relevanztheoretiker dafür argumentieren, dass die Gricesche Maxime der Qualität nicht durch das allgemeine Relevanzprinzip ersetzt werden kann. Die Relevanztheorie kann keine befriedigenden Erklärungen für sprachliche Phänomene wie metaphorische oder ironische Verwendung von Äußerungen liefern, die dem strikten Wahrhaftigkeitsanspruch widersprechen. Wenngleich die Kritik am griceschen Programm partiell gerechtfertigt sein mag, stellt sie die Relevanztheorie vor weit größere explanatorische Schwierigkeiten hinsichtlich des Verhältnisses von kognitivem Aufwand und positivem kognitiven Effekt. Ebenso wenig kann man weiterhin von geglückter Kommunikation sprechen, wenn die Relevanzintention den Wahrhaftigkeitsanspruch verletzt, den wir als Adressaten an die Äußerung eines Sprechers stellen, und damit zu unerwünschten Resultaten führt. Ich plädiere daher für eine Revision der Relevanztheorie unter Berücksichtigung der wesentlichen Rolle des Wahrhaftigkeitsanspruchs in der normalsprachlichen Konversation.

#### Free Will, Capacities and their Exercise

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Since the 1990s, agential capacities and abilities have gained increasing prominence in the free-will debate. A wide range of philosophers have come to argue that the conditions for free will and moral responsibility can be spelt out, at least partly, by reference to the agent's abilities to act, or to his rational capabilities to react rightly to reasons. While, among those philosophers, a large number uses the appeal to capacities as a »substitute« to the traditional principle of alternative possibilities, more recently it has been increasingly recognized that capabilities can also be used to account for the »could« of the alternative possibilities allegedly required for free will.

Focussing on the second line of approach, I want to consider two fundamentally opposed versions of spelling out the »could« of alternative possibilities in terms of capacities, which I will call the possession account and the exercise account, respectively. The possession account takes the »could« of the »could have done otherwise« requirement to be simply the »could« of capacity possession. The exercise account, on the other hand, insists that mere possession of the relevant capacities is not sufficient for moral responsibility, but that the crucial capacity of rational self-government must also have been exercised on the occasion and that the action in question must have issued from this exercise.

While the possession account is the one standardly adopted by philosophers who try to spell out the »could« of alternative possibilities in terms of capacities, I want to argue that it is

signally inferior to an exercise account. I will then go on to defend this latter account against the objection that it leads to an infinite regress of capacities.

### 4 Mergenthaler Canseco

#### The Phenomenal Concept Strategy: still battling the bewitchment of our Intelligence

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Since the 80's, many antiphysicalist arguments depart from a conceivable epistemic or conceptual gap between physical and qualitative experiences and go on to refute, on *a priori* grounds, physicalism. One promising and prominent line of defense argues that these gaps can be explained through a correct understanding of how phenomenal concepts work: the puzzlement is the result of a conceptual and not, as it is suggested, an ontological difference.<sup>1</sup> In short, the strategy offers a deflationary account of what are probably the main problems in contemporary philosophy of mind. We will call this strategy the *Phenomenal Concept Strategy* (PCS).

I will briefly show how the PCS responds to the *Knowledge Argument* (KA) and then I will defend it from recent critiques that deny the mere existence of *Phenomenal Concepts* (PC) by showing that they rest on a wrong conception of PC's. I argue that conceiving PC's as referring demonstratively and clearly distinguishing fine-grained senses from coarse-grained extensions solves the issue.

<sup>1</sup>See Balog (1999, ming); Loar (2003, 2007, 1990); Papineau (2002); Sundström (2011; Stoljar 2005); Byrne (2011); Tye (1997, 2002).

### 4 Michel

#### Evaluative object-cognition, attitudes and metarepresentation

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This talk suggests a general account of transparent attitudes and their first-personal metarepresentation. A theory of 2nd-order beliefs and their properties centrally depends on the attitude-theory we assume. I suggest that attitudes are not inner objects of recognition or standing dispositions but situational object-evaluations that are constructed on the spot. S has an attitude when S evaluates an object o as having a value V. Our primary relation towards our object-evaluations is not epistemic in nature (evaluations are not objects of inner sense) but evaluations can be made objects of cognition. This is what happens in the ›introspection‹ or metarepresentation of attitudes. On the basis of representing object o as having value V, S can perform a cognitive ascent that leads to a representation and classification of the obtaining evaluative relation. On the basis of representational self-understanding and an

attitude-theory about how value-type V relates to folk-psychological attitude-type  $\Phi$ , S can represent his evaluative relation towards o as »I  $\Phi$  o«. Situational object-evaluations are a necessary and sufficient basis for self-knowledge. The evaluation-based cognitive ascent leads to epistemically privileged 2nd-order beliefs.

### Michels 2

#### Can Conceptual Possibilities be Metaphysically Impossible?

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The idea that there are conceptual possibilities that are not metaphysically possible has recently become the target of severe criticism. Three arguments that aim to refute this view have been presented in Jackson (2011) and Stalnaker (2003). In this talk, I will defend the idea by arguing that these three arguments are not conclusive.

Stalnaker argues that conceptual modality cannot be considered a genuine kind of modality, since the objects it applies to are mental and linguistic representations that have nothing to do with ways the world might be. I present an objection to Stalnaker's argument that aims to undermine his assumption that conceptual and metaphysical possibility and necessity apply to different kinds of objects.

Jackson's first argument is a reductio that starts from the assumption that *water's being H<sub>2</sub>O* is metaphysically but not conceptually necessary and *water's being water* is both metaphysically and conceptually necessary. He argues that this forces us to accept the implausible view that there is a necessary connection between the two distinct properties *being water* and *being H<sub>2</sub>O*. I argue that Jackson relies on a false dichotomy in establishing his conclusion and show that his argument fails if we eliminate this defect.

Jackson's second argument aims to establish that conceptual possibilities cannot both characterize representational content and model credence. The problem with this argument is that credences should be thought of in terms of subjective probabilities and that subjective probabilities cannot be explained in terms of conceptually possible worlds.

### Mocker 6

#### Zur Rechtfertigung religiöser Überzeugungen durch pragmatische Argumente

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In der religionsphilosophischen Diskussion über die Möglichkeit einer *pragmatischen* Begründung religiöser Überzeugungen in der Tradition der Pascalschen »Wette« besteht ein weiter Konsens darüber, dass solche Argumente bestenfalls Gründe für eine *Praxis* der Überzeugungsbildung liefern, sich aber nicht unmittelbar auf die Überzeugungen selbst, d. h. auf die Begründung von *Urteilen* beziehen lassen.

Hier wird der Versuch unternommen, zu zeigen, dass sich gerade diese Beschränkung als *aporetisch* erweist, und deshalb im Gegenteil pragmatische Argumente *nicht* auf eine glaubensbildende Praxis beschränkt werden können, wenn sie gültig sein sollen, sondern auch normativ relevant sein müssen für die religiösen *Überzeugungen selbst*.

Das ist kein Plädoyer für die Unverzichtbarkeit einer pragmatischen *Urteilsbegründung* und Rückkehr zu dieser Position. Dass wir etwas für wahr halten *sollen*, weil es sich als (womöglich) *nützlich* erweist, diese Forderung scheitert am unplausiblen doxastischen Voluntarismus, den sie voraussetzen muss. Vielmehr geht es um die Existenz einer *dritten Alternative* zwischen der pragmatischen Begründung einer Glaubensannahme durch ein Urteil auf der einen und der Glaubensannahme durch eine religiöse Praxis auf der anderen Seite: die *Rechtfertigung* von (bereits) *bestehenden* religiösen *Überzeugungen*.

Ein solches *tertium datur* eines »defensiven« pragmatischen Arguments zur (bloßen) *Rechtfertigung* des Gläubigen, dass er glauben *darf*, erscheint sowohl bescheidener als auch realistischer im Vergleich zur herkömmlichen, pragmatischen Anweisung oder Empfehlung an den Nicht-Gläubigen, dass er zum Glauben kommen *soll(te)* und sich dazu einer religiösen Praxis widmen *soll(te)*, um bei sich nützliche religiöse Überzeugungen zu evozieren.

## 1 Moldovan

### Rigid definite descriptions

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In this paper I address the question concerning the existence of rigid definite descriptions, that is, definite descriptions that denote rigidly *de jure*. Kripke (1980) has famously argued that *dd*'s are non-rigid expressions. However, other authors (notably Bach 1987, Sainsbury 2005) have argued that sentences containing *dd*'s in subject position have readings in which *dd*'s behave as rigid expressions. Consider for example the following sentence, which, I maintain, has both a true and a false readings:

(3) The last great philosopher of antiquity might not have been the last great philosopher of antiquity.

Other interesting examples include:

(4) The winner of the elections could not have been absent from the competition.

Certain philosophers, such as Dummett (1973), Stanley (1997), Bach (1987), have argued in a Russellian tradition that such readings are to be explained by postulating scope ambiguities: the true reading corresponds to the first occurrence of the *dd* taking wide scope relative to the modal operator, and the false reading corresponds to the same *dd* taking narrow scope. Sainsbury (2005: 180-8) has argued that the explanation should be different: the true reading of (3) and of other similar sentences is due to the *dd* being rigid on that reading, while it is non-rigid on the false reading. I give two arguments in favor of an explanation of the two readings of (3) and (4) which goes in the line suggested by Sainsbury, and does not give explanatory import to scope ambiguities. The arguments are the following (summarized):

(i) the scope ambiguity hypothesis does not give a systematic explanation of why incomplete *dd*'s easily receive referential (that is, wide scope or rigid) readings, while there is such an explanation for the rigidity hypothesis.

(ii) definite descriptions behave rigidly in certain context where there is no modal or other intensional operator in the sentence, and so where there cannot be any scope ambiguity, such as in (10) and (11):

(10) *The first book on professor J's bookshelf* is his favorite novel.

(11) John was very good at chess because *the boy* had spent all his childhood practicing.

Muders 7

### Naturrechtliche und kantianische Konzeptionen von Würde in der Sterbehilfedebatte

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Sowohl in der allgemeinen normativen Debatte um die Menschenwürde wie auch in angewandt-ethischen Diskussionen, in der sie in Argumenten Verwendung findet, spielen naturrechtlich und kantianisch inspirierte Theorien von Würde eine wichtige Rolle. Sofern der Begriff der menschlichen Würde oder seine dafür gehaltenen Entsprechungen – Heiligkeit oder Unverbrüchlichkeit des menschlichen Lebens, Respekt vor dem unbedingten Wert von Personen – überhaupt als sinnvoll anerkannt werden, sind beide Theorietypen in der Debatte annähernd immer vertreten. Dabei lassen sich aus der gewählten Begründungsstrategie als Art und Weise, Menschenwürde zu rechtfertigen, Schlüsse bezüglich ihres Schutzbereichs ziehen: Welche Wesen verfügen über Würde, welche Handlungen sind ihnen gegenüber erlaubt oder geboten? Innerhalb der normativen Debatte erwachsen daraus Argumente, welche die Angemessenheit eines bestimmten Würdebegriffs anzweifeln oder einer Begründungsstrategie gar interne Inkohärenzen nachzuweisen versuchen. In angewandt-ethischen Debatten setzt sich dieser Disput fort, besonders wenn, wie in der Debatte um Sterbehilfe beide Seiten die Menschenwürde zur Stärkung ihrer Position in Anspruch nehmen. Allerdings widersetzt sich gerade bei diesem Thema die jeweilige Verwendung von »Würde« scheinbar einer einfachen Zuteilung, durch die ein Begründungstyp einer Seite der Debatte zugeordnet werden könnte: finden sich doch auf jeder Seite Vertreter, welche die jeweilige Tradition explizit aufzugreifen bemüht sind.

Wenn nun aber eine nähere Prüfung der in Anspruch genommenen Konzeptionen ergibt, dass die Zuordnung zum jeweiligen Begründungstyp legitim ist, scheint in der Sterbehilfe-Thematik durch die bloße Bezugnahme auf ihn noch keine inhaltliche Vorentscheidung getroffen. Stellt sich umgekehrt heraus, dass die Implikationen eines bestimmten Begründungstyps entgegen dem ersten Anschein nicht neutral gegenüber der Positionierung in der angewandt-ethischen Debatte sind, ließe sich daraus eine Erklärung für den ansonsten kurios wirkenden, beidseitigen Bezug auf Menschenwürde geben. Im ersten Fall liegt darüber hinaus die Vermutung nahe, dass die gewählte Kategorisierung der Begründungsstrategie wenigstens für die Zwecke der Sterbehilfedebatte unterbestimmt ist. Der nächste Versuch würde dann darin bestehen, mehrere Variationen kantianischer und naturrechtlicher Würdekonzeptionen zu unter-

scheiden, die jeweils gegeneinander und gegen ihre Mitbewerber in der betrachteten Debatte den gewünschten Unterschied machen. In beiden Fällen würde so eine Re-Strukturierung der Debatte ermöglicht, die durch den Fokus auf unterschiedliche Begründungsstrategien nicht alleine Konfusion hinsichtlich des Gebrauchs von Menschenwürde vermeidet, sondern einen lohnenden Einstiegspunkt zur Fortführung der Diskussion bietet.

### 2 Mugg

#### Why Dispositions Are Not Second Order Properties

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In this paper I defend C. B. Martin's identity theory which says that intrinsic properties of concrete objects are simultaneously qualitative and dispositional. Using three arguments from Sydney Shoemaker, I demonstrate there are epistemic difficulties with logically separating dispositional and qualitative properties. I use Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson as a paradigm case of such an attempt. The difficulty is that given an asymmetry relation, the qualitative properties can vary without necessarily altering the object's dispositions. Given that our interaction with an object is with its dispositions, our knowledge of objects becomes severely limited. As such, we ought not posit qualitative and dispositional properties as logically distinct. I reject Shoemaker's reduction of qualitative properties to causal powers, concluding that there are both qualitative and dispositional properties that are not logically distinct.

### 3 Müller

#### Branching space-times and general relativity

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The theory of branching space-times (BST, Belnap, *Synthese* 1992) develops a previously proposed logical framework for indeterminism, branching time (BT, Thomason, *Theoria* 1970), in order to provide a mathematically rigorous theory of open possibilities in a relativistic setting. The core technical idea of BST is to define *modal consistency*, i.e., possible co-occurrence within a single consistent course of events, via directedness in a partial (temporal-modal) ordering. *Histories* in the structure (possible courses of events) are maximally modally consistent subsets.

Despite its relativistic soundness and some applications to physical theories, BST has not been much referenced in discussions of space-time theories, even when such discussions are concerned with questions of determinism and indeterminism. In fact, BST (or rather, some close relatives) have received a fair share of critique based on technical considerations of the space-time models of general relativity (Earman in Dieks 2008). Most of that criticism shows BST to correspond poorly to general relativity's background in differential geometry.

This paper introduces an overarching framework that is meant to do justice both to the logical aspects of BST and to the physical considerations supporting space-time theories. We will prove that that framework, which deviates from the mentioned theory of BST in some technical details, is truly a theory of *branching* (in the sense of logic) *space-times* (in the sense of general relativity).

The main issue we need to deal with is the status of the topological Hausdorff property: this property generically fails in BST models. It is widely acknowledged that failure of the Hausdorff property spells trouble whenever it occurs *within a single space-time*. A BST model however represents not one, but many space-times. We will give a novel method for pasting space-times that is compatible with general relativity's background in differential geometry, and which deviates from published accounts of so-called Minkowskian branching structures (e.g., Wronski and Placek, *Stud.Hist.Mod.Phys.* 2009) in a crucial topological detail. In our structures, which are generalized manifolds, modally consistent subsets are specific Hausdorff submanifolds.

We end with a comment on the role of branching vs. divergence in the analysis of indeterminism.

### Müller 4

#### Ein Dilemma für modale Argumente gegen den Materialismus

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Philosophen wie Kripke (1980) und Chalmers (1996; 2010) haben in den letzten Jahren modale Argumente gegen den Materialismus vorgebracht. Diese haben jedoch nur wenige Materialisten überzeugt. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass die Argumente vor einem Dilemma stehen. Je nachdem, was für eine Konzeption von metaphysischer Modalität wir haben, können wir entweder nicht wissen, ob die modale Prämisse wahr ist, oder die Wahrheit der modalen Prämisse genügt nicht, um den Schluss auf die Falschheit des Materialismus zu erlauben.

Modale Argumente gegen den Materialismus sind anspruchsvoll insofern, als sie Einsicht in Tatsachen ermöglichen sollen, die über das hinaus gehen, was wir aufgrund von Erfahrung und begrifflicher Kompetenz wissen können. Hierzu benötigen wir (i) ein Vermögen, dass uns Wissen über metaphysische Möglichkeit erlaubt und (ii) eine Konzeption von metaphysischer Modalität, die Schlüsse auf Tatsachen zulässt.

Materialistische Argumente fallen in die Kategorie anspruchsvoller modaler Argumente. Sie sollen zeigen, dass phänomenale Zustände keine physischen Zustände sind – was keine begriffliche Wahrheit zu sein scheint und sich auch empirisch nicht zeigen lässt.

Das Dilemma für solche anspruchsvollen Argumente ist nun derart, dass sie entweder (ii) leisten können, indem sie eine realistische Konzeption von metaphysischer Modalität zugrunde legen. Diese muss plausiblerweise modale Eigenschaften zur Grundlage von Modalität machen. Dann benötigen wir jedoch ein Vermögen, um herauszufinden, welche modalen Eigenschaften Dinge haben. Niemand, einschließlich Kripke, dessen Argument so funktioniert, hat bisher ein solches in Aussicht gestellt. Alternativ können sie (i) sichern, indem sie metaphy-

sische Modalität an begriffliche Modalität und nicht-modale Tatsachen binden. Dann wird jedoch fraglich, ob Wissen über metaphysische Modalität noch genügt, um anspruchsvolles ontologisches Wissen – wie über die Verschiedenheit physischer und phänomenaler Zustände – zu sichern. Weder Chalmers, der so vorgeht, noch andere Philosophen haben gute Gründe gegeben, um dies zu akzeptieren – und es gibt einigen Anlass, um dies zu bezweifeln.

Daher sind die Aussichten auf ein schlüssiges modales Argument gegen den Materialismus schlecht. Dennoch können wir aus Chalmers und Kripkes Argumenten etwas lernen. Der Materialismus sollte als eine These über die modalen Eigenschaften physischer und phänomenaler Zustände verstanden werden.

## 8 Müller

### Is Metaethical Constructivism Circular?

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Metaethical constructivists deny that normative judgements are true, if they are true, in virtue of correctly describing any independent normative facts. Instead, they take the truth of such judgements to be mind-dependent, i.e. to depend on our subjective states and activities under certain idealized conditions. Recently, Russ Shafer-Landau, David Enoch and others have raised objections to the effect that any adequate metaethical version of constructivism will turn out to be circular. My aim in this talk is to discuss and eventually refute this objection. I start by showing that circularity is aim-relative, i.e. that it depends on what one is trying to achieve with a position or an argument. This allows us to identify different versions of the circularity objection by distinguishing different aims that constructivists might (be taken to) pursue, such as defining normative concepts, determining which normative judgements are true, or explaining how such judgements can be true. I then discuss the cogency of the circularity objection with respect to each of these potential aims and argue that, if understood correctly, constructivism can avoid any problematic kind of circularity. The upshot of my discussion goes beyond defending constructivism against this particular objection. It also illuminates some important but often overlooked aspects of the position and is thus helpful in distinguishing constructivism from alternative options in metaethics.

## 7 Neuhäuser

### Unternehmen als moralische Akteure

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Ziel des Papers ist es zu zeigen, dass Unternehmen moralische Akteure sind und durch die Menschenrechte moralisch verpflichtet werden können. Der Argumentationsgang besteht aus zwei Schritten. In einem ersten Schritt argumentiere ich dafür, dass Unternehmen moralische Akteure sind. Sie haben Interessen, und ihnen werden in der Praxis Handlungspläne zugeschrieben. Dies macht sie zu korporativen Akteuren, weil

individuelle Mitarbeiterinnen als Teil von Unternehmen nach diesen Interessen und Plänen handeln. Aus moralischer Perspektive sind die Pläne von Unternehmen und ihr Handeln oft zweifelhaft bzw. schlecht. Da die Pläne von Unternehmen zugeschrieben sind, kann durch eine Änderung dieser zugeschriebenen Pläne auch beeinflusst werden, was Unternehmen in ethischer Hinsicht tun. Es wäre ein Fehler anzunehmen, dass dafür allein individuelle Akteure adressiert werden müssen, weil es ja individuelle Akteure sind, die den Unternehmen Pläne zuschreiben. Der Einfluss auf diesen Zuschreibungsprozess geschieht, indem Unternehmen direkt als Akteure mit ethischen Plänen angesprochen werden. Nur so lässt sich nachhaltig beeinflussen, was Unternehmen wirklich tun, weil nur so Unternehmen nicht mehr nur als zwar planende, aber notwendigerweise egoistische, sondern als tatsächlich moralfähige Akteure aufgefasst werden.

In dem zweiten Argumentationsschritt zeige ich, dass Unternehmen durch die Menschenrechte verpflichtet werden. Zunächst bedarf es irgendeines moralischen Maßstabs, der für Unternehmen als moralische Akteure geeignet ist. Dabei wiegt ein Problem der philosophischen Ethik sehr schwer, nämlich dass es viele konkurrierende ethische Theorien gibt. Dieses Problem kann jedoch minimaletisch zumindest ein Stückweit umgangen werden, indem die in zahlreichen prägenden Kulturzeugnissen der Menschheit anerkannten Ideen der Menschenwürde und der Menschenrechte zum Ausgangspunkt genommen werden. Die Menschenwürde stellt die moralische Grundlage für die Konstruktion der Menschenrechte dar. Unabhängig davon, welche metaethische Begründung für die Menschenwürde angeführt wird, bringt sie eine zentrale Idee zum Ausdruck: Jeder Mensch muss als gleiches Mitglied der Gemeinschaft der Menschen anerkannt und der Selbstrespekt eines jeden Menschen muss geachtet und geschützt werden. Diese Menschenrechte verpflichten aus völkerrechtlicher Perspektive primär Staaten, aus moralischer Perspektive verpflichten sie jedoch auch Unternehmen, so möchte ich argumentieren.

## Newen 4

### Analyzing Phenomenal Concepts with Mental Files

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In this paper, it is argued that phenomenal concepts – conceived as a specific kind of mental representations – should be classified as theory-based concepts in contrast to perception-based concepts. Phenomenal concepts are acquired in ontology, and they are based on a set of theoretical principles, i.e. a mini-theory about the status of experiences as subjective and private. Building upon the notion of a mental file, this idea of phenomenal concepts is explicated in detail on the basis of antecedent physicalism, and its explanatory power is shown at work discussing the knowledge argument. So a new notion of phenomenal concepts in terms of mental files is spelled out that completely accounts for Mary's cognitive situation from a physicalists' view.

8 Ometto

**Libertarian alternative possibilities:  
why Frankfurt cases continue to miss the mark**

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Libertarians about free will believe that *indeterminism* is a necessary requirement of human freedom. If an agent acts freely and responsibly, the libertarian insists, then it must have been possible for her to do otherwise, and hence determinism is *incompatible* with free will. So-called Frankfurt cases are intended as counterexamples to this position. They are widely believed to establish the compatibility of freedom, responsibility and determinism. A popular incompatibilist response to these cases is to abandon the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) that Frankfurt and his successors attack. Freedom, these *source incompatibilists* claim, is incompatible with determinism not because PAP is true, but rather because the agent must be ›the ultimate source‹ of her action in a way that determinism precludes.

I argue that abandoning the view that freedom requires *leeway*, i.e., the existence of alternate possibilities, is an unfruitful move for the libertarian. The claim that determinism rules out sourcehood cannot be defended without focusing on an agent’s ability to actualize one of his alternative possibilities for action. The distinction between leeway- and source-incompatibilism has obscured this important fact. On the other hand, the alternate possibilities the libertarian requires are *not* the kind of possibilities attacked by the Frankfurt-cases. This can be brought out by examining an important ambiguity in PAP. What does ›otherwise‹ in ›being able to do otherwise‹ mean? Either it means having more than one *option* for action, or it means having an *alternative* to performing an action. I argue that the libertarian in fact only requires, and has always intended, the latter: freely and responsibly doing X does not mean being able to perform some *other* free action. The leeway-incompatibilist, as he is usually depicted in the debate on Frankfurt-examples, is arguably no more than a straw man set up by the libertarian’s opponent. Libertarians should therefore not abandon PAP altogether, but instead accept a revised formulation, to which, I argue, even the most compelling Frankfurt cases form no counterexample. This will perhaps allow the libertarian to explain *why* sourcehood is incompatible with determinism.

8 Orsi

**Higher-order Internalism about Moral Judgment**

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In this paper I aim to make a case for taking seriously an overlooked version of internalism about moral judgment:

*Higher-order Internalism* (HOI): It is necessary that, if a person judges that she is morally required to f, then she is, at least to some extent, motivated to f.

In the first part of the paper I argue that HOI is a plausible candidate for articulating the folk conception of the relation

between first-person moral judgments and motivation. I do this by examining two sets of folk responses: 1) actual responses to described cases of normal, depressed, apathetic, and psychopathic agents, as reported and discussed in a forthcoming paper by C. Strandberg and F. Björklund; 2) reasonably expected responses to five standard anti-internalist scenarios presented by R. Shafer-Landau. I argue that HOI provides a coherent explanation of why the majority of people respond to the scenarios as they do, or as they are reasonably expected to do. In a nutshell, people find the combination of sincere moral judgment and lack of motivation to act less puzzling when a second-order motivation to be thus motivated can be inferred in the agent. In the second part I take up and reply to a few objections to HOI both taken as a folk conception and as an original proposal in the internalism / externalism debate about moral motivation. In this context I show the strengths of HOI with respect to other recent forms of so called »deferred« internalism, where the necessary connection is held to be between the moral judgment and either the agent’s previous motivation to act, or the agent’s belonging to a community of agents who are normally motivated by their moral judgments.

Pfister 8

**Are there Exclusionary Reasons?**

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Are there different kinds of reasons for action? Joseph Raz introduced the concept of exclusionary reasons. An exclusionary reason is a second-order reason that excludes other reasons and does not outweigh them. The claim that there are such reasons has been challenged. Some simply reject the difference between these kinds of reasons, others try to capture the difference in other terms. Christian Pilller argues that all the examples given by Raz can be explained by so called attitude-related reasons, i.e. reasons that can only be referred to by mentioning the attitude, as opposed to content-related reasons. I want to argue that at least in some cases one can only describe the attitude-related reason by referring to a command, rule or norm, and what a norm is can at least for some kinds of norms only be understood as an exclusionary reason, as Raz has shown. The claim of the existence of such reasons therefore not only withstands the argument of attitude-related reasons but is also independently justified.

Piller 8

**What Is Goodness Good For?**

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I investigate whether we can engage in moral deliberation without needing to make use of a substantial notion of goodness (often called goodness simpliciter and contrasted with attributive goodness and goodness-for). I won’t try to establish that morality does not need goodness, but I will defend this idea against the following objections. (1) We need to refer

to goodness in order to establish the normativity of the relevant goodness-for facts. (2) Goodness-for facts conceptually entail goodness facts (Moore, Tenenbaum). (3) What is good for a human being is partially determined by the value of what the person pursues and engages with (Darwall, Scanlon, Raz). (4) Not only consequentialism but moral thought in general needs interpersonal comparisons of well-being which use a notion of simple goodness or, rather a notion of simple betterness (Arneson). After discussing these objections, I end by reflecting on an objection to the whole project undertaken in this paper. According to a buck-passing or fitting attitude analysis of value, once we agree that a person's well being is such that it gives us reason to promote it, we also agree that a person's well-being is simply good. Thus, the idea that we can do without a notion of goodness and restrict the evaluations relevant in moral thought to goodness-for evaluations is incoherent. I reply with an attempt to rephrase the issues pursued in this paper in a way acceptable to a fitting-attitude philosopher.

## 2 Porro

**Karen Bennett on  
»difference-minimizing« disputes**

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In this paper I critically discuss Bennett's claim that some disputes are difference-minimizing. Bennett (2009) argues that the disputes about composition and colocation are difference-minimizing. Bennett's claim in her paper is the following: if a debate is difference-minimizing, and semanticism does not apply to such debate, then epistemicism applies to it.

In my paper I explore the other direction of this implication, i.e. whether there are cases of debates, such that epistemicism applies to them, but they are not difference-minimizing. After discussing the notion of difference-minimizing, I argue that it is the case that some debates are not difference-minimizing, and yet epistemicism can apply to them.

Moreover, I discuss why parties in a debate are difference-minimizing. I analyse whether difference-minimizing is useful for the philosophical enquiry or rather it brings the parties off track. This discussion will focus on two main issues, the first one is why it is important for any philosophical view to be able to reconstruct ordinary judgments. The second one is why it is important for a philosophical view to be able to reconstruct its opponent's claims.

I argue that difference-minimizing plays a role in making philosophical positions understood. However, difference-minimizing should be seen only as a side task a philosophical view might want to engage in, a task that does not affect and is not related to the core arguments in favor of the view.

I then analyse Bennett's definition, if it can be so called, of difference-minimizing, and argue that some words are used loosely, thus making such definition problematic. I argue that this has the consequence of making the definition of difference-minimizing too permissive, and thus more debates than we would want to turn out to be difference-minimizing.

**Wissenschaftliche Repräsentation  
und Ähnlichkeit**

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Kann der Begriff der Ähnlichkeit verwendet werden, um einen substantiellen Beitrag zur Klärung des Repräsentationsbegriffs in den Wissenschaften zu liefern? In diesem Beitrag möchte ich mich mit der Kritik des Begriffs der Ähnlichkeit aus pragmatischer Perspektive auseinandersetzen. In den Debatten der allgemeinen Wissenschaftstheorie um den Begriff der wissenschaftlichen Repräsentation stehen sich zwei unterschiedliche Familien von Positionen gegenüber. Zum einen betonen *Informationsansätze* die Relation zwischen dem Vehikel der Repräsentation und dem Repräsentierten, dem sogenannten Zielsystem. Zum anderen legen *pragmatische* Ansätze großen Wert auf die Tätigkeiten von Wissenschaftlern. Als paradigmatische Vehikel der Repräsentation werden von beiden Positionen vor allem wissenschaftliche Modelle betrachtet. Modelle sind wichtige, vielleicht sogar die wichtigsten Hilfsmittel im Prozess des wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisgewinns. Das hat nach Ansicht der meisten Wissenschaftsphilosophen gerade mit ihrer repräsentationalen Funktion zu tun. Denn Modelle liefern Wissen über Phänomene, weil sie bestimmte Zielsysteme in der Welt adäquat repräsentieren. In diesem Zusammenhang scheint eine Einsicht, die in erster Linie Informationsansätze bemühen, evident zu sein. Es ist nur möglich mit Hilfe von Repräsentationen etwas über die Welt zu lernen, wenn diese ähnlich gegenüber ihren Zielsystemen sind. Aus Sicht der pragmatischen Ansätze wird die Frage nach dem Beitrag des Ähnlichkeitsbegriffs zur Klärung von »Repräsentation« allerdings meist negativ beantwortet, wenn auch manche pragmatische Philosophen davon sprechen, dass Vehikel ihren Zielsystemen oft ähnlich seien. Eine umfassende und einflussreiche Kritik an einer Ähnlichkeitsauffassung der Repräsentation in den Wissenschaften ist von Mauricio Suárez geäußert worden. Seine Argumente sollen in diesem Beitrag untersucht werden.

## Rafiee Rad/Hartmann 3

**Updating on Conditionals =  
Kullback-Leibler + Causal Structure**

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Modeling how to learn an indicative conditional has been a major challenge for Formal Epistemologists. One proposal to meet this challenge is to request that the posterior probability distribution minimizes the Kullback-Leibler distance to the prior probability distribution, taking the learned information as a constraint (expressed as a conditional probability statement) into account. This proposal has been criticized in the literature based on several clever examples. In this paper, we

revisit three of these examples and show that one obtains intuitively correct results for the posterior probability distribution if the underlying probabilistic model reflects the causal structure of the scenario in question.

### 6 Raters

#### Don't worry – be happy? Ein Konsistenzproblem in der pragmatistischen Religionsphilosophie von William James

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Unter dem Einfluss von Emersons Transzendentalismus behauptet William James in *The Varieties of Religious Experiences* von 1901/02 zum einen, dass Religion »leicht und glücklich« machen könne (dt. 1997, 84). Zur Genese der religiösen Erfahrung behauptet James dann jedoch, dass das Phänomen der religiösen Erfahrung hinreichend durch Verschiebungsprozesse im Bewusstsein erklärt werden könnte, wodurch sich der Glaube an eine transzendente Instanz als Ursache der religiösen Erfahrung nicht nur als verzichtbar, sondern sogar als irrational darstellt. Wie aber soll eine religiöse Erfahrung glücklich machen können, wenn man gleichzeitig weiß, dass die religiöse Erfahrung aus dem eigenen Unterbewusstsein stammt und also vermutlich kein fundamentum in re hat? Schließlich kann man sich nicht dazu überreden, etwas zu glauben, nur weil der Glaube glücklich machen würde. Der Vortrag rekonstruiert in einem ersten Schritt die beiden Leitthesen der Religionsphilosophie von William James vor dem Hintergrund von Emersons Transzendentalismus. Im Hauptteil weist der dieser Religionsphilosophie dann ein Konsistenzproblem nach, indem er zeigt, dass sich die beide Leithesen weder normativ als Ratschlag noch deskriptiv als Analyse des Phänomens Religiosität sinnvoll miteinander verknüpfen lassen.

### 8 Rechenauer/Roy

#### Deontic Logic for Procedural Ethics

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Procedural justifications play a large role in contemporary social and individual ethics. Their basic idea is that norms are justified if they have been approved by an application of an appropriate *procedure*. Kantian ethics provides us with the first explicit form of this kind of justification: a norm or precept is justified if it passes the test of the categorical imperative. Modern approaches are the Rawlsian theory of justice, and more to our current interest, *discourse ethics* and *Scanlonian contractualism*.

*Deontic logic*, on the other hand, has made important advances in the study of normative notions like permissions and obligations. It has allowed to circumscribe the core logical

principles (axioms) governing these deontic notions, and shed light on the complexity of reasoning about them. Deontic logicians have furthermore identified a number of potential »paradoxes« or pitfalls arising in many deontic systems.

Up to now, however, procedural normative systems have stayed beyond the scope of contemporary logical analysis, and this is an important gap. It is not clear which logical principles are governing norms stemming from procedural justification, how complex are these justification procedures, and whether they fall pray to known deontic paradoxes. On the other hand, by leaving out procedurally justified norms, deontic logic misses what is arguably one of the most important views on norms in contemporary ethics.

In this paper we make the first step towards filling this gap. Using apparatus from modern *fixed-point logics*, we study the logical properties of obligations and permissions in discourse ethics and Scanlonian contractualism. We show that this sheds light on the logical properties of these norms, on the complexity of these justification procedures, and that they do fall pray to some of the most well-known deontic paradoxes.

### Reining 5

#### Much More Trouble for the Conciliatory View than Elga Expects

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According to the Conciliatory View (CV) on peer disagreement, the most natural reaction to a disagreement about  $p$  with an epistemic peer of mine is to move my degree of confidence in  $p$  at least a bit in the direction of my peer's degree of confidence in  $p$ . A particular version of CV, the Equal Weight View – according to which my peer and I should not only move our degrees of confidence in  $p$  in the direction of each other, but also move them in such a way that we meet in the middle – has been convincingly defended, especially by David Christensen and Adam Elga. However, in his 2010 paper »How to Disagree about How to Disagree«, Elga claims that CV, despite all of its appeal, is ultimately self-undermining, because it offers incoherence advice in certain cases. The cases that Elga has in mind are those in which the peer disagreement is about the truth or falsity of CV itself.

Elga's own solution to this problem is to endorse a restricted version of CV, according to which it is most rational to be conciliatory in all cases of peer disagreement, except those cases in which the disagreement is about CV itself. I will argue that Elga's attack on CV fails, but that a modified version of the attack reveals that CV faces a much more general problem than Elga expects – one that cannot be solved by the kind of restriction he proposes.



## 3 Röhl

**Causation, Dispositions and Mathematical Physics**

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Philosophers have often denied that the concepts of cause and effect have any role in fundamental physics or other mathematical theories of systems with continuous time evolution. There are no causally connected events, just states of a system, and their time development is described by operators or equations. This claim apparently conflicts with causal descriptions in special sciences and with philosophical accounts that hold causation to be a relation between events. Such a divergence in a central concept could lead to a disunity of science and world. But there seems a chance of reconciliation, as the ontological implications of this mathematical description are not obvious. My aim is to show that a world view with causal powers or dispositions is able to accommodate both the viewpoint of mathematical physics and the one of manifestly causal descriptions. Firstly it is to be noted that the »cause-free« description seems to rest on presuppositions that employ causal notions: (1) The concept of closure, which means that all relevant causal features of interest have been taken into account. (2) The Hamiltonian of a system is based on the properties of the component systems relevant for their dynamic influences on each other. The ontic basis of a mathematical description can therefore be analysed in terms of causal properties, because these determine the functions that determine the time evolution. An objection is that in fundamental physics the dynamical properties are connected with symmetries, so no recourse to causal conceptions is necessary. Against this one can argue that the essence of e.g. charge is only captured by its being a specific causal power. Besides these considerations two arguments from physics are offered: In classical physics a movement of a body is continuously caused by an attractive force. Classical forces can be understood either as dispositions or as closely tied to dispositions. In quantum mechanics non-classical dispositions, propensities, capture important aspects of the ontology of the field. Thus, an ontology with dispositions as relevant causal factors allows a unified ontology for both continuous processes and causal links of discrete events.

## 1 Rosefeldt

**Talking about things that don't exist**

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Are there things that don't exist? Several answers seem to be possible here. You can answer ›yes‹ because you are a Meinongian and believe that existence is a discriminating property of objects, i.e. a property that some objects have and others lack. You can answer ›no‹ because you are a Quinean and believe that to exist just means to be identical to something and hence is a property of everything. Or you can be a fan of substitutional quantification and think that you can answer ›yes‹ without committing yourself to non-existing things in

any ontologically interesting sense. In this paper, I want to introduce an alternative to all these views. According to this alternative, you can answer ›yes‹ to the question but nevertheless assume that (i) ›exist‹ expresses a property true of all objects and (ii) ›there are things‹ expresses objectual quantification. The reason why this is possible is that there is a literal reading of the sentence ›There are things that don't exist‹ in which we are using it to quantify over kinds of things and say that there are kinds that have no instances. In order to substantiate this claim, I will show that there are many cases in which natural language quantifiers such as ›there are things‹, ›there is something‹ or ›there are Fs‹ are used to quantify over kinds of things rather than individual things, and give an analysis of the intricate syntactical and semantical features of sentences in which such quantification occurs. I will then use the proposed analysis in order to show that there really is the mentioned reading of the claim that there are things that don't exist and to explain why it has been overseen by so many philosophers. Finally, I will show how useful the insight into the linguistic structure of our talk about non-existing things is by arguing that the proposed analysis can be used to criticize an argument by Timothy Williamson for the existence of so-called ›bare possibilia‹.

## Rosell 5

**Voluntary Belief on a Strictly Epistemic Basis?**

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This paper discusses a recent proposal by Philip Nickel (2010), according to which we believe voluntarily, in cases of non-conclusive but adequate evidence, when the conditions of reason-responsiveness, alternative possibilities and self-expression are satisfied. I argue, on the one hand, that Nickel's argument unjustifiedly mixes up two different issues: the rationality of belief and the voluntariness of belief, of a quite distinct nature. Moreover, Nickel's interpretation of these cases is ad hoc, insofar as he just assigns a role to epistemic character for that kind of cases. Instead, I offer an integrated alternative explanation for those cases in the context of a general account of belief, which I sketch.

## 8 Roy/Anglberger/Gratzl

### You ought to do something! The logic of obligation as weakest permission

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This paper investigates the following interpretation of obligations:

A person *i* ought to do *A* in a situation *S* just in case everything else *i* may (and can) do in *S* is consistent with *A*.

In such case, *A* can be called the weakest permission that *i* has in *S*. Obligations of this form arise in many contexts. Natural examples of such a reading of obligations arise in cases when the deontic notions apply to mutually exclusive alternatives. Take for instance the relatively uncontroversial decision-theoretic principle that agents should not choose actions that are strictly dominated by others, viz. actions that make the agent strictly worse off than another in all possible states of the world. In general, there will be many non-strictly dominated, mutually exclusive alternatives. To say that an agent ought to do all of them would be a blatant violation of the ought-can principle. The more natural reading is that each individual, non-strictly dominated action is permitted, but that only the disjunction of these action, the weakest permission the agent has, is obligatory.

In this paper we study the deontic logic of obligations as weakest feasible permissions. We show that, under this interpretation, obligation and permission are not dual notions, and that it gives rise to an interesting interplay between deontic and alethic notions. We also discuss the logics' adequacy w.r.t. the paradoxes of (classic) deontic logics, present certain plausible extensions and provide a sound and complete axiomatization of this logic. We show that our choice of semantics – which is an extended neighborhood semantics – helps us to get rid of many of the aforementioned paradoxes but without losing a nice philosophical interpretation the semantics' components.

## 2 Sattig

### Pluralism and Determinism

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Pluralists about material objects believe that distinct material objects can coincide at a time – that they may exactly occupy the same spatial region and be constituted by the same matter at that time. Pluralism is often accepted for reasons of common sense. It seems obvious, for example, that there may

be a piece of paper and a paper airplane made from the latter, such that the piece of paper exists before the paper plane is created or exists after the paper plane is destroyed. The artifacts in this scenario would appear to be distinct objects that coincide at various times.

In this paper, it will be argued that folk-inspired pluralism, as underwritten by broadly Aristotelian ontologies of complex material objects, faces a serious problem concerning determinism. The actual world is deterministic just in case there is only one way in which it can evolve that is compatible with the actual laws of nature. If determinism about the actual world fails, we expect it to fail for a reason of physics. Yet certain common-sense cases of distinct, coinciding objects accepted by pluralists seem to show the actual world to be indeterministic on mundane, *a priori* grounds. It should not be that easy to establish indeterminism.

First, I shall set the stage for what I call ›the problem of cheap determinism‹ by distinguishing between weak qualitative determinism and strong qualitative determinism, and by arguing that the strong conception is preferable to the weak one. Then I shall present the problem, which consists in *a priori* violations of strong qualitative determinism by certain common-sense cases of distinct coincidents. Finally, I shall consider various pluralist replies to the problem, and argue that each of them is implausible.

## Schälke 8

### Moralischer Zufall

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Der Vortrag befasst sich mit den unterschiedlichen Formen des moralischen Zufalls. Ich vertrete die These, dass lediglich konstitutiver Zufall möglich ist, ergebnis- und situationsbezogen hingegen nicht.

Nach Thomas Nagel liegt moralischer Zufall vor, wenn Faktoren, die sich der Kontrolle des Akteurs entziehen, seine moralische Qualität beeinflussen. Die Möglichkeit moralischen Zufalls ist unvereinbar dem Kontrollprinzip, dem zufolge lediglich Faktoren, die ein Subjekt kontrolliert, auf seine moralische Qualität »abfärben«. Sowohl für die Möglichkeit des moralischen Zufalls, als auch für das Kontrollprinzip spricht einiges. Die Art und Weise, wie wir im Alltag loben und tadeln, setzt die Existenz von moralischem Zufall voraus. Wir tadeln den fahrlässigen Unfallfahrer stärker als den Fahrer, der genauso fahrlässig gehandelt hat, aber glücklicherweise unfallfrei ans Ziel kommt. Dies lässt sich jedoch kaum rechtfertigen: Erst Kontrolle scheint eine Verbindung zwischen Akteur und Ereignis zu stiften, die robust genug ist, damit ein Ereignis ein evaluatives Licht auf den Akteur wirft. Nimmt man das Kontrollprinzip jedoch ernst, ergeben sich ebenfalls Probleme. Jeder Faktor, den man zur Grundlage moralischer Zurechnung zu machen versucht, erweist sich als kausal abhängig von Faktoren, die sich der Kontrolle entziehen. Auch eine Entscheidung, die jemand trifft, hätte er nicht getroffen, wenn im Vorfeld etwas dazwischen gekommen wäre. Wäre das Kontrollprinzip gültig, so entzögen sich Akteure offenbar gänzlich der moralischen Bewertbarkeit.

Ich versuche zu zeigen, dass das Kontrollprinzip aufgegeben werden muss. Das Fehlen von Kontrolle *in Bezug auf Resultate*

führt dazu, dass die Resultate nicht aussagekräftig sind für die moralische Qualität des Akteurs. Das Fehlen von Kontrolle unterminiert jedoch *nicht immer* eine aussagekräftige Relation. Mentale Zustände wie Entscheidungen und auch Handlungsdispositionen sind Ausdruck der moralischen Identität eines Subjekts und sind somit auch aussagekräftig – ganz gleich, ob das Subjekt ihre Genese kontrolliert. Die Frage ist lediglich, ob Entscheidungen eine *zusätzliche, unabhängige* Rolle spielen, oder ob sich ihre Relevanz auf das Epistemische beschränkt. Im Anschluss an Hume argumentiere ich, dass flüchtige Ereignisse wie Entscheidungen nur dann moralisch auf den Akteur abfärben, wenn ihnen etwas Persistierendes – eine Disposition – korrespondiert. Daraus aber folgt: es gibt allein konstitutiven Zufall.

## 7 Schickhardt

### Zum Begriff des Kindeswohls. Ein liberaler Ansatz

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Der Begriff des Kindeswohls ist in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und westlichen Rechtsstaaten von größter rechtlicher und sozialer Bedeutung. Eltern und Mediziner, Richter und Erzieher orientieren sich im Umgang mit Kindern täglich unzählige Male am Kindeswohl. Trotz der enormen rechtlichen und sozialen Bedeutung des Kindeswohls handelt es sich jedoch um einen nicht nur in Deutschland unbestimmten Rechtsbegriff! Von einem ethischen Gesichtspunkt aus wirft der Kindeswohlbegriff zahlreiche Fragen auf, die keineswegs nur seine inhaltliche Definition betreffen, sondern auch seine inhärenten Strukturen, die Gewichtung seiner unterschiedlichen Inhalte sowie seine begriffliche und metaethische Funktion und Natur – bis hin zur Frage, ob aufgrund der mit ihm verbundenen Schwierigkeiten nicht vollständig auf den Begriff verzichtet werden sollte. Der Kindeswohlbegriff impliziert neben der Frage nach der guten Kindheit auch die klassische ethische Frage nach dem guten Leben überhaupt. Auch die liberale Ethik, deren Vertreter gelegentlich dazu neigen, sich mit der Frage nach dem guten Leben nicht die Hände schmutzig zu machen, muss sich der ethischen Herausforderung stellen, die der Kindeswohlbegriff darstellt. Worin besteht ein liberaler Ansatz bezüglich der ethischen Problematik des Kindeswohls? Inhaltlich erscheint es wünschenswert, dass Kinder bzw. die Personen, in die Kinder sich langfristig entwickeln, subjektiv glücklich sind, personale Autonomie entwickeln und möglichst viele Optionen und Chancen haben, um in personaler Autonomie ihren eigenen Plan vom Glück zu entwerfen und diesem eigenständig nachzugehen. Die Kindeswohlbestimmung ist eine objektive Bestimmung der Interessen von Kindern durch Dritte. Es ist jedoch zum einen geboten, dass sie in möglichst großem Umfang die spezifische Individualität jedes einzelnen Kindes berücksichtigt, und zum anderen, dass der Kindeswohlbegriff nicht zum Schutzmantel oder Instrument von anmaßendem Paternalismus oder Moralismus wird. Zuletzt ist aus begriffsanalytischer Perspektive nach der metaethischen Natur bzw. nach den metaethischen Naturen des Kindeswohlbegriffs zu fragen, wobei vor allem für eine klare Unterscheidung zwischen der allgemein evaluativen und der sensu stricto normativen Bedeutungsebene des Kindeswohlbegriffs zu plädieren ist.

### Carnap's structuralism reconsidered

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Carnap's philosophy of mathematics is usually identified with his adaption of *Russellian* logicism in the late 1920s and early 1930s (e.g. Carnap 1930) and, more importantly, with his principle of tolerance first formulated in *Logische Syntax der Sprache* (Carnap 1934). However, recent scholarly work has shown that Carnap also made significant contributions to the methodology and metalogic of formal axiomatics, in particular in his unpublished manuscript *Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik* (Carnap 2000), written around 1928, as well as in his logic textbook *Abriss der Logistik* (Carnap 1929). While his early metalogical work has been investigated in detail (e.g. Awodey & Carus 2001, Reck 2007), no closer attention has so far been dedicated to the structuralist account of mathematics underlying Carnap's work on »general axiomatics.« This talk will investigate Carnap's mathematical structuralism of the late 1920s and early 1930s. The aim here will be twofold. First, to present and clarify Carnap's main ideas concerning mathematical structures as they are documented in his published and unpublished work. Second, to reevaluate Carnap's contributions in light of the modern theories of mathematical structuralism. In the first, historical part of the talk we discuss two distinct notions of the structural content of a mathematical theory introduced by Carnap at the time: so-called »Explizitbegriffe« and »model structures«. We consider how the two notions are interrelated and also how Carnap's structuralist account of mathematics relates to his other philosophical convictions concerning mathematics, most importantly, his deep-rooted logicism. In the second, more systematic part of the talk, Carnap's early structuralist approach will be discussed in the light of current debates on mathematical structuralism. In particular, we attempt to locate Carnap's views on the ontological status of abstract structures (conceived as »Explizitbegriffe«) in the spectrum of modern theories, specifically between versions of non-eliminative and eliminative structuralism. Finally, we propose how a bottom-up account of structural properties based on Carnap's definition by abstraction is more sensitive to actual mathematical practice than the philosophically motivated versions of structuralism currently under discussion.

## Schink 7

### Grundelemente einer Theorie sozialer Freiheit

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Der vorliegende Vortrag hat die Frage zum Gegenstand, was plausiblerweise unter dem Begriff der sozialen Freiheit verstanden werden kann. Angeschlossen wird an die zeitgenössische Diskussion in der Sozialphilosophie und Politischen Philosophie wie sie insbesondere im anglo-amerikanischen Raum geführt wird, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf den sogenannten negativen Freiheitsansätzen liegt. Zunächst soll gezeigt werden,

dass insbesondere *negative* Freiheitsansätze darauf abzielen, Freiheit als eine soziale Beziehung zu rekonstruieren – und was genau darunter zu verstehen ist. Dann wird diskutiert werden, inwiefern Freiheit zentral über die Abwesenheit von Interferenzen anderer Akteure bestimmt werden kann. Gegen das Dogma der Nichtinterferenz wird ein Verständnis von Freiheit als Nichtbeherrschung (*freedom as nondomination*) in Anschlag gebracht, das in den letzten Jahren vor allem von Philip Pettit entwickelt wurde. Obwohl dieses gewichtige Vorteile gegenüber den Nichtinterferenzmodellen hat, wird schließlich gezeigt, dass Pettits Verständnis von Freiheit als »gesicherter Wahlfreiheit« in entscheidender Hinsicht einer kritischen Revision unterzogen werden muss. Ausgehend von dieser Revision wird schließlich für ein *strikt relationales und negatives* Verständnis von Freiheit argumentiert, welches die Grundlage für einen plausiblen Begriff sozialer Freiheit darstellen kann.

## 5 Schippers

### Probabilistic Measures of Coherence: A Two-Level Approach

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Probabilistic measures of coherence quantify the coherence of a given set *A* of propositions by weighting the respective probabilistic dependencies inside *A*. Prominent candidates have been devised by Shogenji (1999), Olsson (2002) and Fitelson (2003). However, there are arguments to the effect that all probabilistic coherence measures are untenable. We consider two of those arguments and show where they went wrong. One of them is the so called problem of belief individuation: Moretti & Akiba (2007) argue that the coherence of a set of propositions *A* should not be influenced by the way we individuate the propositions. But this is exactly what happens in the case of probabilistic coherence measures. We show that it is possible to generalise Moretti & Akiba's findings to a multitude of coherence measures satisfying intuitively desirable constraints. The second argument, the child's play objection, stems from Siebel (2005). There it is shown that, according to prominent probabilistic coherence measures, the degree of coherence of a given set of propositions may easily be increased by adding deductively entailed propositions.

We argue for the existence of different levels of coherence: next to the representational level, which amounts to taking each given set at face value, there is a content level, which is constituted by the basic commitments contained in each belief set. We show how mixing up these levels causes the above-mentioned problems. Based on BonJour (1985) and Hansson (2006) we underpin our claim to the effect that while the calculations leading to Moretti & Akiba's and Siebel's formal results are situated on the representational level of coherence, the intuitive constraints which they demand are situated on the content level.

We devise and motivate conceptual distinctions and elaborate them formally by means of elementary tools of mathematical logic. Afterwards we show in how far our distinction between two levels of coherence is suitable for solving the problems mentioned above. More precisely, we show that it is possible thereby to account both for the formal results of Moretti & Akiba (2007) and Siebel (2005) and the intuitions

appealed to by BonJour (1985) and Hansson (2006). In a final step we provide examples in support of the usefulness of our distinction between different levels of coherence.

## Schlicht 4

### Social Cognition as know-how

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Debates in the area of social cognition have been dominated by Theory-Theory (Gopnik & Wellman 1992) and Simulation-Theory (Goldman 2006) for a long time. Despite their differences, these approaches share a common background, namely, the assumptions (1) that social cognition is largely an individual affair that is achieved by a human being passively observing one or more other human being(s), and (2) that there is an epistemic gulf between self and other that must be bridged by some explicit mindreading technique, either theoretical inference or simulation.

Accordingly, social cognitive neuroscience has identified two large-scale neural networks that supposedly enable our social cognitive capacities. The so-called mentalizing network (midline structures) is supposed to provide empirical support for theory-theory, while the so-called mirror neuron network is supposed to provide empirical support for the simulation theory (Keysers & Gazzola 2007). But it is unclear how this discrepancy should be interpreted since the evidence has been gathered by the use of paradigms that presuppose the very frameworks that they are supposed to support.

In this talk, I will develop an alternative to these two approaches to social cognition which is based on the premise that being directly engaged and interacting with others within *second-person* reciprocal relations – instead of merely observing them – is the principal source of our social understanding – rather than inferential processes from the *third-person* perspective (3PP) or simulation heuristics from the *first-person* perspective (1PP). The relevant knowledge we bring to bear in social cognition is *knowing how* instead of *knowing that* (see McGeer 2001). This approach will be developed as an extension of the enactive approach to cognition to the social domain. Despite the popularity of this view, its resources have not yet been exploited for the social domain (see Ratcliffe 2007 and de Jaegher, Di Paolo, Gallagher 2010 for notable exceptions). The task of this paper is to show (1) how central concepts of enactive cognitive science translate to the social domain, (2) how this new framework can guide future empirical research in social neuroscience, and (3) how this view enables us to understand social-cognitive disorders like autism.

## 6 Schmalzried

### Die Relevanz des moralischen Werts eines Kunstwerkes

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Dürfen wir glauben, dass der moralische Wert eines Kunstwerkes relevant für dessen Wert als Kunstwerk betrachtet ist? – Um diese Frage zu beantworten, sollte man darlegen, was für eine allgemeine Werttheorie für Kunstwerke man zu Grunde legt. Man kann zwischen zwei Arten von Werttheorien unterscheiden: monistischen und pluralistischen Werttheorien. Laut einer monistischen Werttheorie gibt es nur einen einzig angemessenen Bewertungsmaßstab für Kunstwerke. Gemäß einer pluralistischen Werttheorie gibt es mehrere Bewertungskriterien, die gemeinsam Auskunft über den Gesamtwert des Werkes geben.

Der monistische Gedanke ist eng mit dem moderaten Autonomismus verbunden, wonach der moralische Wert irrelevant für den Wert eines Kunstwerkes ist. Der radikale Moralismus, laut dem allein der moralische Wert den Wert eines Kunstwerks bestimmt, ist keine überzeugende Variante einer monistischen Werttheorie. Eine vielversprechendere Alternative stellt der radikale Ästhetizismus dar, wonach allein der ästhetische Wert relevant ist. Der ästhetische Wert ist unabhängig von dem moralischen Wert eines Werkes, weshalb der moralische Wert irrelevant für die Bewertung eines Kunstwerkes ist. Wir akzeptieren diese autonomistische These. Unsere Kritik setzt am monistischen Zug des radikalen Ästhetizismus an: Warum sollte man glauben, *nur* der ästhetische Wert sei relevant? Ganz grundsätzlich kann man den monistischen Gedanken in Zweifel ziehen.

Im Vergleich zu einer monistischen ist eine pluralistische Werttheorie überzeugender, da sie die Vielschichtigkeit der Kunstkritik besser erfassen kann. Als Kriterien einer pluralistischen Werttheorie schlagen wir einen ästhetischen, einen kognitiven, einen affektiv-antwortabhängigen und einen kunsthistorischen Maßstab vor. Auf Basis dieser Werttheorie wird für die Relevanz des moralischen Werts argumentiert. Der moralische Wert eines Werkes kann Bewertungen auf Basis des kognitiven, des affektiv-antwortabhängigen und des kunsthistorischen Maßstabes beeinflussen, wie man anhand typischer Bewertungen auf Grundlage dieser Kriterien zeigen kann. Diese Beeinflussung fällt kontextualistisch aus, d. h. ein moralisches Defizit kann sich sowohl positiv, als auch negativ auswirken, ebenso wie ein positiver moralischer Wert.

## 5 Schmechtig

### Interrogatives Formen des Wissens und reduktiver Intellektualismus

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Es gehört zur gängigen Auffassung in der Erkenntnistheorie, dass Wissens-Zuschreibungen, die ein deklaratives Satzkomplement beinhalten (Wissen-dass) im Mittelpunkt des Forschungsinteresses stehen. Im Alltag sind wir hingegen sehr viel häufiger mit *interrogativen bzw. praktischen Formen des Wissens* konfrontiert. Reduktive Intellektualisten versuchen diesem Problem vorzubeugen, indem sie behaupten, dass praktisches Wissen (Wissen-wie) lediglich eine spezielle Unterart von Wissen-*wh* ist (Wissen in Bezug auf eingebettete Fragen: *where, who, why, whether etc.*). Wobei gleichzeitig angenommen wird, dass alle Zuschreibungen von interrogativem Wissen eine einheitliche Basisform besitzen, nämlich auf Wissen-dass zurückführbar sind. Es stellt sich jedoch die Frage, ob diese (in zweifacher Hinsicht) reduktionistische Sichtweise plausibel ist. Meine Antwort lautet: Nein! Weder ist praktisches Wissen eine Unterart von Wissen-*wh* noch lassen sich interrogative Formen des Wissens auf Wissen-dass reduzieren. In diesem Vortrag wird es mir hauptsächlich um die Begründung der zweiten Behauptung gehen.

Nach einer kurzen Erläuterung der reduktionistischen Standardauffassung von Wissen-*wh* werde ich drei grundlegende Einwände vorbringen, die gegen eine mit dem intellektualistischen Ansatz eng verbundene »*Proposition Set Analysis*« (PSA) von (indirekten) Interrogativen sprechen. Im Wesentlichen sollen drei Dinge gezeigt werden: Erstens werde ich ein Argument anführen (vgl. Ginzburg 1995), das berechtigte Zweifel weckt, ob Zuschreibungen von Wissen-*wh* überhaupt eine »*proposition-denoting-manifestation*« besitzen. Zweitens argumentiere ich für eine bestimmte Form der *Relativität* kongruenter Antworten, d. h. ich gehe davon aus, dass die epistemische Hinsicht, gemäß der eine Antwort auf die eingebettete Frage des *wh*-Satzkomplements kongruent erscheint, mit dem *Ziel unserer Erkenntnisbemühungen* variiert. Entsprechend versuche ich deutlich zu machen, dass die *Faktivität epistemischer Interrogative* nicht mithilfe irgendeiner Bedingung propositionaler Vollständigkeit erklärt werden kann. Drittens stelle ich die Behauptung auf, dass der reduktive Ansatz des Intellektualisten kein prototypisches »*setting*« für epistemische Interrogative liefert, da es *Kontexte der Zuschreibung von Wissen-*wh** gibt, die sich nicht mit PSA modellieren lassen.

Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Einwände wird im abschließenden Teil des Vortrags kurz angedeutet in welche Richtung man eine adäquate Analyse von interrogativen Wissens-Zuschreibungen entwickeln sollte.

## Schmidt 4

### How We Know Our Senses

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I propose a new criterion by which, I hold, subjects recognize and distinguish their sensory modalities. I argue that, rather than appealing to one of the standard criteria (sense organ, proximal stimulus, phenomenal character, or representational content (Grice 1962, Macpherson 2011a)), we need to appeal to the criterion of *location in the functional architecture of the subject's mind at the personal level* in order to make sense of an ordinary subject's ability to tell which sensory modality is employed in her occurrent perceptual experience. More specifically, a subject's mind is functionally organized into different faculties, and, seeing as it is *her* mind, she has a natural cognitive access to this structure at the personal level; in the specific case of perceptual experience, perceptual input from

the world is present to the subject at the personal level as organized by the different sensory modalities, vision, hearing, touch, taste, and smell.

In my presentation, I motivate and explicate this new criterion for distinguishing the senses, in particular its psychological aspects. Moreover, I show how it can handle problems raised by empirical findings, such as additional human senses (e.g. the vomeronasal sense) and cross-modal experiences (e.g. the experience of a speaker's voice emanating from his mouth).

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## 7 Schmidt-Petri

### Erbschaftsteuern, Obduktionen und die posthume Konfizierung von Organen

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In Deutschland wird zur Zeit sehr heftig um eine Neuregelung des Transplantationsgesetzes gekämpft. Das seit 1997 geltende Gesetz sieht eine sogenannte ›erweiterte Zustimmungslösung‹ vor: Organe können Verstorbene nur dann entnommen (und danach transplantiert) werden, wenn der Verstorbene selbst oder posthum seine Angehörigen der Entnahme zugestimmt haben. Da mit diesem Verfahren anscheinend weder alle Personen versorgt werden können, die ein Organ benötigen, noch alle Personen zum Spenden bewegt werden können, die grundsätzlich einer Organspende positiv gegenüberzustehen scheinen, wird inzwischen vielerorts eine ›Widerspruchslösung‹ favorisiert: Organe sollen auch dann entnommen werden können, wenn der Verstorbene einer Organentnahme zwar nicht explizit zugestimmt, ihr aber zumindest nicht explizit widersprochen hat.

Beiden Ansätzen (wie auch der Kompromisslösung ›Äußerungspflicht‹) liegt die Annahme zugrunde, dass ein Mensch über seinen Körper auch über seinen Tod hinaus verfügen kann. In diesem Vortrag möchte ich diese Annahme überprüfen. Ich werde dafür plädieren, dass Organe für potentielle Empfänger von so großer Bedeutung sein können, dass unter bestimmten – sehr selten eintretenden – Umständen auch die Entnahme gegen den erklärten Willen des Verstorbenen bzw. seiner Angehörigen moralisch zulässig sein kann (meine Diskussion erstreckt sich nicht auf menschliches Gewebe, für das ich eine andere Lösung für angebracht halte). Hierfür werden zwei m. E. hinreichend ähnliche Konstellationen als Analogien angeführt: erstens das Erheben von Erbschaftssteuern und zweitens die Anordnung von Obduktionen. In beiden Fällen findet im Zweifelsfall auch gegen den Willen des Verstorbenen bzw. seiner Angehörigen ein Zugriff auf sein Vermögen bzw. seinen Körper statt. Beide Regelungen werden zumeist als unproblematisch empfunden, und die jeweiligen Begründungen für die Zulässigkeit sollten in Kombination auch für menschliche Organe akzeptiert werden.

## Schmitz 5

### Practical Knowledge

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When practical knowledge is discussed at all in contemporary philosophy, since Ryle it has usually been discussed as know-how in the sense of mere skill. There is a blind spot in contemporary thinking about knowledge for a conception of practical knowledge which treats it not as a mere skill, but as knowledge state that, like theoretical knowledge, is conceptually articulated and even in a sense ›propositional‹ and yet essentially and irreducibly different from theoretical knowledge that something is the case. This is true even though there are countless examples for this form of knowledge ranging from recipes over instructions how to behave in case of a fire to moral maxims. The contribution defends the reality of states of practical knowledge and characterizes them as being prescriptive, as having world-to-mind direction of fit, and as knowledge of means and ends rather than of facts. Practical knowledge, it is further argued, should be thought of as knowledge-to rather than as knowledge-how, because there are many other forms of practical knowledge such as knowing what to do, and where, when, and why to do it.

## Schneider 6

### Leibnizianischer Molinismus: Individuelle Essenzen und metaphysische Freiheit

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Spätestens seitdem *Alvin Plantinga* in seinem Werk ›The Nature of Necessity‹ von 1974 die Mögliche-Welten-Erklärung kontrafaktischer Konditionale von *David Lewis* zur Lösung des Theodizée-Problems heranzog, reüssierten in der analytischen Religionsphilosophie die spätscholastischen Systeme, die im 16. / 17. Jahrhundert zur Klärung der Frage nach nach Kohärenz von göttlicher Vorhersehung und menschlicher Freiheit entwickelt wurden. In diesem Beitrag soll der *analytische Molinismus* beleuchtet und seine Charakterisierung als libertarische Position kritisch untersucht und neu verortet werden. Hierbei wird vor allem auf die aktuelle Diskussion um anti-molinistische Konsequenzargumente und die in ihnen verwendeten Transferprinzipien eingegangen. Darüber hinaus soll gezeigt werden, dass die sog. ›essence-solution‹ der berühmten ›Grounding-objection‹ gegen den Molinismus zu einer potenten Lösung ausgebaut werden kann, wenn individuelle Essenzen freier Akteure als leibnizianische ›vollständige Begriffe‹ aufgefasst werden, welche alle kontra- bzw. präfaktischen Freiheitskonditionale des jeweiligen Akteurs enthalten. Tatsächlich entwickelte Leibniz sein Konzept der vollständigen Begriffe von Individuen auf Basis der Debatte um die molinistische *scientia media*. Diese leibnizianischen Individualideen sollen jedoch im molinistischen Kontext nicht als rein aktualistisch aufgefasst werden, sondern müssen zudem den ganzen Möglichkeitsraum des jeweiligen Individuums enthalten. Daher wird ein spezifisches mathematisches Modell entwickelt, in welchem die

vollständigen Begriffe als eine nicht-algorithmische Komposition von Auswahlfunktionen konzipiert werden, die auf möglichen Weltverläufen operieren. Es zeigt sich, dass der Molinismus tatsächlich eine libertarische Position ist, jedoch kann er höchstens als eine schwache Form von Libertarismus etabliert werden, für die in einer aktuellen Welt keine echte Wahlfreiheit, sondern nur Vollzugsfreiheit im Sinne der Akteurskausalität besteht.

## 8 Schönherr

### What makes moral values queer?

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John Mackie's argument from moral queerness has often been taken to raise doubts about the existence of moral properties, facts and values based on the claim that, if moral properties existed, they would have to instantiate some property »utterly different from anything else in the universe« (Mackie 1977, 38). His argument can be put as follows:

1. If moral values existed, they would have to instantiate property *Q*.
2. Property *Q* would have to be »utterly different from anything else in the universe.«
3. It is not reasonable to assume that something exists which would have to instantiate a feature »utterly different from anything else«.

1. It is not reasonable to assume that moral properties exist.  
In this talk, my target will be *Q*: what it cannot represent and what it can represent.

Traditionally, *Q* has been taken to represent moral properties' intrinsic *reason-givingness*. I argue that this popular idea is accompanied by a distinct methodological problem: The fact that only moral properties are intrinsically reason-giving is trivially true. It is true by virtue of the meaning of »moral property«. This, however, is not a result the proponents of the argument from queerness should be intending.

Furthermore, I suggest that the *supervenience* of intrinsically normative properties on descriptive properties is a more promising candidate for *Q*.

## 2 Schulte

### How Truth Can Be Grounded in Being: A Grounding Theory of Truthmaking

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True propositions are not true *simpliciter*, they are true because of the way the world is. This intuitive idea has led many theorists to embrace the ideas that every true proposition  $\langle p \rangle$  has a truthmaker – an entity whose existence explains  $\langle p \rangle$ 's truth. But the crucial challenge for truthmaker theorists is to give a plausible account of the relation that holds between  $\langle p \rangle$  and its truthmaker. In my talk, I will argue that a certain version of *grounding theory* can be used to give an

analysis of truthmaking. However, contrary to the claims of some grounding theorists (namely, Jonathan Schaffer), such an account cannot be constructed in a straightforward way, but requires a fundamental revision of standard truthmaker theory.

Traditional necessitation theories of truthmaking face (at least) two fundamental problems. First, there is the problem of counterintuitive truthmakers: in some cases, the truth of a proposition is necessitated by an entity that does not seem to explain its truth. Secondly, there is the problem of ontological commitments: if all true propositions have truthmakers which necessitate their truth, then we need to postulate entities that necessitate the truth of propositions like  $\langle$ the rose is red $\rangle$  or  $\langle$ there are no unicorns $\rangle$ .

Proponents of grounding theories of truthmaking attempt to solve these two problems. Standard versions of this approach claim that an entity *x* is a truthmaker for  $\langle p \rangle$  iff  $\langle p \rangle$ 's truth is grounded in *x*. Such accounts, I maintain, manage to solve the problem of counterintuitive truthmakers, but they can solve the problem of ontological commitments only at the cost of abandoning one of the main motivations for truthmaker theory – the idea that the truth of a proposition is *explained* by its truthmaker.

Fortunately, there exists an alternative, based on a different conception of grounding (the »operator view«). As I will argue, an account of truthmaking along these lines is able to provide fully satisfactory solutions to both of the fundamental problems, and should therefore be considered as an attractive new version of truthmaker theory.

## Schwartzkopff 1

### Frege vs. Moltmann:

### Why »The number of planets is eight« is an identity statement after all

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In his *Grundlagen*, Gottlob Frege proposed that a sentence like

(N) The number of planets is eight,

be, *pars pro toto*, analyzed as an identity statement, i.e. as a sentence in which two singular terms flank the is of identity (call this the F-Analysis). This analysis is a well-supported staple of many discussions in the philosophy of mathematics: the F-analysis lends credit to the view – relied upon in, e.g., the (Neo-)Fregeans' use of Hume's Principle – that sentences of the form »The number of *F*s is the number of *G*s«, are identity statements as well. In her forthcoming paper »Reference to Numbers in Natural Language«, Friederike Moltmann attacks the F-Analysis. Moltmann argues, on broadly linguistic grounds, that such sentences be analyzed as specificational sentences: sentences of the form »XP 1 be XP 2« (for some syntactic category *X*) that are neither predications nor identity statements. Appealing to the influential Question in Disguise account of specificational sentences, Moltmann analyzes (N) as follows: »the number of planets« conceals the question »How many planets are there?«, whilst »eight« is elliptical for »There are eight planets«; a sentence in which »eight« isn't a singular term (call this the M-Analysis). The viability of the M-Analysis crucially relies on two assumptions:

(A 1) (N) is a specificational sentence.

(A 2) In (N), ›the number of planets‹ conceals ›How many planets are there?‹.

In my talk, I'll defend the F-Analysis against Moltmann's criticisms by showing that both (A 1) and (A 2) are of questionable plausibility. But if they are, so is the M-Analysis itself. Thus, we should accept the otherwise well-supported F-Analysis. (Neo-)Fregeans will rejoice.

Seidel **3**

**Zwischen Relativismus und Absolutismus?  
Warum ein Kuhnscher, moderater Relativismus  
scheitert**

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**7 Schweikard**

**The Justification of Contributory  
Political Obligations**

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The recently revived debate about political obligation centres around the following question: What are individuals as citizens of a state obligated to do in view of or for the state? This question concerns the individual agent in their role as citizen and it aims at those potentially obligatory acts that affect other citizens or the respective state. Examples of political obligations are obeying the laws of one's country, joining the army or voluntary social services of one's country, and voting in democratic elections. Some of these obligations are connected with questions of obedience, others with questions of contribution. In this paper, I expound an account of the justification of contributory political obligations.

I will argue for the view that citizens are obligated to contribute to the maintenance of the institutions of their political community in so far as they have reasons to value them. On this account the citizens of a democratic state are, for instance, obligated to vote in elections in so far as they have reason to value the integrity of the electoral procedure, the representational structure, the functioning and processes of monitoring political institutions, and the integrity of office holders.

First, I introduce two basic conditions of adequacy, the conditions of universality and of particularity, and delineate the spectrum of accounts of political obligation. In a second step, I present a promising candidate, the associativist account, according to which citizens as members of a political association have certain obligations in virtue of the fact that they are so associated. In the *third* section, I criticise associativist accounts with respect to their commitment to the normative independence thesis, i.e. the thesis that associative obligations are grounded in the fact of association and not in the character of the community in question. In the *fourth* section, I develop a systematic proposal with the reverse focus on the moral quality of the respective political community and its institutions. I go on to vindicate an account grounded in *reasons to value* and *reasons to contribute* which also meets the requirements of universality and particularity.

Nach der Veröffentlichung des wissenschaftstheoretischen Klassikers *Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen* wurde Thomas Kuhn von vielen Kritikern der Vorwurf gemacht, seine Position und im Besonderen seine These methodologischer Inkommensurabilität impliziere einen unhaltbaren Relativismus und führe dazu, wissenschaftlichen Theoriewandel letztlich zu einem irrationalen Unterfangen zu machen. Zur Verteidigung Kuhns ist im Zuge der Diskussion um die potentiell relativistischen Konsequenzen seiner Wissenschaftstheorie von einigen Autoren der Vorschlag gemacht worden, Kuhns Position im Sinne eines moderaten oder gemäßigten Relativismus zu lesen. Der Beitrag setzt sich mit diesem Vorschlag kritisch auseinander.

Dabei wird dreierlei gezeigt: Zum einen ist es plausibel bereits Kuhns Position in *Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen* im Sinne eines gemäßigten Relativismus zu beschreiben, so dass Kuhns spätere Äußerungen in diesem Kontext nicht als Revision sondern als Elaboration seiner Position in seinem Hauptwerk beschrieben werden müssen. Zweitens kann gezeigt werden, dass ein gemäßigter, Kuhnscher Relativismus jedoch an Kuhns eigenem Zirkularitätsargument scheitert: Entweder Kuhns Argument ist auf die von ihm angeführten, transparadigmatisch geteilten Werte selbst anwendbar, so dass Kuhns Relativismus letztlich doch extrem ist, oder nicht, wobei eine solche Ausnahme ad hoc ist. Dieses Dilemma wird anhand einer Kritik der Arbeiten von moderaten Relativisten wie Bernd Schofer und Gerald Doppelt detailliert aufgewiesen. Drittens wird Kuhns These, die eine Konsequenz von Kuhns gemäßigtem Relativismus sein soll, konstruktiv aufgenommen: Die These, dass vernünftige Meinungsverschiedenheit zwischen Wissenschaftlern möglich ist. Im Bezug auf die aktuelle, in der Erkenntnistheorie geführte Diskussion um Meinungsverschiedenheit wird gezeigt, dass diese intuitiv plausible Möglichkeit im Rahmen einer absolutistischen Konzeption epistemischer Rechtfertigung zugelassen werden kann – weder die Idee methodologischer Inkommensurabilität noch die Idee geteilter, aber verschieden gewichteter Werte ist notwendig, um diese Möglichkeit philosophisch adäquat zu erklären.

Seidel **7**

**Defending distributive equality against  
the social-relational critique**

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Distributive egalitarians believe in at least two claims: First, that a conception of distributive justice is (partially) explained by the idea of distributive equality (DE); and second, that DE is of intrinsic (and not purely instrumental) value. Against this view, some critics – most prominently, perhaps, Elizabeth



Anderson and Samuel Scheffler – have pointed out that distributive egalitarians fail to account for the true value of equality, which rather lies in the idea of equality as a substantive social value (ESV). This paper examines the social-relational critique of distributive equality and points out two related issues which arise from the social-relational argument: The first is the relation between DE and the critics' more general conception of equality as a social value (ESV); this boils down to the question of what egalitarianism really is all about and I will argue that – contrary to the critics' claim – DE is actually both conceptually and explanatory prior to ESV. The second issue is about the way in which one may argue for DE; this is a question about the justificatory or argumentative structure of egalitarian conceptions of distributive justice and I will argue that – again, contrary to the critics' claim – the idea of ESV cannot serve as a foundation of DE.

## 4 Seuchter/Vosgerau

### Causal Indexicals in a Mental File Framework

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In this paper, we argue that the notion of causal indexicals, as coined by Campbell (1994), can be understood best if it is spelled out in a mental file framework, as proposed by Recanati (2005) and Perry (1980, 2000). Causal indexicals, a useful but not much discussed notion in philosophy, have a high explanatory value regarding the classification of objects in terms of their action-related properties as well as in terms of accounting for behavior of subjects. In a nutshell, causal indexical thinking, such as »this is a weight I can easily lift« or »this is too hot to touch (for me)« relates »causal powers« (determined by the bodily constitution and abilities of subjects) to objects in respect of potential interactions. Objects are then classified according to what the subject can do with them in the light of its abilities. To get a fine grasp on the concept of causal indexicals and its explanatory value, this idea needs to be spelled out in a larger theory of (indexical) concepts. Such a framework can be provided by referring to the concept of mental files. At the very heart of the notion of mental file is the idea that subjects who entertain epistemically rewarding relations to objects (e.g. acquaintance) are enabled to gather and store information about these objects in a mental file. The SELF-file is a specific mental file containing information about oneself, gained, inter alia, through first-person epistemic access (proprioception, introspection). Crucial for the mental files account and for the present purpose is the possibility of linking files. Two distinct files can be linked and the information contained in these files be bound together. This linkage, we will argue, works in a similar fashion for causal indexicals: An object file is linked to the SELF-file, the latter containing information about the bodily constitution of the subject (cf. the notion of a body scheme). The result of such a link is that the object file contains information that specifies what the subject is able to do with the object.

### The Wrong Kind of Reason

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On a fairly familiar view, reasons are considerations that count in favor of attitudes and actions. As many philosophers have noted, however, there is a serious ambiguity in this way of thinking about reasons. For just as the fact, say, that you're better at tennis than I am might be a reason to believe you'll trounce me in our next match, so might the fact, say, that your teammates have threatened me with a beating unless I believe it. Both considerations seem – in whatever sense is intended by the original statement – to count in favor of the belief that you'll win our next match. But the former considerations seem to be the ›right‹ kind of reasons for belief, whereas the latter have the flavor of the ›wrong‹ kind of reasons for belief. Similar points can be made, mutatis mutandis, for other propositional attitudes like desire, intention, imagination, and so on. In this paper I argue that current attempts to explain the distinction between the ›right‹ and the ›wrong‹ kinds of reasons fail on grounds either of extensional or explanatory inadequacy. I propose an alternate account and show how it is both extensionally adequate to the phenomenon and explanatory. I conclude with some speculative remarks about what this alternative proposal tells about the more general nature of normative reasons.

## Slaby 4

### Clarifying Enaction

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Enactivism is a systems-biology-inspired position in the philosophy of mind and in cognitive science that proposes significant shifts in the conceptual repertoire required to think about the mind. The position's central tenets concern the nature of conscious experience, which is claimed to be inseparable from agency; the constitutive interrelatedness of organism and environment, and an alleged »deep continuity« of mind and life. What has so far hindered a broader reception and systematic assessment of enactivist philosophy has to do with a perceived lack of clarity pertaining to some of its central terms and claims. Most notably, it is notoriously difficult to grasp what the central concept »enaction« is supposed to mean. In how far can conscious experience and intentional agency be seen as inseparable? What does it mean that an agent »brings forth« its own »world« or »cognitive domain«? In what sense exactly does enaction entail a non-representational understanding of intentionality?

In this contribution, a substantial clarification of enactivism's core idea and key terms along with the solution to a central problem is undertaken. The problem concerns the demarcation between the sophisticated mentality proper to humans and lower forms of differential responsiveness found all the way down in the realm of living creatures. The solution

will be a novel reconstruction of enactivism that is framed mostly in terms of personal level concepts, dealing in particular with dynamic experience-action couplings in humans. Separating the core idea of enaction somewhat from the systems biology context in which it is usually framed, it will be shown that the proper paradigm of enaction is distinctively *human* agency, viewed in its full experiential context, i.e. including a form of affective self-awareness. This novel rendition of enactivism allows to conceive of the temporality of conscious experience in a new way and also offers a reading of the thesis of »enaction as world constitution« that is no longer in danger of being misread as a kind of idealism.

### 4 Soom

#### **A Functionalist Approach to the Concept of ›Delusion‹ and its Sub-Types**

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Delusions are key symptoms of many severe mental disorders. However, no adequate theoretical definition has been provided yet, although the empirical research made considerable progresses towards etiological and reductive accounts of delusions. This contribution aims to use the theoretical tools of philosophy of mind in order to provide a functional definition of the concept of delusion, and to show how this definition may be used to set up a classification of sub-types of delusions.

The paper starts with a critical evaluation of the DSM-IV definition of delusions in order to shape a positive account of what delusions are from a functional point of view. We shall argue that delusions are essentially characterized by their asymmetrical inferential profile. We improve on this proposal by considering etiological and reductive accounts of delusions, which suggest that two factors are at play, one of them tokening a problematic belief and the second preventing the subject to reject this belief in spite of its inconsistency with evidence. This suggests that we should consider that all delusions share a specific inferential profile and that the specific etiology of different delusions might contribute to individuate (functional) sub-types of delusions.

### 2 Spann

#### **Can there be strict biological Identity through Time without Aristotelian Substances? A short Examination of Eric T. Olson's Animalism**

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Recently, the current debate on personal identity has seen a boom of biological theories construing persons as biological wholes in the spirit of Aristotelian hylemorphism. Compared to the much-criticized psychological Reductionism à la Par-

fit which drops strict numerical identity in favour of mere empirical continuity, these theories have the advantage of maintaining strict identity due to their presupposing the existence of substances whose essential features are determined by natural kinds.

Nevertheless, there are some biological theories which pretend to get the same result of retaining strict identity *without* reference to Aristotelian substances, i.e. *without* Aristotelian essentialism. They claim to explain our strict transtemporal identity as constituted by special relations of biological continuity, thereby, it seems, combining the advantages of the Aristotelian theories with the Complex Theories' benefit of giving lucid scientific explanations instead of postulating dubious entities like Aristotelian essences.

But can there really be strict biological identity through time without Aristotelian substances? In my paper, I want to explore this question with a view to Olson's Animalism which appears to be a Complex Theory in that it tries to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for our persistence and claims to talk about strict numerical identity although making no explicit use of Aristotelian ideas. I will argue that Olson's arguments do not suffice for establishing strict biological identity through time, mainly because Animalism's materialistic framework leaves no room for the self-organizing activity of organisms which Olson takes to be the distinctive feature of biological life. If it is true that Olson's Animalism in fact is tacitly committed to Aristotelian presuppositions, this could be seen as evidence for there being no chance of having strict biological identity through time without Aristotelian substances.

### Stei 5

#### **A presuppositional strict invariantist account of knowledge attributions**

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It is often taken to be a weakness of strict invariantism that it has difficulties explaining the apparent variability of knowledge attributions exhibited by contextualist case studies. The critics of strict invariantism seem to assume that some kind of variability in the extension of »knows« is the key to a satisfactory analysis of sentences of the form »x knows p (at time t)«. I want to challenge that assumption in my talk and defend the claim that strict invariantism has the means to explain the intuitions triggered by the relevant cases. I briefly outline the phenomenon in question and sketch the basic ideas of truth-conditional analyses. I then propose a novel strict invariantist explanation which borrows certain aspects from contextualist readings of pragmatic presuppositions. I hope to show that presuppositional strict invariantism is able to provide a general explanation of the relevant kind of variability of knowledge attributions and that, therefore, there is no need for contentious semantic claims about »knows«.

## 2 Steinberg

**Defining Global Supervenience**

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What does it mean that certain properties globally supervene on others? The paper criticises the now standard way of spelling out the notion in terms of 1-1 correlations between world-domains and proposes a modification that escapes the difficulties. It is then shown that, contrary to the standard account, global supervenience is not theoretically dispensable, since it is not equivalent to a form of individual supervenience.

## 3 Steinberger

**Logic, normativity and paraconsistency**

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Arguments in favor of paraconsistent logic (and hence against the validity of the principle of *ex falso sequitur quodlibet* (EFQ)) frequently rely on the assumption – a widely shared assumption – that logic enjoys a certain normative authority over thought. The argument can be summarized thus: if I believe a number of propositions, I ought (or am permitted) to believe at least those propositions that I recognize to be logical consequences of my beliefs. Since agents may sometimes hold inconsistent beliefs (perhaps even rationally so), EFQ cannot be a valid principle of logic. If it were, agents with inconsistent belief sets, would have an obligation (permission) to believe any proposition whatsoever. Hence, EFQ must be rejected along with the classical conception of validity that underlies it. Branden Fitelson recently claimed that arguments of this form are doomed to failure since there is no bridge principle to be had – i.e. a principle encapsulating the supposed normative role of logic by specifying how facts about logical consequence relate to doxastic norms – satisfying the joint demands of being sufficiently strong for the argument to go through and sufficiently weak to give a plausible account of the relationship between logic and rationality. In this paper, I propose to put Fitelson's claim to the test. Drawing on work by John MacFarlane, I systematically examine a representative range of candidate bridge principles both for their overall cogency and for their ability to support the paraconsistent logician's argument. I argue that, contrary to Fitelson's conjecture, there are two potential loop holes the logical revisionist could exploit and sketch the resulting picture of the normative role of logic for thought along with the attendant philosophical commitments. In closing, I offer a number of remarks about the normative status of logic in general.

## Stelling 3

**When is it rational to believe a mathematical statement?**

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The traditional answer to the question in the title is: We may believe a mathematical statement if we have a proof for it. Otherwise, we should remain agnostic as to its truth value. I want to show that this answer is wrong. In particular, my claim is this: Either it is rational to believe some mathematical statements even though there is no proof for them, or it is irrational to believe some other mathematical statements, even though they have been proved.

We will start by considering the case of a mathematical oracle—an omniscient entity that can give us the answer to any mathematical question, though it will do so only approximately. (Oracles tend to be difficult like that.) We will then look at examples from mathematical practice that mirror the case of the oracle. In particular, these are the two examples we will look at: (a) There is a probabilistic argument for the Riemann Hypothesis due to Denjoy, that results in the claim that Riemann's Hypothesis is true with probability one. This does not imply that the Hypothesis is logically, necessarily true, but merely that the chance of it being false is so small as to be zero. (We will discuss what this means.) Mathematicians typically don't accept this kind of reasoning. (b) The second example is a published and accepted proof within projective geometry. It relies on heavy usage of computers, and the authors have taken the time to actually calculate the probability that an unnoticeable hardware defect might have resulted in a false outcome. The probability of that happening is again so small as to be essentially zero. Both of these examples suffer from very similar defects, yet mathematicians treat them very differently. We will try to analyze what the relevant difference might be, and see what we can infer about the mathematicians' attitudes toward their field of inquiry.

## Stern 3

**Modality and Axiomatic Theories of Truth**

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Predicate treatments of modality have been around since the very beginning of formal philosophizing as can be witnessed by the works of Carnap and Quine. However, since these days the predicate approach to modality has been a minority position, maybe due to an early result of Montague, which allegedly shows that basic and intuitive modal principles cannot be jointly adopted for sake of paradox.

We shall argue that Montague's theorem does not rule out a predicate treatment of modality in which the basic and intuitive modal principles are jointly adopted. Moreover, we argue that if care is taken in formulating the intuitive modal principles, we can consistently embrace all modal principles of S5. The resulting theory does not treat modalities in isolation but

intimately links them to truth and accordingly the conception or theory of modality we end up with depends on the theory of truth adopted.

We shall investigate the theories of modality the theories FS («Friedman-Sheard») and, respectively, KF («Kripke-Feferman») give rise to and show amongst other things that both theories of modality are adequate from the perspective of modal operator logic. However, there is a decisive difference between the two conception of modality, which is essentially due to the well-known fact that the so-called inner and the outer logic of KF differ.

### 4 Stiller/Nagel

#### Über Veränderung und Einheit der Person – Eine Synthese analytischer und phänomenologischer Überlegungen

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Um die Frage nach personaler Identität zu untersuchen, verbinden wir zwei aktuelle Erklärungsansätze aus der analytischen Philosophie und der Phänomenologie, die Kriterien des Personseins und personaler Einheit beleuchten. Der analytische Ansatz Michael Quantes identifiziert das dauerhafte Bestehen des biologischen Organismus eines Menschen als Kriterium lebenslanger personaler Einheit. Der Körper ist der Träger von Zeit- und Selbstbewusstsein, welche Erinnerungs- und Antizipationsleistungen ermöglichen. Hieraus entsteht die beständige Selbstidentifikation einer Person, da die Erinnerungen an vergangene Erlebnisse zu der Überzeugung führen, auch zukünftig etwas zu erleben. So kann sich eine individuelle Persönlichkeit entwickeln, welche neben sozialen und kulturellen Umständen auch durch die Beschaffenheit des Körpers geformt wird. Die Einheit der Person wird durch die Verschränkung von Persistenz und Persönlichkeit erklärt: Mit der Entwicklung der individuellen Persönlichkeit, welche durch Beständigkeit und Beschaffenheit des Körpers beeinflusst ist, entsteht persönliche biografische Kohärenz. Shaun Gallagher und Dan Zahavi explizieren die phänomenologische Position, dass die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit des Personseins durch die kognitiven und erfahrungsbezogenen Fähigkeiten eines Individuums gegeben sind. Das kognitive Vermögen des Bewusstseins befähigt einen Menschen zur Wahrnehmung der Zeit und seiner Selbst im Durchleben aller Erfahrungen («*quality of mine-ness in experiencing*»). Die gleichbleibende Struktur dieser Selbsterfahrung ist das Fundament personaler Identität über die Zeit hinweg. Wir schlagen vor, beide Ansätze zu integrieren, um eine systematische Perspektive auf das Phänomen personaler Einheit zu entwickeln. Zusammen beschreiben die Ansätze den Menschen auf verschiedenen Ebenen: unter anderem als biologischen Organismus, als kognitives System und in seiner sozialisierten Existenz, wobei jede Ebene ein Zusammenspiel von Veränderung und Stabilität aufweist. Für die Erklärung des Personseins und personaler Einheit bedingen Veränderung und Stabilität einander. Eine Person kann sich nur verändern, wenn sie im Laufe der Ver-

änderung dieselbe Person bleibt. Ansonsten würde anstelle dessen eine neue, aber an sich unveränderte Person entstehen. Umgekehrt sind für die Beständigkeit der Person in einer sich andauernd ändernden Umwelt Flexibilität und Anpassungsfähigkeit notwendige Voraussetzungen. Wir argumentieren, dass der entscheidende Schritt für eine Erklärung personaler Einheit das Verständnis dieser Wechselbeziehung ist.

### Strößner 3

#### Statistical and Non-Statistical Normality

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Logics of normality which have been suggested so far interpret normality as typicality. This normality understanding doesn't presuppose any statistical frequencies. In this sense, something is normally the case if it is true in the *most typical circumstances*. On the other hand, one might think of normality as majority. In this sense something is normally the case if it is true in *most circumstances*. The talk introduces a formal logic of quantitative normality (i.e. normality as majority) and compares it to qualitative normality (normality as typicality) approaches. It will be argued that a descriptive explication of normality must imply statistical majority.

### Sturm 2

#### Eine allgemeine Theorie der Eigenschaften

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Verschiedene Autoren haben darauf hingewiesen, dass der Ausdruck »Eigenschaft« in der Philosophie systematisch ambig in dem Sinne verwendet wird, als dass er dazu dient, zwei Kategorien von Entitäten zu bezeichnen.

Die eine Kategorie besteht aus Entitäten, die zusammen mit der Kategorie der raum-zeitlich lokalisierten Einzeldinge – und eventuell noch Entitäten aus anderen Kategorien – die grundlegenden Bausteine unserer Welt abgeben. Eigenschaften, so verstanden, bilden die ontologische Grundlage für die qualitative Beschaffenheit der Dinge.

Die zweite Kategorie von Eigenschaften begegnet uns primär im Kontext der Semantik. Eigenschaften werden hier als Entitäten verstanden, die mit bestimmten sprachlichen Ausdrücken – insbesondere Prädikaten und deren Nominalisierungen – assoziiert sind und ihnen dadurch ihre Bedeutung verleihen.

In dem Vortrag werde ich eine allgemeine Theorie der Eigenschaften vorstellen, der die Annahme zugrunde liegt, dass es sich bei den Eigenschaften der ersten Kategorie um eine echte Teilklasse der Eigenschaften der zweiten Kategorie handelt. Das Ziel besteht dabei nicht nur darin, die philosophische Grundlage für eine solche Theorie zu schaffen, sondern sie darüber hinaus in einem formalen Rahmen zu kodifizieren.

Der Vortrag gliedert sich in vier Teile. Im ersten Teil wird es darum gehen, für die beiden folgenden Thesen zu argumentieren:

1. Eigenschaften sind basale Entitäten, die sich weder unter Rückgriff auf Tropen noch auf Mengen adäquat verstehen lassen.

2. Es ist sinnvoll, davon auszugehen, dass es sich bei den beiden Kategorien von Eigenschaften nicht um prinzipiell unterschiedliche Typen von Gegenständen handelt.

Die anderen drei Teile des Vortrags dienen dazu, die Theorie sukzessive aufzubauen. Zunächst wird die Basistheorie TB eingeführt, die dann im nächsten Schritt zu einer allgemeinen Theorie TE erweitert wird. Was die formale Gestalt angeht, handelt es sich bei TE um eine axiomatische Theorie, die Ähnlichkeiten mit bestimmten Systemen der Mengentheorie aufweist. Im Unterschied zu anderen, an der Mengentheorie orientierten Eigenschaftstheorien lässt TE die Existenz der Universalen Eigenschaft zu, also derjenigen Eigenschaft, die auf alles und jeden zutrifft. Es lässt sich zeigen, dass TE konsistent ist relativ zu ZF Der vierte und letzte Teil des Vortrags befasst sich mit dem Problem einer modalen Erweiterung der Theorie TE. Es soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, auf welche Weise sich das Zusammenspiel von Eigenschaften und Modalitäten adäquat erfassen lässt, ohne dabei auf so etwas wie mögliche Welten zurückgreifen zu müssen.

## 1 Sühr

## Analyses as Explanations

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In this paper I develop a new conception of analysis. According to this conception, an analysis, very roughly, specifies for every entity which falls under a certain concept why it falls under that concept. I motivate this view by discussing the second paradox of analysis as stated by Felicia Ackerman. Starting from something which seems to be a correct analysis, the paradox concludes by the substitution of synonyms that a tautology is an analysis. There are several ways out of the paradox. One is to deny that analyses are propositions and to argue that they are sentences or hybrid entities consisting of a proposition and something (quasi-)linguistic instead. Both views fail to appreciate the purpose of analyses. Analyses shall provide answers to socratic questions concerning the nature of something. But answers in the relevant sense are neither sentences nor hybrid entities consisting of propositions and something else but propositions. If analyses are propositions, how do we express them properly? My starting point is the platitude that analyses are explanations. Although sometimes one can literally express an explanation without using the word »because« (or some translation of it), for example, if one explains a theory or the meaning of a word, the explanation of a concept is literally expressed by a because-sentence. Therefore, I propose to literally express an analysis of the concept F, very roughly, as follows: For every entity which falls under F it falls under F because it is G. I conclude by discussing some objections to this proposal. The main worry is that it provides no way out of the second paradox. To dispel this objection, I argue that in a literal expression of an analysis the expression for the analysans must not be synonymous with the expression for the analysandum. In this way the second paradox is avoided (and the first paradox as well).

## Intensional verbs – a dynamic approach

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Intensional transitive verbs (ITVs) such as look for, need or resemble have attracted a lot of attention from formal semanticists in the past decades. In my work I challenge the two assumptions that have shaped the research on ITVs so far: first, that ITVs are evaluated with respect to the belief state of their agent, and second, that their nonspecific readings are derived from the specific ones. I argue that it is worthwhile to consider developing a dynamic semantics for intensional verbs to model their behavior in dialogue. The resulting formalism is an update twist of the logic with generalized quantifiers of Barwise and Cooper, where intensional verbs are taken to denote relations between quantifiers as opposed to individuals. Specific readings of sentences with intensional verbs are derived from the model rather than by arbitrary meaning rules. Such a system explains the patterns of use of sentences with intensional verbs in a dialogue setting.

## Tamminga/Verhaegh 5

## Katz's Revisability Paradox Dissolved

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W.V. Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: noncontradiction, universal revisability and pragmatic ordering. Jerrold Katz (1998; 2002) argues that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox: because the three constitutive principles of holistic empiricism cannot themselves be rationally revised, holistic empiricism is incoherent. In this paper, we show that Katz's argument fails. Using Gärdenfors and Makinson's logic of belief revision based on epistemic entrenchment, we argue that Katz wrongly assumes that the three constitutive principles are statements within a holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. Instead, we show that constitutive principles are best seen as properties of a holistic empiricist's theory of scientific inquiry and argue that without Katz's mistaken assumption the paradox cannot be formulated. Finally, we argue that our perspective on the status of constitutive principles is perfectly in line with Quinean orthodoxy.

## 8 Tanyi/Bruder

### Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach

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According to act-consequentialism the right action is the one that produces the best results as judged from an impersonal perspective. It is often claimed that this requirement is so demanding that it is unacceptable for any agent to follow it. The paper breaks with dominant trends in discussing this so-called Overdemandingness Objection both in its understanding of the Objection and its approach to it. It understands the Objection as claiming that consequentialism is overdemanding because it requires us, with decisive force, to do things that, intuitively, we do not have decisive reason to perform. Understood in this way, the Objection proposes that there exists a widely shared intuition that at least some consequentialist demands are unreasonably extreme. The paper empirically investigates this proposition by examining what people think about the practical significance of consequentialist requirements and how much weight they attach to them when faced with moral decisions. In doing so it argues that the proposition is in fact not supported by common-sense morality. Using carefully designed experimental situations the paper shows that the majority of people agree that consequentialist requirements override their conflicting reasons even when those requirements are highly demanding.

## 3 Thomann

### Eine Logik des Könnens mit Handlungstypen

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Im Rahmen dieses Vortrags wird ein Formalismus zur Modellierung des Begriffs praktischer Fähigkeiten vorgestellt, der das zu analysierende Konzept des Könnens durch einen auf Handlungsterme anzuwendenden satzbildenden Operator repräsentiert. Damit grenzt sich dieser Vorschlag von den zahlreichen in der Literatur verfolgten Ansätzen ab, die wohlgeformte Formeln oder Propositionen als Argumente des fraglichen Operators annehmen. Gleichzeitig erwächst aus dieser Herangehensweise die Notwendigkeit, eine Ontologie von Handlungstypen, die als Denotate der Handlungsterme dienen können, in den Modellbegriff aufzunehmen.

Die Objektsprache der vorzustellenden Logik umfasst neben einer Menge von Satzbuchstaben und den booleschen Junktoren eine Menge von Handlungstermen, zwei satzbildende Operatoren zur Formalisierung von Fähigkeits- und Handlungszuschreibungen sowie termbildende Operatoren. Interpretiert wird diese Sprache über Modellen, in denen mögliche Welten als zeitlich geordnete Mengen von Momenten verstanden werden. Handlungstypen werden durch ihre Erfolgsbedingun-

gen, Testbedingungen und Realisierungen individuiert. Diese Modellierung erlaubt die Formulierung einer Wahrheitsbedingung für Fähigkeitszuschreibungen, gemäß der eine Fähigkeit zu haben bedeutet, den fraglichen Handlungstyp unter dafür geeigneten Bedingungen normalerweise erfolgreich zu realisieren.

Nach der Vorstellung des Formalismus' sollen außerdem die Abschlusseigenschaften des modellierten Fähigkeitsbegriffs diskutiert werden. Wie im Rahmen der verfolgten Herangehensweise zu erwarten, werden diese nicht in erster Linie durch die logische Struktur von Propositionen bestimmt, also z. B. Folgerungs- oder Äquivalenzbeziehungen. Stattdessen ergeben sich die Abschlusseigenschaften aus der Struktur der Menge der Handlungstypen, so dass hier auch die Adäquatheit bestimmter strukturgebender Forderungen zu untersuchen ist sowie die Möglichkeiten, diese Struktur durch Einführung weiterer termbildender Operatoren anzureichern.

## Todd 6

### Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: Remotivating Incompatibilism

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Nelson Pike's 1965 paper, ›Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action‹, arguing for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, provoked a veritable avalanche of work on the issues of God and freedom. Needless to say, Pike's argument, while accepted by some, was resisted by many. In this paper, I aim to reconstruct and *remotivate* Pike-style arguments for incompatibilism. As I see it, the force of these arguments has not yet been appropriately recognized in the contemporary discussions about freedom and foreknowledge. I argue that we can make a key comparison between the cases of divine foreknowledge and divine *prepunishment* – a comparison that will, I hope, bring out in new and intuitively compelling ways the core motivating elements of Pike's argument, and shed considerable light on the so-called ›hard / soft fact‹ distinction. In short, I argue that divine *prepunishment* is (very plausibly) incompatible with human freedom, and that, if divine *prepunishment* is incompatible with freedom, so also is divine *prebelief*. As I hope to show, the argument for the incompatibility of *prepunishment* and freedom is *exactly parallel* to Pike's argument for the incompatibility of foreknowledge and freedom. The relevant question is simple: if you have already been justly pre-punished by God for doing something, how can you avoid doing it? I investigate three different ›answers‹ to this question – all parallel to answers explicitly considered by Pike in the foreknowledge case – and find them all wanting. The upshot is that we have a new way of motivating the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom.

### 3 Unterhuber

#### Modeling the Ramsey Test by Chellas-Segeberg Semantics

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In this talk I introduce Chellas-Segeberg (CS) Semantics, a possible worlds semantics for conditionals, and argue that it can adequately model a modified Ramsey test and fares in this respect better than Stalnaker semantics.

In CS-semantics an accessibility relation  $R_X$  between possible worlds is used, where  $X$  is an arbitrary set of possible worlds. A conditional  $\alpha \Rightarrow \beta$  is true at a world in CS-semantics iff  $\beta$  is true at all possible worlds, which are accessible by  $R_{\|\alpha\|}$ , where  $\|\alpha\|$  is the set of possible worlds, at which  $\alpha$  is true.

CS-semantics models the Ramsey test insofar adequately, as  $R_{\|\alpha\|}$  can be used – as the Ramsey test requires – for describing the belief set, which results from putting  $\alpha$  hypothetically to one's stock of beliefs (the new belief set). The Ramsey-test states, furthermore, that the conditional  $\alpha \Rightarrow \beta$  is true iff  $\beta$  follows from the new beliefs set. CS-semantics also models this part of the Ramsey test, since it makes  $\alpha \Rightarrow \beta$  true at a possible world iff  $\beta$  is true in all worlds accessible by  $R_{\|\alpha\|}$ , the new belief set.

For an adequate modeling of epistemic states – as the Ramsey test requires – we need to start in addition with sets of possible worlds  $X$  rather than single possible worlds. To model this aspect in CS-semantics we can use the following definitions: A formula  $\alpha$  is true at  $X$  iff it is true at all worlds in  $X$ . Furthermore, a world is accessible by  $R_{\|\alpha\|}$  from  $X$  iff it is accessible from some world in  $X$ .

Let us explain why CS-semantics fares better than Stalnaker semantics. In Stalnaker semantics to each pair consisting of a world and a formula a single possible world is assigned or else the absurd world, at which all formulas are true. If we aim to model the Ramsey test with Stalnaker semantics employing the above definitions, we must, in case we start from a singleton set, always end up at a single world or the absurd world. This is hardly plausible and does not hold for CS-semantics.

### 8 van Miltenburg

#### Tracing the commitments of Libertarianism: Indeterminism without objective probability

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Libertarians hold, contrary to compatibilists, that free will requires indeterminism. However, if actions are undetermined, then it may be hard to see how they can be more than mere matters of chance or luck. But if what human agents do is just up to chance, then how can their actions be free? This is known as the luck problem. Perhaps the clearest formulation of this problem is the rollback argument (van Inwagen 2000). Van Inwagen asks us to imagine an undetermined agent, Alice, in a binary choice situation that is rolled back,

say, a 1000 times. Because her choice is undetermined, Alice will choose option A in a one fraction of rollbacks and option B in another fraction. This provides us with a certain ratio A:B, based on which we can calculate the objective probabilities of Alice deciding for A or B respectively. It seems to follow that Alice's choices are governed by chance, and thus that she is not a free agent. Very recently, Franklin (2011) has proposed that the libertarian can circumvent the rollback argument if she combines her libertarianism with the causal theory of action (CTA). So-called event causal libertarians can argue that although an action is an undetermined event, it is still free as long as the agent has causal control over it. In my paper I criticize Franklin's solution to the rollback argument. I argue that his strategy obscures the libertarian requirement of indeterminism. Instead I propose a different and more radical strategy for avoiding the thrust of the rollback argument: libertarians should abandon the idea that undetermined actions need to have objective probabilities. However, the idea that actions do have objective probabilities is deeply ingrained current versions of CTA. If I am correct, then contrary to what Franklin believes, libertarians should look away from CTA, rather than towards it, if they want freedom instead of luck.

### van Riel 1

#### Three Conceptions of Explication – Two In, One Out

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Ever since Rudolf Carnap introduced the term »explication« in his (1947 and 1950), the term has been employed by authors who suggest that when we deal with conceptual issues, we should abandon the method of conceptual analysis (classically construed, as concept-decomposition, based on a priori reasoning). »Explication« became a cover-all term for methods supposedly differing from conceptual analysis, especially in the philosophy of science, but also in the philosophy of mind and in metaphysics. Despite its frequent use, the concept of explication has attracted little attention. Most authors refer to Carnap's characterization, which runs as follows (1947, 1950): The explication relation holds between concepts, an explicatum and an explicandum. Although meaning similarity is not required, an explicatum should be suitable for replacing the explicandum in some contexts (or, as Quine put it (1960), it should be functionally similar to the explicandum). The paper argues that these remarks do not yield a sufficiently precise picture of explication. Moreover, it sheds light onto explication by (i) summarizing the main motivation for abandoning conceptual analysis and moving towards explication, (ii) identifying three different conceptions of explication, and (iii) showing why at least one of these is highly problematic. Thereby, it contributes to an often neglected, though central topic in the field of meta-philosophy.

## 1 Viebahn

### Speaker intentions and semantic content

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It is a widespread view in contemporary philosophy of language that speaker intentions determine both the semantic and the communicated content of utterances containing non-automatic indexicals. I will argue against the first part of this view: speaker intentions should not be taken to determine the semantic content of utterances containing indexical expressions. Adherents of intention-sensitive semantics can appeal to two types of intentions as determinants of semantic content: specific intentions directed at the semantic content of an utterance, or communicative intentions that determine both the semantic and the communicated content of an utterance. With help of a number of examples involving gradable adjectives and non-literal speech, I will show that both of these approaches have serious problems. Specific semantic intentions require speakers to be over-sophisticated in their use of language and are in many cases theoretically idle. Communicative intentions, on the other hand, are not suited to determine semantic content in non-literal speech: usually many different semantic contents can be used to (non-literally) communicate a certain proposition, so communicative intentions will not determine a single proposition as semantic content. The common assumption that gradable adjectives are intention-sensitive should thus be questioned. I will show that similar problems arise for allegedly intention-sensitive referential expressions, and argue that this speaks in favour of intention-insensitive semantics. I will look at theories that replace speaker intentions with salient features of the context and, finding them wanting, end by arguing that the examples presented are best accommodated by a minimal theory of semantics.

## 3 Wagner

### The Corroboration Paradox

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Among the well-known paradoxes of positive relevance is the fact that two items of evidence, each positively relevant to some hypothesis, may fail to corroborate each other on that hypothesis. This talk assesses two rather different analyses of the corroboration paradox due, respectively, to John Pollock and Jonathan Cohen. Pollock invokes a particular embodiment of the principle of insufficient reason to argue that instances of this paradox are of negligible probability, and that it is therefore defeasibly reasonable to assume that two items of evidence positively relevant to some hypothesis are mutually corroborating. In *The Probable and the Provable*, his study of scientific and legal reasoning, Cohen identifies supplementary conditions that are sufficient to ensure that such items of evidence will be mutually corroborating, and he claims that these conditions account for most cases of mutual corroboration. Combining a proposed common framework for

the general study of paradoxes of positive relevance with a simulation experiment, we conclude that neither Pollock's nor Cohen's claims stand up to detailed scrutiny.

## Warmt 8

### Konsequentialistische Theorien und der besondere-Pflichten-Einwand

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Ein häufig gemachter Einwand gegen konsequentialistische Theorien ist der besondere-Pflichten-Einwand. Dieser besagt, dass konsequentialistische Theorien unplausibel (kontrainuitiv) sind, weil sie keine besonderen Pflichten generieren können, obwohl besondere Pflichten bzw. die daraus resultierenden Handlungen moralisch wünschenswert sind. Unter besondere Pflichten verstehe ich, im Gegensatz zu allgemeinen Pflichten, diejenigen Pflichten, die man Personen auf Grund einer besonderen Beziehung oder vorausgehenden Handlung schuldet.

Mit ihrem Aufsatz *RELATIVES AND RELATIVISM* haben Jeske und Fumerton den besonderen-Pflichten-Einwand neu formuliert. Das Ziel der beiden ist es, zu zeigen, dass auch Konsequentialisten anerkennen müssen, dass es Situationen gibt, in denen es *erlaubt* ist, zu Gunsten seiner Vertrauten zu handeln, obwohl eine andere Handlung das allgemeine Wohlergehen mehr fördern würde. Hierauf aufbauend folgern sie, dass Konsequentialisten entweder ein radikal relativistisches Konzept von Werten vertreten müssen oder aber den Konsequentialismus komplett fallen lassen müssen.

In einem *ersten* Schritt werde ich zeigen, dass es zu der Schlussfolgerung von Jeske und Fumerton eine Alternative gibt, bei der weder der Konsequentialismus verworfen wird noch der Konsequentialist relative Werte akzeptieren muss. Die Alternative, welche ich anhand der folgenden drei Theorien entwickle, besteht in einer konsequentialistischen Zwei-Ebenen-Theorie à la R. M. Hare:

1. These: In einer moralisch perfekten Welt generieren konsequentialistische Theorien eine Gruppe von Pflichten – die quasi-besonderen Pflichten –, die ihrem Inhalt nach mit einigen besonderen Pflichten identisch sind.
2. These: Der Übergang von der moralisch perfekten Welt zur realen Welt macht es notwendig, dass konsequentialistische (Ein-Ebenen-)Theorien zu Zwei-Ebenen-Theorien weiterentwickelt werden.
3. These: Konsequentialistische Zwei-Ebenen-Theorien generieren auch in der realen Welt einige quasi-besondere Pflichten.

In einem *zweiten* Schritt werde ich zeigen, dass der gegenüber konsequentialistischen Theorien erhobene besondere-Pflichten-Einwand insgesamt nicht haltbar ist, wenn man die Prämisse akzeptiert, dass jede plausible moralische Theorie ein Prinzip der Unparteilichkeit beinhalten muss:

4. These: Die generierten quasi-besonderen Pflichten – sowohl der moralisch perfekten Welt als auch der realen Welt – decken den Umfang an besonderen Pflichten ab, die innerhalb jeder moralischen Theorie, die das Prinzip der Unparteilichkeit anerkennt, widerspruchsfrei gefordert werden können.



## 4 Weber/Vosgerau

**The arché of Cognition –  
Grounding Representations in Action**

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The term »embodied cognition« is currently hotly debated amongst philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists. Unfortunately, this term does not refer to a unified theory or a unitary research perspective. Questions like, »what does »embodiment« or »to be embodied« mean?« are still to be answered in detail, and the possibility of operationalizing this concept in empirical research – as well as its explanatory advantage for theoretical progress – remain unclear. To achieve some progress in this regard, we clarify theoretical presuppositions of a certain understanding of »embodied« cognition, namely »grounded« cognition.

To this end, we present grounded action cognition as a theoretical framework for understanding the interdependencies of motor control and action-related cognitive processes, like perceiving an action or thinking about an action. By focusing especially on this relation between motor control and conceptual and perceptual abilities, we investigate the grounding-relation in a direct manner, whilst remaining neutral on the nature of further cognitive processes, like abstraction, for instance.

An adequate formulation of a prospective theory of grounded action cognition requires examination of its conceptual and ontological implications. To guide further research towards an appropriate theory of grounded action cognition, we distinguish between grounding qua acquisition and grounding qua constitution of cognitive abilities. On this basis, we distinguish three possible theoretical conceptions. In addition to these methodological and conceptual analyses, we draw on recent empirical evidence to motivate our inclination towards a particular theory. According to this theory certain representations are involved in action cognition and action perception that are not modality-specific as usually proposed by advocates of grounded cognition. What emerges is a comprehensive theoretical perspective on cognition and the architecture of the mind that also presents a significant challenge to anti-representational accounts, namely the challenge to develop an equally precise theory of the relations between cognition and action.

## Weichold 4

**Wissen Wie:  
Intelligenz ohne Intellektualismus**

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Was ist Intelligenz? Laut Gilbert Ryle ist es eine intellektualistische Legende zu glauben, Intelligenz bestehe nur in der gerechtfertigten Kenntnis wahrer Propositionen, d. h. im Verfügen über Wissen-Dass. Vielmehr erstreckt sich Intelligenz auch auf das vom Wissen-Dass grundverschiedene Wissen-Wie. Auch wer z. B. über alles Faktenwissen über Herzoperationen verfüge, könne dieses Wissen-Dass intelligenter oder weniger intelligent anwenden, d. h. über mehr oder weniger Wissen-Wie verfügen. Diese »anti-intellektualistische« Position ist im Jahr 2001 wiederum kritisiert worden: »All knowing how is knowing that. The intellectualist legend is true« schließen Jason Stanley und Timothy Williamson ihren mittlerweile klassischen Aufsatz »Knowing How« ab. Zwar motivieren Stanley und Williamson ihren Ansatz vor allem über eine semantische Analyse sprachlicher Zuschreibungen der Form »S knows how to A«. In seinem neuen Buch *Know How* verteidigt Stanley die intellektualistische Position aber dezidiert auch als eine Analyse der kognitiven Komponente gekonnten Handelns (S. 74): »What makes an action an exercise of skill, rather than mere reflex, is the fact that it is guided by the intellectual apprehension of truths.«

In meinem Vortrag werde ich argumentieren, dass der Intellektualismus als Theorie menschlicher Kognition nicht überzeugend ist, und eine Alternative vorschlagen, die Vorteile des Intellektualismus und des Anti-Intellektualismus miteinander vereint. Nachdem ich zuerst Stanleys Position kurz dargestellt haben werde, werde ich zeigen, dass seine ausführlichen Verteidigungen seiner Position vor allem gegen kognitionswissenschaftlich motivierte Einwände als ebenso wenig überzeugend angesehen werden können wie seine positive Argumentation. Schließlich skizziere ich einen alternativen Vorschlag, demgemäß – im Gefolge Dennetts – gekonntes Handeln auf verschiedenen Ebenen beschrieben werden kann. Auf einer grobkörnigen Ebene kann die intellektualistische Analyse eine hilfreiche Beschreibung darstellen – auch wenn ich eine Klasse von Fällen aufzeigen werde, in der auch alltagssprachlich mit dem Begriff des Wissens-Wie nicht-propositionale Fähigkeiten zugeschrieben werden. Auf einer feinkörnigeren Ebene zeige ich dagegen anhand der Analyse eines komplexen Beispiels, dass die kognitive Komponente gekonnten Handelns so analysiert werden sollte, dass sie zwar propositionales Wissen involviert, dass sie aber auch eine genuin praktische Intelligenz beinhaltet, die sich nicht in propositionalem Wissen erschöpft.

### 3 Weigelt

#### The Frequentist Interpretation of Probability in Quantum Mechanics

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In two articles Alan Hájek (1997, 2009) gave thirty arguments against the frequentist interpretation of probability. I want apply Hájek's argumentation to the conception of probability in quantum mechanics. It is a common feature that probabilities in quantum mechanics given by the wave function are understood as relative frequencies.

I want show that the conception that probabilities in quantum mechanics are relative frequencies is not sustainable. Especially the problems of reference classes, stable relative frequencies and irrational probabilities in the frequentist interpretation are incompatible with the standard formalism of quantum mechanics. I will show that if probabilities are understood as relative frequencies the only possible interpretation of quantum mechanics is the ensemble interpretation. The ensemble interpretation states that the wave function always represents an ensemble. The ensemble interpretation faces the problem that there is experimental support to the claim that the wave function is referring to single systems and not only to ensembles. Recent experiments using superconducting quantum interference devices (SQUID) demonstrate that if quantum mechanics to be capable of describing elementary processes the reference to single system is necessary.

Using Hájek's arguments and the experimental support I want to make the strong claim that when quantum mechanics as a fundamental theory is taken seriously an interpretation of probability in quantum mechanics as relative frequencies must be given up.

### 5 Weisbrod

#### Why agreement cannot justify peerness: Completing Elga's non-sceptical Conciliationism by refining his Equal Weight View

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One essential question in the debate about the epistemic significance of peer disagreement remains: How can our conciliatory intuitions – that we have to suspend judgment when being confronted with a disagreeing peer – be fulfilled while at the same time sceptical consequences can be avoided? Adam Elga has suggested a promising answer: We only have to suspend judgement if we are justified in believing that it is a peer who disagrees. However, such justification can only be obtained if there is undisputed basis for it, which according to Elga is not the case in complex fields like philosophy. Hence Conciliationism does not imply scepticism in in this area. However, Elga's »no undisputed basis at all« assumption has been rejected. I want to show that this assumption is not even necessary for Elga's solution. Although Elga's conciliatory position, the Equal Weight View (EWW), implicates the contrary, it is not the case that opinions which the agents agree upon and have

always agreed upon are better suited to justify peerness. In arguing for this, I aim to complete Elga's anti-sceptical strategy as well as modify his EWW in a way that it accounts for hitherto unrecognized epistemic features of disagreement. I will give a counterexample to the EWW and then examine Roger White's reconstruction of it to identify the underlying error: It is wrong to assume the subjective probabilities an agent assigns to »I am right« and »my dissenter is right« to be independent of each other. Hence, the probability  $P(I \text{ am right} | \text{Disagreement})$  cannot be deduced from the simple fact that  $P(I \text{ am right}) = P(\text{You are right})$ . Instead direct disagreement track record evidence is necessary to justify suspension of judgment. The dependence of the event is due to the fact that we often share the sources of our cognitive mistakes with our dissenter, which results in an epiphenomenal connection between »I am right« and »You are wrong«. Finally, I will use this framework to give a thorough explanation of the counterexample and hereby motivate the rejection of agreement as a basis for the peerness assumption further.

### Wendt 7

#### Zur Moralität moralischer Kompromisse

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Simon May hat jüngst zu zeigen versucht, dass es keine moralischen Gründe gibt, moralische Kompromisse einzugehen. Ein moralischer Kompromiss ist eine Vereinbarung, bei der beide Seiten Abstriche von ihren moralischen Überzeugungen gemacht haben, um zu einer Einigung gelangen zu können. Pragmatische Gründe, solche Kompromisse einzugehen, gibt es oft. Aber moralische Gründe? Ein Argument dafür, dass es moralische Gründe gibt, moralische Kompromisse zu machen, basiert auf dem Legitimitätsprinzip des »Rechtfertigungs-Liberalismus« (in der einen oder anderen Spielart). Ein solches Legitimitätsprinzip verlangt, dass mit staatlichen Zwangsmaßnahmen exekutierte Gesetze allen (vernünftigen) Personen gegenüber rechtfertigbar sein müssen, also auch gegenüber Personen mit zwar vernünftigen, aber falschen moralischen Überzeugungen. Wenn man ein solches Legitimitätsprinzip akzeptiert, dann scheint es gute moralische, nämlich auf dem Legitimitätsprinzip basierende Gründe zu geben, moralische Kompromisse zu machen: Man muss von der eigenen Position abrücken und auf ihre Durchsetzung verzichten, damit das Gesetz allen vernünftigen Personen gegenüber rechtfertigbar ist. May weist dieses Argument zurück, ohne das Legitimitätsprinzip zurückweisen zu wollen. Das Legitimitätsprinzip des Rechtfertigungs-Liberalismus, so May, liefert keine moralischen Gründe, auf einer zweiten Ebene moralischen Nachdenkens Kompromisse bezüglich einer zunächst auf einer ersten Ebene für korrekt befundenen Position zu machen. Vielmehr liefert das Legitimitätsprinzip nach May höchstens »reasons of correction« schon auf der ersten Ebene moralisch-politischen Nachdenkens: Die vermeintliche Kompromissposition muss für Rechtfertigungs-Liberale selbst eine als korrekt zu bezeichnende Position sein. Ich halte diese Rekonstruktion des Rechtfertigungs-Liberalismus für irreführend. Zumindest einige Rechtfertigungs-Liberale werden nicht bestreiten, dass es zu vielen Themen korrekte moralische Positionen gibt. Das Legitimitätsprinzip jedoch bezieht sich allein auf die poli-

tische Durchsetzung bestimmter Positionen und bestimmt nicht, was die moralisch korrekte Position ist. Deswegen gibt es aus der Perspektive des Rechtfertigungs-Liberalismus in der Tat auf einer zweiten Ebene moralischen Nachdenkens moralische Gründe, bezüglich einer auf der ersten Ebene moralischen Nachdenkens für korrekt befundenen Position Kompromisse zu machen.

## 5 Werning

### Reliabilism and the Extra Value of Knowledge

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What makes knowledge more valuable than merely true belief? This question is the heart of Meno's Problem and the related Swamping Problem. Under the assumption of veritism – all that matters in inquiry is the acquisition of true belief – Goldman and Olsson (2009) have recently tried to show how the extra value of knowledge might be explained if knowledge is identified with reliably produced true belief (plus X). Their account distinguishes two possible and, as they claim, independent solutions: (1) the conditional probability solution and (2) the type-instrumentalism / value autonomization solution. Both solutions will be critically analyzed in the present paper.

G&L's common idea is that the extra value of reliably produced true belief is due to the inheritance of epistemic value. However, whereas the first solution (advocated by Olsson) proposes a kind of future-inheritance – the extra value of a present reliably produced belief is inherited from the truth of future beliefs – the second solution (favored by Goldman) appeals to a kind of type-inheritance – the extra value of a present reliably produced belief token is inherited from the generally truth-conducive type to which it belongs. In a recent debate between Olsson (2009), Goldman (2009), and the Author (2009) the strengths and weaknesses of the two solutions have been at issue. To evaluate the conditional probability solution, it is crucial to spell out what it means that a present reliably produced belief has »the property of making it likely that one's future beliefs of a similar kind will also be true.« Three readings have to be distinguished:

- a) The merely probabilistic reading: The probability of S's having more true beliefs of a similar kind in the future is greater conditional on S's having the reliably produced true belief that p than conditional on S's merely truthfully believing that p.
- b) The causal reading: S's reliably produced true belief that p causally makes it likely that S's future beliefs of a similar kind will be true.
- c) The evidential reading: S's reliably produced true belief that p is indicative of S's future beliefs being true, provided the beliefs are of a similar kind.

While (a) is true, it is consistent with a common cause scenario and therefore too weak to establish a means-end relation between the present belief being reliably produced and the future belief being true. It hence does not establish value inheritance from future truth. Option (b) would be strong enough to achieve value inheritance from future truth, but is false generally. Option (c) remains, but has to undergo further scrutiny: Is an evidential relation between two states A and

B sufficient to transfer value from B to A, even though the relation is not grounded in a direct causal connection from A to B?

## Wildman 2

### Some Fine Lessons

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This paper examines and rejects three attempted responses to Fine's [1994] argument that the notion of essence cannot be understood in modal terms. The first, derived from Della Rocca's [1996], relies upon rendering all trivially necessary properties unessential; I show how an unfortunate consequence of the reply is that no properties are essential to any object – a clear case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The second, from Gorman's [2006], appeals to a purported distinction between »characteristics« and »mere features«. I demonstrate that it faces a dilemma: the response either is viciously circular or requires forgoing analysing essence in modal terms. Finally, the third reply is from Zalta [2005], and turns upon objects both *having* and *encoding* properties. I show that, while this response easily dismisses two of Fine's counter-examples, it leaves a second pair untouched; further, I argue that accepting Zalta's framework requires giving up on analysing essence in terms of modality. I conclude by taking on-board the lessons learned from examining these three unsuccessful responses, specifying what a suitable reply to Fine might look like, and briefly hinting at an avenue the modalist might fruitfully pursue.

## Wilholt 3

### Is There Such a Thing as the Reliability of a Method?

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Reliability is widely taken to be the decisive feature when it comes to determining the epistemic goodness of a method or type of inquiry. In this talk, I am going to argue that this take on epistemic quality management is deeply problematic. For one thing, I claim that there is no such thing as the reliability of a method. For every method or type of inquiry, at least two kinds of reliability are required to characterize its prospects for epistemic success. This observation will lead me to a closer inspection of the features that capture what is desirable in a method of inquiry. I am going to argue that a convincing model of these features needs to include at least three dimensions. The most relevant result of this analysis is that there can be no linear ranking of methods of inquiry with regard to their epistemic quality. A common view holds that reliability is a simple, one-dimensional measure of how good a method is at getting at the truth. This suggests that the aim of getting at the truth uniquely determines which of two methodological alternatives is the better one. In contradistinction to this, all three dimensions that I identify are geared towards the aim

of getting at the truth. Methodological choices are therefore underdetermined by truth as the aim of inquiry.

Observations related to my argument have been made before by some authors in the context of the debate on science and values. However, the fact that the characteristics determining the epistemic quality of a method come in three dimensions has so far not been appreciated. Moreover, my aim in this talk is to show that the basic problem can be identified without making any assumptions about the moral responsibilities of scientists. The problem is that there can be no linear measure of purely epistemic goodness. That is why a purely epistemological perspective on methodology is always incomplete.

## 4 Wilutzky

### **Integrating Evaluation into the Intentionality of Emotion**

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What characterizes all emotions is their pronounced affective and inherently evaluative nature and any adequate theory of emotions must account for how these features characterize the intentionality of emotions. As a case in point I will discuss the account put forward by Michelle Montague (2009). Montague refers to the cognitive, evaluative and affective contents of emotions' intentionality and attempts to explain how these relate to one another. Central to her account is the notion of framing, by which she means to denote not only a thin content but a kind of thick cognitive content in which a state of affairs is represented as bearing a certain relation to a subject. One and the same state of affairs may be framed in different ways, e.g. as a success for someone or as a failure for someone else. The framing itself, however, is not yet evaluative or has any connection to affective content yet. Instead, the framing first needs to be associated with an evaluative content, which may then bring about a third kind of content, namely the affective phenomenality of emotions. Montague's account poses two problems. First, the separation of the framing process from the evaluative content of an emotion seems questionable, since the framing of a state of affairs is itself already an evaluation of a situation. Secondly, the affective, evaluative and cognitively framed contents of an emotion appear as distinct objects in emotion experience according to Montague. This is not only phenomenologically implausible but furthermore neglects the way in which the affective content of an emotion may inform the other aspects of an emotion's intentionality. These two points of criticism will be explicated by contrasting Montague's account with those of Bennett Helm and Peter Goldie in these respects. The overall conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that the evaluative and affective contents of emotions are not distinct components that need only be added to an otherwise cold or neutral intentionality. Instead, the evaluative and affective contents of emotion are intertwined and also figure in the cognitive content.

### **Are dreams deceptive experiences? Assessing Cartesian dream skepticism from the perspective of philosophy of mind**

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The problem of dream deception is typically discussed in epistemology in order to raise doubts about the reliability of sensory-based beliefs about the external world. However, one can also question the adequacy of the dream example itself. I discuss the background assumptions underlying Cartesian dream skepticism and their vulnerability to different types of objections. I propose under which conditions dreams can be described as deceptive experiences, namely, first, if they are phenomenal states; second, if they involve a phenomenal self, or a subject of deception; and third, if this phenomenal self is relevantly similar to the waking self. I briefly argue that the first two conditions are fulfilled and then concentrate on the third condition, arguing that in order for dreams to count as deceptive experiences in an interesting sense, they must involve a dream-self capable of undergoing belief-like states, i.e. of enjoying the phenomenology of occurrent beliefs regarding her current conscious state. I then use findings from empirical dream research to develop three scenarios of dream deception. In »deception despite rational cognition«, and as suggested by the Cartesian scenario of dream deception, the overall perceptual realism of the dream leads the dreamer to falsely conclude that she is awake. In »deception from corrupted cognition«, the dreamer's failure to realize that she is dreaming results from bad reasoning. »Retrospective dream deception« shows that dream-induced false beliefs as well as related feelings of doubt and uncertainty can even extend beyond the borders of sleep into wakefulness. Finally, a majority of dreams provides no foothold for deception in an interesting sense in that the dreamer does not reflect upon her current conscious state or form any related beliefs whatsoever. While these examples narrow the scope of the dream argument to certain types of dreams, they also suggest that dreams can be deceptive in more various and in some respects more disturbing ways than suggested by Descartes. Importantly, they show that dream deception, as opposed to science-fictional scenarios of deception, is not only nomologically possible, but actually occurs.

## Wolkenstein 7

### **Welchen Wert hat Würde? Zur Rolle des Würdekonzeptes in der (Angewandten) Ethik**

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In jüngster Zeit hat sich am Thema »Würde« ein reges Interesse ergeben. Mehrere deutschsprachige Veröffentlichungen sind hierzu erschienen, und es wird reger diskutiert, was denn Würde eigentlich sei, wie es sich zur Moral verhält, ob es sinnvoll sei, den Begriff der Würde weiter zu verwenden. Menschen-

würde wird in Zusammenhang mit Menschenrechten gebracht, und wo letztere in ihrer Natur und ihrem Ausmaß umstritten sind, ist dies für den Begriff der Würde weniger der Fall. Wo es zwar möglich ist, dass nicht alles wichtige für den Menschen sofort ein Menschenrecht sein muss, ist doch klar, die Würde des Menschen nicht einfach so bestritten werden kann und darf. Dennoch gibt es nicht wenige kritische Stimmen, die für einen zumindest geläuterten Umgang mit der Menschenwürde im ethischen Kontext plädieren, um dem notorisch unscharfen Begriff nicht noch zum allumfassenden und damit nichtssagenden Einsatz zu verhelfen.

In dem vorliegenden Paper werden die aktuellen Diskussionen um den Menschenwürdebegriff nachgezeichnet. Die unterschiedlichen Typisierungen des Würdebegriffs sowie die inhaltlichen Bestimmungen insbesondere des Menschenwürdebegriffs werden einer Kritik unterzogen. Diese Kritik wird sich insbesondere auf die Frage konzentrieren, woher die normative Kraft stammt, die der Verwendung des Begriffs zukommt. Die zugrundeliegende Überlegung ist die, dass in den genannten Ansätzen mehr die Natur der Würde untersucht wird, ohne dabei auf die Rolle innerhalb der Moral zu achten. Das heißt, es wird gefragt werden, welche Rolle im System »Moral« ein solch starkes Element wie die Würde einnimmt, wie diese Rolle zu erklären ist und welche Schlussfolgerungen sich hieraus für die Philosophie der Moral ergeben. Schlussendlich werden diese Überlegungen anhand eines Beispiels aus der Politischen Philosophie und der Angewandten Ethik überprüft. Genauerhin wird gefragt werden, wie sich der nun bestimmte Würdebegriff in sicherheitsethischen Überlegungen anwenden lässt, d. h. in Überlegungen zur normativen Bestimmung der Herstellung von Sicherheit.

## 7 Wollner

### Obligations of fairness and natural duties of justice under conditions of moderate injustice

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Just institutions have claims on us. There are two reasons for thinking that such claims are warranted. First, one may believe that we are under a natural duty of justice to support and further just institutions. If one believes that it matters whether or not institutions are just, one also has a reason, almost as a matter of consistency, to support and further just institutions. Second, one may believe that by enjoying the benefits brought about by cooperation through just institutions, one incurs an obligation to support these institutions. Individuals who accept and enjoy the benefits brought about by cooperation through a just scheme are under an obligation of fairness to reciprocate. They ought to restrict their liberty in the same way as other cooperators, or more generally, do their bit in the provision of advantages for all.

But what happens to these reasons to support and comply with an institution if the scheme of cooperation is less than fully just, say because the rules constitutive of the scheme are unjust, because some of its participants less than fully comply with their obligations, or because the burdens and benefits of cooperation are for some other reason distribu-

ted unfairly? Are individuals under the same obligation to comply and contribute to the provision of advantages if the scheme through which they cooperate does not fully meet the standards of justice? Are they under a duty of justice to support such a scheme? There is hardly a real world institution or scheme of social cooperation that would qualify as fully just. However, questions about obligations of fairness and duties of justice under conditions of injustice have hitherto suffered relative neglect. They are the questions that my paper begins to address: I shall examine what the victims of injustice owe to institutions that are moderately unjust.

## Wündisch 7

### Climate Change & Virtue Theory: A Cautionary Perspective

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Implementing strategies to address climate change confronts us with an enormous collective action problem. Dale Jamieson argues that in order to avoid large scale defection and therefore the collapse of any cooperative effort to curb climate change, utilitarians must become virtue theorists. In essence this entails, in Jamieson's view, a renunciation of making one's own actions contingent on »beliefs about the behaviour of others«. It is contingency and the resulting cynical calculations that allow us to rationalize defection. Therefore, Jamieson argues that only non-contingent and thereby non-calculative approaches to climate change can be effective. Accordingly, he understands virtues as »non-calculative generators of action«. The development and inculcation of these virtues is meant as an effective response to climate change.

As a tool to combat climate change virtue change faces severe obstacles. First, even if inculcation is possible it will take too long to make the approach viable. Second, if timely inculcation were possible the new values would likely be contingent on the behaviour of others thwarting the original intention of virtue change. Third, given its inherent inflexibility value change is maladapted to deal with the great scientific uncertainty of climate change. Values we choose may need to be updated – a process for which there will be too little time. Fourth, even a partial solution to the problems of contingency and exposure to uncertainty can only be had at the cost of colossal inefficiencies. If we make virtues unfathomably stringent so as to forbid all the emissions but those of exhaling we may non-contingently and with little exposure to uncertainty avoid a climate catastrophe – but at what cost?

## 3 Wüstenberg

## Das perspektivische Argument für den wissenschaftstheoretischen Antirealismus

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Bas van Fraassen argumentiert in seinem wirkmächtigen Buch »Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective«, dass der Gebrauch von Karten ein Paradigma für die Repräsentation in der Wissenschaft insgesamt liefern kann. (van Fraassen 2008) Er will zeigen, dass eine wissenschaftliche Repräsentation über den Bereich der Phänomene hinaus nicht möglich ist und damit auch keine Repräsentation von nicht mit menschlichen Sinnen wahrnehmbaren Entitäten oder Prozessen durch unsere besten Theorien und Modelle. Es lässt sich ein zentrales Argument in diesem Kartengebrauchsparadigma der Repräsentation rekonstruieren. Ich nenne es das perspektivische Argument für den Antirealismus der wissenschaftlichen Repräsentation. Die These dieses Arguments ist, dass die Repräsentation auf die Phänomene, also auf Objekte, die mit menschlichen Sinnen wahrzunehmen sind, begrenzt ist. Ein wissenschaftlicher Realismus, der auf die These festgelegt ist, dass wissenschaftliche Theorien und Modelle Entitäten oder Strukturen jenseits des Bereichs der Phänomene repräsentieren können, wäre unmöglich.

Das Argument kann folgendermaßen formuliert werden:

- (i) Es gibt keine Repräsentation ohne Gebrauch als Repräsentation.
- (ii) Gebrauch erfordert Selbstlokation des Benutzers in der Repräsentation.
- (iii) Also (aus i und ii) gibt es nur Repräsentation, wo es Selbstlokation gibt.
- (iv) Selbstlokation ist nur in den Phänomenen möglich.
- (v) Also (aus iii und iv) kann nur im Bereich der Phänomene repräsentiert werden.

(i) wurde von Goodman vertreten und kann in der aktuellen Debatte (Giere, Suarez, van Fraassen) als allgemein anerkannt gelten. (ii) ist eine Prämisse, die van Fraassen aus dem Kartengebrauch abzuleiten und auf alle Repräsentationen in der Wissenschaft zu übertragen versucht. Die Perspektivität besagt, dass wissenschaftliche Repräsentationen immer indexikalische Verortungen haben. Das Argument für diese Prämisse der Selbstlokation ist durch den Kartengebrauch als Paradigma unterstützt. Ich zeige nicht, dass diese Prämisse (ii) falsch ist, sondern dass es darauf ankommt, was genau darunter zu verstehen ist. Davon wird abhängen, ob die Selbstlokation nur im Bereich der Phänomene möglich ist. Auch wenn die Perspektivität gilt, folgt (iv) nicht aus (ii), sondern ist eine weitere Prämisse. In der Analyse der Selbstlokation werde ich zeigen, dass sie nicht an den Bereich der Wahrnehmung gebunden ist. Auch wenn wir die Perspektivität der Repräsentation vertreten, folgt daraus nicht Antirealismus.

## Wüstholtz 4

## Thinking about Thoughts without Language

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Bermúdez (2003) argues in his *Thinking Without Words* that thinking about thoughts is impossible without language. Holding metathoughts necessarily requires a linguistic vehicle, which most conveniently is offered by human public language. His argument is based on three cornerstones. (1) Thinking about thoughts requires higher-order intentional attitudes which are *structured* in a way that can sustain the complexity of higher-order intentionality, (2) public language sentences offer a cognitive vehicle which can accommodate such structured metathoughts, and (3) there is no sufficiently structured nonlinguistic vehicle which could sustain metacognition. I will show that (3) is unfounded. Contrary to Bermúdez' claim that the structure of nonlinguistic thought puts a limit on what can be cognitively represented, I will argue that he fails to demonstrate the necessary unavailability of metacognitive processes on the nonlinguistic level. While being able to establish that some forms of metacognition (especially what he describes as *second-order cognitive dynamics*) are linguistic in nature, there remains a broad realm of other forms of metacognition which is left untreated and is excluded for insufficient reasons. Thinking about thoughts is *not* restricted to reflective thinking which involves »a direct and conscious cognitive access to the target thoughts« (Bermúdez, 2006, 653). An empirically more sensible model of nonlinguistic metacognition will be presented. It is designed to show that animals are able to represent *affordances* featuring mental state representations (either conceptual or non-conceptual) (Cf. Gibson, 1977). Furthermore, the model, based on the *feature-based representational system* theory of metacognition (Proust, 2009), is capable of doing justice to the growing body of empirical data, largely gathered by conducting experiments using uncertainty monitoring paradigms (Smith et al., 2003). These support the claim that some animals do in fact possess metacognitive abilities. Hence, the combination of three factors ultimately weigh heavily in against (3) and strongly suggests that Bermúdez' corresponding argument is unsound. *Conceptual examination* exposes the problem of using the concept of second-order cognitive dynamics to explain all metacognitive mechanisms. *Empirical data* suggests metacognitive abilities in animals and a *theoretical framework* explains the empirical data in a more unified way.

## Wüthrich 2

## When the actual world is not even possible

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Contemporary fundamental physics offers compelling reasons for the need of a quantum theory of gravity, i.e. a theory unifying classical general relativity with the quantum physics of the standard model of particle physics. Approaches to quan-

tum gravity often involve the disappearance of space and time at the fundamental level. The metaphysical consequences of this disappearance are profound, as is illustrated with David Lewis's analysis of modality. As Lewis's possible worlds are unified by the spatiotemporal relations among their parts, the non-fundamentality of spacetime – if borne out – suggests a serious problem for his analysis: his pluriverse, for all its ontological abundance, does not contain our world.

If a Lewisian accepts, in a naturalistic vein, that physics may eliminate space and time from the fundamental furniture of the world, she can resist the argument by insisting that an empirical theory cannot coherently deny the existence of space and time, for all experience is experience of something being located somewhere at some time. I will argue that theories denying the fundamental existence of space and time are not incoherent in this sense, but only if they entail the non-fundamentality, i.e., emergent existence of space and time. Unfortunately, this does not suffice to salvage the Lewisian account of modality. First, it is insufficient on principled grounds: a metaphysician will hardly be satisfied with being offered what is at best an approximately true account of modality which ignores the fundamental reality in favour of a description of emergent phenomena. Second, a Lewisian theory of modality trading in emergent spatiotemporal relations must remain impotent in binding the basic constituents of actuality into one and the same possible world. The reason for this impotence is straightforward: there are no spatiotemporal (not even analogically spatiotemporal) relations exemplified in the fundamental structure, and the basal elements of this structure cannot be the relata of the emergent spacetime relations. Thus, non-spatiotemporal fundamental physics, naturalism, and Lewis's analysis of modality are incompatible.

## 1 Zakkou

### (Not So Many) Varieties of Disagreement

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The notions of a real disagreement and a verbal disagreement play a decisive role both in the current debate on semantic relativism and the latest discussion on metaontology. Recently, attempts have been made to get a clear grasp of these notions. But most of them focus only on one of the two. This seems surprising. For on the one hand both notions are often applied in order to indicate that the other notion is not applicable. On the other hand, it is clear that they are not exact opposites.

In this paper, I suggest a unified account of both real and verbal disagreements that is suitable for both the debate on semantic relativism and the discussion on metaontology. In the first part, I challenge John MacFarlane's claim that the notion of a real disagreement is »dangerously ambiguous« by arguing that only one of three definitions he distinguishes adequately captures our ordinary notion. First, I present the three definitions that according to him refer to different kinds of real disagreement. Then I argue that under the assumption of a certain account of propositions they are coextensive and given an alternative view on propositions only one of the

three definitions refers to a phenomenon that according to our ordinary notion qualifies as a real disagreement. Lastly, I conclude that »real disagreement« should be defined in these terms. In the second part of the paper, I show that, based on this account, one can give a satisfactory definition of both the notion of a verbal and a merely verbal disagreement. First, I introduce these two definitions. Then I show that they predict the intuitively correct results for those cases discussed in the current debate on verbal disagreements.

## Zardini 1

### Consequence and Context. The Intercontextual Logic of Sentences

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The paper traces a particular path through the rich and yet very much underexplored topic of the effects of the context dependence of a language on the relation of logical consequence operative over that language. It first argues that various considerations, including a few stemming from context dependence, speak in favour of taking sentences, rather than propositions or utterances, to be the primary bearers of the relation of logical consequence. With such background in place, the paper proceeds to argue that context dependence plays nevertheless an important role in logical consequence. To take a style of example first discussed by Frege, ›Tomorrow, it'll be warm‹ taken on Monday entails ›Today, it's warm‹ taken on Tuesday, but the first sentence taken on Monday does not entail the second sentence taken on Wednesday. Such role has not been accounted for by the tradition initiated by Kaplan that has extensively studied the distinctive logical features of context-dependent languages, for that tradition has exclusively focussed on inferences made within a single context. The paper attempts to start to remedy this situation, by proposing a family of simple temporal intercontextual logics that adequately model the validity of arguments on which certain cross-contextual inferences rely. In particular, such logics validate the argument from ›Tomorrow, it'll be warm‹ to ›Today, it's warm‹ in the Fregean example. The logics invalidate just about any traditional structural rule (reflexivity, exchange, monotonicity etc.), given the logical significance acquired by the sequence structure of premises and conclusions. The logics are however strong enough to capture in the form of theorems all the valid arguments of both classical logic and Kaplan's intracontextual logic. Finally, the new framework can be exploited so as to introduce new operators into the object language, such as intercontextual conjunction and implication, which, contrary to normal (intracontextual) conjunction and implication, perfectly match the metalinguistic, intercontextual notions of premise combination and logical consequence, by representing their respective two operands as taken at different contexts.

## 4 Zednik

### **From extended mechanisms to extended minds**

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Recent discussions of the extended mind hypothesis have identified the need for a *mark of the cognitive*, which specifies the sufficient conditions for a system to be a cognitive system. Extant proposals for such a mark face a variety of difficulties, not least of all the threat of anthropocentrism. In contrast to these extant proposals, I introduce a *pragmatic* mark of the cognitive that is rooted in cognitive scientific practice: a system is a cognitive system if it realizes a mechanism that is described in mechanistic explanations of one or more cognitive phenomena. This mark of the cognitive avoids most of the difficulties faced by extant proposals, including the threat of anthropocentrism, and offers new ways of resolving longstanding problems in the extended mind debate, such as the notorious problem of »cognitive bloat«.

## 4 Zinck

### **First-Third- and Second-Person-Perspective**

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In the last decade, the debate on theory of mind, the capacity to understand others' and own mental states, focused on the interrelation between first-person-perspective (subjective perspective of the subject on herself and on the world, 1PP) and third-person-perspective (external perspective on a subject, 3PP). However, there is not much known about the second-person-perspective (2PP). Second-person-perspective may be defined as symmetrical immediate, and non-inferential access and engagement between two first-person subjects.

I will introduce a characterization of the second-person-perspective employing research from phenomenology, philosophy of mind and neuroscience, thereby putting it to the test in one of its pathological conditions, the autistic spectrum. To that extent, I will examine (i) in how far the capacity of mindreading (synonymous with theory of mind, i.e. understanding others' mental states) in the second-person-perspective can be characterized based on both basic cognitive processes and complex cognitive processes involving meta-representations. Further, (ii) the relation between this capacity of second-person-perspective (2PP) for self-consciousness of introspective mental states (1PP) and for mindreading of others' mental states (3PP) will be explored. On this basis, I (iii) will investigate the interaction between self and other and how the development of self- and other-consciousness are mediated by a second-person-perspective.



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Die Präsenzzeit der Posterautoren ist Dienstag und Mittwoch in der Regel zwischen 12:15 und 12:45 Uhr.  
In general, the time of presence of the poster authors is Tuesday and Wednesday, from 12:15 to 12:45 p.m.

## P 1.1 auf der Straße

### Wahrheit und Norm – Wrights Kritik am Deflationismus

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Das Papier setzt sich mit der Kritik Crispin Wrights am Deflationismus, in der Form, in der er z. B. von Paul Horwich vertreten wird, auseinander. Ziel ist es, die deflationistische Position zu stärken. Dazu werde ich dreischrittig vorgehen: erstens werde ich knapp in den Hintergrund der Debatte einführen, d. h. die minimalistische Theorie der Wahrheit umreißen und aufzeigen, welche spezifische Frage in der Debatte mit Wright strittig ist. Ich werde zweitens Wrights Argument gegen den Minimalismus ausführlich rekonstruieren und möglichst stark machen. Diese Rekonstruktion wird sehr kleingliedrig erfolgen, um alle Hintergrundannahmen und Zwischenkonklusionen explizit zu machen. Aufbauend auf dieser Rekonstruktion wird dann in einem dritten Schritt Wrights Argument kritisiert werden. Dabei werde ich mich insbesondere auf folgende Punkte konzentrieren: (i) Wrights Argument dafür, dass wahre Sätze berechtigterweise behauptbar sind, scheint zirkulär zu sein; (ii) ferner scheint er das Bikonditional, welches im Zitattilgungsschema auftaucht, anders zu verwenden als der Deflationist; (iii) letztlich bleibt zudem unklar, was genau Wright unter »realen Eigenschaften« versteht. Bezüglich des letzten Punktes werde ich drei mögliche Interpretationen diskutieren, die sich jedoch alle als mit Horwichs Position vereinbar erweisen werden. Zu (i): Wright möchte mittels des Zitattilgungsschemas zeigen, dass wahre Sätze (und nur wahre Sätze) berechtigt assertibel sind. Bei der Anwendung des Schemas setzt er aber bereits voraus, was erst gezeigt werden soll. (Dies wird anhand der Prädizierbarkeitsbedingungen des Falschheitsprädikates illustriert.) Zu (ii): aufgrund der unüblichen Verwendung des Bikonditionals schlägt mindestens der Versuch, den Deflationismus als inhärent widersprüchlich darzustellen, fehl (weil bei normaler Verwendung kein Widerspruch herleitbar ist). Zu (iii): die Diskussion des Terms »Eigenschaft« wird in einem Dilemma münden. Entweder wird ein schwacher Eigenschaftsbegriff zugrunde gelegt (dann ist kein Widerspruch herleitbar) oder Wright nimmt einen stärkeren Begriff an (dann bliebe unklar, wie dieser zu explizieren wäre und was einen solchen stärkeren Begriff rechtfertigen könnte).

## P 4.1 Barner

### Contents of the Imagination – A Perspective and Two Selves

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This presentation focuses on how to model contents of the imagination in a centered possible worlds framework. Contents of imaginings seem to pose particular challenges to traditional accounts of how to model contents in this framework. These challenges arise because imaginings highlight that perspectival contents are merely contingently egocentric or de se.

First, some (e.g. visual) imaginings are arguably perspectival without being egocentric: in the imagination I can be represented quasi-visually but from a perspective that is not my own.

Second, some imaginings are arguably egocentric (de se) but only relative to a counterfactual self: I can imagine being somebody else than I actually am, and arguably imagine things from this person's own perspective.

These two features sometimes are combined. Some imaginings are arguably perspectival without being egocentric but still egocentric relative to a counterfactual self: I can imagine being somebody else than I actually am and imagine my counterfactual self from the outside.

In this presentation I will argue that, given these two features, we need to distinguish three different kinds of centers to successfully model contents of the imagination, if we are using a centered possible worlds framework: one center to represent the perspective only, one to represent my counterfactual self and one to represent my actual self.

By focusing on examples I will elaborate on the kinds of centers, their exact properties and their functional roles.

My proposal can also be understood as a criticism of Dilip Ninan's (2008) account of the contents of imaginings in a centered possible worlds framework. More generally, it highlights how different kinds of centered contents are distinguishable, even in the case of belief or perception for example.

## Blumenthal P 1.2

### Die Semantik von Äußerungen über fiktive Kontexte.

#### Versuch einer pragmatistisch-inferentialistischen Analyse

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Die Kernfrage meiner Überlegungen lautet: Worauf legen wir uns mit Äußerungen über fiktive Kontexte (kurz: AFKs) – d. i. sprachlichen Performanzen wie meiner Äußerungen des Satzes »Asterix ist ein Gallier« – fest? Diese Frage ist relevant, weil zwischen unserer alltäglichen Verwendung von AFKs als wahrheitsfähige Äußerungen und einer ersten, oberflächlichen Analyse eine eigentümliche Spannung zu bestehen scheint. Denn sind einige AFKs wahr, so scheint daraus zu folgen, dass diejenigen fiktiven Charaktere, über die sie etwas aussagen, existieren. Diese Folgerung führt jedoch unmittelbar in ontologische Probleme derart, dass der Begriff der Existenz exzentrisch ausgeweitet wird.

Ziel ist es, diese Spannungen durch eine Theorie der Semantik von AFKs und auf Grundlage einer inferentialistischen Semantik, für die nicht gesondert argumentiert wird, aufzulösen. Dazu werden zunächst zwei Forderungen an jede angemessene Theorie der Semantik von AFKs formuliert. Die erste besagt, dass eine solche Theorie den praktisch konstituierten, inferentiellen Beziehungen, in denen AFKs faktisch stehen, Rechnung tragen muss. Die zweite besagt, dass nur auf Gegenstände zurückgegriffen werden darf, die in bestimmter Hinsicht ontologisch unschuldig sind.

Anschließend werden drei klassische Vorschläge diskutiert: – Derjenige von Russell, welcher AFKs als Äußerungen über bestimmte Mengen fiktionaler Medien versteht.

– Die verwandten Positionen von Searle, van Inwagen und Parsons, die AFKs als Äußerungen über fiktive Gegenstände verstehen.

– Derjenige von Rorty, welcher für einen entspannten Umgang mit AFKs plädiert.

Diese Vorschläge werden als im Lichte der Forderungen als unangemessen abgelehnt und es wird ein eigener Vorschlag entwickelt, welcher die Probleme der zuvor angeführten vermeidet. Dieser orientiert sich an der Position Russells, buchstabierte diese jedoch anders aus. Die Kerngedanken bestehen dabei darin, AFKs als Äußerungen über bestimmte Werke zu betrachten, die wesentlich auf Interpretation beruhen, wobei Werke als Äquivalenzklassen fiktionaler Medien verstanden werden. Die logische Feinstruktur von AFKs wird nach dem Modell von De-dicto-Zuschreibungen erläutert, deren Funktionsweise wiederum inferentialistisch verstanden wird.

Als Konklusion ergibt sich somit folgendes Konditional: Wenn die inferentialistische Semantik richtig ist, so ist die entwickelte Theorie der Semantik von AFKs den referierten klassischen Theorien vorzuziehen, da erstere – anders als letztere – den beiden aus ebendieser Semantik abgeleiteten Forderungen gerecht wird.

### P 8.1 Céspedes

#### Überdetermination in der kausalen Entscheidungstheorie

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Zwei allgemeine Theorien der Kausalität, die probabilistische und die kontrafaktische, werden hier erklärt und mit Gegenbeispielen konfrontiert. Es wird gezeigt, in welcher Verbindung diese Analysen mit der evidentiellen und der kausalen Entscheidungstheorie stehen. Newcombs Problem beschreibt eine Situation, in der es eine gemeinsame Ursache für zwei verschiedene Ereignisse gibt. Die Hauptthese besteht darin aufzuzeigen, dass ein Problem für die kausale Entscheidungstheorie entsteht, das die Form des Überdeterminationsproblems hat. Am Ende ist auch eine Lösung für solche Situationen vorschlagbar.

### P 4.2 Conduct

#### The Impossibility of Perfect Partial Hallucinations

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I argue that it is impossible to have perfect partial hallucinations of scenes of normal objects. Perfect partial hallucinations of scenes of normal objects are experiences of arrangements of normal objects that have elements that are perceptual and elements that are non-perceptual, and which are subjectively indiscriminable from entirely perceptual experiences of arrangements of objects of those kinds. The argument has two stages:

(1) Perfect hallucinations of normal objects require the possibility of apparent interaction between what is perceived and

what is hallucinated. If they do not, then it can be revealed through reflection that one is not perceiving normal objects.

(2) The requirement that perfect hallucinations must accommodate apparent interaction between what is perceived and what is hallucinated precludes the possibility of perfect, partial hallucinations. This is because:

1. When something in the scene before one, *x*, moves into the space apparently occupied by something one is in fact hallucinating, *y*, then one cannot actually be perceiving *x* at that time, for one will not be aware of the true location or motion of *x* because of the truth of (1).

2. Even when something in the scene before one, *x*, is *not* moving into the space apparently occupied by something one is in fact hallucinating, *y*, one cannot actually be perceiving *x*, because of the possibility of such a change in position of *x*.

The conclusion is, then, that if one is enjoying a perfect hallucination of a scene of normal objects this hallucination must be hallucinatory in its entirety. Hence it is impossible to have perfect partial hallucinations of scenes of normal objects.

### Dänzer P 1.3

#### Ultra-minimalist semantics and the ›psychological reality‹ of sentence meaning

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According to what has recently been labeled the ›ultra-minimalist‹ view of semantics (UMS), the goal of a semantic theory is to characterize the standing, context-invariant meaning of the expression types of a language, including its sentences. Semantics thereby aims to specify a particular kind of information available to, and made use of by, the competent speakers of the language in interpreting the utterances of their fellow speakers – viz. the information that is associated with a sentence token *qua* token of a particular type and which is available to competent speakers simply in virtue of their knowledge of meaning of the sentence type.

The purpose of this talk is to elaborate and rebut a particular objection to this conception of semantics suggested by Jeff King & Jason Stanley. Ironically, the objection is a variation on the ›psychological reality‹ argument that has been employed by friends of UMS themselves against somewhat less than ultra-minimalist views. In a nutshell, it can be put as follows: Since the case for UMS rests on the claim that speakers make use of the meaning of a sentence *S* in interpreting utterances of *S*, it is committed to the view that computing a representation of the meaning of *S* plays an important role in the process of utterance interpretation. Yet, a little reflection on possible comprehension algorithms reveals that it is far from obvious that the process of utterance interpretation must in fact conform to such a model. Thus, unless one is happy to base semantics on a psychological speculation, one should reject UMS.

I'll argue that the right response to this objection is to deny UMS's commitment to the relevant questionable view of utterance interpretation. Properly construed, the claim that the process of utterance interpretation ›makes use of‹ the information encoded by the meaning of a sentence is compatible with a wide variety of possible processing algorithms.

The response stresses the general point long held by Daniel Dennett that one should not take a characterization of a competence at the intentional level to map straightforwardly onto a corresponding characterization at the algorithmic one.

### P 4.3 Falk

#### Von magischen Pilzen und Stimmgabeln im Vakuum

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Nachdem sich die Philosophie der Wahrnehmung lange Zeit fast ausschließlich dem Sehen gewidmet und anschließend auf andere Sinnesmodalitäten generalisiert hat, mehrten sich in den letzten Jahren die Stimmen, die aufgrund philosophisch relevanter Unterschiede diesen Visuoentrismus in Frage stellen und für jede Modalität eine spezifische Wahrnehmungstheorie fordern. Auch für die auditive Wahrnehmung scheint eine Reihe modalitätsspezifischer Fragen bisher offen geblieben zu sein und die Entwicklung einer Theorie des Hörens zu rechtfertigen.

Ich möchte für folgende Idee argumentieren:

*Beim Hören repräsentieren wir bestimmte Außenweltereignisse als auditive Objekte.*

Diese These ist in mehreren Hinsichten nicht trivial:

- i. Sie behauptet eine *intentionalistische*, im Gegensatz zu einer relationalistischen, z. B. disjunktivistischen Theorie der Wahrnehmung.
- ii. Sie handelt von *Ereignissen*, nicht von gewöhnlichen Einzeldingen (z. B. Schallwellen) oder Eigenschaften der Objekte unseres Erkenntnisinteresses (analog zu z. B. Farben beim Sehen).
- iii. Sie geht von *auditiven Objekten* aus und steht damit in Konkurrenz zu atomistischen Theorien und solchen, die von der Wahrnehmung gewöhnlicher Außenweltdingen (Geräuschquellen) ausgehen.
  - i) Nicht nur bei der Erklärung von Verhalten spielt die Zuschreibung mentaler Gehalte beim Wahrnehmen eine zentrale Rolle. Mit von veridischen Wahrnehmungsfällen subjektiv nicht unterscheidbaren Halluzinationen hat der Relationalismus seit jeher zu kämpfen. Auch seine moderne Variante, der Disjunktivismus, kann solche Fälle nicht befriedigend erklären, in denen sich diese beiden Typen von Zuständen weder auf behavioraler, noch neuronaler oder phänomenaler Ebene unterscheiden.
    - ii) *Ereignisanalysen* gehen davon aus, dass nicht Einzeldinge, wie z. B. Schallwellen oder Eigenschaften von Gegenständen die Bezugsobjekte unserer auditiven Wahrnehmung sind, sondern Interaktionen zwischen Gegenständen und Umgebungsmedium. Neben einer Reihe weiterer Vorteile berücksichtigen Ereignisanalysen auf elegante Weise, dass beide Elemente unverzichtbar für das letztendliche Resultat eines hörbaren Geräuschs sind.
    - iii) Bei der Objektwahrnehmung spielen eine Reihe von empirisch gut untersuchbaren Wahrnehmungsleistungen eine entscheidende Rolle. Der Hörer ergänzt, verändert, gruppiert und selektiert das Tonmaterial aus der im dargebotenen auditiven Szene unwillkürlich, unbewusst und nach festen Prinzipien. Das wird anhand zahlreicher Befunden aus der auditiven Wahrnehmungsforschung deutlich. Eine Theorie, die Objekterken-

nung allein mit der Zusammensetzung von Einzelempfindungen zu erklären sucht, scheitert hingegen an den unterschiedlichsten Wahrnehmungsphänomenen, wie z. B. an Scheinbewegungen und dem Phänomen der Ergänzung virtueller Tonhöhen.

### Fink P 4.4

#### Is Indeterminacy of Consciousness a Viable Option?

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Sometimes, we hesitate to assent or dissent to phenomenological claims like »Dreams are coloured«. So far, an epistemic strategy and a indeterminacy strategy have been proposed to explain this. The epistemic strategists reject introspective omniscience but accept that the statement has a truth-value – we simply don't know it. The indeterminacy strategists claim that phenomenological sentences themselves are indeterminate concerning their truth value. I construct three different possible version of these: (1) A Strawsonian account, (2) a Dennettian account, and (3) a Schwitzgebelian account. (1) and (2) lead to phenomenal anti-realism, while (3) is trivial. The possibility to lie about one's experience, e.g. a hypochondriac lying about that he feels pain, forces us to reject (2) and (1) concerning general statements. This leads us then to accept phenomenal realism and interpret hesitance of assent or dissent as either failures of introspective access, failures of that specific type of experience, or failures in setting up the phenomenological claim under consideration, i.e. containing a category mistake.

### Franken P 4.5

#### Woher weißt Du, dass Du es bist, der kein Zombie ist?

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Der sog. *Intentionalismus* ist derzeit eine der stärksten Positionen innerhalb der Philosophie des Geistes. Sie lässt sich (teilweise) durch folgende Thesen charakterisieren:

*Die These von der Transparenz der Erfahrung:* In einer bewussten Erfahrung haben wir von nichts anderem Bewusstsein als von den Gegenständen der Erfahrung.

*Die These des direkten Realismus:* Die Gegenstände bewusster Erfahrungen (wirklichkeitsgetreuer ebenso wie nicht-wirklichkeitsgetreuer) sind physische Gegenstände.

In seinem Aufsatz *How Do You Know You are Not a Zombie?* hat mit Fred Dretske ausgerechnet einer ihrer bedeutendsten Vertreter auf ein bemerkenswertes Problem dieser Position hingewiesen: Da physische Gegenstände so sind wie sie sind, unabhängig davon, ob jemand ein bewusste Erfahrung von ihnen hat, gilt: Wenn wir uns in unseren bewussten Erfahrungen *ausschließlich* physischer Gegenstände bewusst sind (d. i. wenn die These von der Transparenz der Erfahrung und die These des direkten Realismus wahr sind), kann uns nichts, des

sen wir uns in unseren bewussten Erfahrungen bewusst sind, einen Hinweis darauf geben, dass wir diese bewussten Erfahrungen haben. Tatsächlich scheinen wir jedoch gerade dies – in Dretskes Worten – »auf nicht-inferentielle und autoritative Weise« zu wissen.

Dretskes überraschende Lösung ist, dass dieser Eindruck auf einer Verwechslung beruhe. Was wir auf nicht-inferentielle und autoritative Weise wissen, sei, *wovon* wir bewusste Erfahrungen haben, nicht aber, *dass* wir bewusste Erfahrungen haben.

Dretske übersieht in seiner Lösung jedoch einen wichtigen Aspekt unseres Selbst-Wissens. Wir wissen nicht nur auf nicht-inferentielle und autoritative Weise, *wovon* wir bewusste Erfahrungen haben, wir wissen auf diese Weise auch, dass *wir* es sind, die diese Erfahrung haben. Aus diesem zweiten Aspekt des Selbst-Wissens ergibt sich ein, zu Dretskes ursprünglichem Problem analoges, Problem. Wenn die These von der Transparenz der Erfahrung und die These des direkten Realismus wahr sind, kann uns nichts, dessen wir uns in einer Erfahrung bewusst sind, einen Hinweis darauf geben, dass *wir* es sind, die diese Erfahrung haben. Für dieses Problem gibt es jedoch keine, zu Dretskes ursprünglicher Lösung analoge, Lösung. Wir haben es dementsprechend mit einem ernstem Problem für den Intentionalismus zu tun.

**Theorien semantischer Vagheit –  
getestet an semantischer Vagheit im Recht**

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Vage Prädikate sind in natürlichen Sprachen allgegenwärtig. Man muss nach Prädikaten suchen, die sich nicht so verhalten wie »reich«, »rot« oder »jung«. Prädikatsvagheit ist aus zwei Gründen philosophisch interessant: Zum einen lassen vage Prädikate Grenzfälle zu, also Fälle, in denen für kompetente Sprecher, die über alle relevanten Informationen verfügen, unklar ist, ob das fragliche Prädikat zutrifft oder nicht. Zum anderen können vage Prädikate das Sorites-Paradox hervorrufen. Ein seit der Antike bekanntes Beispiel ist das Prädikat »ist ein Haufen«. Ein einziges Korn ergibt offensichtlich keinen Haufen. Ferner kann ein Korn keinen Unterschied dafür machen, ob eine Ansammlung von Körnern ein Haufen ist. Also ergibt keine noch so große Anzahl an Körnern einen Haufen.

Beide Phänomene berühren fundamentale logische Prinzipien. Es überrascht daher nicht, dass Prädikatsvagheit in letzter Zeit zu einem intensiv bearbeiteten Forschungsgebiet der Philosophie avanciert ist. Als Ergebnis dessen konkurrieren mittlerweile ein gutes Dutzend Theoriefamilien um Akzeptanz als die richtige Theorie. Doch nach welchen Kriterien soll dieser Streit entschieden werden? Scott Soames hat dazu vorgeschlagen, die verschiedenen Theorien einfach einem Tauglichkeitstest zu unterziehen; sie also darauf hin zu überprüfen, ob sie in außerphilosophischen Gebieten, in denen Vagheit zum Problem wird, anwendbar sind und welche Resultate sie liefern. Diesen Vorschlag greifen wir in unserem Poster auf. Als Testgebiet haben wir das Recht gewählt, wo das Thema vager Prädikate bisweilen unter dem Stichwort »unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe« diskutiert wird. Vagheit ist für das Recht besonders problematisch, weil Gerichte auch in Grenzfällen begründet Urteile fällen müssen und rechtliche Abgrenzungen, die mithilfe vager Prädikate in Rechtsnormen vorgenommen wurden, durch Sorites-Argumentationen unterlaufen werden können. Eine Vagheitstheorie, die diese Probleme im Recht entschärfen oder gar lösen kann, ist vermutlich besser als eine, die dazu nicht imstande ist. Wir haben Fuzzy-Logik, Supervaluationismus, Epistemizismus und Kontextualismus darauf hin untersucht, ob und mit welchem Ergebnis sie im Recht anwendbar sind. Die Resultate präsentieren wir in unserem Poster.

P 3.1 Glauer

**Mechanistic Reduction**

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Quite a number of proponents of mechanistic accounts of explanation argue that mechanistic explanations are anti-reductionistic, prominently among them Bill Bechtel and Carl Craver. Craver, for instance, argues that mechanistic explanation is inherently multilevel. And Bechtel claims, among other things, that the organization of a mechanism is an interlevel relation and that the environment of mechanisms, i.e. aspects of the higher level, plays a role in mechanistic explanations. But when carefully assessed, none of the arguments identifiable for mechanism's alleged anti-reductionistic character is satisfactory or speaks for a substantial form of anti-reductionism. In case of the mentioned arguments, it can be shown that the multilevel character of mechanistic explanation is to be expected of any micro-reductive explanation; that the organization of a mechanism is constituted by relations between components, not between components and the system as a whole; and that environmental boundary conditions do not make mechanistic explanations non-reductive, but merely restrict the scope of reductive explanations. Ultimately, only an argument presented by Bechtel to the effect that mechanistic explanations are local and stepwise and that, therefore, mechanism is incompatible with a comprehensive reduction of everything to some fundamental level seems to be convincing. The result is that mechanistic explanation is a reductive form of explanation, but that reductions are (bound to be) local or at best regional.

## P 1.5 Harth

**Faultless Disagreement, Relative Truth and Superassertibility**

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The aim of this paper is to explore the prospects of a form of relativism that is supposed to be an alternative to semantic or formal truth-relativism, a semantic account of some selected region of discourse that relativizes the truth predicate applied to the propositions of that region. I shall focus on ethical discourse, which has the advantage that the possibility of so-called faultless disagreement is not something to be explained by any relativist theory but, presumably, merely one option to spell out such a position, viz. formal truth-relativism. Yet I envisage an alternative form of truth-relativism that I call substantial truth-relativism. It is the view that the property of truth has to be relativized rather than the concept or the truth predicate. Truth is then conceived of as so-called superassertibility: P is superassertible iff it is assertible in the actually accessible state of information of the assessor of P and remains so no matter what improvements are made to it. Moreover, it is supposed that both P and not-P may be superassertible based on two distinct initial states of information. However, substantial truth-relativism faces a serious problem: its relativized superassertibility predicate doesn't satisfy the Equivalence Schema, which is to say that relative superassertibility isn't truth (if it is granted that the validity of the Equivalence Schema is an adequacy condition for any theory of truth). The only rescue for the envisaged shape of relativism, I shall argue, is to abstain from relativizing superassertibility. Yet the question then is whether the resulting position – I term it superassertibilism – is worth to be called relativism at all. Anyway, what kind of account deserves this title? Concluding my paper, I argue that superassertibilism is able to embrace epistemic relativism and, moreover, it is in a position to deny rampant realism – which also is able to embrace epistemic relativism – without being committed to accepting the possibility of faultless disagreement. So, finally, there seems to be no reason to deny superassertibilism the status of a genuine relativist position.

## P 3.2 Hillerbrand

**Computer simulation –  
The future of experiment  
or theoretical phantasies?  
Epistemic aspects of numerical experiments**

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The success of computational sciences has prompted a heated debate within philosophy of science on the epistemic status of computer simulations. While some authors see computer simulations more as non-empirical phantasies than serious scientific instruments, others articulate the antithetic view and claim that computer simulations are not only methodologically, but also epistemically on a par with material experiments.

By introducing a three-fold classification of computer simulations as regards their epistemic aim, this paper aims not only to harmonize this opposing views, but also to provide a bridge between the case-study analysis in the field and more generalized arguments on the epistemic status of computer simulations per se.

## Jansen P 7.1

**Hilfe unter Freunden: Pflicht oder Neigung?  
Über das Handeln in informellen Institutionen**

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John Searle (2005, 2010) mischt in seiner Analyse sozialer Entitäten Elemente, die zu formellen Institutionen gehören mit solchen, die zu informellen Institutionen gehören. Zu formellen Institutionen gehören explizite Statuszuschreibungen und die damit verbundenen Übertragung »deontischer Kräfte«, also von Rechten und Pflichten. Zu informellen Institutionen gehört hingegen die Verankerung in den komplexen Verhaltensdispositionen, die durch den »Background« konstituiert werden, d. h. durch die neuronalen Netze unserer Gehirne.

Um diese Analyse aufrecht zu erhalten, müssen auch mit informellen Institutionen wie Freundschaften genauso Rechte und Pflichten verbunden sein wie mit einer formellen Institution wie einer Ehe. Aber eine Ehe wird explizit geschlossen unter gesetzlich genau bestimmten Bedingungen; für Freundschaften gilt dies nicht. Trotzdem fühlen wir uns unseren Freunden gegenüber in besonderem Maße verpflichtet. Verschiedene Erklärungsstrategien kommen in Betracht:

1. Freundespflichten sind bloßer Schein. In Wirklichkeit liegen unserem Handeln bloße Verhaltensdispositionen zugrunde.
2. Es gibt Pflichten gegenüber Freunden, aber nicht gegenüber Freunden als solchen (sondern als Spezialfälle von allgemeinen Normsätzen oder aufgrund von individuellen Versprechungen).
3. Es gibt Pflichten gegenüber Freunden als solchen. Dann aber müssen diese Pflichten ebenso graduell und vage sein, wie das Phänomen der Freundschaft.

Position 1 und 2 sind miteinander kompatibel. Gemeinsam erklären sie sowohl, warum wir sowohl, warum wir nur einigen als Freund beistehen und warum wir uns aber dafür auch verpflichtet fühlen. Position 3 scheint mir hingegen mit zu vielen Problemen belastet zu sein und nicht wirklich eine zufriedenstellende Antwort geben zu können auf die Frage nach dem Fundament einer bestimmten Freundespflicht. Dies ist nicht nur in Freundschaften so, sondern allgemein in informellen Institutionen. Und das zeigt, dass man in der sozialontologischen Analyse tatsächlich klarer als Searle dies tut zwischen den formellen und informellen Aspekten der sozialen Wirklichkeit unterscheiden muss.

P 4.6 Laanpere

**Constructive Memory and Memory Traces**

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In this presentation, I am going to 1) introduce two recent philosophical analyses of memory – one by Sven Bernecker and another by Kourken Michaelian – attempting to accommodate developments in cognitive neuroscience of memory and 2) evaluate their merits in that aspect. In empirical memory research, it is commonplace to consider memory as an active and (re)constructive faculty, rather than a passive storage device designed to retain unaltered mental contents from previous experiences. Bernecker (and to a lesser extent Michaelian) wish to maintain a distinction between remembering and other, more constructive mental processes such as confabulation or inference, while also acknowledging that a memory state should not be required to have type-identical contents with some previous mental state. I argue that while both accounts are relatively successful in modifying their content condition, there is a tension between constructivist picture of memory and the causal connection condition proposed by both authors. Bernecker and Michaelian include the notion of causation through a contiguous chain of memory traces in their analyses to exclude deviant causal chains from producing genuine memories. Memory traces are some to-be-specified intracerebral occurrences retaining mental contents from some previous experience. I argue that referring to traces leads to a dilemma – either one makes the notion of a memory trace too strong, in which case the philosophical analysis would dictate neuroscientists what they should be looking for in the brain; or one makes it too weak, in which case it doesn't help to determine the cases of genuine remembering from other forms of representation. However, I also find that in Michaelian's analysis, the introduction of traces is redundant anyway – reference to causation via »properly functioning memory systems« can be applied to do all the work that the traces were originally supposed to do, while also appreciating the constructive nature of memory.

P 1.6 Leahy

**Logical Consequence in a Teleosemantic Framework**

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The aim of this talk is to outline the nature of logical consequence in the semantic framework developed in Millikan's *Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories* (1984). It begins by demonstrating some features of how classical logic understands the construction of complex formulae and how this understanding impacts the resulting theories of logical consequence. In particular, complex well-formed formulae (wffs) are constructed by the repeatable application of concatenation rules to primitive wffs. It then demonstrates how Millikan's theory understands the construction of formulae

(complex and otherwise). On Millikan's theory there are no concatenation rules; signs cannot be broken down into parts. Rather systems of signs can be analyzed into variant and invariant aspects with contrary-ranges for each variant aspect. A particular sign is the product of each variant aspect taking some particular value from its contrary-range. Importantly, from this it follows that every sign in a single signalling system determines values for the same set of variable aspects. From this, and the fact that not every sign in a natural language determines values for the same set of variable aspects, it follows that not every sign in a natural language is a sign in a single signalling system. Rather we should see a natural language as a set of signalling systems.

The paper then shows how this difference forces her to take a different stance on the nature of logical consequence, in particular because there need not be any logical constants. Logical consequence needs to be understood as a relationship between members of different signalling systems. Fortunately natural languages comprise a set of signalling systems, and so relations of logical consequence can hold amongst signals in a natural language.

The paper concludes by outlining and evaluating two different available approaches to logical consequence for the teleosemanticist.

Leerhoff P 3.3

**Worrall zu Theorienunterbestimmtheit und Strukturrealismus. Wirklich kein Problem?**

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Im Rahmen der wissenschaftstheoretischen Realismusdebatte wird von antirealistischer Seite das Argument der *Theorienunterbestimmtheit* ins Feld geführt, welches besagt, dass zu jeder wissenschaftlichen Theorie dieser widersprechende Alternativtheorien existieren, die den empirischen Phänomenen in gleicher Weise gerecht werden. Eine Variante des Realismus ist der *Strukturrealismus*, der den realistischen »Glauben an die Existenz« und an die Wahrheit von Theorien einschränkt: Nicht mehr Entitäten *und* Strukturen der Wirklichkeit sind ontologisch relevant und für die Wahrheit der Theorien entscheidend, sondern nur noch die Strukturen. Der Strukturrealismus steht, so dessen Verfechter, im Lichte der antirealistischen Argumente besser dar als der »normale« wissenschaftliche Realismus. Insbesondere, so Worrall (2009), ist er gegen das Theorienunterbestimmtheits-Argument immun.

Worrall analysiert dazu das Konzept der *empirischen Stützung von Theorien* und unterscheidet in diesem Zusammenhang zwischen *empirischer Stützung<sub>B</sub>*, die sich nur auf Beobachtungsdaten bezieht, und *empirischer Stützung<sub>BS</sub>*, bei der neben den Beobachtungsdaten auch die in der ramseyfizierten Form der Theorien impliziten Aussagen über Strukturen des Unbeobachtbaren Berücksichtigung finden. Während das Konzept der empirischen Stützung<sub>B</sub> in der Literatur weit verbreitet ist, ist Worralls Ergänzung um die Strukturebene ein Novum. Auf dieser Grundlage kommt Worrall zu dem Schluss, dass der Strukturrealismus (anders als der »normale« Realismus) gegen alle relevanten Fälle von Theorienunterbestimmtheit –



solche empirisch äquivalenten<sub>BS</sub> Theorien nämlich – immun ist.

Es wird sich zeigen, dass Worralls Argumentation zwar schlüssig und plausibel ist, seine Konzeption von empirischer Stützung<sub>BS</sub> – mit der sein Projekt steht und fällt – aber *question begging* ist und zudem skeptischen Einwänden Tür und Tor öffnet: Eine Beurteilung der Strukturkomponente könnte nämlich nur auf Grundlage extraobservatorischer Kriterien erfolgen, die aber weder eindeutige Ergebnisse liefern noch Garanten für die Wahrheit von Theorien sind. Ein Rückgriff auf die weniger problematische empirische Stützung<sub>B</sub> hingegen würde aus dem Strukturenrealismus einen »verkappten Antirealismus« (Worrall) machen. Von einer Immunisierung des Strukturenrealismus vor Theorienunterbestimmtheit kann folglich keine Rede sein.

Worrall, J., »Underdetermination, Realism and Empirical Equivalence« in *Synthese* 180, 2009, 157–172

## P 7.2 Meyer

### Morality & Causality

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The following is an implicit methodological assumption in much of applied ethics:

*M*: Causal differences are not, on their own, morally significant. Causal differences can only be considered morally significant if a further, moral reason can be given why they are morally significant.

I argue that this assumption is misguided. One of the presuppositions of *M* is that mere causal differences are not among the moral reasons that can be invoked to justify treating cases morally differently. Rather, *M* suggests that once we have identified the relevant causal differences between cases, we need to look at a different bucket of reasons, that explain why this causal difference matters. In Trolley problems, for instance, we first describe how a case differs from another regarding the causal facts, and then we invoke moral principles like the mere means principle or the doctrine of double effect to explain the moral significance of this causal difference.

To show the importance of *M* in contemporary applied ethics, I look at one instance in which the principle plays a major role in how a debate in applied ethics has evolved: The debate around Michael Otsuka's argument for the wrongness of killing aggressors in self-defense that are not morally responsible for their aggression.

I then look at the principle in more general terms, distinguishing between two different attitudes towards revising our moral commitments in the face of arguments revealing that the differences between cases we treat morally different are »merely« causal:

*Philosophical Revisionism*: If a certain factual difference between A and B is not plausibly morally relevant considered on its own, we should treat A and B as morally on a par.

*Philosophical Conservatism*: Accept every factual difference as making a moral difference, as long as it explains enough of our moral intuitions across a reasonably broad range of cases.

I argue that we should accept neither of these two views.

One of the things we should demand in each individual case from the *Philosophical Revisionist* is an explanation of why our intuition that certain »mere« causal differences are morally significant should be mistaken.

## Mölder P 4.7

### What the mind is made of

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There are two implicit assumptions in the philosophy of mind. There is the *Mentalist Assumption*: the mind is solely composed of mental states and the *Folk Assumption*: mental states are individuated through folk psychology. Together, these two assumptions yield the *Folk-Mentalist Thesis* (FMT): the mind is solely composed of mental states as individuated by folk psychology.

FMT seems too narrow, for there are several phenomena that are related to the mind, but seem to be left out by FMT. These include (a) processes happening at the time-scale so short that the usual conceptual distinctions of folk psychology do not apply; (b) certain psychological structures making up consciousness and other features of consciousness that cannot be characterised as mental states (e.g., the unity of consciousness, operative intentionality, the affordance of certain situations); (c) intersubjective processes through which we understand other people.

FMT can be attacked by criticising the Folk Assumption (by acknowledging the relevance of psychology and the neurosciences to the individuation of mental states) and by criticising the Mentalist Assumption. In both cases, the crucial question is what makes a phenomenon mental. In the first case, there is the question how can psychology and neuroscience play a role in individuating the phenomena that are regarded as mental. In the second case, there is the question why count the troublesome phenomena as mental.

The *mental* is a concept for which there are multiple sufficient criteria: according to the folk psychological criterion, a phenomenon is mental in case it is individuated in folk psychological terms; according to the experiential criterion, a phenomenon is mental in case having it is experiencing something.

Given this, psychology and neuroscience can play a role in the individuation of mental phenomena for two reasons: 1) they help to extend and develop folk psychology; 2) they target the processes that have effects on experiences and thus they would be relevant also to what counts as experiential. Accordingly, we can keep the *Revised Folk-Mentalist Thesis*: the mind is solely composed of mental phenomena as individuated by folk psychology and its scientific extensions.

P 8.2 Mukerji

**The Case Against Consequentialism – Reconsidered**

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Critics of consequentialism often point out that the doctrine has many counter-intuitive implications and should therefore be rejected. In recent times, consequentialists have increasingly used a strategy of »interpretative divergence« to rebut such charges. They have made ample use of the conceptual degrees of freedom that the notion of consequentialism allows in order to argue that common criticisms do not apply. E.g., some critics have assumed that the notion of a consequence is to be understood in an objective (rather than subjective) sense, that it is the aggregate value (rather than other features) of consequences which matters and that this value is determined by a metric of well-being which attaches equal weight to each individuals' interests. On the basis of these stipulations they have pointed out, e.g., that consequentialism violates the principle Ought-implies-Can, because no agent can foresee the objective consequences of her acts. They have protested that consequentialism is insensitive to distributive concerns, as it only considers aggregate value. Or they have objected that consequentialism is incompatible with a special concern for those near and dear to us, as it forces moral agents to attach equal weight to everyone's well-being. Consequentialists can dodge these objections simply by pointing out that their version of the doctrine employs a subjective notion of a consequence, does not rely on aggregation and does, contrary to their critics' assumption, allow us to give special weight to our nearest and dearest. Consequentialists can apparently dodge each individual objection in that way. Critiquing the doctrine can, hence, become quite a pesky undertaking. In my paper I shall present a new approach to conceptualising consequentialism which opens up a new perspective on the debate. This approach makes it possible to devise a method of critique from which consequentialists cannot escape using mere interpretative tricks. Finally, if time permits, I shall present a tentative case against consequentialism which draws on my method.

P 2.1 Mulder

**The Essentialist Inference**

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It is often claimed that principles of individuation imply essential properties of the things individuated: sets are individuated by their members, hence sets have their members essentially. I analyze this type of inference and defend its cogency under certain specific conditions having to do with ontology in general. To that effect, I first discuss this essentialist inference from a formal point of view. It turns that, although there is a form which all principles of individuation have in common, it is not true that any statement of that form licenses essentialist conclusions, hence there is no valid inference based purely

on that form. However, I argue that there is a viable version of the essentialist inference nonetheless. The resources for a proper reconstruction of this type of inference can be gathered from reflections upon the role principles of individuation play in the project of the ontologist. An ontology typically provides a list of fundamental categories to which everything that exists can be reduced by way of the following recipe: for any non-basic kind K, there is a basic ontological category C such that K's are just C's satisfying a certain set of conditions G. Thus, bachelors are just human beings satisfying the conditions being male and being unmarried (roughly). Whether or not the conditions can be satisfactorily spelled out or rather remain vague (for instance, because of ›family resemblance‹), is irrelevant – the ontologist merely claims that the individuation of non-basic kinds of things depends upon the individuation of the basic categories. The essentialist inference only goes through when dealing with a principle of individuation for such basic ontological categories. For any non-basic kind K, we may intelligibly hold that for any given K it is possible that it is not-K, because its individuation does not depend on its being K but rather on the ontological category to which K reduces – e.g., for any given bachelor it is possible that he is married. Since the individuation of a basic ontological category C is sui generis, no C can possibly fail to be C. That is precisely what the essentialist inference amounts to. And, since some categories are bound to be basic, some essentialism is simply inescapable.

Nagel P 7.3

**Neuronale Plastizität und Autonomie – Chancen und Risiken des zunehmenden Wissens über die Veränderbarkeit des Gehirns**

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Die moderne Lebenswelt ist geprägt von Prozessen der Individualisierung und Pluralisierung, die sich in vielen Lebensbereichen durch einen enormen Zuwachs von Optionen, die dem Einzelnen zur Wahl stehen ausdrücken. Der Raum, in dem autonom entschieden werden kann, weitet sich zunehmend aus. Neurowissenschaftliche Forschung leistet einen zentralen Beitrag zum Wachstum der Optionsspielräume, der Menschen existentiell betrifft. Sie zeigt die lebenslange Veränderbarkeit des Gehirns, das durch vielfältige Interventionen beeinflussbar ist. Neuronale Plastizität eröffnet Potentiale für klinische Anwendungen, und sie erlaubt gezielte Maßnahmen zur Selbstgestaltung, die von Trainings, Ernährung und Psychopharmaka bis zu neurotechnologischen Interventionen reichen. Besonders viel diskutiert ist im Bereich der Selbstgestaltung in letzter Zeit das so genannte Neuro-enhancement, das den Einsatz von Medikamenten zur Steigerung von Leistungen bei Gesunden beschreibt. Die wachsenden Handlungsspielräume sind ambivalent zu bewerten: Unbestritten ist der Wert von Autonomiezuwachs. Die Möglichkeit, selbstbestimmt Entscheidungen über seine persönliche Entwicklung treffen zu können, ist bereichernd und motiviert, seine Möglichkeiten zu nutzen. Psychologische und ökonomische Studien zeigen jedoch, dass ein Übermaß an Optionen belastet. Die Präsenz der Techniken zur Selbstgestaltung geht einher mit steigender Verantwortlichkeit für die eigenen Geistesleistungen. Es wird

eine nahezu grenzenlose Verfügbarkeit des eigenen Seins suggeriert. Die sich ergebenden Handlungsoptionen für persönliche Entwicklung führen zu einem neuen Ausmaß an Autonomie: Es wird nicht mehr nur gewählt, was man haben möchte, wie man sein Leben gestalten möchte, mit wem man sein möchte, sondern es gilt auch, sich selbst zu gestalten, seine eigenen Persönlichkeit bis ins hohe Alter auszuarbeiten. Wer wir sind, wie wir fühlen und handeln, scheint mehr in unseren Verantwortungsbereich gerückt und wird es weiter tun. Die Verantwortung für eine Selbstgestaltung, die den eigenen und fremden Anforderungen entspricht, liegt zunehmend beim Einzelnen. Diese Verantwortlichkeit droht, den Einzelnen zu überfordern und zu Desorientierung und Stabilitätsverlust zu führen. Ich argumentiere hier für eine sensible Betrachtung der Verschiebung der Verantwortungsbereiche bezüglich existenzieller Fragen. Die Chancen, die Plastizität bringt, sollen genutzt werden. Dafür muss die wachsende Kenntnis über plastische Prozesse durch eine Förderung der Kompetenz zur Selbstbestimmung begleitet werden, um einen wohltuenden Umgang zu ermöglichen.

## P 2.2 Oliva Córdoba

### The point of action

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Is every action extended in time? Call the view given by an affirmative view to this question the *durational view*. It is a view touching upon the metaphysics and ontology of actions and events, and it seems many theorists would happily accept it. After all, aren't all actions either themselves bodily movements or at least ultimately linked very closely to such events? In this talk, I motivate and propose a negative answer by alluding to considerations pertaining to the ontology of events, the semantics of achievement verbs and the nature of speech acts. My result will be that we seem to be forced to admit *point actions*, i.e. actions with temporal position but without temporal extension. Another upshot is that the idea that necessarily an event is an action only if it is under *control* of its executor or subject to his or her *guidance* (cf. Frankfurt 1978, 73) will not work – at least not, if (as they most naturally are) control or guidance are conceived of as being effective simultaneously to the execution of the action and are being understood as requiring at least a certain duration.

Frankfurt, Harry G. 1978: ›The Problem of Action‹, in his 2009, pp. 69–79.  
 – 2009: The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

### Illokutionäre Rollen und die Normativität der Bedeutung

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Es gibt eine ausgedehnte Debatte darüber, ob Bedeutung normativ ist. Diese Frage ist von Gewicht, weil von der Antwort auf diese Frage die Möglichkeit einer naturalistischen Theorie der Bedeutung abhängt. In dieser Debatte herrscht weitgehend Konsens darüber, dass es nicht hinreicht, auf die Existenz von Korrektheitsbedingungen zu verweisen, sondern dass gezeigt werden muss, dass aus dem Umstand, dass ein Wort etwas bedeutet, Präskriptionen über seinen Gebrauch folgen. Nun hat es sich allerdings als schwierig erwiesen, aus den unbestrittenen Bestehen von Korrektheitsbedingungen allein die Gültigkeit von Präskriptionen abzuleiten. Dass man einen Ausdruck gemäß seinen Korrektheitsbedingungen anwenden sollte, gilt nämlich nur, sofern man die Wahrheit sagen möchte.

In diesem Punkt würde ich letztlich den Argumenten der Anti-Normativisten zustimmen, glaube aber, dass sich auf einem alternativen Weg zeigen lässt, dass Bedeutung Präskriptionen impliziert. Und zwar besteht die Bedeutung von Sprechakten normalerweise nicht nur darin, dass sie einen propositionalen Gehalt haben, sondern auch darin, dass sie eine illokutionäre Rolle spielen. Viele dieser illokutionären Rollen lassen sich jedoch nur mit Hilfe normativer Folgen analysieren, also so, dass durch sie der Sprecher, der Hörer und andere Beteiligte das Recht oder die Pflicht auferlegt wird, bestimmte Handlungen zu vollziehen.

Die Überlegung, dass zwar nicht aus dem Vorliegen von Bedingungen der Korrekten Anwendung, wohl aber aus dem Spielen einer illokutionären Rolle das Gelten von Präskriptionen folgt, deutet eine Sichtweise an, nach der zwar eine naturalistische Theorie repräsentationaler Zustände möglich ist, wie Tiere und Computer sie anscheinend besitzen, aber keine naturalistische Theorie von Sprechakten, wie sie von Menschen vollzogen werden.

## Rellihan P 4.8

### A Dilemma for Double-Aspect Theories of Consciousness

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Double-aspect theories of consciousness hold that mind and matter are but two aspects of a single underlying reality. According to these theories, the phenomenal properties of conscious experience are simply the intrinsic properties of the very physical objects whose extrinsic, causal properties are investigated by science. This is an attractive picture, for it promises to combine the virtues of dualism and physicalism without falling into either extreme. This promise, however, proves illusory. I argue that double-aspect theories are faced with a dilemma, one horn of which leads us back into dualism, the other horn of which leads us back into physicalism.

I argue for this dilemma by means of the principle that a state's intrinsic properties cannot be changed merely by changing its counterfactual causal role – what *would have caused* the state or what the state *would have caused* in certain counterfactual situations. When we change a conscious state's counterfactual causal profile, we thereby change its extrinsic physical properties. But do we also change its phenomenal properties? Do we change what it's like for a conscious being to undergo such a state? If we do, then phenomenal properties are extrinsic after all, and the argument that consciousness cannot be reductively explained in terms of more familiar physical properties loses all of its bite. If we do not, then consciousness would appear to float free from the physical, and double-aspect theories collapse into a particularly extreme form of dualism.

I develop this dilemma in considerably more detail, responding to potential objections along the way. Much of my focus is on David Chalmers' version of double-aspect theory, according to which it is informational states that have both phenomenal and physical aspects. Chalmers' is the most plausible and detailed version of double-aspect theory yet developed, but, as I show, it faces a particularly virulent form of this dilemma. I conclude by arguing that it is independently quite plausible that physical states are constituted by their extrinsic relations and phenomenal states by their intrinsic properties and that it is therefore the dualistic horn of the dilemma that we are compelled to choose. Thus, the very dilemma that refutes double-aspect theories of consciousness also serves as a powerful argument for a dualistic theory of phenomenal consciousness.

P 4.9 Sánchez Guerrero

**Mixed Emotions in Social Context:  
Defending the Notion of Caring-With**

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There are situations in which we can easily recognize that the source of our ›emotional ambivalence‹ lies on the fact that some of our interests are purely individual while others are interests we have in virtue of our constituting certain social groups. In this paper, I defend a view on collective affective intentionality by showing that these situations do not really render it problematic.

Characterizing those situations in which we are inclined to speak of a collective affective intentional episode as situations in which a number of individuals are emotionally actualizing a shared evaluative perspective, I introduce the notion of *caring-with* to refer to a form of human comportment which distinctively involves individuals who may be said to *ultimately be caring about something on behalf of a group they take themselves to constitute*.

I construe the challenge cases of the above-described kind seem to pose to this account in terms of a sort of dilemma. What these situations seem to show is: either that the mode of comportment I call ›caring-with‹ is merely instrumental, or that we have to abandon the idea of a *unified* and, for the most part, rationally coherent evaluative perspective which allows us to understand emotions as states that disclose the import something has to someone.

I begin to answer to this challenge by appealing to the thought that one could be *differentially* directed towards one and the same situation by adopting diverse evaluative points of view. Subsequently, I make room for the idea that two emotions may co-occur in experience in a not merely dispositional sense by recurring to the distinction between the background and the foreground of an experiential episode. Finally, I tackle the issue of the aspectuality of the self-conception implicit in our intentional acts and try to dispel the impression that the above-mentioned situations necessarily make evident a sort of divided evaluative perspective. In so doing, I try to show that caring-with is a human possibility and a way in which one can press ahead into one's personal possibilities while *genuinely* caring about a group one takes oneself to constitute.

Schleidgen P 7.4

**Zur Notwendigkeit adäquater Theoriebildung  
für eine erfolgreiche Umsetzung  
nachhaltiger Entwicklung**

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Nachhaltige Entwicklung hat sich in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten zu einem allgegenwärtigen Terminus sowie zu einem der zentralen Leitbilder in Politik, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft entwickelt. Dennoch ist es faktisch nicht gut um die Umsetzung nachhaltiger Entwicklung bestellt.

Dies ist zunächst darin begründet, dass es sich beim modernen Begriff nachhaltiger Entwicklung um ein *essentially contestable concept* handelt, mithin um einen normativen Begriff, über deren Wert und Bedeutung sich die gesellschaftlichen Akteure *nur im weitesten Sinne* einig sind (vgl. Gallie 1956: 167–198). Keine Einigkeit wiederum besteht mit Blick auf die konkrete Bedeutung des Begriffs nachhaltiger Entwicklung. Vielmehr scheinen wir es mit einer Situation zu tun zu haben, in der »[...] fast alles zur Nachhaltigkeit gezählt werden kann und nachhaltig ist« (Stappen 2008: 5). Wo aber keine Einigkeit über die konkrete Bedeutung eines Konzepts vorliegt, ist trivialerweise eine Einigung über die praktische Umsetzung dieses Konzepts ebenso unmöglich. Dies wiederum erschwert eine erfolgreiche Umsetzung nachhaltiger Entwicklung, wenn es sie nicht sogar unmöglich macht.

Die Ursache für die Uneinigkeit über die konkrete Bedeutung nachhaltiger Entwicklung nun ergibt sich im Wesentlichen aus dem *normativen* Charakter des Nachhaltigkeitskonzepts. Diese Einsicht wiederum scheint die schwerwiegende Konsequenz zu haben, dass Einigkeit über die konkrete Bedeutung nachhaltiger Entwicklung per se unmöglich ist. Das aber würde auch bedeuten, dass eine erfolgreiche Umsetzung von vornherein zum Scheitern verurteilt ist.

Vor diesem Hintergrund zeigt mein Poster erstens, dass und warum die Entwicklung von Nachhaltigkeitstheorien zwingend notwendig ist auf dem Weg zu einer Einigung über die konkrete Bedeutung nachhaltiger Entwicklung. Zweitens führe ich einen Katalog von Adäquatheitskriterien ein, die die grundsätzliche Konsensfähigkeit solcher Theorien gewährleistet.

## P 4.10 Schmid

**An Unbelievable Truth, or:  
Why Beliefs Are No Mental States**

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Beliefs aim at truth (Bernard Williams). Falsities are unbelievable. Sentences of the type › $p$  is the case, but I don't believe that  $p$  is the case‹ ( $p \ \& \ \sim B(I, p)$ ) can neither be believed nor asserted, even if they are true. This is a familiar version of Moore's Paradox. But why are Moore-paradoxical sentences unbelievable? And what is its impact on the concept of belief?

In my contribution, I present three attempts to accommodate Moore's Paradox in realism with regard to mental states. Realism regarding mental states entails (1) that beliefs are mental phenomena that are objectively identifiable (realist claim), (2) that psychological concepts represent psychological states (reference claim), and (3) that identical sentences have identical meaning (uniformity claim). I will argue that Moore's Paradox cannot be integrated into realism, and that, therefore, realism is wrong.

Whereas a Moore-paradoxical sentence cannot be believed or asserted, it can be supposed or imagined. Although asserting / believing the sentence › $p \ \& \ \sim B(I, p)$ ‹ is similar to asserting / believing the contradiction › $p \ \& \ \sim p$ ‹, supposing that › $p \ \& \ \sim B(I, p)$ ‹ is *not* similar to supposing that › $p \ \& \ \sim p$ ‹. Moore's Paradox presents a counter-example to the uniformity claim (3): One and the same content is absurd in one environment, but perfectly fine in another. Identical expressions are not always identical in meaning.

Moore's Paradox equally questions the reference claim (2): If the expression ›I (don't) believe that  $p$ ‹ was to refer to the presence (absence) of the belief that  $p$ , a Moore-paradoxical sentence would either not be absurd at all, or, amended by an implicit statement, amount to a contradiction. Both results are wrong; hence, Moore's Paradox overrules the reference claim.

Eventually, the realist claim collapses: First, it relies on (2) and (3), and (2) and (3) are wrong. Second, if beliefs were objectively identifiable entities, one should be able to entertain any attitude towards one's own beliefs. But one cannot believe a Moore-paradoxical sentence because this would amount to ascribing a false belief to oneself and thereby contradict the core of the concept of belief, that beliefs aim at truth.

## P 4.11 Schmitz

**The Role of Direct Perception  
in Social Cognition**

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The question *How do we understand other people?* has been traditionally answered by the dominant *Theory of Mind* (ToM) approach. According to ToM, interpersonal understanding can be achieved only by gaining access to the mental states *hidden* in another person's mind, i.e. mental state attribution is

essential. Critics of ToM suggest that social cognition usually is not a matter of theorizing but one of pragmatic, non-mentalistic interaction. Advocating this alternative view, Shaun Gallagher defends an interaction theory (IT) – an account which characterizes a person's mind not as closed-off but as *openly accessible* by means of *direct perception* of the person's expressive behavior (Gallagher, 2005; 2008).

Even though the concept of direct perception plays a crucial role in his proposal, Gallagher does not clearly define it – a reason for misunderstandings and criticism. Hence, answering the question whether social phenomena are directly perceptible or not depends upon a clearer understanding of the underlying concept of direct perception.

I therefore suggest distinguishing between different types of perceptual experience: First, there is *basic perception*, i.e. having basic sensations such as visually experiencing a moving object. Secondly, there is *perception as*: e.g. the perception of the moving object *as* a moving hand. Then there is *perception of action* which partly overlaps with *perception of intention*: perceiving the moving hand as a *waving* hand – and possibly perceiving the intention behind it (i.e. the waving is a sign of farewell). Finally, there is *social perception* which comprises all those aspects plus the perception of a person's body language expressing her mental states: the waving person is sad to say goodbye. Of course these types are neither experienced sequentially nor do they have clearly defined borders. Additionally, there are inter-individual differences in perceptual ability due to a person's individual training / experience or cultural background. Thus, some people are able to directly perceive (social) phenomena which are imperceptible for others.

Summing up, I argue that direct perception should be understood as a gradational, multilayered experience rather than a clear-cut category. Therefore, it seems hardly possible to draw a line between *universally* perceptible and imperceptible (social) phenomena.

## Seitz P 4.12

**›Embedded Rationalism‹:  
A Rationalist's Guide for Naturalizing  
the Notion of Reason**

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To analyze the notion of Reason as a natural phenomenon is a still unsolved task. I want to defend the claim that in order to achieve this, we have to combine both Rationalism and Psychologism. For well-known reasons promoted by Frege, this claim raises some difficulties. On the one hand, it seems impossible to derive a rationalistic position from psychological investigations; on the other, within Psychologism it is hard to comprehend the normative dimension of rationality. I shall offer a diagnosis of these difficulties, as well as present my proposal to solve them. I will conclude that (i) without Rationalism there will be no account of rationality at all, but (ii) the notion of Reason itself entails that empirical investigations are required for an appropriate account. This implicates that even a Rationalist has to give support to a naturalistic position. Such a hybrid I label ›Embedded Rationalism‹.

## P 8.3 Tiefensee

**How to Defend Expressivism  
against anti-Archimedeanism**

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Expressivists understand their own position as a non-moral, metaethical account. Yet, this understanding has recently come under severe pressure from anti-Archimedeanism, such as Dworkin, who proclaim that although it may seem as if metaethical accounts are external to moral discourse, they are themselves built on moral grounds.

My aim is to defend expressivism against what I take to be the most forceful anti-Archimedean attack, which runs as follows:

- (P<sub>1</sub>) If moral claims are entailed by expressivism, then expressivism is a moral position. (Hume's Law)
- (P<sub>2</sub>) The supervenience thesis is a moral claim.
- (P<sub>3</sub>) The supervenience thesis is entailed by expressivism.
- (C) Hence, expressivism is a moral position.

Expressivists are well-advised to take this challenge seriously, as a strong *prima facie* case can be made for the claim that expressivists are committed to each of the three premises. This might be least obvious with regard to (P<sub>2</sub>). However, I show that (P<sub>2</sub>) also appears to be supported by assumptions that expressivists share. The first of these is found in expressivists' recent adoption of minimalism about truth which, in turn, exposes certain metaethical theses as substantive moral claims. The second concerns the limitation thesis introduced by Blackburn, which arguably rests on moral ascriptions of moral (ir)relevance by constraining the supervenience base of moral properties.

Despite strong appearances to the contrary, though, I argue that expressivists can reject (P<sub>2</sub>). More precisely, I show, firstly, that although minimalism does indeed convert certain metaethical theses into moral verdicts, this does not imply that supervenience is a moral thesis. Secondly, whilst I agree with anti-Archimedeanism that the attributions of moral (ir)relevance which underlie the supervenience thesis are moral, I argue that these attributions nevertheless do not entail the moral status of supervenience. To demonstrate how this fine balancing act can be achieved, my argument runs in close parallel to expressivists' stance on the contest between judgement-internalism and judgement-externalism. That is, I suggest that once we understand fully how it can be argued that judgement-internalists win the war even if judgement-externalists may win individual battles, we have found a blueprint for the solution to the anti-Archimedean challenge.

## Tillas/Seuchter/Vosgerau P 4.13

**Making the Most of Affordances?**

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This paper focuses on one of the most controversial notions in psychology and cognitive science, namely the notion of affordances. Our target is to secure the explanatory role that affordances do have in understanding behavior, while avoiding the controversies of ecological psychology in general and of Gibson's claims in particular. Gibsonians most often try to secure the explanatory role of affordances by arguing for the objective nature of affordances and in turn for their direct perceivability. We suggest that the explanatory role of affordances could be secured on different grounds. Our starting point is that affordances are relational properties, which are not perceived directly but on the basis of the feedback information that subjects receive when interacting (even unintentionally) with their environment. Affordances can be ascribed to objects by agents on the basis of the agents' unintentional movements as well as their intentions. In this sense, we depart from traditional ecological psychologists by arguing that affordances are inherently linked to unintentional movements and possible intentional actions. More specifically, it is argued that in virtue of the linkage between affordances and intentions one could account for the infinite number of affordances that any given object could have. Furthermore, perception of affordances and in turn their explanatory value could be secured by appealing to objective systematic contingencies between movements and perceptual inputs that provide the actor with information about the effects of his/her actions on the environment. It is courtesy of these systematic contingencies that affordances acquire their objective aspect and are thus perceived universally. For instance, a simple unintentional contact with a solid surface suffices for any subject to gather information about solid objects affording bumping into them. On the basis of such unintentionally acquired affordances, other affordances could be acquired through intentional movements. Taken together, it is in virtue of this linkage between affordances and intentional actions that one could account for the infinite number of affordances that any given object seems to have.

## P 4.14 Tooming

## When do we need to talk about desires?

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In this presentation I give an example of a conceptual genealogy, pertaining to desires. The larger aim is to show that the genealogical approach, along the lines of Bernard Williams and Edward Craig, is also applicable to the concepts of mental states in order to demonstrate what they add to the everyday social understanding. This can be done by construing a hypothetical situation where people lack the requisite concepts and then ask in what ways the concept in question can enrich that practice, and what needs it can fulfil. More specifically, I focus on Christopher Gauker's account of propositional attitudes which can be interpreted as an exercise in genealogy, having its precedent in the Sellarsian Myth of Jones. I argue that Gauker's genealogy, which models the desire-ascriptions on vicarious imperative speech acts, fails to bring out why there would ever arise a need for the concept of desire. The main reason is that it doesn't provide an explanation for the difference between mere acknowledgments of commands and actual attributions of desires which are also supposed to take into account the conative perspective of other people. But instead of completely rejecting Gauker's account of desires, I present a way of amending it. My claim is that the need for talking specifically about desires enters the scene when there is a tension between our awareness of another person having commanded something and our attribution of a hedonic state to her which is in tension with the satisfaction condition of the command. By accepting that, it is possible to account for the perspective-sensitivity of desire-attributions and answer the explanatory need that isn't gratified by Gauker's theory.

## P 8.4 Wagner

## Coercion: an excusing condition?

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An agent who does something that is considered to be morally blameworthy is excused, if certain conditions are present. Commonly accepted excusing conditions include lack of knowledge, accident or absence of intention, physical constraint, and coercion. Paradigmatic examples of excusing conditions that block moral blame are agents who unintentionally hurt another person by tripping, after being pushed, or simply by taking the person for someone else. In my poster presentation, I focus on the latter two excusing conditions, which are, I think, problematic: physical coercion and coerced action. Supported by some examples, I aim at showing that *actions* performed under coercion do not necessarily provide sufficient excusing conditions. The common view that coerced actions are to be excused derives its force from a misleading analogy that is drawn between physical coercion and coerced action. But while physical coercion indeed *is* an excusing condition, coerced action, as such, is *not*. In my presentation I will point out the differences between these two forms of

coercion and I will argue for a definition of coerced action, the conditions of which are not sufficient for excusing the action. I will argue that a further condition must be added in order to make coerced action excusable. This condition refers to the moral acceptability of an agent's preference structure that makes the agent do something she does not want to do; e.g. to follow the threat »Do  $\Phi$  or  $E$  happens«. Depending on what  $\Phi$  and  $E$  stand for, we do or do not accept the agent's decision to  $\Phi$ . The reason for distinguishing coerced action and excusable coerced action is this: Whether an agent is *coerced* into doing something cannot be decided on moral grounds. But whether an agent is *excused* for having done something (under coercion) is a matter that has to be decided on moral grounds. My approach explains why people tend to hold coerced action to be excusable in general: they simply take it for granted that the agent's preferences are morally acceptable, without realizing this as an independent condition that is not inherent in the concept of coerced action.

## Weber P 2.3

## Theorien vager Objekte

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*Ontologische Vagheit* oder *Vagheit de re* ist die Theorie, derzufolge Vagheitsphänomene ihren Ursprung nicht oder nicht nur in der Sprache haben und die Welt selbst somit vage ist. Was es bedeutet, dass »die Welt selbst« vage ist, lässt sich am Besten mit Rückgriff auf *vage Objekte* erläutern: Die Welt ist genau dann vage, wenn es in ihr Objekte gibt, deren räumliche, zeitliche oder modale Grenzen sich auch dann nicht eindeutig bestimmen lassen, wenn man von sprachlichen oder epistemischen Beschränkungen abstrahiert. Eine Definition dieser Art lässt sich allerdings, wie ich darlegen werde, auf zwei Weisen interpretieren: Man kann ihr zufolge unter vagen Objekten zum einen solche mit Randbereichsunschärfe verstehen, bei denen für manche Atome durch die Beschaffenheit der Welt nicht festgelegt ist, ob sie Teil von ihnen sind, und zum anderen vage Objekte als genau diejenigen ansehen, die Identität zu einer vagen Relation machen. Keine dieser beiden Auffassungen vager Objekte impliziert die jeweils andere.

Allerdings ist auch keine von beiden Auffassungen in der Lage, die (jeweils verschiedenen) Theorieprobleme auszuräumen, zu deren Lösung sie überhaupt erst entwickelt wurde. Denn Objekte mit Randbereichsunschärfe haben den Nachteil, dass ihre Grenzbereiche epistemisch unzugänglich und selbst entweder scharf begrenzt oder hoffnungslos verworren sind. Sie sind daher, so meine erste These, keine natürlicheren oder klarer individuierten Objekte als die von konkurrierenden Theorien postulierten Gegenstände. Und Objekte, die Identität zu einer vagen Relation machen, funktionieren in der Theorie nur so lange gut, wie man Personen nicht als vage Objekte auffasst. Tut man dies doch, dann folgt, so meine zweite These, dass es unter bestimmten Umständen erstens nicht der Fall ist, dass alle meine Gedanken nur von mir gedacht werden, und zweitens nicht der Fall ist, dass ich wissen kann, welche von mehreren Personen ich bin.

**P 4.15** Wunder

**Nichtwillentliche Aktivität**

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John Hyman behauptet, dass viele Philosophen die aktiv/passiv Unterscheidung mit der willentlich/nicht-willentlich Unterscheidung vermengen, so dass aktiv und willentlich auf der einen und passiv und unwillentlich auf der anderen Seite gleich gesetzt werden. Nicht-willentliche Aktivität und willentliche Passivität werden deshalb weitestgehend ignoriert. Die Möglichkeit von nicht-willentlicher Aktivität sollten wir aber akzeptieren, so Hyman, weil wir nicht nur von Tieren, die zu willentlichen Handlungen fähig sind, sagen wollen, dass sie etwas tun. Die damit verbundene Vorstellung von nicht-menschlichen Akteuren teilt Hyman mit anderen Philosophen, wie Kenny, Frankfurt und Dretske. Wer oder Was jedoch außer Menschen noch als Akteur in Frage kommt, darüber herrscht Uneinigkeit. Für Kenny und Hyman sind es neben Lebewesen auch unbelebte Substanzen (z. B. Salzsäure), während Frankfurt und Dretske sich weitestgehend auf belebte Akteure beschränken. Diese Uneinigkeit verweist auf unterschiedliche Kriterien für die Zuschreibung von Aktivität. In meinem Vortrag werde ich die unterschiedlichen Kriterien (Kenny und Hyman einerseits und Dretske andererseits) darstellen. Darüber hinaus versuche ich zu zeigen, dass keines der beiden Kriterien überzeugen kann.



# Workshops

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Philosophical Issues in Belief Revision, Conditional  
Logic and Possible World Semantics

**W 1**

Freitag / Friday, 21.09.  
09:15–17:50  
Samstag / Saturday, 22.09.  
08:30–12:55  
**Raum C 421**

Formal Methods in Argument Reconstruction

**W 2**

Donnerstag / Thursday, 20.09.  
17:00–19:40  
Freitag / Friday, 21.09.  
09:30–16:00  
**Raum C 422**

Causation and Laws in the Special Science.  
Metaphysical Foundations

**W 3**

Freitag / Friday, 21.09.  
09:15–18:45  
Samstag / Saturday, 22.09.  
09:30–15:15  
**Raum C 336**

Logical and Philosophical Aspects of Real Possibility

**W 4**

Freitag / Friday, 21.09.  
09:30–18:00  
Samstag / Saturday, 22.09.  
09:30–18:15  
**Raum C 423**

Immunity to Error through Misidentification and  
Essential Indexicality

**W 5**

Freitag / Friday, 21.09.  
10:00–18:00  
Samstag / Saturday, 22.09.  
09:00–12:30  
**Raum C 427**

The Scope and Limits of Experimental Ethics

**W 6**

Donnerstag / Thursday, 20.09.  
17:00–18:45  
Freitag / Friday, 21.09.  
09:00–19:00  
Samstag / Saturday, 22.09.  
09:00–15:00  
**Raum C 424**

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## W 1 Philosophical Issues in Belief Revision, Conditional Logic and Possible World Semantics

The aim of the workshop is to bring together philosophers (related to the GAP, but not limited to it), who work in the area of belief revision, conditional logic and possible worlds semantics. The workshop shall serve as a platform for the exchange of ideas from these related areas.

Ziel des Workshops ist es, Philosophen aus dem Umfeld der GAP zusammenzubringen, die in den Bereichen Glaubensre-

vision, Konditionallogik und Mögliche-Welten-Semantik arbeiten. Der Workshop soll als Forum für den Austausch von Ideen aus diesen verwandten Gebieten dienen.

Organisation: **Matthias Unterhuber**

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**Freitag / Friday, 21.09. Philosophical Issues in Belief Revision, Conditional Logic and Possible World Semantics**  
**09:15–17:50**  
**Raum C 421** (Language: English)

- 09:15–09:20 Welcome
- 09:20–10:15 **Igor Douven** (Groningen):  
Scope Ambiguities and Conditionals
- 10:25–11:20 **Franz Huber** (Toronto):  
What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case?
- 11:30–12:25 **Matthias Unterhuber** (Duesseldorf):  
Belief Revision from a Conditional Logic Perspective
- 13:30–14:25 **Hannes Leitgeb** (Munich):  
A New Lottery Paradox for Counterfactuals
- 14:35–15:30 **Manfred Kupffer** (Frankfurt):  
Properties of Fat Men – Quantified Modal Logic without Possible Individuals
- 15:50–16:45 **Holger Andreas** (LMU Munich):  
Paraconsistent Concept Formation in a Belief Revision Framework
- 16:55–17:50 **Gerhard Schurz** (Duesseldorf):  
Reward and Risk in Reasoning with Uncertain Conditionals

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**Samstag / Saturday, 22.09.**  
**08:30–12:55**  
**Raum C 421**

- 08:30–09:25 **Heinrich Wansing** (Bochum):  
Varieties of Implication
- 09:35–10:30 **André Fuhrmann** (Frankfurt):  
Knowledge of Possibilities
- 10:50–11:45 **Sonja Smets** (Univ. Amsterdam):  
Evidence-Based Belief Revision, a Logical Analysis
- 11:55–12:50 **Hans Rott** (Regensburg):  
Two Concepts of Plausibility in Default Reasoning
- 12:50–12:55 Farewell
-

## W 2 Formal Methods in Argument Reconstruction

The purpose of this international workshop is to bring together researchers who apply formal methods, widely understood, to natural language argumentation in order to provide a reconstruction which can provide the basis for an evaluation. A related objective is to make the state of the art accessible to audiences who predominantly reconstruct natural language argumentation with more traditional formal or informal tools.

Themes addressed at the workshop include: 1. Reconstructing premises and conclusions (logical formalization of individual sentences and arguments; techniques for identifying and rephrasing premises and conclusions). 2. Reconstructing indi-

vidual arguments (topics, patterns of argument, argumentation schemes, critical questions; reconstruction and evaluation of various types of argument such as inductive arguments, inference to the best explanation, analogies, practical arguments; dealing with enthymemes; dimensions of argument quality). 3. Reconstructing complex argumentation (mapping the structure of argumentation; evaluating complex arguments; argumentation frameworks; dialectical structures).

Organisation: **Gregor Betz, Frank Zenker, Georg Brun**

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**Donnerstag / Thursday, 20.09.**  
**17:00–19:40**  
**Raum C 422**

17:00–17:10	Welcome
17:10–17:40	<b>Catarina Dutilh Novaes:</b> The formal, the formalized, and the history of logic
17:40–17:50	<b>Georg Brun:</b> Commentary
17:50–18:10	Discussion
18:10–18:40	Break
18:40–19:10	<b>Georg Dorn:</b> Logical formalization of argument hierarchies
19:10–19:20	<b>Friedrich Reinmuth:</b>
19:20–19:40	Commentary
20:15	Discussion
	Dinner

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**Freitag / Friday, 21.09.**  
**09:30–16:00**  
**Raum C 422**

09:30–10:00	<b>Hans Rott:</b> Argumentation, common ground and presupposition accommodation
10:00–10:10	<b>Christoph Lumer:</b> Commentary
10:10–10:30	Discussion
10:30–10:50	Break
10:50–11:20	<b>Henry Prakken:</b> Argumentation frameworks in AI
11:20–11:30	<b>Gregor Betz:</b> Commentary
11:30–11:50	Discussion
11:50–12:00	Break
12:00–12:30	<b>Tom Gordon:</b> Evaluating complex legal argumentation
12:30–12:40	<b>Michael Baumgartner:</b> Commentary
12:40–13:00	Discussion
13:00–14:00	Lunch
14:00–14:30	<b>Ulrike Hahn:</b> Bayesian analysis of natural language arguments
14:30–14:40	<b>Frank Zenker:</b> Commentary
14:40–15:00	Discussion
15:00–15:10	Break
15:10–15:30	<b>Douglas Walton:</b> Formal Aspects of Argument Reconstruction
15:30–15:40	<b>N. N.:</b>
	Commentary
15:40–16:00	Discussion

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## W 3 Causation and Laws in the Special Science. Metaphysical Foundations

In recent debates in metaphysics of science, a considerable amount of work has been dedicated to causation and (ceteris paribus) laws in the higher-level or special sciences including the life sciences and the social sciences. Assuming some kind of minimal physicalist attitude (such as, at least, non-reductive physicalism), a question arises for accounts of causation and laws in those sciences: how can one explain that there are causal and nomic facts on the higher-level in a world that

is ultimately described by fundamental physics? To put it in even more tendentious words: how do these causal and nomic facts emerge from the physical world? The goal of this workshop is to explore a metaphysics of causation and laws in the special sciences that is able to answer the above-mentioned challenges.

Organisation: **Markus Schrenk, Alexander Reutlinger**

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### Freitag / Friday, 21.09. Causation and Laws in the Special Science. Metaphysical Foundations

09:15–18:45 (Language: English)

Raum C 336

09:15–09:30 Arrival

09:30–10:45 **Benedikt Kahmen** (University of Aachen):

Causal Explanations of Action

10:45–11:15 Coffee

11:15–12:30 **Alyssa Ney** (University of Rochester):

Fundamental and Derivative Causation »Why metrical properties are not powers«

12:30–14:00 Lunch

14:00–15:15 **Gerhard Müller-Strahl** (University of Münster):

Explaining Organismic Phenomena in Scientifically Based Medicine

15:15–15:45 Coffee

15:45–17:00 **Markus Schrenk** (University of Cologne):

Better Best Systems and the Issue of cp-Laws in the Special Sciences

17:00–17:30 Coffee

17:30–18:45 **Huw Price** (University of Cambridge):

Retrocausality – what would it take?

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### Samstag / Saturday, 22.09.

09:30–15:15

Raum C 336

09:30–10:45 **Andreas Hüttemann** (University of Cologne):

Why Laws are More Basic than Causal Structure

10:45–11:15 Coffee

11:15–12:30 **Jenann Ismael** (University of Arizona):

Why Causal Structure is More Basic than Global Laws

12:30–14:00 Lunch

14:00–15:15 **Sandra Mitchell** (University of Pittsburgh):

Biological laws: contingency and stability

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## W 4 Logical and Philosophical Aspects of Real Possibility

We live in a world of possibilities. Much of our practical life – planning, deciding, hoping and fearing – only makes sense before a background of options to choose from and possibilities for what the future will bring: real possibilities in concrete situations. Such real possibilities are dynamical: they vanish when they are not actualized. Real possibilities are commonly represented within branching frameworks such as provided by the Prior-Thomason account of Branching Time and Belnap’s theory of Branching Space-Times. In those branching frameworks our world is pictured as a tree of histories branching off from a single past course of events into multiple possible futures. Work on real possibility has so far been mainly technical, e.g., in the formal-logical study of the semantics of the future tense and the problem of future contingents.

In this workshop we want to combine logical and philosophical aspects of real possibility. Important logical questions concern the interaction of time, modality and quantification. Connected to these logical issues there are questions of interpretation: How should a branching structure be understood in the first place? Are all branches equally real? What is the difference between branching and divergence? How can individuals be situated within a branching picture? Exploring the relation of real possibility to other notions of possibility is another desideratum. Metaphysical and physical possibilities are prominent in accounts of causality and laws of nature. The role of real possibilities in metaphysics and in the sciences still needs to be assessed.

Organisation: **Thomas Müller**

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**Freitag /Friday, 21.09. Logical and Philosophical Aspects of Real Possibility**  
**09:30–18:00** (Language: English)  
**Raum C 423**

09:30–10:00	Coffee
10:00–10:15	Introduction
10:15–11:15	<b>Sara Uckelman:</b> Impossible possibilities in medieval logic
11:15–12:15	<b>Niko Strobach:</b> t. b. a.
12:15–13:30	Lunch
13:30–14:30	<b>Antje Rumberg:</b> Real possibilities in a branching framework
14:30–15:30	<b>Alex Malpass /Jacek Wawer:</b> A future for the thin red line
15:30–16:00	Coffee
16:00–17:00	<b>Michael De:</b> Partial endurantism
17:00–18:00	<b>Stephan Torre:</b> Fission and uncertainty about the future

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**Samstag /Saturday, 22.09.**  
**09:30–18:15**  
**Raum C 423**

09:30–10:00	Coffee
10:00–11:00	<b>Tomasz Placek:</b> On agents’ choices
11:00–12:00	<b>Thomas Müller:</b> Case-intensional branching time: A substantial logic
12:00–13:30	Lunch
13:30–14:30	<b>Leszek Wroński:</b> t.b.a.
14:30–15:30	<b>Christian Wüthrich:</b> Humean possibilities
15:30–16:00	Coffee
16:00–17:00	<b>Christopher Hitchcock:</b> The relative a priori and the space of possibilities
17:00–17:15	Coffee
17:15–18:15	Discussion

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## W 5 Immunity to Error through Misidentification and Essential Indexicality

The question of self-knowledge asks what is special about the way one knows one's own mind. One answer is given by the thesis of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). The thesis holds that introspective self-ascriptions of mental states are immune to identification errors. For instance, it is impossible to have introspective grounds for the belief that someone is hungry yet falsely believe that it is oneself who is hungry.

The primary aim of the workshop is to bring together recent developments in the discussion of immunity to error through

misidentification and explore the connections between IEM and essential indexicality.

The main questions are:

- What types of IEM are there? Which thoughts are IEM?
- What is the role of identification processes in the explanation of IEM?
- Can the absence of identification processes help explain the essentially indexical nature of certain I-thoughts?

Organisation: **Gottfried Vosgerau, Max Seeger**

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**Freitag / Friday, 21.09. Immunity to Error through Misidentification and Essential Indexicality**  
**10:00–18:00** (Language: English)  
**Raum C 427**

- 10:00–11:00 **Gottfried Vosgerau & Max Seeger** (Düsseldorf):  
Welcome and Introduction
- 11:30–12:30 **John Campbell** (Berkeley):  
Another Look at Shoemaker on Self-Reference
- 14:00–15:00 **Simon Prosser** (St. Andrews):  
The Structure of Indexical Belief
- 15:30–16:30 **François Recanati** (Paris):  
Immunity and Relativization
- 17:00–18:00 **Annalisa Coliva** (Modena):  
Logical immunity to error through misidentification. What it is and why it matters
- 20:00 Workshop Dinner

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**Samstag / Saturday, 22.09.**  
**09:00–12:30**  
**Raum C 427**

- 09:00–10:00 **Daniel Morgan** (Oxford):  
What Explains Immunity?
- 10:00–11:00 **Kristina Musholt** (London):  
Immunity to error through misidentification and the content of perception
- 11:30–12:30 **Michael Pauen** (Berlin):  
Self-Consciousness and the Immunity to error through misidentification
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## W 6 The Scope and Limits of Experimental Ethics

Motivated by the new interest in experimental methods in philosophy which has been sparked by US-American colleagues like Joshue Knobe and Joshue Greene, we discuss and explore the scope of experimental methods in the scientific investigation of ethical problems in this workshop. The workshop features contributions from a broad range of disciplines whose target questions are of philosophical relevance. Besides our focus on ethical questions we also discuss contributions

which investigate problems from other philosophical fields experimentally or are otherwise empirically informed ventures into philosophical territory. Additionally, we dedicate one session exclusively to philosophical contributions which critically discuss the role of experimental methods in philosophy in general.

Organisation: **Christoph Lütge, Hannes Rusch**

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### Donnerstag /Thursday, 20.09. The Scope and Limits of Experimental Ethics

(Language: English)

17:00–18:45

Raum C 424

#### In Medias Res

17:00–17:30

**Christoph Lütge** (TU München)

Welcome & Introduction

17:30–18:15

**Verena Utikal** (FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg)

The Attribution of Externalities – An Economic Approach to the Knobe Effect

18:15–18:45

Opening Discussion

18:45

Informal get-together

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### Freitag /Friday, 21.09. Applied Experimental Ethics 1

09:00–19:00

Raum C 424

09:00–09:45

**Matthias Uhl** (TU München)

Paternalism with Hindsight

09:45–10:30

**Ulrich Frey** (JLU Giessen)

Environmental Ethics – Value Assignments in the Protection of Species and the Problem of Reliably Measuring such Value Assignments

10:30–11:00

Coffee Break

#### Applied Experimental Ethics 2

11:00–11:45

**Stephan Wolf** (ALU Freiburg) **Alexander Lenger** (GU Frankfurt)

Choosing Inequality – An Experimental Analysis of the Impact of Social Immobility on the Democratic Election of Distributive Rules

11:45–12:30

**Hannes Rusch & Christoph Lütge** (TU München)

Smile! Ethical Motivations of Microcredit Lenders?

12:30–13:30

Lunch

#### On Methodology

13:30–14:15

**Fernando Aguiar** (IESA-CSIC Cordoba) **Antonio Gaitán** (UC3 Madrid)

**Blanca Rodríguez** (UC Madrid)

Robust Intuitions and Experimental Ethics: Bringing Reflective Equilibrium to the lab

14:15–15:00

**Alexander Lenger** (GU Frankfurt) **Stephan Wolf** (ALU Freiburg)

The Scope of Behavioral Business Ethics – Preliminary Results from Semi Structured Interviews

15:00–15:30

Coffee Break

#### Improving Experimental Philosophy 1

15:30–16:15

**Attila Tanyi & Martin Bruder** (Uni Konstanz)

Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach

16:15–17:00

**Ezio Di Nucci** (Uni Duisburg-Essen)

The Trolley Problem and the Self-Sacrifice Trilemma

17:00–17:15

Coffee Break

17:15–18:00

**Verena Wagner** (Uni Regensburg)

Explaining the Knobe effect

19:00

Dinner at Seerhein Konstanz, Spanierstraße 3, 78467 Konstanz

## Workshops

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### Samstag / Saturday, 22.09. Improving Experimental Philosophy 2

09:00–15:00

Raum C 424

08:30–09:15 **Andreas Bunge & A. Skulmowski** (Uni Osnabrück)  
Mapping the Folk Concept of Intentionality: Contexts and Explanations of Intentionality Ascriptions

09:15–10:00 **Benjamin Huppert** (Uni Bayreuth)  
Debunking Arguments and the Psychology of Moral Relevance

10:00–10:30 Coffee Break

#### Critical Reflections & Discussion

10:30–11:15 **Nikhil Mukerji** (TU München)  
On the Link between Empirical Science and Moral Epistemology

11:15–12:00 **Jacob Rosenthal** (RFWU Bonn)  
Experimental Philosophy is Useful – But not in a Specific Way

12:00–12:30 Discussion on Scope and Limits

12:30–13:30 Lunch

#### Interdisciplinary Brides

13:30–14:15 **Andre Grimes** (Uni / MPI Jena)  
Moral Tradeoffs through the Lens of Ecological Perception

14:15–15:00 **Sabine Thürmel** (TU München)  
Experimental Ethics and Multi-Agent Systems

15:00 Goodbye

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## Sprecher A–Z / Speaker A–Z

**M** Hauptvorträge / Main Lectures

**A** Autorenkolloquium / Author's Colloquium

### Kolloquien / Colloquia

- A Aggregationism
- B Vagueness and Ontology
- C Game Theory Meets Philosophy
- D Should open-minded people be dogmatists about justification?
- E Consequence and Consequences
- F Moral Understanding
- G Truth, Meaning, and the Semantics – Pragmatics Distinction
- H Mindreading versus Teleological

Reasoning: Two Ways of Understanding Rational Action

- I The Contribution of the History of Philosophy to the Theory of Perception
- J Perspectivism in the Philosophy of Science and Epistemology

### Sektionen / Sections

- 1 Sprachphilosophie / Philosophy of Language
- 2 Metaphysik und Ontologie / Metaphysics and Ontology
- 3 Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie / Logic and Philosophy of Science

4 Philosophie des Geistes / Philosophy of Mind

- 5 Erkenntnistheorie / Epistemology
- 6 Religionsphilosophie und Ästhetik / Philosophy of Religion and Aesthetics
- 7 Angewandte Ethik, Politische, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Applied Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
- 8 Normative Ethik, Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie / Normative Ethics, Metaethics, Theory of Action and Theory of Decision

Halbfett geschriebene Ziffern oder Buchstaben verweisen auf die Vortragssiglen, die Zahlen in Klammern auf die Seitenzahl.

### A

- Aicher, Simone **7** (54)
- Alscher, Daniel **3** (54)
- Andric, Vuko **8** (54)
- Anglberger, Albert J.J. **8** (98)
- auf der Straße, Alexander **P 1.1** (123)

### B

- Bagattini, Alexander **7** (54)
- Balcerak Jackson, Magdalena **5** (55)
- Barner, Alma **P 4.1** (123)
- Baumberger, Christoph **5** (58)
- Baumgartner, Michael **4** (55)
- Beall, Jc **E** (41)
- Beck, Valentin **7** (56)
- Binmore, Ken **C** (37)
- Bittner, Rüdiger **A** (30)
- Blau, Ulrich **M** (24)
- Bleisch, Barbara **7** (56)
- Bluhm, Roland **1** (57)
- Blumenthal, David **P 1.2** (123)
- Borg, Emma **G** (45)
- Braham, Matthew **8** (57)
- Bratu, Christine **7** (57)
- Briesen, Jochen **5** (58)
- Brössel, Peter **3** (58)
- Bruder, Martin **8** (110)
- Brüggen, Anne-Sophie **4** (58)
- Brun, Georg **8** (59)
- Brzozowski, Jacek Jerzy **2** (59)
- Bukow, Gerhard Christopher **2** (60)
- Bukow, Gerhard Christopher **4** (60)
- Burkard, Anne **8** (61)
- Buss, Sarah **A** (30)
- Büter, Anke **3** (61)

### C

- Carrier, Martin **3** (61)

- Carston, Robyn **G** (45)
- Centrone, Stefania **3** (62)
- Céspedes, Esteban **P 8.1** (124)
- Ciuni, Roberto **3** (62)
- Cohnitz, Daniel **1** (80)
- Conant, James **J** (51)
- Conduct, Matthew **P 4.2** (124)
- Correia, Vasco **8** (62)

### D

- Dahlgrün, Malte **4** (63)
- Dänzer, Lars **P 1.3** (124)
- David, Richard **3** (63)
- De, Michael **2** (63)
- Delgado, Laura **1** (63)
- Di Nucci, Ezio **8** (64)
- Diekemper, Joseph **2** (64)
- Dinges, Alexander **5** (64)
- Dohrn, Daniel **8** (65)
- Dolby, David **1** (65)

### E

- Eklund, Matti **B** (35)
- El Kassar, Nadja **1** (65)
- Engels, Julia Apollonia **7** (65)
- Ernst, Gerhard **F** (43)
- Eronen, Markus Ilkka **3** (66)
- Evers, Daan **4** (66)

### F

- Fink, Julian **8** (66)
- Fink, Julian **P 4.4** (125)
- Fink, Sascha Benjamin **P 4.4** (125)
- Fischer, Eugen **5** (67)
- Fischer, John Martin **6** (67)
- Folde, Christian **1** (67)
- Franken, Dirk **P 4.5** (125)
- Freitag, Wolfgang **1** (67)

- Friebe, Cord **3** (68)
- Fritz, Peter **3** (68)

### G

- Gäb, Sebastian **6** (68)
- Gasser, Georg **6** (69)
- Gebharter, Alexander **3** (69)
- Gerogiorgakis, Stamatios **6** (69)
- Gertken, Jan **8** (69)
- Giere, Ronald N. **J** (51)
- Gigerenzer, Gerd **C** (37)
- Glauer, Ramiro David **P 3.1** (126)
- Grahle, André **8** (70)
- Gratzl, Norbert **8** (98)
- Grundmann, Thomas **5** (70)
- Grunenberg, Lisa **4** (71)
- Grüne-Yanoff, Till **3** (70)
- Gruschke, Daniel **P 1.4** (126)
- Gudmundsson, Johann **8** (71)
- Gutsche, Bettina **4** (71)
- Gutwald, Rebecca **7** (71)

### H

- Hacker, Peter **M** (25)
- Harbecke, Jens **3** (72)
- Harth, Manfred **P 1.5** (127)
- Hartmann, Stephan **3** (63)
- Hartmann, Stephan **3** (95)
- Haueis, Philipp **3** (72)
- Hauswald, Rico **3** (73)
- Haverkamp, Nick **3** (73)
- Heilingner, Jan-Christoph **8** (73)
- Henning, Tim **8** (74)
- Hill, Thomas E. **A** (30)
- Hillerbrand, Rafaela **P 3.2** (127)
- Hills, Alison **F** (43)
- Himmelreich, Johannes **8** (74)
- Hirose, Iwao **A** (33)

## **Sprecher A-Z / Speaker A-Z**

Hirsch Hadorn, Gertrude **3** (75)  
Hjortland, Ole Thomassen **3** (75)  
Hoffmann, Magdalena **8** (75)  
Hoffmann, Martin **4** (76)  
Hoffmann, Martin **8** (76)  
Hofmann, Frank **5** (76)  
Hohl, Sabine **7** (77)  
Hommen, David **2** (77)  
Horst, David **8** (78)  
Horvath, Joachim **5** (78)  
Hoyningen-Huene, Paul **3** (78)  
Huebl, Philipp **4** (79)

### **J**

Jaag, Siegfried Hermann **2** (79)  
Jacob, Pierre **H** (47)  
Jansen, Ludger **P 7.1** (127)  
Jaster, Romy **5** (79)

### **K**

Kahmen, Benedikt **8** (80)  
Kaiser, Marie I. **3** (80)  
Kangilaski, Jaan **1** (80)  
Kästner, Lena **3** (80)  
Katzner, Matthias **7** (81)  
Kelp, Christoph **5** (81)  
Kiesewetter, Benjamin Paul **8** (81)  
Kietzmann, Christian **8** (81)  
Klein, Jonas **4** (82)  
Knappik, Franz **5** (82)  
Knappitsch, Markus Pierre **2** (60)  
Köhler, Sebastian **8** (83)  
Köllmann, Carsten **7** (83)  
Korbmacher, Johannes **2** (83)  
Kreft, Nora **8** (84)  
Krickel, Beate **3** (84)  
Kruse, Andrea **5** (84)  
Kühler, Michael **8** (85)

### **L**

Laanpere, Taavi **P 4.6** (128)  
Langkau, Julia **5** (85)  
Lanius, David Samuel **1** (85)  
Lanius, David Samuel **P 1.4** (126)  
Leahy, Brian **P 1.6** (128)  
Leerhoff, Holger **P 3.3** (128)  
Lenhard, Johannes **3** (86)  
Leuschner, Anna **3** (86)  
Liefke, Kristina **1** (86)  
Look, Brandon Charles **2** (86)  
Löschke, Jörg **8** (87)  
Lowe, E. Jonathan **B** (35)  
Löwenstein, David **5** (87)  
Lübbe, Weyma **A** (33)  
Lumer, Christoph **8** (87)  
Lyre, Holger **4** (88)

### **M**

Mantel, Susanne **8** (88)  
Mantzavinos, Chrysostomos **3** (89)  
Marx, Theresa **1** (89)  
Mayr, Erasmus **8** (89)  
Mergenthaler Canseco, Max **4** (90)  
Meyer, Marco **P 7.2** (129)

Michel, Christoph **4** (90)  
Michels, Robert **2** (90)  
Mocker, Christoph Kurt **6** (90)  
Mölder, Bruno **P 4.7** (129)  
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